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Crime Investigation Report
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GARDA 
SÍOCHÁNA INSPECTORATE IS:
‘To ensure that the resources available to the Garda Síochána are 
used so as to achieve and maintain the highest levels of efficiency 
and effectiveness in its operation and administration, as measured by 
reference to the best standards of comparable police services.’
(s. 117 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005)
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Foreword
The prevention and investigation of crime and disorder is the primary function of every police organisation 
worldwide and the Garda Síochána is no exception. Over the years, there has been some modernisation with 
enhancements to the processes and technology used to investigate crime in Ireland, but a holistic view has not 
been the driver; but rather the crisis of the day. This approach may have been sufficient to address issues in the 
past; but today’s policing environment needs a much more comprehensive solution to overcome the challenges 
that now face the Garda Síochána. 
In July 2012, the Inspectorate team began work on its remit from the Minister for Justice and Equality to review 
the entire crime investigation process utilised by the Garda Síochána. The inspection has included all of the 
ancillary and support processes involved in investigating crime and reviewed the day to day work of Garda 
Síochána staff. 
In May of 2014, after the release of the Guerin report, the newly appointed Minister for Justice and Equality 
requested that the Inspectorate expand its work on the crime investigation inspection, to address managerial, 
operational and procedural concerns identified within the Guerin report and to provide a report thereon. After 
our review of the Guerin Report; and given the work undertaken by the Inspectorate in this report, it is clear to 
the Inspectorate that many of the issues indentified in that report are still problematic today. 
Over two years of research including, policy review, field inspections and focus group sessions the Inspectorate 
has examined the Garda Síochána’s crime investigation practices and informed this inspection. The Inspectorate 
has also described in detail, the processes involved in the everyday investigation of crime in Ireland, in order to 
show the significant challenges and complex inter-relationships involved in these processes.
The Inspectorate has found a police service in critical need of modernisation of its crime investigation 
operational and support infrastructure. The absence of up to date technology and dated inefficient investigative 
processes and policies, combined with poor internal audit controls, inconsistent case management and poor 
supervisory practices have led to the systemic operational deficiencies identified in this and other recent 
government initiated reports. As a result, potentially hundreds of thousands of Garda staff hours and 
resources, which should be spent on front-line policing, are currently allocated to those inefficient processes.
The issues identified in this report are not entirely the sole responsibility of the police service. The Garda 
Síochána is only one component of what should be a national criminal justice service. Although a major 
component of the “criminal justice system”, many of the things they are required to do in the investigation 
of crime are influenced by other parts of the “system”. As noted in the Inspectorate’s recent report on Fixed 
Charge Processing System, the components of this service must work collaboratively, allowing for no single 
agency’s processes to detract from the whole of the criminal justice service’s public responsibility to be efficient 
and effective in using the resources provided to them. For the criminal justice system, resource inefficiencies 
include delays and increased costs caused to one criminal justice service partner by the action or inaction of 
another. In the interests of the common good inefficiencies in the system must be addressed in a holistic manner 
by regular collective collaboration between all criminal justice partners and this should include funding 
matters. It is for these reasons that the Inspectorate is again recommending that the Government establish 
a criminal justice working group, similar to the one recommended in the Fixed Charge Processing System 
Report, charged with overseeing the implementation of all the accepted recommendations in this report. 
The systemic challenges and deficiencies identified during this inspection are not unique to the Garda Síochána. 
Problems regarding the reporting, recording, classifying and detecting of crime have been reported in other 
police services. New York City recently addressed these issues and received a report and recommendations 
for correction of problems identified by a distinguished blue ribbon panel, commissioned by the Police 
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Commissioner and recent published reports of some UK police services found evidence of under recording 
of crime numbers. However, public accountability requires a remedial response; with appropriate focus on 
ensuring that confidence in the criminal justice system is maintained. 
This Crime Investigation Report should be viewed as a ‘watershed’ opportunity; making significant interim, 
short, medium and long-term recommendations to ensure that the Garda Síochána’s investigative processes 
align with, and even exceed international practice. This is a detailed report, covering nearly a dozen moving 
parts of a complex process that involves multiple agencies and institutions that directly and indirectly influence 
the crime investigation process in Ireland. If only one or two of these parts were not functioning properly, the 
extent of reform recommended here might not have been as wide ranging. However, the Inspectorate found 
deficiencies in several areas of the investigative process, with many of them cumulatively exacerbating the 
problems found in other areas.
This inspection has identified several deficiencies in recording practices, supervision and governance 
over recorded crime and the level of recorded detections for those crimes. The veracity of crime recording 
in Ireland must be addressed immediately. It is for this reason that the Inspectorate is making substantial 
recommendations to get it right from the first contact with a victim reporting a crime and through every stage 
of the investigative process.
Many of the recommendations are dependant on the acquisition of modern technology used by most 
international police organisations. It is recommended that the first priority for strategically dealing with 
these deficiencies is the immediate procurement of an integrated Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), Human 
Resource Management (HRMS) and Criminal Investigation/Case Management system for the Garda Síochána. 
The Inspectorate is mindful that this technology can provide the modern tools needed to inform more efficient 
and effective operational decisions. However, it cannot take the place of good management practices and 
supervision in the investigation of crime.
It should be pointed out that many of the recommendations, including those for the purchase of CAD and 
HRMS technology, are not new. Several were made in various forms in previous Inspectorate reports but were 
never fully implemented. The Inspectorate has reiterated and updated several of these prior recommendations, 
as they are even more urgent today. All the recommendations in this inspection will be referenced and 
complementary to the holistic and forward focused recommendations in our forthcoming review of the entire 
structure and administration of the Garda Síochána under the Haddington Road Review.
The Crime Investigation Report highlights issues requiring urgent and ongoing attention to meet the criminal 
justice needs of victims and the wider public of Ireland.
Finally, it is important to point out that the Inspectorate found many good practices in place locally in many of 
the divisions and national units visited and has referenced some of them in the report. The Inspectorate was 
also impressed by the hundreds of hard working and dedicated rank and file officers, reserves and support 
staff we met in every region, that were doing their best to get the job done, not withstanding these inefficient 
processes, dated technology and poor management practices identified in the report. The Inspectorate wishes 
to thank everyone we met with during field visits for their candour, thoughtful comments and suggestions for 
making the Garda Síochána a more efficient and effective community policing service for Ireland. 
Robert K. Olson 
Chief Inspector
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Glossary
AFIS Automated Fingerprint Identification System
ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition
ATM Automated Teller Machine
BURG	 Burglary
CAB	 Criminal	Assets	Bureau
CAD Computer Aided Despatch
LAPD Los Angeles Police Department
CCC Central Command and Control
CCJ Criminal Courts of Justice
CCIU Computer Crime Investigation Unit
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CHIS Covert Human Intelligence Sources
CIO Criminal Intelligence Officer
CJIP Criminal Justice Interoperability Programme
CJU Criminal Justice Units
CPD Continued Professional Development
CPS Crown Prosecution Service
CSE Crime Scene Examiner
CSO Central Statistics Office
DDM Dedicated Decision Maker
DMR Dublin Metropolitan Region
DMR N Dublin Metropolitan Region North
DMR S Dublin Metropolitan Region South
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DO District Officer
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions
DV Domestic Violence
DV/SA Domestic Violence/Sexual Assault
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DVSAIU  Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Investigation Unit
EAW		 European	Arrest	Warrant
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003
ELO  Ethnic Liaison Officer
ERU Emergency Response Unit
FCR Force Crime Registrars
FLO  Family Liaison Officer
GBFI		 Garda	Bureau	of	Fraud	Investigation
GERM  Garda Establishment Resource Model
GIM  Garda Information Message
GISC  Garda Information Service Centre
GLO  Garda Liaison Officer
GMP  Greater Manchester Police
GNDU  Garda National Drugs Unit
GNIB		 Garda	National	Immigration	Bureau
GPS  Global Positioning System
GPSU  Garda Professional Standards Unit
GRIDO  Garda Racial Intercultural and Diversity Office
GSAS  Garda Síochána Analysis Service
GSOC  Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission
GVLO  Garda Victims Liaison Office
GYDO  Garda Youth Diversion Office
HMIC  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES  Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HR  Human Resources
HSE  Health Service Executive
IAS  Information Analysis Service
ICVS  Independent Custody Visitors Scheme
IDVA  Independent Domestic Violence Advisor
IOM  Integrated Offender Management
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IOMU  Integrated Offender Management Unit
IP  Internet Provider
IRC  Incident Room Coordinator
JLO  Juvenile Liaison Officer
KPI  Key Performance Indicator
LGBT		 Lesbian	Gay	Bisexual	Transgender	Officers
MAPPA  Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements
MARAC  Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference
MAT  Mandatory Alcohol Testing
MATAC  Multi-Agency Tasking and Coordinating
MDT  Mobile Data Terminal
MIMS  Major Investigation Management System
MO  Modus Operandi
MPS  Metropolitan Police Service
MPV  Mechanically Propelled Vehicle
NBCI		 National	Bureau	of	Criminal	Investigation
NCIS  National Criminal Intelligence Service
NCIU  National Criminal Intelligence Unit
NCRS  National Crime Recording Standards
NSDA  National Study of Domestic Abuse
NIBRS		 National	Incident	Based	Reporting	System
NIM National Intelligence Model
NSIR  National Standard for Incident Recording
NSMU National Source Management Unit
NSS  National Support Services
NSU  National Surveillance Unit
NYPD  New York Police Department
OCU  Organised Crime Unit
PACE  Police and Criminal Evidence Act
PAF  Performance Accountability Framework
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PALF  Performance and Learning Framework
PEMS  Property and Exhibits Management System
PINS  Prison Identification Notification System
PIU  Paedophile Investigation Unit
PSNI  Police Service of Northern Ireland
PULSE  Police Using Leading Systems Effectively
PTSN  Prisoner to Station
RPSTN  Report to Station
RSU  Regional Support Units
SBD  Secure	By	Design
SCD  Specialist Crime Directorate
SCI  Specialist Child Interviewers
SCRS  Scottish Crime Recording Standard
SCRT  Serious Crime Review Team
SDU  Special Detective Unit
SHO  Station House Officer
SIO  Senior Investigating Officer
SIS II  Schengen Information System
SID  Scottish Intelligence Database
SOLO  Sexual Offence Liaison Officer
SOP  Standard Operation Procedure
SORAM  Sex Offender Risk Assessment and Management Model
TACU  Tasking and Co-ordinating Unit
TI  Telephone Intercept
TIC  Taken into consideration
TLU  Telecom Liaison Unit
TNA  Training Need Analysis
VIPER  Video Identification Parade Electronic Recording
VOL  Victim, Offender and Location
WA		 Western	Australia
WROTI 	 Written	Record	of	Taped	Interview
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Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
Introduction
The Introduction provides the background information on the terms of 
reference for the inspection, the structure of the Garda Síochána and the crime 
levels in Ireland over a seven year period. It also outlines the methodology 
and structure of the report, and the recommendations of the Inspectorate to 
provide for a more efficient and effective process for crime prevention and 
crime investigation. 
Introduction Key Points/Findings
Garda Structure •	 Geographically	 the	 country	 is	 divided	 into	 six	 regions	 headed	 by	 an	
assistant commissioner; each region is divided into divisions headed by 
a chief superintendent; each division is divided into districts headed by a 
superintendent (also known as a district officer); 
•	 The	structure	then	descends	from	superintendent	to	inspector,	sergeant,	and	
to garda level;
Level of Crime •	 Recorded	 crime	 incidents	 (which	 excludes	 traffic	 offences	 and	 some	
miscellaneous offences) show a peak of total recorded crime of 296,705 in 
2008, and a consistent year on year reduction of crime to 229,579 in 2013;
•	 In	 this	 time	period	 there	was	a	significant	reduction	 in	 intoxicated	driving	
and public order offences; 8,000 fewer drug offences and 1,400 more burglary 
offences; 
•	 Crime	detection	rates	reached	a	peak	of	69%	in	2008	and	slightly	reduced	to	
66%	in	2012;
•	 Crime	 counting	 rules,	 definitions	 and	 legislation	 make	 international	
comparisons difficult;
Methodology of the 
Report 
•	 Main	 focus	 of	 the	 report	 is	 on	 the	 volume	 crime	 incidents	 of	 assaults;	
burglary; domestic violence; vehicle crime; and robbery; 
•	 Field	 visits	were	 carried	 out	 in	 seven	divisions	 and	 in	 national	 units	with	
over 1,000 garda members and staff interviewed in one to one or rank/grade 
specific groups; 
•	 Visits	were	carried	out	to	external	stakeholders	including	the	Probation	Service,	
HSE,	Courts	Service,	County/City	Managers,	Joint	Policing	Committees	and	
victims support groups; 
•	 Visits	were	 also	 carried	 out	 to	 international	 policing	 services	 in	Northern	
Ireland, England, Scotland, Wales and Denmark. Written and video conference 
contacts	were	made	with	US,	Australian	and	New	Zealand	police	services;		
•	 Approximatively	1,500	PULSE	crime	and	incident	records	were	examined	in	
detail; 
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Introduction Key Points/Findings
Volume Crime Case 
Reviews
•	 158	calls	for	service	were	randomly	selected	from	the	seven	selected	divisions	
made	by	members	of	 the	public	were	examined	 throughout	 the	report.	All	
information on the 158 calls was requested and the full process of crime 
investigation over a twelve month period from reporting, to recording, to 
investigation, to prosecution was tracked. The service provided to victims 
was	also	examined;
Structure of this 
Report
•	 The report contains a large number of recommendations which are divided 
into	those	which	can	be	implemented	in	the	short	term	(zero	to	six	months),	
medium	term	(six	to	twenty-four	months)	and	long	term	(more	than	twenty-
four months);
•	 Most	 of	 the	 recommendations	 are	 directed	 towards	 action	 by	 the	 Garda	
Síochána but there are other responsible organisations and authorities within 
or relevant to the efficiency of the crime investigation process; 
•	 A	number	 of	 recommendations	 fully	 reiterate	 or	 update	 recommendations	
previously made by the Inspectorate;
Report Findings •	 Overall	impression	of	the	Garda	Síochána	is	of	an	organisation	with	a	majority	
of very dedicated and committed staff who strive to make their communities 
safer places; 
•	 The	 report	 shows	 that	 despite	 poor	 technology,	 some	weak	 processes	 and	
gaps in supervision, a lot of decent men and women work very hard on a 
daily basis to deliver a good policing service;
The Way Forward 
Recommendation 1 
•	 It	 is	 essential	 that	 the	 report	 is	 considered	 holistically	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
maximum	benefit	can	be	derived	from	this	inspection;
•	 It	 is	 recommended	 that	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 and	 Equality	 establish	
and	 task	a	 criminal	 justice	 service	 group,	 comprised	 of	 the	 agencies	 and	
stakeholders that are responsible for community safety in Ireland, with 
overseeing the implementation of all of the recommendations accepted from 
this report. 
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Crime Prevention Key Points/Findings
Crime Prevention in 
the Garda Síochána
Recommendation 1.1
Recommendation 1.2
•	 Crime	prevention	should	be	the	number	one	priority	for	any	police	service;	
•	 Garda	Síochána	has	not	published	a	crime	prevention	strategy	that	articulates	
how resources will be used more effectively to reduce crime;
•	 Crime	prevention	 specialists	 are	 not	 always	 engaged	 at	 the	 early	 stages	 of	
planning	 applications	 for	major	 developments	 to	 provide	 advice	 on	 crime	
prevention design;
Crime Prevention 
Officer
Recommendation 1.3
Recommendation 1.4
•	 Inconsistent	approach	to	the	use	of	Crime	Prevention	Officers	(CPOs)	across	
the seven selected divisions;
•	 CPOs	are	not	always	invited	to	attend	local	crime	management	meetings;
•	 Good	practice	initiatives	led	by	CPOs,	include	developing	watch	schemes	and	
text	alerts;	
•	 Literature	not	available	from	the	National	Crime	Prevention	Unit	(NCPU);	
Crime Survey
Recommendation 1.5
•	 Crime	surveys	are	generally	carried	out	after	a	crime	has	taken	place;
•	 CPOs	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	complete	crime	surveys	for	the	majority	of	
persons who require advice;
•	 An	 inconsistent	 approach	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 crime	 prevention	 packs	 to	
victims of crime;
•	 An	 inconsistent	 approach	 to	 the	monitoring	 of	 crime	 surveys	 on	 business	
premises.	Limited	follow	up	to	ensure	recommendations	were	implemented;
Watch Schemes
Recommendation 1.6
Recommendation 1.7
Recommendation 1.8
•	 Text	alert	schemes,	some	very	positive	feedback	but	schemes	are	reliant	on	
individual gardaí to pass on relevant information;
•	 Neighbourhood	 Watch,	 Community	 Alert	 (NWCA)	 and	 other	 related	
schemes	are	an	excellent	way	to	engage	local	communities;	30%	of	schemes	
are dormant;
•	 There	are	few	metrics	in	place	to	measure	success	of	NWCA	crime	prevention	
schemes; 
•	 Garda	Website	information	on	crime	prevention	could	be	improved;
•	 A	 new	 community	 policing	 model	 has	 been	 introduced	 in	 a	 division	 in	
the	 Dublin	 Metropolitan	 Region	 focussing	 on	 local	 garda	 ownership	 of	
geographically defined small areas;
Property Marking
Recommendation 1.9
Recommendation 1.10
Recommendation 1.11
•	 Crime	prevention	measures	such	as	property	marking	and	DNA	marking	are	
underdeveloped;
•	 Need	for	more	detailed	analysis	to	identify	if	particular	crimes	are	impacting	
on particular community groups;
This	 part	 of	 the	 report	 looks	 at	 the	 role	 and	 deployment	 of	 Garda	 Crime	
Prevention	Officers,	the	use	of	technology	in	crime	prevention	as	well	as	the	
role of local community and business groups in helping to prevent crime and 
anti-social	behaviour	in	their	local	areas.
Part 1: Crime Prevention
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Crime Prevention Key Points/Findings
Engage the Public
Recommendation 1.10
•	 Need	to	engage	the	public	in	reducing	crime	and	reporting	suspicious	activity;
•	 Fear	of	crime	can	often	be	higher	than	the	reality;
Anti-Social 
Behaviour
Recommendation 1.12
Recommendation 1.13
•	 Reduction	in	community	policing	units;	
•	 Needs	a	problem	solving	approach;
•	 Limited	use	of	anti-social	behaviour	legislation;
•	 International	police	services	have	 identified	and	 focused	activity	on	repeat	
locations for calls for service;
Partnership Working
Recommendation 1.14
•	 Lack	of	co-location	with	key	partner	agencies	and	an	absence	of	a	statutory	
footing for partnership working;
•	 Legislation	in	other	countries	brings	key	agencies	together;
•	 Opportunities	for	key	agencies	to	tackle	crime	by	joint	working;	
•	 Joint	 Policing	 committees	 should	 be	 fully	 engaged	 in	 crime	 prevention	
initiatives.
Part 2: Divisional Policing
A divisional policing model will help the Garda Síochána be more efficient and 
effective in crime investigation. This part of the report looks at the district and 
divisional management structure, including the operation of senior detectives 
at a divisional level; supervision of crime investigation, the deployment of 
resources	at	a	divisional	level,	as	well	as	an	examination	of	the	operation	of	
the pilot garda roster.
Divisional Policing Key Points/Findings
Divisional Approach 
to Local Policing/ 
Delivery of Local 
Policing
Recommendation 2.1
Recommendation 2.2
•	 Variation	in	the	size	and	operation	of	the	ninety-six	districts;	
•	 High	 levels	 of	 autonomy	 in	 decision-making	 of	 district	 officers	 with	
implications for the consistency of incident management, crime recording and 
detections;
•	 Some	districts	operate	almost	as	separate	entities	within	a	division;
•	 Disproportionate	amount	of	district	officer	time	taken	up	on	matters	related	
to administration, human resources and investigation of Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman	Commission	complaints;
•	 Duplication	 of	 administration	 functions	 between	 district	 and	 divisional	
administration units;
•	 Unnecessary	bureaucracy;
•	 Significant	 numbers	 of	 gardaí	 in	 non-operational	 roles	 performing	
administration functions;
Functionality Versus 
Geographical 
Responsibilities 
of all Divisional 
Superintendents
Recommendation 2.3
•	 Non	physical	barriers	negatively	impact	on	delivery	of	policing	services	in	the	
district structure; 
•	 Imbalances	in	the	allocation	of	members	across	districts;	
•	 Different	 decisions	were	 sometimes	made	 in	 respect	 of	 crime	 investigation	
across divisions;
•	 Detective	Superintendents	are	not	responsible	for	crime	investigation;
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Divisional Policing Key Points/Findings
Postings and 
Transfers
Recommendation 2.4
•	 Members	are	promoted	and	sometimes	posted	far	away	from	home,	impacting	
on service delivery and personal circumstances;
•	 Divisional	chief	superintendents	have	no	role	in	determining	the	transfer	of	
superintendents to division;
•	 Working	patterns,	 availability	 and	 retention	 of	 ‘Travelling	 Superintendents’	
has implications for overall crime and district management; 
Senior Garda 
Visibility
Recommendation 2.5
•	 Senior	gardaí	carry	out	many	administrative	functions	which	reduces	time	to	
spend with staff;
•	 Perceived	lack	of	visibility	and	engagement	of	senior	gardaí	with	staff;
Supervision of 
Crime and Incidents
Recommendation 2.6
Recommendation 2.7
•	 Significant	 gaps	 in	 front-line	 supervision,	 particularly	 with	 24/7	 patrol	
sergeants;
•	 Front-line	supervision	of	crime	is	crucial;	
•	 Introduction	 of	 the	 new	 pilot	 roster	 has	 further	 reduced	 the	 presence	 of	
sergeants;
•	 Numbers	of	uniform	inspectors	varied	across	all	of	the	divisions	visited;
•	 Large	 portfolio	 of	 responsibilities	 of	 inspectors	 means	 that	 their	 crime	
responsibilities do not always get the attention required; 
Detective Resources
Recommendation 2.8
Recommendation 2.9
•	 DMR	divisions	have	both	detective	superintendent	and	detective	inspectors;
•	 Outside	of	the	DMR,	detective	superintendents	usually	operate	on	a	regional	
basis, covering more than one division;
•	 In	the	DMR,	the	detective	inspector	is	the	most	senior	detective	in	the	district,	
with responsibility for all detectives working in their district;
•	 Outside	of	the	DMR,	detective	inspectors	operate	on	a	divisional	basis	and	are	
the most senior detective;
•	 Detective	 inspectors	 and	 detective	 superintendents	 have	 to	 approach	
individual district officers for use of resources and funding;
•	 Pilot	roster	has	impacted	negatively	on	the	availability	of	detective	sergeants	
for supervision;
Deployment of 
Resources
Recommendation 2.10
•	 Garda	resources	are	not	allocated	in	terms	of	policing	need	and	crime	levels;
•	 Significant	number	of	members	in	specialist	duties	and	in	Headquarters;	
•	 Large	number	of	 local	 specialist	units	 sometimes	 leading	 to	demarcation	of	
responsibilities with units only dealing with certain calls;
•	 Variation	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 detectives	 and	 detective	 aides	 deployed	 in	
divisions; 
Garda Fleet
Recommendation 2.11
•	 Lack	of	suitable	garda	vehicles	for	operational	policing;	
•	 No	rationale	for	the	allocation	of	the	garda	fleet;
•	 Deployment	of	significant	numbers	of	garda	vehicles	to	specialist	units;
Garda Roster
Recommendation 2.12
•	 Pilot	 garda	 roster	provides	members	 at	 specific	 times	 and	has	members	 on	
duty at times when not required;
•	 Creation	of	a	fifth	unit	has	negatively	impacted	on	the	availability	of	numbers	
of frontline staff and supervisors;
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•	 Roster	is	negatively	impacting	on	the	availability	of	detective	resources;
•	 Four	day	 rest	period	built	 into	 the	 roster	 is	 impacting	on	 the	continuity	of	
crime investigations; 
Crime Briefings
Recommendation 2.13
•	 Members	are	not	routinely	paraded	at	commencement	of	duties;	
•	 Where	 parades	 were	 observed,	 some	 did	 not	 adequately	 task	 and	 brief	
members;
•	 Members	are	not	de-briefed	at	the	end	of	a	tour	of	duty;
Performance 
Management
Recommendation 2.14
•	 While	 there	 are	 clearly	 many	 hardworking	 members,	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	
objectively	measure	performance;
•	 No	individual	performance	management	system	in	the	Garda	Síochána;	
•	 A	perception	that	underperformance	is	not	being	adequately	addressed;	
A New Model
Recommendation 2.1
•	 A	new	model	of	service	delivery	is	recommended;
•	 The	Inspectorate’s	proposal	of	a	functionality	model	outlines	a	new	way	of	
operating.
Part 3: First Response
This part looks at the various ways that members of the public contact the 
Garda Síochána, how that contact is managed and recorded, and the levels 
of service provided.
First Response Key Points/Findings
Recording Calls 
from the Public
Recommendation 3.1
Recommendation 3.2
Recommendation 3.3
Recommendation 3.4
Recommendation 3.5
Recommendation 3.6
•	 First	encounter	with	the	public	is	critical;
•	 Need	focus	of	‘getting	it	right	first	time’	at	an	incident;
•	 A	 Computer	 Aided	 Dispatch	 (CAD)	 system	 operates	 in	 Dublin	 with	 a	
centralised	Command	and	Control;
•	 Stand	alone	CAD	pilot	programmes	in	operation	in	four	other	divisions;	
•	 Outside	of	Dublin,	many	divisions	record	calls	on	paper	records;
•	 A	large	proportion	of	calls	from	the	public	go	directly	to	garda	stations;
•	 Garda	Síochána	has	plans	to	introduce	control	rooms	regionally;
•	 Lack	of	analytical	information	on	the	volume,	nature	and	responses	to	calls	in	
non-CAD	divisions;
•	 No	evidence	of	incident	grading,	risk	assessment,	times	of	dispatch	or	times	
of	arrival	in	non-CAD	divisions;	
•	 Non-CAD	control	rooms	call	takers	are	gardaí;
•	 In	the	DMR,	some	untrained	gardaí	are	creating	CAD	messages;
•	 No	single	non-emergency	number	in	Ireland;
•	 There	 are	 more	 control	 rooms	 and	 less	 technology	 in	 Ireland	 relative	 to	
international police services; 
•	 Insufficient	recording	options	on	CAD	to	accurately	measure	specific	crime	
category;
•	 Call	 takers	 are	 not	 routinely	 providing	 callers	 with	 an	 estimated	 time	 of	
arrival	 of	 a	 unit	 and	 limited	 evidence	 of	 re-contacting	 a	 caller	 to	 explain	
unforeseen delays;
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Control Room 
Operations
Recommendation 3.7 
Recommendation 3.8
Recommendation 3.9
Recommendation 3.10
•	 No	evidence	of	any	formal	system	of	grading	and	prioritisation	of	calls	in	non-
CAD	control	rooms;
•	 No	data	to	analyse	Garda	Síochána	performance	outside	the	DMR;
•	 Missing	data	in	relation	to	times	of	arrival,	times	of	assignment	of	a	unit	and	
times	of	arrival	at	a	call	in	some	CAD	records	and	more	frequently	in	non-CAD	
rooms;
•	 Opportunity	to	use	support	staff	to	release	members	for	front-line	duties;
•	 DMR	Command	and	Control	Centre	has	a	mixture	of	garda	and	support	staff;	
•	 Outside	of	the	DMR,	gardaí	are	generally	deployed	to	perform	all	of	the	control	
room functions; 
•	 Control	rooms	outside	of	DMR	sometimes	operate	below	minimum	staff	levels;
Supervision in 
Control Rooms
Recommendation 3.11
•	 Outside	of	the	DMR	there	was	a	general	absence	of	a	formal	supervisor;	
•	 A	practice	of	control	rooms	asking	if	there	is	a	unit	available	to	deal	with	a	call,	
rather than assigning directly;
•	 Where	units	do	not	respond	to	requests	to	attend	calls,	this	practice	can	often	go	
unchallenged by supervisors;
Deployment of Units
Recommendation 3.12
Recommendation 3.13
Recommendation 3.14
Recommendation 3.15
•	 Technology	to	track	and	pinpoint	locations	of	garda	members	on	patrol,	based	
on the position of garda radios and patrol cars is available to the Garda Síochána, 
but	is	only	activated	in	DMR	North	Central;
•	 Limited	 evidence	 of	 cross	 district	 deployment	 of	 resources	within	 the	 same	
division, and less evidence of gardaí dealing with calls in other divisions;
•	 Unhelpful	 demarcations	 of	 the	 types	 of	 situations	 that	 specialist,	 traffic	 and	
other units will deal with;
•	 Under	utilisation	of	garda	reserves	through	practices	such	as	placing	a	reserve	
as a third person in a patrol car; 
•	 A	lack	of	supervision	and	direction	of	reserve	members;	
Responding to Calls
Recommendation 3.16
•	 Control	 rooms	 staff	 do	 not	 always	 have	 access	 to	 the	 totality	 of	 resources	
available to them; 
•	 Good	compliance	 levels	of	people	booking	on	and	off	with	control	 rooms	 in	
some divisions, and poor levels in others; 
Starting the 
Investigation
Recommendation 3.17
Recommendation 3.18
Recommendation 3.19
Recommendation 3.20
•	 One	 region	visited	 is	 keen	 to	 implement	 a	pilot	 that	 focuses	on	 call	 takers	
starting an investigative process at the point of taking a call; 
•	 Control	room	staff	do	not	always	have	the	time	or	the	available	technology	to	
conduct risk assessments;
•	 Lack	of	in-car	technology	to	access	garda	data,	such	as	mobile	data	terminals	
and satellite navigation systems; 
Deployment of First 
Responders
Recommendation 3.21
Recommendation 3.22
Recommendation 3.23
Recommendation 3.24
•	 In	most	cases	regular	units	are	the	first	responder	and	will	complete	the	full	
investigation of that crime;
•	 Regular	units	are	often	under	pressure	to	move	to	 the	next	call	 for	service,	
resulting in some aspects of initial investigations being postponed;
•	 Other	 police	 services	 have	 moved	 to	 an	 approach	 of	 assigning	 resources	
specifically for a first response and are not assigned to the full crime 
investigation; 
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•	 Greater	Manchester	Police	extended	the	remit	of	their	control	rooms	to	include	
identifying fast time trends and moving resources to prevent a second offence; 
•	 Other	police	services	operate	scheduled	appointment	cars;
Actions at a Crime 
Scene and Recording 
Outcomes
Recommendation 3.25
Recommendation 3.27
Recommendation 3.28
Recommendation 3.29
•	 Inconsistencies	in	actions	completed	at	a	crime	scene;	
•	 Large	amount	of	statements	taken,	in	many	cases	where	there	is	no	prospect	
of a prosecution taking place; 
•	 Lack	 of	 availability	 of	 patrol	 sergeants	 and	 inspectors	 to	 supervise	 is	 a	
contributory factor in poor crime investigations; 
•	 CAD	incidents	are	closed	when	a	unit	informs	a	control	room	that	they	are	
finished; however, there may still be outstanding work to be completed in 
relation to the call;
•	 Rationale	is	not	recorded	on	CAD	and	paper	messages	as	to	why	a	call	does	
not	result	in	a	PULSE	incident;
•	 Most	 frequently	 closed	 incidents	 are	 coded	RPSTN	 “report	 to	 station”,	 but	
often no garda report is created;
Crime Scene 
Examiners (CSEs)
Recommendation 3.26
•	 CSEs	 receive	 five	 weeks	 training,	 and	 little	 Continuing	 Professional	
Development	(CPD);
•	 No	performance	indicators	for	CSEs;
•	 Some	CSEs	struggle	to	deal	with	work	demands	and	are	called	to	cases	with	
few forensic opportunities;
•	 CSE	examination	results	are	not	always	recorded	on	PULSE;
•	 There	are	no	Garda	databases	to	record	retrieval	of	tools	or	shoe	marks;
Crime Reporting at 
Garda Stations
Recommendation 3.30
•	 Reception	 areas	 of	 some	garda	public	 offices	 are	 unsuitable	 for	 discussing	
matters of a sensitive nature;
•	 Some	stations	do	not	have	a	suitable	private	room	to	meet	with	victims;	
•	 Inconsistencies	in	the	information	displayed	in	garda	stations;	
Volume Crime Case 
Reviews
•	 As	part	of	this	review,	the	Inspectorate	tracked	158	calls	from	members	of	the	
public to the Garda Síochána across the seven divisions visited and found 
poor recording and deployment systems in place, in some cases resulting in 
the	non-attendance	of	a	garda;
•	 Little	or	no	evidence	of	a	supervisor	checking	paper	or	CAD	records;
•	 A	total	of	44	calls	of	the	158	calls	reviewed	were	not	recorded	on	PULSE;	
•	 Reasons	 for	 not	 recording	 a	 crime	 included	 the	 victim	 was	 unwilling	 to	
make a complaint, victim taking time to consider what they would do, victim 
leaving the scene before the arrival of a garda or the victim advised to call into 
a garda station; 
Non-Recorded 
Crime
Recommendation 3.31
•	 Crimes	are	not	always	recorded;
•	 Domestic	Violence	cases	are	not	always	correctly	recorded;
•	 Some	low	level	incidents	are	not	recorded;
•	 Approach	of	the	first	member	is	crucial;
Non-Recording
Recommendation 3.32
Victims Comments 
•	 Crimes	reported	were	not	always	recorded;
Supervision
•	 Limited	evidence	of	supervision;
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Calls from the Public
•	 Not	always	recorded;
Unrecorded Crime
•	 Difficult	to	determine	levels	of	unrecorded	crime;
•	 Other	 policing	 jurisdictions	 found	 police	 non-recording	 could	 be	 as	 high 
as	24%;
•	 Inspectorate’s	 2010	 report	on	Child	Sexual	Abuse	 found	similar	 issues	with	
non-recording;
•	 Failure	to	record	a	crime	is	unacceptable;	
•	 Other	police	services	have	developed	national	standards	for	incident	recording.
Part 4: Incident Recording
This	 part	 of	 the	 report	 examines	 the	 recording,	 classification,	 review	 and	
supervision	of	incidents	on	the	PULSE	system.
Incident Recording Key Points/Findings
Incident Recording 
Structures
Recommendation 4.1 
Recommendation 4.2 
Recommendation 4.3
Recommendation 4.4
Recommendation 4.5
•	 PULSE	is	a	national	incident	recording	system	and	not	a	crime	investigation	or	
case management system;
•	 Garda	Síochána	has	crime	counting	rules	that	determine	when	a	crime	should	
be recorded;
•	 Limitations	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 data	 PULSE	 can	 hold	 with	 insufficient	
mandatory fields;
•	 Crime	investigation	and	case	management	system	which	should	be	integrated	
with	CAD	technology	is	required;
•	 Two	 assistant	 commissioners	 perform	 separate	 roles	 of	 corporate	
responsibility for incident recording and information management; and for 
crime administration and crime counting rules;
Recording Entries 
on PULSE
Recommendation 4.6
Recommendation 4.7
Recommendation 4.8
•	 Garda	Information	Service	Centre	(GISC)	maximises	garda	time	on	patrol	by	
providing	a	24/7	telephone	and	TETRA	radio	PULSE	incident	creation	service;	
•	 Opportunities	to	use	GISC	more	effectively	and	to	create	more	detailed	crime	
records;
•	 GISC	creates	16,000	of	the	18,000	weekly	PULSE	incidents;
•	 Some	members	wait	until	the	end	of	their	duty	to	create	one	or	more	PULSE	
incidents,	placing	GISC	under	pressure	at	shift	changeover	time.	This	results	
in a lost opportunity for supervisors to check incidents were correctly 
investigated;
•	 Garda	members	complained	of	poor	radio	signal	as	a	reason	for	not	contacting	
GISC	from	a	crime	scene;	
•	 Many	divisions	have	high	compliance	rates	in	excess	of	90%	for	using	GISC	to	
create incidents, while other divisions have much lower rates; 
•	 Incidents	 created	 by	 GISC	 call	 takers	 result	 in	 fewer	 review/clarifications	
requests than incidents created by divisions;
•	 Significant	numbers	of	PULSE	crimes	and	incidents	are	created	after	a	member	
finishes	their	tour	of	duty.	Nationally,	almost	10%	of	PULSE	incidents	examined	
were created over a week later;
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Crime and Incident 
Classification
Recommendation 4.9
Recommendation 4.10
Recommendation 4.11 
Recommendation 4.12
•	 GISC	has	an	advisory	role	in	the	classification	and	incident	type,	but	the	garda	
member	is	the	final	decision-maker	in	cases;
•	 GISC	 identified	 regular	 incorrect	 classifications	 of	 burglaries	 as	 criminal	
damage; attempted burglaries as criminal damage or trespass, and minor 
assaults	as	non-crimes;
•	 PULSE	records	do	not	always	reflect	the	gravity	of	the	crime	committed;
•	 Poor	 narrative	 sections	 on	 PULSE,	 lacking	 details	 related	 to	 crime	 scene	
investigations, suspects and witnesses;
•	 Information	on	PULSE	narratives	can	be	altered,	with	the	changes	only	visible	
to viewers with higher level access; 
•	 Instances	where	wording	on	PULSE	narratives	were	changed,	accompanied	
by	an	incorrect	re-classification	of	a	crime	to	a	less	serious	offence;
Supervision of 
PULSE Data and 
Incidents
Recommendation 4.13 
Recommendation 4.14
Recommendation 4.15
•	 Limited	 evidence	 of	 supervisors	 checking	 PULSE	 incidents	 to	 ensure	 the	
correct recording of crime; 
•	 Unnecessary	duplication	of	PULSE	records	with	paper	reports;
•	 Members	have	unrestricted	access	to	PULSE	records;
•	 Other	police	services	restrict	access	to	sensitive	investigations;
Classification of 
Crime and Other 
Incidents - Sampling 
•	 Based	on	a	sampling	of	500	PULSE	crime	records,	the	Inspectorate	found	30%	
to	be	incorrectly	classified	and	insufficient	detail	in	16%	of	cases	to	determine	
if the classification was correct;
•	 In	many	 cases,	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	 PULSE	 narratives	 suggesting	more	
serious offences;
Initial Classification 
of Non-Crime 
Incidents- Sampling
Recommendation 4.16
•	 On	the	basis	of	the	PULSE	records	examined,	significant	numbers	of	crimes	
were	incorrectly	classified	in	a	non-crime	category;
•	 A	high	proportion	of	PULSE	incidents	were	recorded	under	 ‘Attention	and	
Complaints’	and	‘Property	Lost’	(Non-crime	categories);	
•	 Incidents	under	 these	categories	are	not	provided	 to	 the	CSO	for	statistical	
purposes;
Volume Case 
Reviews
•	 Of	the	158	Volume	Case	Reviews,	114	were	recorded	on	PULSE,	of	which	90	
were designated as a crime;
•	 The	Inspectorate	disagreed	with	32%	of	the	classifications	shown	on	PULSE.	
There	was	insufficient	detail	to	make	a	determination	in	6%	of	cases;
•	 Assaults	had	lower	rates	of	correct	classification	(38%);
Reviewing PULSE 
Incidents
Recommendation 4.17
•	 Reviewers	at	GISC	are	conducting	between	16,000	and	17,000	reviews	per	week	
with a three to four week backlog; 
•	 District	officers	have	the	final	approval	in	relation	to	crime	classification;
•	 Instances	 occur	 where	 crime	 classifications	 are	 reviewed	 by	 GISC	 and	
classifications	changed	by	a	member	either	before	it	was	reviewed	by	GISC	or	
in	some	cases,	following	sign	off	by	GISC;
Review/
Clarifications
Recommendation 4.18
•	 Approximately	420,000	Review/Clarifications	issued	to	members	by	GISC	staff	
seeking further information, or in some cases clarifying crime classification, 
are outstanding;
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•	 Inspectorate	found	the	Review/Clarification	questions	and	comments	raised	
by	GISC	to	be	valid;
•	 Instances	where	Review/Clarifications	requests	are	sometimes	ignored;	
•	 No	further	action	is	usually	taken	by	GISC	if	the	request	is	ignored;
•	 An	 inconsistent	 approach	 amongst	 reviewers	 in	 challenging	 crime	
classifications; 
•	 GISC	has	no	designated	responsibility	to	check	crime	detections;
Crime Classification 
– The Future
Recommendation 4.19
•	 GISC	should	be	the	final	decision-maker	in	the	classification	of	crime;
•	 GISC	have	a	much	higher	level	of	consistency	in	crime	classification;
•	 Inspectorate	 believes	 that	 there	 are	 systemic	 failures	 in	 recording	 practices	
and	non-compliance	with	crime	counting	rules.
Part 5: Crime Management
This part looks at the management of a crime or an incident that is recorded 
on	 PULSE.	 The	 process	 of	 crime	 classification	 and	 re-classification	 is	 also	
addressed.
Crime 
Management Key Points/Findings
Role of Senior 
Managers
•	 Assistant	Commissioner	Crime	and	Security	leads	on	crime	counting	rules;
•	 Divisional	chief	superintendents	produce	an	annual	policing	plan;
•	 District	 officer	 leads	 on	 all	 crime	matters.	 The	 Inspectorate	 found	 that	 the	
experience	of	individual	post	holders	varied;
District Daily 
Accountability 
Meetings
Recommendation 5.1
•	 Performance	Accountability	Framework	 (PAF)	meetings	are	used	 to	discuss	
crime incidents at district level;
•	 Inconsistencies	with	frequency	of	meetings;
•	 Limited	discussion	on	who	should	be	investigating	crime	and	crime	counting	
rules	at	PAF	meetings;
•	 Garda	Síochána	is	developing	a	standard	PULSE	enquiry	to	be	used	at	all	PAF	
meetings;
Crime Management
Recommendation 5.2 
Recommendation 5.3
•	 No	electronic	crime	management	system	in	the	Garda	Síochána;
•	 Garda	Síochána	do	not	have	dedicated	crime	management	units;
•	 No	process	for	closing	cases;
•	 No	 standardised	 approach	 to	 supervision,	 tracking	 cases	 and	making	 sure	
that	investigations	are	completed	diligently	and	expeditiously;	
•	 Unlike	other	jurisdictions,	there	is	no	formal	process	of	crime	screening	and	
unsolved cases are kept open indefinitely; 
•	 Too	many	cases	 receive	both	primary	and	secondary	 investigation	with	 the	
result that too much time is spent on cases that may never be solved;
•	 Crimes	usually	investigated	by	the	first	member	on	scene	at	an	incident;
•	 No	clear	protocol	on	what	crimes	detectives	investigate;
•	 Instances	of	cases	assigned	to	gardaí	who	had	retired	or	who	were	on	extended	
leave;
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Reclassification of 
Crime
•	 8.5%	of	all	crimes	recorded	on	PULSE	were	reclassified	over	seventeen	month	
period	from	January	2011	to	May	2012;
•	 Inspectorate	 selected	 eight	 crime	 categories	 and	 examined	 2,372	 crimes	
reclassified	between	January	2011	and	May	2012	in	the	seven	divisions	visited;
•	 Six	of	the	eight	categories	significantly	moved	to	a	lesser	crime	type;
•	 In	83%	of	cases,	reclassification	resulted	in	a	crime	moving	to	a	less	serious	
offence; 
•	 The	greatest	percentage	movement	to	a	lesser	crime	took	place	in	the	categories	
of burglary, robbery and assault harm;
•	 Domestic	disputes	showed	the	highest	percentage	change	to	a	more	serious	
offence;
•	 A	 large	 number	 of	 incidents	 were	 moved	 to	 the	 non-crime	 category	 of	
Attention	 and	 Complaints,	 with	 assault	 minor	 incidents	 and	 domestic	
disputes featuring highly in these figures; 
•	 Conversely,	 a	 number	 of	 incidents	 initially	 classified	 as	 Attention	 and	
Complaints	moved	to	crime	categories;
•	 In	focus	groups	with	members,	it	was	highlighted	that	crimes	are	sometimes	
reclassified	incorrectly	or	changed	to	a	non-crime	category;
•	 PULSE	records	were	viewed	by	the	Inspectorate	in	which	gardaí	had	recorded	
on	PULSE	that	they	had	reclassified	a	crime	as	a	result	of	directions	from	a	
supervisor; 
PULSE Incident 
Sampling
The	 Inspectorate	 directly	 accessed	 the	 PULSE	 system	 and	 sampled	 393	
reclassified	incidents	from	live	PULSE	incident	records.	A	database	was	created	
with detailed information from each record: 
•	 Inspectorate	 found	 71%	 of	 crimes	 incorrectly	 reclassified	 with	 insufficient	
information	to	make	a	determination	in	11%	of	the	cases;	
•	 No	recorded	rationale	to	explain	the	reclassification	in	many	cases;
•	 In	the	majority	of	cases	the	initial	classification	was	correct;
•	 Crimes	of	burglary	and	attempted	burglary	are	not	always	recorded	correctly	
and	as	a	result	there	is	significant	under-recording;
•	 Assault	minor	cases	were	sometimes	incorrectly	reclassified	to	Attention	and	
Complaints	as	a	result	of	a	reluctance	of	a	victim	to	assist	with	a	prosecution;
•	 Most	 reclassifications	of	 robbery	went	 to	a	 less	serious	crime	 type,	 such	as	
theft person or theft; 
•	 Assaults,	criminal	damage	and	theft	other	crime	incidents	moved	to	the	non-
crime	category	of	Attention	and	Complaints;
•	 31%	of	the	Attention	and	Complaints	reclassified	were	moved	to	sexual	assault	
crime category;
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Other Crime 
Counting Rule 
Issues
Recommendation 5.4
Recommendation 5.5
•	 Examples	 of	 multiple	 crimes,	 that	 were	 not	 always	 linked	 on	 the	 PULSE	
system; 
•	 Cases	 where	 multiple	 offences	 were	 committed,	 but	 only	 one	 crime	 was	
actually	recorded	on	PULSE;
•	 Where	there	was	a	clear	justification	to	invalidate	a	crime,	this	action	was	not	
always completed;
•	 Any	member	of	the	Garda	Síochána	can	change	a	crime	classification,	without	
approval or supervision review;
•	 From	a	 sample	of	PULSE	 incidents	 invalidated	by	 the	Garda	Síochána,	 the	
Inspectorate	found	62%	correctly	invalidated,	34%	incorrectly	invalidated	and	
4%	insufficient	detail	to	determine	classification;
Crime Management 
Units and 
Reclassification of 
Crime 
Recommendation 5.6 
Recommendation 5.7
Recommendation 5.8
•	 Crimes	reclassified	without	supervision;
•	 July	 2013	 instruction	 by	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 stated	 that	 a	 PULSE	 incident	
narrative	should	justify	the	reclassification	of	a	crime;	
•	 GISC	should	play	a	more	enhanced	central	role	in	crime	reclassification	and	
divisions should not be allowed to reclassify a crime without the authority of 
GISC;
•	 Many	people	with	responsibility	for	crime	counting	rules	have	received	no	
formal training or refresher training; 
•	 Crime	management	units	operate	in	other	jurisdictions;
•	 Other	police	services	operate	a	system	of	crime	registrars	with	responsibility	
for checking compliance with crime counting rules;
•	 Other	jurisdictions	have	introduced	national	crime	recording	standards;
•	 Other	 jurisdictions	 limit	 reclassification	 authority	 to	 people	 designated	 as	
Dedicated	Decision	Makers;
Reclassifying Crime
Recommendation 5.9
Recommendation 5.10
•	 Concern	 with	 accuracy	 of	 crime	 recording,	 crime	 classification	 and	 crime	
reclassification;
•	 At	present,	too	many	people	are	allowed	to	make	decisions	on	classifications	
and reclassifications and far too few people are checking to make sure that 
those decisions are correct;
•	 Needs	to	be	a	baseline	year	for	recorded	crime	to	enable	comparison;
•	 Inspectorate	recommends	an	annual	audit	of	incident	and	crime	recording	by	
an independent body.
Part 6: Investigating Crime
This part looks at how serious crime is investigated. It also looks at how 
detective	resources	are	allocated,	trained	and	deployed.	Crime	investigation	
is a core function of any police service.
Investigating 
Crime Key Points/Findings
Current Position •	 Not	all	gardaí	are	available	for	operational	duties	or	used	to	investigate	crime	
and deal with incidents;
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•	 Total	recorded	crime	since	2008	has	reduced	year	on	year;
•	 Serious	crime	represents	4.5%	of	all	crime;
•	 Crime,	non-crime	and	other	workloads	analysed	showed	wide	variance	across	
the seven divisions visited;
Divisional 
Resources to 
Investigate Crime 
and the Allocation of 
Crime Investigation
•	 Absence	of	written	protocol	in	place	explaining	what	crimes	are	investigated	
by individual units creates inconsistency; 
•	 Limited	evidence	of	 the	 reallocation	of	 a	volume	crime	 from	a	 regular	unit	
garda to a detective garda;
•	 Examples	 of	 regular	 unit	 gardaí	 investigating	 serious	 crime	 such	 as	 rape,	
threats	to	life,	aggravated	burglary	and	child	sexual	abuse.	In	other	policing	
jurisdictions	 these	 types	 of	 crimes	 are	 usually	 investigated	 by	 trained	
detectives or officers assigned to specialist investigative units;
•	 In	more	rural	areas,	the	allocation	of	a	serious	crime	might	be	determined	by	
who	is	available,	rather	than	who	has	the	skills	and	experience	to	investigate	a	
particular crime; 
•	 Responsibilities	 of	 traffic	 units	 must	 include	 investigating	 collisions,	 crime	
prevention and crime investigation; 
•	 Inconsistent	approach	to	the	role	of	community	gardaí	in	crime	investigation;
•	 Community	gardaí	should	be	allocated	for	crimes	to	investigate;	
•	 A	 DMR	 division	 has	 reconfigured	 the	 functions	 of	 first	 response	 and	
community policing units;
•	 Drug	units	focus	on	intelligence	led	operations,	but	are	sometimes	deployed	to	
target prolific burglary offenders; 
•	 With	the	introduction	of	the	pilot	roster	some	pro-active	specialist	units	were	
disbanded or reduced in numbers, whilst administration units retained many 
gardaí that could be redeployed to operational duties;
•	 Administrative	 posts	 should	 always	 be	 reduced	 first	 to	 maintain	 patrol	
numbers delivering policing services; 
•	 Local	specialist	units	may	have	reached	the	point	of	unsustainability	in	their	
current format;
Detective Resources 
and the Role of the 
Detective in Crime 
Investigation
Recommendation 6.1
Recommendation 6.2
Recommendation 6.3
Recommendation 6.4
Recommendation 6.5
Recommendation 6.6
•	 No	clear	written	protocol	about	what	crime	a	detective	should	and	should	not	
investigate;
•	 Disconnect	 between	what	 senior	 gardaí	 thought	 detectives	 investigate	 and	
what they do in practice;
•	 Perception	that	detectives	only	get	 involved	in	investigations	after	a	regular	
unit officer has identified a suspect;
•	 Good	practice	to	move	detectives	to	a	new	working	environment	when	selected	
for promotion or on appointment to detective;
•	 Deployment	 of	 6%	 of	 total	 detectives	 in	 policy	 and	 administration	 units	 in	
Garda Headquarters;
•	 Limited	evidence	of	detectives	routinely	investigating	volume	crimes	offences;
•	 Detectives	should	have	responsibility	in	the	investigation	of	volume	crime;
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Investigating 
Crime Key Points/Findings
•	 All	detective	units	in	a	division	should	operate	on	a	divisional	basis;
•	 Large	number	of	trained	detectives	or	gardaí	appointed	as	detectives	in	non-
investigative roles or with no connection with crime investigation;
•	 Routine	 patrolling	 and	 armed	 duties	 by	 specialist	 units	 does	 not	 require	
trained detectives;
•	 Regional	Support	Unit	(RSU)	scheme	should	be	extended	to	cover	the	DMR,	
removing the role from trained detectives;
•	 Detectives,	without	formal	training	were	appointed	in	post	for	two	or	three	
years and in some cases ten years before receiving training; 
•	 No	 formal	 process	 or	 specific	 training	 and	 development	 programme	 for	
detective aides towards becoming detectives; 
•	 Limited	continuous	professional	development	for	detectives;
•	 Some	 detectives	 are	 investigating	 complex	 crimes	 without	 any	 specific	
training e.g. fraud investigation;
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 should	 introduce	 a	 formal	 trainee	 detective	 programme	
focussing on developing and selecting future detectives; 
•	 There	are	approximately	700	untrained	detectives;
•	 Under	 performance	 of	 detectives	 must	 be	 addressed,	 rather	 than	
accommodated; 
•	 Current	detective	roster	is	ineffective	and	inefficient	for	crime	investigation	or	
good victim care;
•	 Roster	impacting	on	crime	investigation	and	supervision;
Foundation Training 
for Gardaí
Recommendation 6.7
•	 Garda	Síochána	needs	to	conduct	a	Training	Need	Analysis	(TNA)	for	gardaí	
that	completed	foundation	training,	post	2005.	Following	the	TNA,	the	Garda	
Síochána needs to develop a specific training programme;
•	 New	training	course	–	first	intake	in	September	2014;
•	 Foundation	 training	 2000-2009.	 Estimated	 that	 only	 25%	 of	 the	 available	
training time was spent on operational policing and criminal investigation;
•	 Accelerated	recruitment	programme	was	highlighted	as	a	reason	for	changing	
the delivery of training to a lecture based approach;
•	 Minimal	assessment	and	screening	processes	in	place	before	students	were	
attested as gardaí;
•	 No	 practical	 training	 and	 guidance	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	
produced a garda prepared for the demands of a modern police service; 
District Detective 
Units Investigation 
of Crime
•	 Inspectorate	conducted	analysis	of	three	district	detective	unit	workloads:
•	 Each	district	had	a	small	detective	unit;
•	 Variance	 in	 number	 of	 crimes	 investigated	 per	 detective	 9	 –	 55	 crimes;	
Detectives and detective aides investigate same type of crimes;
•	 Some	detectives	investigated	100	crimes	a	year	and	some	less	than	ten	crimes	
per year;
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National Support 
Services
Recommendation 6.9
Recommendation 6.10
Recommendation 6.11
Recommendation 6.12
Recommendation 6.13
Recommendation 6.14
Recommendation 6.15
•	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Criminal	 Investigation	 (NBCI)	 do	 not	 lead	 any	murder	
investigations but provide short term assistance with particular investigative 
skills;
•	 Investigation	 of	 garda	 criminality	 and	 corruption	 requires	 specialist	 skills,	
but	the	use	of	NBCI’s	Investigation	Section	for	this	purpose	is	not	best	use	of	
resources;
•	 Investigation	Section	needs	to	be	released	to	investigate	murders	on	a	full	time	
basis;
•	 NBCI	has	become	a	repository	for	sensitive	enquiries	and	crimes	which	do	not	
fit	into	other	unit’s	responsibilities;	
•	 Poor	fingerprint	recovery	at	crime	scenes	is	a	key	concern	with	no	performance	
data	available	on	the	quality	of	crime	scene	examinations;	
•	 Opportunities	to	provide	enhanced	IT	that	allows	the	electronic	transmission	
of	fingerprints	directly	from	crime	scenes	to	Fingerprint	Section;
•	 Technical	Bureau	should	attend	all	murder	enquiries	and	other	serious	crimes;
•	 In	 some	 cases	 the	 Incident	 Room	 Co-ordinator	 appointed	 is	 inexperienced	
in that role and may not always know how to make best use of specialist 
resources;
•	 Absence	of	a	Major	Investigation	Management	System	(MIMS)	is	a	gap	which	
should be filled;
•	 Combining	Serious	Crime	Review	Team	(SCRT)	and	the	Investigation	Section	
is a more effective way of managing these two units;
•	 Other	police	services	use	Independent	Advisory	Groups	to	provide	assistance	
in managing local community issues;
•	 Decision	logs	are	not	used;
•	 Good	system	of	Family	Liaison	Officers;
Current System 
of Murder 
Investigation
Recommendation 6.16
Recommendation 6.8
•	 Responsibility	for	the	investigation	of	a	murder	rests	with	a	district	officer;
•	 Many	 divisions	 and	 regions	 have	 developed	 good	 skills	 in	 murder	
investigation;
•	 Garda	Síochána	should	have	dedicated	investigation	teams	that	deal	with	all	
murders and other specified serious crime; 
•	 Current	location	of	NBCI	sometimes	prohibits	more	activity	in	the	Southern,	
Western	and	Northern	regions.	There	are	opportunities	to	place	the	NBCI	into	
strategic locations that provide national coverage;
•	 In	the	early	stages	of	an	investigation	it	was	sometimes	difficult	to	find	gardaí	
with	the	necessary	skills	and	experience;
•	 Under	 the	 current	 structure,	 detective	 superintendents	 should	 lead	
investigations;
Other National 
Units with 
Investigative 
Responsibilities
•	 Garda	Bureau	of	Fraud	Investigation	receives	all	fraud	cases	for	assessment	and	
allocates	 crime	 for	 investigation.	Crime	 investigations	 can	be	protracted	and	
some	cases	are	complex;
•	 There	are	a	number	of	other	national	units	which	investigate	crime;
•	 Garda	Síochána	needs	to	prepare	for	cybercrime	threat;
•	 Opportunities	to	merge	national	units	such	as	the	Garda	National	Drugs	Unit	
and	the	Organised	Crime	Unit;
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•	 Structure	 of	 national	 units	will	 be	 examined	 by	 the	 Inspectorate	 as	 part	 of	
Haddington	Road	Review;
Rape and Serious 
Sexual Assault 
Investigation
Recommendation 6.17
•	 Regular	 unit	 gardaí	 often	 undertake	 the	 primary	 investigation	 of	 rape	 and	
sexual	 assault	 investigation	 and	 in	many	 cases	 remain	 as	 the	 investigating	
garda. These crimes are some of the most difficult investigations that an 
investigator will face;
•	 Inspectorate	does	not	agree	with	garda	policy	that	the	investigation	of	serious	
sexual	offences	can	be	performed	by	all	front-line	gardaí;
•	 Rape	 and	 serious	 sexual	 assault	 cases	 should	 always	 be	 investigated	 by	
detectives and supervised by a senior detective;
•	 Other	police	services	have	dedicated	rape	investigation	units;
Volume Crime 
Investigation
•	 Detectives	are	not	investigating	large	numbers	of	volume	crimes	and	this	is	a	
lost	opportunity	to	use	their	skills	and	expertise;
•	 Regular	units	investigate	the	majority	of	volume	crimes;
•	 Regular	units	have	no	time	set	aside	in	their	roster	for	completing	investigations;
Domestic Violence 
Investigation
Recommendation 6.18
•	 Limited	evidence	that	Domestic	Violence	(DV)	policy	is	audited	or	monitored	
to ensure that it is implemented at an operational level;
•	 No	recorded	evidence	that	divisional	nominated	inspectors	are	checking	DV	
calls	or	ensuring	accurate	recording	and	classification	on	PULSE;
•	 Follow-up	 visits	 do	 not	 always	 happen	 (DV	 Policy	 -	 call	 back	 within	 one	
month);
•	 High	number	of	calls	to	domestic	incidents	with	low	volume	of	arrests	recorded	
on	CAD;
•	 A	difference	 in	 the	 service	provided	 to	victims	where	 a	 court	 order	was	 in	
place	to	protect	the	person	and	where	no	such	court	order	existed;
•	 Absence	of	supervision	of	calls	to	DV	incidents	by	control	rooms.	Supervisors	
do	not	always	check	the	actions	of	gardaí	dealing	with	DV	cases	and	are	not	
asking why an offender was not arrested;
•	 Identified	many	cases	of	domestic	violence	where	a	crime	had	occurred,	but	it	
was	wrongly	recorded	as	an	‘Attention	and	Complaint’	or	a	case	of	‘domestic	
dispute	–	no	offence	disclosed’;
•	 Inconsistent	 approach	 to	 dealing	 with	 victims	 of	 DV	who	 initially	 make	 a	
statement of complaint, but later decide that they do not want to go to court;
•	 Different	garda	attitudes	towards	DV.	While	some	members	demonstrated	an	
understanding	of	DV,	others	were	unaware	of	the	complex	reasons	why	many	
DV	victims	return	to	their	abusive	partners	and	the	broader	challenges	faced	
by	DV	victims;
•	 Some	gardaí	are	providing	a	very	good	 level	of	 service	 to	victims	and	help	
them to obtain the relevant protection or barring orders at court. These gardaí 
also visited victims after the initial call. However, some members displayed 
negative	 attitudes	 towards	 DV	 by	 referring	 to	 calls	 as	 problematic,	 time	
consuming	and	a	waste	of	resources.	Examples	provided	where	assaults	were	
recorded	in	non-crime	categories;
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•	 An	arrest	of	an	offender	at	the	time	of	dealing	with	a	crime	or	breach	of	an	
order sends an important message to all parties that this crime will not be 
tolerated;
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 needs	 to	 re-appraise	 both	 their	 strategic	 and	 operational	
response	to	DV;
•	 Other	police	services	have	multi-agency	groups	that	focus	on	repeat	victims	
and violent offenders;
Racist and 
Homophobic 
Incidents
Recommendation 6.19
•	 Recorded	levels	of	racist	and	homophobic	crimes	are	very	low;
•	 Other	jurisdictions	have	specific	offences	for	aggravated	crimes;
•	 Divisions	 have	 trained	 Ethnic	 Liaison	 Officers	 and	 Lesbian	 Gay	 Bisexual	
Transgender	Officers	that	have	a	liaison	role	with	communities	and	can	assist	
with investigations;
Investigation Plans
Recommendation 6.20
Recommendation 6.21
Recommendation 6.22
Recommendation 6.23
Recommendation 6.24
Recommendation 6.25
Recommendation 6.26
•	 Limited	evidence	of	investigation	plans	and	no	plans	were	found	on	PULSE;
•	 Minimal	evidence	that	details	of	secondary	investigations	are	recorded	on	the	
PULSE	system;
•	 Across	 seven	 divisions,	 supervisors	 were	 unable	 to	 say	 how	 many	 crimes	
individual gardaí were investigating;
•	 Individual	member	case	loads	are	high;
•	 Regardless	of	 the	seriousness	of	 the	crime,	gardaí	are	given	 three	months	 to	
complete	an	investigation	and	this	often	stretches	towards	the	six	month	time	
limit for summary offences; 
•	 Specialist	interviewers	take	statements	from	child	victims	of	sexual	or	physical	
abuse or serious neglect;
•	 In	one	court	visited,	20%	of	the	summonses	issued	were	late	submissions;
•	 Supervisors	 were	 unable	 to	 provide	 details	 about	 how	 many	 people	 were	
shown	on	PULSE	as	a	suspect,	who	had	not	yet	been	arrested;
•	 Decision	of	some	investigating	gardaí	not	to	record	a	known	suspect’s	details	
on	PULSE.	This	 information	 is	not	 recorded	 in	case	another	member	arrests	
that person and takes credit for that detection;
•	 Lapsed	criminal	cases	found	where	there	was	an	identified	suspect	for	a	crime,	
but	the	six	month	time	limit	for	proceedings	had	passed;
•	 Long	 delays	 in	 obtaining	 forensic	 examination	 of	 computers	 and	 other	
technology;
•	 Opportunity	to	regionalise	the	Computer	Crime	Investigation	Unit	(CCIU);
•	 Significant	 delays	 in	 obtaining	mobile	 phone	 subscriber	 information	 from	
some service providers;
•	 Unnecessary	delays	with	crime	investigation;
•	 Majority	of	crime	investigations	should	be	concluded	within	a	maximum	of	
twenty-eight	days;
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Other Investigative 
Opportunities
Recommendation 6.27
Recommendation 6.28
Recommendation 6.29
Recommendation 6.30
Recommendation 6.31
Recommendation 6.32
•	 No	garda	national	CCTV	database	to	assist	investigators	in	crime	investigation;
•	 There	 are	 opportunities	 to	 develop	 Automatic	 Number	 Plate	 Recognition	
(ANPR)	on	existing	camera	networks;	
•	 In	the	absence	of	an	electronic	case	management	system,	a	standard	national	
case file protocol would ensure consistency in application;
•	 Obtaining	pre-charge	advice	should	be	available	to	all	investigators;
•	 Limited	evidence	of	supervision	by	sergeants	and	inspectors	before	a	file	was	
sent to a district officer;
•	 Need	to	move	away	from	paper	files	and	paper	based	management	systems	to	
electronic IT solutions;
•	 Absence	 of	 effective	 supervision	 at	 all	 stages	 of	 many	 volume	 crime	
investigations;
•	 Many	crimes	without	any	obvious	lines	of	enquiry	are	still	technically	under	
investigation. It is clear that in many cases, no further investigation ever takes 
place;
•	 There	is	no	electronic	case	file	management	system;
•	 One	division	is	using	software	to	track	case	files	and	monitors	progress;
•	 In	two	district	stations	inspected,	superintendents	are	making	the	decision	to	
close investigations;
•	 There	is	no	crime	screening	process	to	determine	if	the	cases	are	solvable;
•	 Garda	Síochána	needs	to	introduce	a	process	that	brings	a	crime	investigation	
to a natural conclusion;
Developing New 
Ways to Investigate 
Crime
Recommendation 6.33
Recommendation 6.34 
Recommendation 6.35
•	 Develop	telephone	reporting	and	telephone	investigation	of	crime;
•	 Develop	opportunities	for	extending	on-line	reporting	of	crime	and	reduce	the	
bureaucracy of the current process;
•	 With	the	creation	of	the	new	proposed	divisional	policing	model,	the	Garda	
Síochána must ensure that detective resources are fully utilised in the 
investigation	of	both	serious	(non-homicides)	and	volume	crime;
•	 Develop	a	model	of	dedicated	investigation	teams	that	deals	with	all	serious	
crimes and a significant percentage of volume crime investigations;
•	 There	should	be	a	crime	management	process	for	allocating	crimes,	based	on	
agreed protocols.
Part 7: The Victim’s Experience
Part	 7	 looks	 at	 the	 victims	 experience	 following	 a	 crime	 and	 the	 various	
supports mechanisms that are in place. There are two important stages for 
victims,	(i)	the	initial	contact	(ii)	follow-up	contact	throughout	an	investigation.
The Victim’s 
Experience Key Points/Findings
Garda Support 
Services
Recommendation 7.1
Recommendation 7.2
Recommendation 7.3
•	 National	 support	 services	 for	 victims	 of	 crime	 includes	 a	 National	 Crime	
Victims	Helpline,	a	Victims	of	Crime	Office	and	the	Irish	Tourist	Assistance	
Office;	
•	 Garda	Victim’s	Liaison	Unit	has	contact	with	victims’	groups;
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Recommendation 7.4 •	 Garda	Síochána	has	a	number	of	dedicated	victims	support	services	including:	
Garda	 Family	 Liaison	 Officers	 who	 are	 appointed	 to	 serious	 crime	 cases.	
Some	divisions	have	Victim’s	Offices	as	a	single	point	of	contact	for	victims	of	
crime;
•	 The	 information	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 website	 should	 be	 updated	 in	
preparation	for	the	EU	Victims	Rights	Directive;	
•	 Two	letters	are	sent	to	victims	of	crime	on	behalf	of	the	district	officer.	The	
first	letter	contains	the	investigating	member’s	name,	the	garda	station	contact	
details	and	the	victim’s	helpline	contact	details.	A	second	letter	is	sent	once	an	
offender is identified and the case has progressed; 
•	 Across	 divisions	 there	 is	 89%	 compliance	 with	 issuing	 letter	 1	 and	 74%	
compliance with issuing letter 2;
•	 No	letters	are	currently	sent	to	victims	of	domestic	violence	or	sexual	assault	
or cases where the victim is vulnerable to avoid further risk to them;
•	 Victims	of	property	crimes	were	far	more	positive	than	victims	of	domestic	
violence	in	terms	of	feedback	of	their	experiences;	
•	 Victims	groups	referred	to	delays	or	failures	of	gardaí	in	getting	statements	of	
complaint, arrests in domestic violence instances are not always made unless 
a	barring	order	is	in	force,	and	criminal	cases	being	adjourned	on	numerous	
occasions;
•	 Little	or	no	evidence	of	supervisors	contacting	victims	to	determine	the	levels	
of service provided; 
•	 An	unwillingness	 of	 victims	 to	make	 a	 statement	 of	 complaint	 sometimes	
results in a crime not being recorded; 
•	 In	many	 cases	 there	 is	 no	 follow-up	with	 a	 person	who	 does	 not	make	 a	
statement of complaint; 
•	 PULSE	does	not	have	a	facility	to	remind	investigators	to	update	victims;
•	 Inspectorate	met	with	and	spoke	to	a	number	of	victims	and	family	members.	
Eight interviews are included;
•	 Inconsistencies	across	divisions	in	contact	with	victims;
•	 From	September	2014,	Garda	Síochána	are	introducing	victim	offices	across	
all	twenty-eight	divisions;
Victim Interviews
Recommendation 7.5
Recommendation 7.6
•	 Overall	the	Inspectorate	found	an	inconsistent	approach	to	updating	victims	
and no national garda standard as to how or when this contact should take 
place; 
Volume Case Reviews 
•	 In	43%	of	the	cases	that	were	investigated	by	the	gardaí,	there	were	no	updates	
on	PULSE	in	the	twelve	months	following	the	creation	of	the	record;
•	 Some	victims	who	contacted	the	Inspectorate	reported	good	initial	action,	but	
less	satisfactory	follow-up;
Victim Views on Follow-up Contact
•	 Many	victims	are	not	being	kept	up	to	date	with	developments	in	their	case	
and	find	it	extremely	difficult	to	contact	their	investigating	officer:
•	 When	victims	contact	garda	stations	and	the	investigating	officer	is	not	present,	
no other officer is taking responsibly for assisting them;
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•	 Calls	are	not	always	returned;
•	 Many	victims	would	like	to	have	the	option	of	using	e-mail	to	communicate	
directly; 
•	 Crimes	often	take	a	long	time	to	investigate;	
•	 Good	examples	of	victim	contact	were	found	in	divisions	that	use	community	
gardaí to visit victims; 
Findings on Victim Supports
•	 Front-line	 gardaí	 and	 detectives	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	 updating	
victims, but often cannot find the time to do so; 
•	 In	 one	 division	 visited	 a	 Victims	 Office	 has	 responsibility	 for	 updating	
victims;
•	 Limited	use	is	made	of	the	update	facility	on	PULSE	which	prompts	members	
to contact victims one day, one week and one month after the crime was 
committed;
•	 There	 is	 no	 formal	process	 to	monitor	 the	quality	 and	 service	provided	 to	
victims;
•	 There	is	no	garda	policy	or	procedure	for	dealing	with	people	who	are	repeat	
victims of crime. 
Part 8: Intelligence Led Policing
This part reviews the units gathering intelligence, the range of contributors 
of intelligence and the intelligence systems used by the Garda Síochána. It 
also reviews how intelligence is developed and used to investigate crime.
Intelligence Led 
Policing Key Points/Findings
Importance of 
Intelligence
Recommendation 8.1
•	 Security	and	Intelligence	Division	is	the	central	repository	for	intelligence	in	
relation to state security and serious crime;
•	 Intelligence	Section	focuses	on	intelligence	relevant	to	state	security;
•	 National	Crime	 Intelligence	Unit	 (NCIU)	 focuses	 on	 serious	 and	 organised	
crime;
•	 Garda	Síochána	has	conducted	a	high	volume	of	operations	and	 there	 is	an	
absence of formal prioritisation at a corporate level; 
•	 NCIU	is	responsible	for	security	vetting	new	entrants	to	the	Garda	Síochána,	
such as recruits and reserves; 
•	 People	vetted	 for	 entrance	 to	 the	Garda	Síochána	 are	not	 subject	 to	 further	
security vetting at any later stage;
Surveillance
Recommendation 8.2
Recommendation 8.3
Recommendation 8.4
Recommendation 8.5
Recommendation 8.6
Recommendation 8.7
•	 Garda	 pilot	 roster	 is	 severely	 impacting	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 National	
Surveillance	Unit	(NSU);
•	 NSU	unable	to	service	all	of	the	demands	placed	on	the	unit;
•	 Many	 regions	 and	 other	 national	 units	 have	 developed	 their	 own	 small	
surveillance teams;
•	 Other	national	units	 see	merit	 in	having	 their	own	surveillance	equipment,	
such as tracking devices for cars; 
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•	 No	 garda	 policy,	 instructions	 or	 training	 about	 the	 recording	 of	 decisions	
during an operation; 
•	 Armed	 officers	 are	 attending	 incidents	 and	 on	 occasions	 an	 on-scene	
commander (usually an inspector) is not always available;
•	 With	the	advancement	of	telephone	applications,	the	Garda	Síochána	needs	to	
upgrade technology; 
•	 Reports	produced	by	Garda	Statistical	Analysis	Service	(GSAS)	are	of	a	high	
quality and senior gardaí stated that they use them to better inform operational 
decisions;
•	 Many	examples	at	regional	and	national	level	where	analysts	and	gardaí	are	
analysing similar intelligence in the same buildings, but in different offices;
•	 In	the	absence	of	an	investment	in	an	IT	solution,	the	Inspectorate	believes	that	
analysts should be trained and provided with access to the data available to 
Information Analysis Service (IAS) staff;
•	 Large	numbers	of	gardaí	on	a	daily	basis,	collecting	and	storing	statistics	and	
information;
•	 Inspectorate	 found	duplication	 in	 activity	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 automation	 often	
demands manual searches for data;
•	 PULSE	 system	 contains	 a	 large	 number	 of	 management	 and	 information	
reports that are not always used; 
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 has	 a	 Telephone	 Liaison	 Unit	 that	 provides	 a	 single	 point	
of contact for communication service providers and telephone interception 
issues;
National Intelligence 
Model
Recommendation 8.8
Recommendation 8.9
•	 Garda	Síochána	work	to	a	national	crime	intelligence	model,	but	there	is	no	
written document outlining what this model is, how the model works and 
what processes should take place to make sure that resources are targeting 
prolific offenders;
•	 Most	other	countries	operate	a	national	model	of	intelligence;
•	 Tasking	 and	 co-ordinating	 meetings	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 any	 effective	
model;
•	 Opportunity	to	develop	a	single	intelligence	hub	for	National	Support	Services;
Garda Síochána 
Internal Crime 
Meetings
Recommendation 8.10
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 convenes	 a	 number	 of	 different	 crime	meetings	 at	 national,	
regional, divisional and district levels;
•	 The	success	of	a	good	intelligence	system	is	the	evaluation	process	of	identifying	
effective and ineffective operations and initiatives;
•	 Process	of	using	checkpoints	or	other	such	activity	should	be	part	of	the	tasking	
process, needs to be intelligence led and results must be recorded and evaluated;
•	 Needs	to	develop	a	tasking	and	co-ordinating	process	at	all	levels	that	reviews	
intelligence and crime trends, identifies priorities and allocates appropriate 
resources;
•	 Tasking	meetings	should	be	held	at	three	specific	levels:	national,	regional	and	
divisional;
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Recommendation 8.11 •	 Important	 to	 co-ordinate	 the	 activity	 of	 national	 units	 and	 to	 provide	 a	
structured forum for regions and divisions to seek the assistance of units, such 
as	the	National	Surveillance	Unit;	
•	 Senior	 garda	 member	 should	 chair	 all	 tasking	 meetings,	 particularly	 at	 a	
national level;
•	 National	units	have	 their	own	separate	 intelligence	sections.	Within	National	
Support	Services	(NSS),	 the	Inspectorate	found	six	separate	 intelligence	units.	
Some of these units work in the same building, but operate separately;
•	 Considerable	variance	in	the	methods	employed	by	detective	superintendents	to	
ensure that intelligence was utilised effectively; 
• Inspectorate did not find any clear formalised process for determining how 
regional units are deployed;
•	 Detective	superintendents	should	be	responsible	for	all	aspects	of	the	effective	
management and use of intelligence;
•	 No	 Standard	 Operating	 Procedure	 (SOP)	 for	 Interpol	 Unit	 staff	 and	 in	
particular for the desk officer; 
Criminal 
Intelligence Units in 
Garda Divisions
Recommendation 8.12
Recommendation 8.13
Recommendation 8.14
Recommendation 8.15
Recommendation 8.16
Recommendation 8.17
Recommendation 8.18
Recommendation 8.19
Recommendation 8.20
•	 Criminal	Intelligence	Officers	(CIOs)	are	based	in	garda	districts;
•	 Inspectorate	believes	that	there	are	benefits	to	be	gained	by	creating	a	single	
divisional intelligence hub; 
•	 CIOs	spend	a	considerable	amount	to	time	undertaking	administrative	tasks,	
such	 as	 the	 uploading	 of	 prisoner	 photographs	 onto	 PULSE.	 It	would	 be	 a	
much more effective use of resources to allocate these administrative tasks to 
police staff; 
•	 A	Standard	Operating	Procedure	(SOP)	is	required	to	clarify	the	functions	and	
operating	practices	of	a	CIO;
•	 No	evidence	that	CIOs	regularly	attended	unit	briefings	or	parades	to	either	
provide intelligence or to encourage gardaí to input actionable intelligence 
reports;
•	 Limited	 evidence	 of	 Crime	 Scene	 Examiners	 (CSEs)	 routinely	 supplying	
information	 to	 CIOs	 about	 particular	 methods	 used	 by	 suspects	 at	 crime	
scenes	and	recording	this	on	PULSE;	
•	 District	 intelligence	 units	 described	 intelligence	 as	 a	 one-way	 flow	 of	
intelligence from local policing units to national units with little in return;
•	 Needs	to	be	a	clear	process	(i)	to	decide	how	the	high	volume	of	intelligence	
received by national units is managed, and (ii) to seek opportunities to utilise 
local specialist units to action intelligence;
•	 Most	national	and	local	specialist	units	greatly	restrict	the	level	of	information	
and	intelligence	they	put	on	PULSE	as	there	is	unrestricted	access	to	the	PULSE	
system;
•	 PULSE	 allows	 alteration	 of	 records	 by	 changing	 some	 of	 the	 details	 of	 the	
record (such as changing a date of birth) without supervision oversight;
Crime Investigation Report       Summary of Findings and Recommendations
Summary  |  24
Intelligence Led 
Policing Key Points/Findings
•	 Inordinate	amount	of	CIOs	time	is	spent	correcting	inaccurate	and	poor	quality	
intelligence reports;
•	 No	evidence	of	supervisors	checking	the	quality	of	PULSE	intelligence	reports;
•	 Inspectorate	 understands	 that	 there	 are	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 children	
under	the	age	of	seven	and	infants	under	the	age	of	one	on	PULSE	intelligence	
records;
•	 High	volume	of	duplicate	PULSE	intelligence	records	for	the	same	person;
•	 Intelligence	 units	 at	 local	 and	 national	 levels	 should	 have	 full	 access	 to	
interrogate and monitor open source intelligence;
•	 In	 both	 divisional	 and	 national	 units,	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	 that	 many	
intelligence units still retain paper intelligence records dating back many 
years;
•	 Operational	gardaí	should	be	briefed	daily	with	the	latest	intelligence	on	crime	
and tasked to complete actions that will reduce opportunities for crime or 
locate a person(s) suspected of crime;
•	 Significant	variance	in	the	amount	of	formal	training	that	CIOs	had	received;
•	 Continual	training	on	intelligence	gathering	and	data	protection	requirements	
should be provided;
Information Sharing •	 Limited	evidence	of	information	sharing	protocols;
•	 Close	relationships	and	trust	are	used	by	gardaí	and	partners	as	the	basis	for	
sharing information;
•	 Partnerships	in	Ireland	are	not	statute	based;	
•	 The	 Data	 Protection	 Act	 provides	 for	 the	 disclosure	 of	 information	 for	 the	
purposes of investigation, prevention and detection of criminal offences, but 
the Inspectorate found no clear guidance for members as to how this should 
operate on a day to day basis;
•	 Sharing	of	 information	by	the	Criminal	Assets	Bureau	is	a	good	model	 that	
could be replicated;  
Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources 
(CHIS)
Recommendation 8.21
Recommendation 8.22
•	 The	Major	Investigation	Management	System	(MIMS)	system	has	provided	a	
more	sustainable	IT	platform	for	recording	and	monitoring	CHIS;
•	 Success	of	a	CHIS	system	requires	all	gardaí	who	have	contact	with	the	public	
to encourage people to come forward with information and where someone is 
suitable, to refer them to the source unit for assessment; 
•	 There	is	an	absence	of	performance	management	data	to	show	the	outcomes	
from	CHIS	in	respect	of	the	numbers	of	arrests	and	seizures	that	resulted	from	
CHIS	intelligence;
•	 Current	approach	to	CHIS	has	resulted	in	gardaí	becoming	reluctant	to	engage	
with people who may be able to provide useful intelligence for fear of breaching 
garda policy; 
•	 Detectives	 and	 other	 gardaí	 are	 not	 permitted	 to	 gather	 or	 use	 intelligence	
from criminals;
•	 Inspectorate	 recognises	 that	 criminals	 have	 to	 be	 managed	 within	 clear	
safeguards, but the current approach is not encouraging the effective use of a 
valuable source of criminal intelligence;
•	 Limited	 evidence	 that	 volume	 crime	 intelligence	 is	 provided	 by	 CHIS	 and	
the Inspectorate believes that intelligence sources must be refocused towards 
volume crime;
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Crime Stoppers and 
Garda Confidential
Recommendation 8.23
Recommendation 8.24
•	 Limited	 evidence	 of	 Crimestoppers	 information	 being	 received	 or	 that	 the	
intelligence was actioned;
•	 There	is	no	formal	tracking	system	that	monitors	Crimestoppers	information	
and what happens when that information is sent to a national unit or a local 
division for action; 
•	 Having	 two	 different	 numbers	 (Crimestoppers	 and	 Garda	 Confidential)	 is	
unnecessary and confusing;.
Open Crime 
Information
•	 There	should	be	a	system	of	open	crime	information	to	inform	the	public	about	
local crime levels;
Way Forward •	 The	impact	of	limited	allocation	of	resources	requires	the	Garda	Síochána	to	
be more strategic about how it prioritises work and how it deploys available 
resources;
•	 High	quality	intelligence	must	support	and	drive	the	operational	response	to	
crime investigation, prevention and the identification of risk.
Part 9: Investigation and Detention of 
Suspects
This	part	explores	the	investigative	process	of	gathering	evidence	to	identify	
suspects	and	the	decision-making	process	in	relation	to	how	to	deal	 in	an	
offender.	Part	9	also	examines	what	happens	when	a	person	 is	 taken	 to	a	
garda station.
Investigation 
and Detention of 
Suspects Key Points/Findings
Investigation of 
Suspect
Recommendation 9.1
•	 When	a	person	is	shown	as	a	suspected	offender	the	crime	is	usually	shown	as	
detected;
•	 Inspectorate	found	that	many	crimes	shown	as	detected	on	the	day	the	crime	
is	recorded	and	in	some	cases	without	compliance	with	the	Crime	Counting	
Rules;
Making an Arrest •	 Consistently,	members	gather	evidence	before	considering	an	arrest;
•	 Many	 cases	where	 interviews	 took	place	many	months	 after	 the	 crime	was	
committed;
•	 Obtaining	some	technical	and	forensic	evidence	can	take	several	years,	which	
is significantly impacting on the timing of an arrest;
•	 Many	suspected	offenders	are	not	subsequently	charged	after	arrest;
•	 DPP	and	Garda	Síochána	should	review	the	current	process	for	providing	pre-
charge advice to investigators;
•	 Distinct	 advantages	 to	 the	 timely	 arrest	 of	 a	 suspect,	 including:	 an	 early	
opportunity to interview the suspects; increase opportunities to secure 
corroborating	evidence	and	reduce	opportunities	for	suspects	to	re-offend;
Barriers to Arrest •	 New	pilot	roster	has	added	to	the	delays	in	arresting	suspects;
•	 At	certain	times	of	the	day,	resources	are	short	and	an	arrest	of	a	suspect	might	
remove all available responders in that area;
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•	 Victims	of	crime	who	have	consumed	alcohol	may	be	sent	away,	with	the	onus	
on the victim to contact the gardaí later if they want to report a crime;
•	 Many	examples	of	crimes	that	were	notified	to	gardaí,	but	were	not	recorded	
as	 crimes	 or	 were	 recorded	 as	 a	 non-crime	 incident	 in	 the	 Attention	 and	
Complaints	category;
•	 A	 number	 of	 issues	 were	 identified	 with	 obtaining	 victim	 and	 witness	
statements including: some were left with a perception that the gardaí did 
not want to investigate the crime when it was first reported; some significant 
delays in obtaining victim and witness statements and broken appointments;
•	 Inspectorate	 found	 PULSE	 incidents	 and	 case	 files	 where	 a	 victim	 was	
unwilling to make a statement of complaint. However, there was no recorded 
evidence of any attempts to persuade a victim to assist with a criminal 
investigation;
•	 In	cases	examined,	it	sometimes	took	several	months	to	take	a	statement	from	
a	victim	and	in	one	very	serious	assault	case,	some	six	months	later	a	statement	
had not been taken;
•	 Need	to	develop	clear	guidelines	on	when	it	is	appropriate	to	take	a	withdrawal	
statement and how that process should be appropriately supervised;
•	 Photo-fit	is	an	important	investigative	tool	that	should	be	more	widely	available	
to help to solve crimes;
•	 Greatest	risk	to	an	investigator	is	the	opportunity	for	a	suspect	to	commit	a	
further	offence	in	the	absence	of	a	diligent	and	expeditious	investigation	of	the	
initial crime;
Supervision and 
Impact on Arrest
•	 Absence	of	intrusive	supervision	to	ensure	that	crimes	are	investigated	quickly	
and that identified offenders are arrested at the earliest opportunity;
•	 Suspects	 are	not	 always	entered	onto	PULSE	 for	 a	variety	of	 reasons	and	a	
supervisor	 checking	 a	 PULSE	 record	 could	 be	 unaware	 that	 there	 is	 an	
identified suspect;
•	 There	 is	 a	 paper	 based	 approach	 to	 supervision	 of	 crime	 investigation.	 In	
many cases, investigating gardaí are required to provide unnecessary written 
reports on crimes on the progress of an investigation;
•	 PULSE	 does	 not	 allow	 supervisors	 to	 search	 for	 the	 details	 or	 numbers	 of	
outstanding suspects for their unit or for their geographical area;
•	 No	clear	national	standards	or	policies	about	crime	investigation;
•	 Face	 to	 face	 daily	 contact	 with	 a	 supervisor	 is	 essential	 to	 ensure	 that	
investigations are progressed;
•	 There	 are	 suspects	 details	 recorded	 on	 PULSE,	where	 there	 is	 no	 recorded	
evidence of action taken to locate them;
Investigation and 
Interviewing of 
Suspects
Recommendation 9.2
•	 A	significant	number	of	examples	taken	from	the	158	Volume	Case	Reviews	
are highlighted:
•	 Good	 examples	 of	 serious	 cases	 that	were	 dealt	with	 promptly	 in	 terms	 of	
gathering evidence and effecting arrests;
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•	 Evidence	 that	 crimes	 were	 not	 recorded	 and	 investigated	 at	 the	 time	 of	
reporting; 
•	 Victim	and	witness	statements	were	not	always	taken	and	in	some	cases	there	
was no further victim contact; 
•	 There	is	an	absence	of	supervision	of	interviewing;
•	 Unnecessary	delays	in	dealing	with	identified	suspects;
•	 Some	poor	quality	victim	and	witness	statements;
•	 Some	investigations	were	not	effectively	progressed;
•	 Long	delays	in	gathering	and	viewing	CCTV	evidence;
•	 Crimes	 recorded	 on	 PULSE	 twelve	 months	 later	 and	 after	 the	 request	 for	
information from the Inspectorate;
Garda Professional 
Standards Unit 
(GPSU)
Recommendation 9.3
Recommendation 9.4
•	 In	reports	compiled	by	the	Garda	Professional	Standards	Unit	(GPSU),	there	
are similar findings to those identified by the Inspectorate; 
•	 GPSU	 has	 significantly	 changed	 the	 way	 examinations	 are	 conducted	 and	
the Inspectorate welcomes this new approach, finding it to be a much more 
intrusive	and	evidence-based	process;
•	 Where	 comparisons	 could	 be	 drawn	 with	 GPSU	 examinations,	 the	
Inspectorate found similar findings, which included: domestic violence cases 
inappropriately	 categorised;	 unsatisfactory	 investigation	 of	 sexual	 assaults	
and	 inappropriate	 recording	 of	 sexual	 assaults	 in	 the	 non-crime	 category	
of	Attention	and	Complaints;	an	inability	to	find	out	the	results	for	calls	for	
service; statements and other papers undated; tardiness in investigations and 
long delays in submission of files for directions; 
Dealing with 
Persons in Garda 
Detention
Recommendation 9.5
Recommendation 9.6
Recommendation 9.7
•	 In	more	rural	areas,	discretion	is	often	applied	when	considering	whether	to	
arrest or not;
•	 Members	are	trained	in	the	use	of	rigid	handcuffs	but	the	equipment	has	not	
been issued;
•	 Vast	majority	of	sergeants	and	gardaí	performing	the	member-in-charge	role	
responsible for detained persons, have received no specific training. Garda 
Síochána has developed a new training course for those performing this role;
•	 During	inspection	visits	to	divisions	outside	of	the	main	cities,	the	Inspectorate	
regularly found no persons actually detained in custody;
•	 There	are	multiple	small	custody	facilities,	each	staffed	by	a	member-in-charge	
or	Station	House	Officer	(SHO);
•	 During	visits	to	custody	areas,	the	Inspectorate	did	not	find	any	secure	custody	
area;
•	 In	other	countries,	there	are	moves	towards	health	services	taking	responsibility	
for medical care provision for those in custody;
•	 Garda	Síochána	should	engage	key	partner	agencies	to	develop	action	plans	
for managing people that are suffering with mental health issues who come to 
the attention of garda members for care and not for criminal matters;
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Recommendation 9.9 •	 Garda	 Síochána	 needs	 to	 conduct	 a	 full	 review	 of	 all	 custody	 facilities	
and	 explore	 opportunities	 for	 rationalisation,	 centralisation	 and	 where	
opportunities	exist,	to	co-locate	with	other	justice	partners;
•	 Other	police	 services	have	 Independent	Custody	Visitors	who	attend	police	
stations to check on the welfare of persons detained;
•	 The	 six	hours	 initial	detention	period	 is	 short	 and	an	 increase	 in	detention	
without charge would provide more time (where required) to fully investigate 
most offences;
•	 Part	2	of	the	Criminal	Justice	Act	2011	provides	a	new	system	to	make	more	
effective use of detention periods. This allows the period of detention to be 
suspended	and	the	person	released.	Many	investigators	did	not	appear	to	be	
aware of this provision;
•	 The	subject	of	detention	times	and	authorities	for	detention	should	be	reviewed	
by	the	Garda	Síochána	with	key	criminal	justice	partners	to	determine	if	the	
detention period is sufficient for the effective investigation of an offence;
•	 In	 other	 jurisdictions	 police	 services	 drug	 test	 people	 arrested	 for	 specific	
crimes;
Custody Records in 
Garda Detention
Recommendation 9.8
Recommendation 9.10
•	 Paper-based	custody	records	are	cumbersome	and	not	user-friendly.	A	new	
version is being developed, but it is not yet in operational use;
•	 Many	 parts	 of	 the	 custody	 record	 that	 require	 completion	 are	 not	 always	
filled in and some court cases are lost because custody records were not fully 
completed	or	details	in	the	custody	records	conflicted	with	other	documents;
•	 PULSE	prisoner	logs	were	not	always	created	or	updated	and	many	persons	
were still shown as being in custody, although released some time previously;
•	 Custody	records	should	be	classified	as	primary	or	best	evidence	and	disclosed	
as part of a case file in a court case;
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 must	 operate	 an	 electronic	 and	 fully	 integrated	 custody	
management system;
•	 Other	 police	 services	 have	 prisoner	 processing	 units	 that	 manage	 persons	
detained to release arresting officers to go back out on patrol; 
•	 Identification	processes	for	suspects	are	generally	live	parades	–	other	police	
services have moved to electronic systems;
Interviewing 
Suspects in 
Detention
Recommendation 9.11
•	 The	 requirement	 to	 write	 contemporaneous	 notes	 of	 an	 interview	 and	
subsequent typing of those notes is a waste of resources;
•	 Internal	review	of	interview	training	has	identified	deficiencies	in	the	interview	
training provided;
•	 Not	all	gardaí	have	received	basic	interview	training	and	those	that	did	receive	
training, may not be fully equipped with the skills to conduct interviews; 
•	 Since	2005,	approximately	5,000	gardaí	have	joined	the	Garda	Síochána	and	a	
large	majority	of	those	gardaí	have	not	received	any	or	appropriate	interview	
techniques training;
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•	 The	issue	of	silences	and	inferences	requires	attention	in	terms	of	training	for	
those involved in interviewing;
•	 There	is	no	system	to	quality	assure	taped	interviews;	
Evidence of Arrest 
and Gathering 
Evidence
Recommendation 9.12
Recommendation 9.13
•	 In	 selected	divisions	 inspected,	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	one	district	where	 a	
supervisor periodically reviewed garda notebooks;
•	 Quality	 of	 the	 entries	 in	 garda	 notebooks	 viewed	 by	 the	 Inspectorate	were	
sometimes poor and did not appear to adhere to any particular notebook rules;
•	 There	should	be	standard	operating	procedures	for	the	recording	of	entries	in	
garda notebooks;
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 needs	 to	 improve	 investigative	 skills	 for	 gathering	 best	
evidence;
•	 Many	 typed	 garda	 statements	 were	 undated	 and	 this	 included	 statements	
completed by supervising officers;
•	 Conversely,	most	 victim	 and	 non-garda	witness	 statements	 checked	 by	 the	
Inspectorate were dated;
•	 Many	other	police	services	do	not	use	note	books	for	recording	evidence;
•	 Garda	Síochána	needs	to	develop	a	national	Standard	Operating	Procedure	for	
conducting address searches for detained persons;
Fingerprints and 
Photographs
Recommendation 9.14
Recommendation 9.15
•	 It	has	become	common	practice	in	garda	stations	to	ask	persons	detained	to	
voluntarily provide their fingerprints;
•	 Gardaí	routinely	 take	fingerprints	with	consent,	 in	respect	of	other	offences	
outside of the statutory powers; 
•	 Inspectorate	 supports	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 taking	 fingerprints	
voluntarily, but recommends legislative changes to devolve the authority for 
the taking of fingerprints from an inspector to a custody sergeant;
•	 Fingerprints	 are	 taken	 either	 through	 the	 Automatic	 Fingerprinting	
Identification	System	(AFIS)	or	manually	with	ink.	All	persons	arrested	should	
be	taken	to	a	station	where	AFIS	is	operating	and	wet	ink	fingerprinting	should	
only	be	used	if	AFIS	is	not	working;
•	 AFIS	provides	an	instantaneous	result	on	fingerprints;
•	 Limited	knowledge	by	 the	member-in-charge	of	how	 to	obtain	 results	 from	
AFIS;
•	 Ensuring	photographs	and	fingerprints	are	taken	should	be	supervised	by	the	
member-in-charge;	
•	 Fingerprints	are	not	always	taken	for	persons	arrested	for	serious	offences;	
•	 Post	conviction	at	court,	the	Garda	Síochána	has	the	power	to	take	fingerprints	
for persons summonsed to court. In 2013, only 389 prints were taken out of 
6,830 that should have been obtained; 
•	 68%	of	fingerprints	are	taken	on	AFIS	–	there	are	significant	variances	across	
divisions;
•	 Only	45%	of	fingerprints	were	 taken	 in	2012/13	 for	 those	detained	 in	garda	
stations who should have had fingerprints taken; 
•	 In	2013,	of	all	persons	who	should	have	had	fingerprints	taken,	66%	were	not	
taken;
•	 Systemic	failure	to	effectively	deal	with	persons	in	garda	custody	for	crimes	
where fingerprints should always be taken;
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Identification 
Processes
•	 A	welcome	provision	in	the	Criminal	Justice	(Miscellaneous	Provisions)	Bill,	
2010 to provide regulations for the use of video identification;
•	 Courts	 should	be	 able	 to	draw	 inference	 from	a	 refusal	 to	participate	 in	 an	
identification process;
•	 Inspectorate	supports	the	intention	to	legislate	for	the	process	of	conducting	
parades, but it must be accompanied by training for gardaí and a move 
towards an electronic system;
•	 No	standard	operating	procedure	about	how	personal	identity	is	verified;
Exhibits and 
Property 
Management
Recommendation 9.16
•	 Garda	Síochána	are	 rolling	out	a	Property	and	Exhibit	Management	 system	
(PEMS);
•	 Inspectorate	 welcomes	 the	 concept	 of	 Property	 and	 Exhibits	 Management	
System	 (PEMS)	 as	 a	process	of	managing	property.	PEMS	 is	not	 a	national	
property IT system; it is a local standalone database in some divisions 
operating	 independently	 from	 other	 PEMS	 stores,	 including	 the	 Technical	
Bureau	and	the	Forensic	Science	Laboratory;
•	 Gardaí	 and	 sergeants,	 in	 some	 places	 are	 managing	 stores,	 which	 the	
Inspectorate does not view as a role which requires a sworn member;
•	 Garda	Síochána	 should	be	developing	an	 electronic	 system	 that	will,	 in	 the	
long	 term,	 allow	 bar	 coding	 of	 all	 exhibits,	 including	DNA,	which	would	
track	exhibits	from	crime	scenes	to	laboratories	for	analysis;
•	 Future	 technology	 which	 is	 developed	 in	 the	 Garda	 Síochána,	 should	 be	
capable of integration with other garda and key partner agency IT systems; 
•	 Some	excellent	property	stores	operating	outside	of	PEMS	and	this	was	usually	
associated with good supervision by a station sergeant;
•	 Other	property	stores	were	overflowing	with	items	and	with	no	clear	systems	
to store and find property;
•	 Exhibits	and	other	property	items	in	garda	stations	located	in	all	sorts	of	places,	
including garda lockers;
Legislative Changes 
Recommendation 9.17
•	 The	 recommendation	 contains	 a	 number	 of	 legislative	 changes	 designed	 to	
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of crime investigation.
Part 10: Offender Management
This part of the report looks at the management of young and adult offenders. 
It	also	examines	risk	areas	in	bail	and	warrant management.
Offender 
Management Key Points/Findings
Young Offenders
Recommendation 10.1
Recommendation 10.2
• Where a young person between the age of twelve and eighteen years has their 
details	entered	onto	PULSE	in	connection	with	a	crime	and	are	categorised	
as	a	‘suspected	offender’	they	must	be	referred	to	the	Garda	Youth	Diversion	
Office	(GYDO)	who	make	decisions	about	the	suitability	of	caution	or	charge	
for the offence;
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•	 Director	of	GYDO	makes	decisions	across	all	crimes;
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 has	 115	 Juvenile	 Liaison	Officers	 (JLOs)	 that	manage	 cases	
involving young offenders; 
•	 In	cases	unsuitable	for	cautions,	some	youths	are	not	prosecuted;
•	 Approximately	80%	of	all	 referrals	 to	 Juvenile	Liaison	Officers	are	accepted	
onto the scheme;
•	 Referrals	for	some	cases	are	delayed;
•	 GYDO	has	no	performance	targets	and	does	not	record	statistics	on	outcomes	
in	connection	with	re-offending	rates;
•	 JLOs	would	prefer	 a	procedure	where	 a	 caution	 is	 given	with	 or	without	 a	
supervision order rather than the current formal and informal caution system;
•	 A	numbers	of	offenders	are	given	several	cautions	before	being	placed	before	
the courts; 
•	 JLOs	do	 not	 consider	 themselves	 qualified	 to	 deal	with	 young	people	with	
severe emotional and behavioural difficulties; 
•	 Young	 people	 are	 sent	 for	 treatment	 without	 mandatory	 attendance,	
particularly	sex	offender	treatment;
•	 One	in	twenty	cases	dealt	with	by	JLOs	use	restorative	justice	processes;
Diversion 
Programmes
•	 Up	to	5,000	young	people	are	referred	to	diversion	programmes	annually;
•	 Opportunity	to	create	a	co-located	multi-agency	youth	offender	service;
•	 In	 2015,	 the	 Irish	 Youth	 Justice	 Service	 will	 role	 out	 the	 full	 version	 of	 an	
assessment tool to all diversion programmes which can be used to develop an 
intervention plan for the children referred;
Adult Offenders
Recommendation 10.3
Recommendation 10.4
•	 Work	with	young	offenders	is	far	more	established	than	the	programmes	for	
adult offenders; 
•	 A	 large	 number	 of	 effective	 policing	 operations	 on	 high	 risk	 and	 prolific	
offenders	are	conducted,	but	there	is	not	a	co-ordinated,	multi-agency	approach	
to offender management; 
•	 A	number	of	regional	approaches	to	offenders	who	operate	across	regional	and	
divisional boundaries with a focus on the identification of suspect offenders;
•	 Restorative	 justice	 is	 far	 less	 developed	 and	 resourced	 for	 adults	 than	 for	
young offenders;
 Release programmes and supervision orders
•	 Compliance	rates	with	community	returns,	which	provides	earned	temporary	
release, appear to be high;
•	 Probation	officers	 reported	 that	 they	find	 it	difficult	 to	obtain	a	 copy	of	 the	
garda	 case	 précis	 or	 statement	 of	 facts	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 creating	 a	 pre-
sanction report for the courts; 
•	 Those	on	shorter	prison	sentences	do	not	always	receive	treatment	programmes	
to	impact	on	re-offending	behaviour;
•	 No	examples	were	found	of	application	of	orders	to	place	restrictions	on	certain	
activities following release from prison as provided for under Section 26 of the 
Criminal	Justice	Act,	2007	(as	amended);	
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Integrated Offender 
Management
Recommendation 10.5
Recommendation 10.6
Recommendation 10.7
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 has	 developed	 a	 new	 pilot	 scheme	 called	 the	 Strategic	
Approach	 to	Offender	Recidivism	 (SAOR)	 to	manage	prolific	 offenders	 in	 a	
consistent	way	across	divisions.	This	was	 launched	in	the	DMR	Region	and	
was accompanied by training and briefings to key personnel; 
•	 In	March	2013,	 the	 Irish	Prison	Service	 and	 the	Probation	Service	 launched	
a	 joint	 strategic	 plan	 whose	 objectives	 include	 the	 management	 of	 prolific	
offenders in a consistent way and in partnership with key agencies;
•	 Opportunity	 to	 create	 a	 co-located	 multi-agency	 integrated	 offender	
management service;
SORAM •	 A	joint	model	of	sex	offender	management	was	introduced	in	June	2010	called	
the	Sex	Offender	Risk	Assessment	and	Management	(SORAM)	which	brings	
together	the	Garda	Síochána,	HSE	and	the	Probation	Service	to	establish	the	
risk of reoffending;
•	 In	 divisions	 where	 SORAM	 was	 operating,	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 better	
understanding	of	the	requirements	of	the	need	to	risk	assess.	SORAM	is	a	way	
of	co-ordinating	the	response	to	a	small,	high	risk	group	of	offenders;
•	 In	some	divisions,	SORAM	was	described	as	a	dynamic	process	and	in	others	
as being very slow and evolving;
•	 Once	the	gardaí	are	notified	of	the	registration	of	a	sex	offender	in	their	area,	a	
risk assessment takes place to assess the risk posed by the offender; 
•	 Some	gardaí	and	those	involved	in	SORAM	are	untrained	in	risk	assessment;
•	 Garda	 Sex	 Offender	 Management	 Unit	 (SOMU)	 do	 not	 always	 receive	
notification from a court that a person is required to register following 
conviction and in some cases an offender is not notified of the registration 
requirement;
•	 Garda	would	like	to	see	the	seven	day	period	to	register	reduced	to	three	and	
would like an obligation to be placed on offenders to attend their local garda 
station; 
•	 With	 three	 information	 systems	 in	 operation	 across	 the	 SORAM	 agencies,	
there	are	barriers	to	sharing	of	information	on	sex	offenders;	
•	 Garda	 Paedophile	 Investigations	 Unit	 (PIU)	 deals	 with	 a	 large	 number	 of	
requests from districts in cases under investigation. Unnecessary time is 
wasted as result of system restrictions on sending information electronically. 
There is limited access to social media available at district level;
•	 The	PIU	has	poor	IT	resources;
Warrants
Recommendation 10.8
Recommendation 10.9
Recommendation 10.10
Recommendation 10.11
•	 Warrants	and	summons	are	sometimes	issued	in	false	names	and	addresses;
•	 Gardaí	 often	 receive	 warrants	 without	 a	 date	 of	 birth	 or	 other	 identifying	
features; 
•	 Other	police	services	use	national	and	local	media	to	publish	photographs	of	
most wanted persons to engage the public in helping to find them;
•	 Bench	warrants	 issued	 in	Dublin	 City	 courts	 are	 put	 directly	 onto	 PULSE.	
Outside	of	Dublin,	bench	warrants	are	 sent	 from	 the	court	by	post	or	hand	
delivered,	which	adds	delays	to	executing	the	warrant;
•	 Circuit	court	warrants	are	sent	directly	to	garda	stations;
•	 Penal	and	estreatment	warrants	are	sent	by	post	to	garda	districts.	Where	large	
numbers are sent they can take between three weeks and three months to enter 
onto	PULSE;	
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•	 A	warning	marker	(WTR)	is	placed	on	PULSE	that	a	warrant	has	been	issued	
for	a	person.	This	does	not	update	the	original	PULSE	record	for	the	crime	the	
suspect was linked to, and it does not link the warrant to the address where 
the person resides;
Warrants Received, 
Executed and 
Cancelled
Recommendation 10.12
Recommendation 10.13
Recommendation 10.14
Recommendation 10.15
Recommendation 10.16
Recommendation 10.17
•	 Garda	Síochána	had	approximately	122,000	warrants	on	hand	in	January	2014,	
a	1%	reduction	on	the	previous	year;	
•	 Garda	 Síochána	 executed	 50,350	 warrants	 in	 2013.	 Of	 the	 total	 number	
executed,	84%	were	new	warrants.	A	total	of	13,049	warrants	were	cancelled	in	
2013;
•	 All	gardaí	are	involved	in	the	execution	of	warrants	in	some	divisions,	whereas	
it is the role of the warrants units in others;
•	 Currently	districts	manage	their	own	warrants;	
•	 Some	warrant	unit	support	staff	do	not	have	access	to	PULSE	intelligence	and	
prison data; 
•	 Bench	and	 committal	warrants	 carry	 the	highest	 risk	and	are	 a	priority	 for	
warrants units; 
•	 There	 can	 sometimes	 be	 difficulties	 in	 finding	 the	 original	 warrants	 and	
charge sheets for court appearances;
•	 Two	warrant	audits	conducted	by	the	Garda	Síochána	found	that	22%	of	all	
warrants could not be located on the day of the audit;
•	 Charges	are	not	always	brought	in	cases	where	a	person	bailed	from	a	garda	
station	or	from	a	court,	who	has	signed	a	bond,	fails	to	attend	court.	Failing	to	
do	so	removes	the	opportunity	to	raise	this	as	an	objection	to	granting	bail	in	
the future;
•	 Letters	are	often	sent	asking	people	to	hand	themselves	in	at	a	garda	station.	
This is an effective option, however, it appears that on occasions there is no 
follow up action;
•	 In	some	cases	gardaí	are	not	arresting	persons	wanted	on	a	bench	warrant	as	
it would involve the arresting member attending court; 
•	 Limited	recorded	evidence	of	action	taken	to	execute	a	warrant;	
•	 Very	little	evidence	of	the	execution	of	historical	warrants;
•	 Lack	of	policy	providing	guidance	as	to	when	a	warrant	may	be	cancelled;
•	 Warrant	 units	 received	 a	 notification	 not	 to	 execute	 estreatment	 warrants	
that were issued before 2013. As a result, thousands of such warrants were 
cancelled; 
•	 Gardaí	 often	 spend	 several	 hours	 trying	 to	 find	 a	 prison	 that	will	 accept	 a	
person	who	is	wanted	on	a	penal	warrant.	Often	persons	committed	to	prison	
for failure to pay fines are released immediately;
•	 No	correlation	between	 the	numbers	of	warrants	 in	some	divisions	and	 the	
numbers of staff employed in warrant units; 
•	 The	current	system	of	penal	warrants	is	inefficient	and	needs	to	be	addressed;
Bail
Recommendation 10.18
Recommendation 10.19
•	 Persons	who	should	be	kept	in	custody	are	sometimes	released	on	station	bail	
when	the	local	court	is	not	sitting	on	the	next	day;
•	 An	 inconsistent	 understanding	 amongst	 gardaí	 about	 objecting	 to	 bail	 and	
when	to	use	Section	2	Bail	and	when	to	use	the	O’Callaghan	rules;
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•	 A	risk	of	complacency	amongst	gardaí	based	on	a	belief	that	people	get	out	on	
bail	and	there	is	no	point	in	objecting;
•	 Attending	 High	 Court	 bail	 appeals	 can	 take	 up	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	
members time;
•	 Multiple	bail	conditions	are	sometimes	attached	to	persons	awaiting	trial.	This	
creates challenges for the Garda Síochána in terms of ensuring that conditions 
are monitored;
•	 Court	bail	decisions	are	not	recorded	on	PULSE;
•	 In	 relation	 to	 signing	 on	 at	 a	 garda	 station,	 there	were	multiple	 signing	 on	
books in stations visited, limited space for entries; with little process for a daily 
check	of	 the	 signing-on	books	 to	 identify	 anyone	 that	had	 failed	 to	present	
themselves;
•	 Some	good	evidence	of	managing	people	on	curfews;
•	 The	absence	of	a	direct	power	of	arrest	when	a	person	breaches	bail	conditions	
adds an unnecessary delay in the process of bringing a person back to court;
•	 Some	districts	have	unmanageable	numbers	signing	on	at	garda	stations;
•	 PULSE	has	a	bail	application	to	electronically	record	people	signing	on	but	it	is	
not always used;
•	 Difficult	to	abstract	information	on	previous	convictions	from	PULSE.
Part 11: Detecting and Prosecuting Crime
This part looks at the detection and prosecution of crime. The success of many 
police services is usually assessed on the ability to reduce crime and solve 
crime.	Detecting	 crime	 is	 an	 important	 element	of	policing	and	 influences	
public	confidence	in	the	criminal	justice	system.
Detecting and 
Prosecuting Crime Key Points/Findings
Crime Counting 
Rules
Recommendation 11.1
•	 Rules	governing	 the	detection	of	crime	are	contained	 in	 the	 text	of	a	Garda	
Síochána	HQ	Directive	which	is	generally	referred	to	as	the	Crime	Counting	
Rules;
•	 The	 main	 criteria	 for	 considering	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 crime	 should	
be recorded as detected include criminal proceedings based on 
sufficient evidence; or a young person dealt with on a diversion 
programme and a number of situations where there is sufficient 
admissible evidence to charge but proceedings can not or will not be brought 
forward for a number of stated reasons;
•	 Crime	counting	rules	in	many	other	jurisdictions	are	more	detailed	and	have	
stricter rules on detections than those being used by the Garda Síochána;
•	 Many	district	officers	were	not	aware	of	a	requirement	to	review	unsuccessful	
prosecutions, and no evidence was provided that this takes place;
•	 New	 guidance	 procedures	 are	 required	 to	 enhance	 compliance	with	 crime	
counting rules;
•	 In	many	examples,	detections	are	claimed	early	without	finishing	the	case	and	
charging or summonsing an offender; 
Crime Investigation Report       Summary of Findings and Recommendations
Summary  |  35
Detecting and 
Prosecuting Crime Key Points/Findings
Divisional 
Detections
Recommendation 11.2
Recommendation 11.3
Recommendation 11.4
Recommendation 11.5
•	 No	evidence	of	quality	assurance	at	regional	or	headquarter	level	to	determine	
if detections are correctly recorded;
•	 Detections	across	the	seven	divisions	visited	show	a	wide	variation	in	detection	
rates across different crime categories; 
•	 Some	 detection	 status	 codes	 are	 confusing	 and	 use	 investigation	 outcomes	
rather	 then	 detection	 outcomes,	 as	 some	 descriptions,	 such	 as	 ‘under	
investigation’,	‘proceedings	complete’	or	‘committed	for	trial’;
•	 Good	 practice	 was	 found	 in	 a	 number	 of	 cases	 where	 an	 investigator	 had	
entered	details	of	the	detection	in	the	PULSE	narrative	and	highlighted	that	
the person has been charged or summonsed;
•	 Many	detected	crimes	were	 found	on	PULSE,	with	 the	status	code	field	 left	
blank;
•	 Many	 instances	of	PULSE	 incidents,	with	recorded	detection	codes	 that	did	
not have an associated charge, summons or a caution with it;
•	 On	many	occasions	 a	 crime	 is	 shown	as	detected	on	 the	 same	day	 that	 the	
PULSE	record	is	created;
•	 GISC	is	not	assigned	any	role	in	the	review	of	detections;	
•	 The	third	category	under	the	Crime	Counting	Rules	where	there	is	sufficient	
admissible evidence to charge but proceedings can not or will not be brought 
forward for a number of stated reasons, allows considerable scope for district 
officers to detect a large percentage of crime when a suspect is identified;
•	 A	number	of	cases	in	the	third	category	are	shown	as	detected	but	no	rationale	
is given; 
•	 On	checking	two	HQ	Directives	issued	in	2013,1 the Inspectorate did not find 
any mention of detections and specifically who has responsibility for checking 
the validity of a detection;
•	 GISC	should	have	a	key	role	to	play	in	crime	detections	and	to	establish	if	a	
crime is detected that there is evidence to support it;
•	 Limited	evidence	of	supervision	of	detected	crime	on	PULSE	or	in	case	files;
•	 Other	policing	jurisdiction	use	Dedicated	Decision	Makers	(DDMs)	to	make	a	
decision on whether a crime is detected;
•	 There	are	no	restrictions	on	PULSE	to	prevent	a	member	from	showing	a	crime	
as	detected.	PULSE	also	allows	a	retrospective	detection	date	to	be	entered;
•	 A	 Garda	 Crime	 Registrar	 should	 be	 appointed	 with	 responsibility	 for	
introducing systems to ensure compliance with detection, counting rules and 
be the final decision maker for any appeals raised about decisions;
1 
1	 There	 were	 two	 HQ	 Directives:	 (i)	 A	 review	 of	 PULSE	
incidents	roles	and	responsibilities	of	GISC	sergeants,	garda	
and	 district	 officers	 and	 (ii)	 A	 review	 of	 PULSE	 incidents	
supervisory responsibilities.
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Pulse Sampling of 
Detections
Recommendation 11.6
Recommendation 11.7
Recommendation 11.8
Recommendation 11.9
Recommendation 11.10
Recommendation 11.11
Recommendation 11.12
Recommendation 11.13
Recommendation 11.14
The Inspectorate requested detection data from the Garda Síochána in the form of 
a	PULSE	search	of	key	volume	crime	areas	in	a	three	month	period	in	2012	of	the	
seven districts visited:
•	 Of	2,195	crimes	reported,	946	were	recorded	on	PULSE	as	detected,	resulting	
in	a	detection	rate	of	43%;	only	390	of	the	total	detections	had	a	charge	or	a	
summons	attached	to	the	PULSE	incident.	On	examination,	the	Inspectorate’s	
view	is	the	correct	detection	rate	is	26%;
•	 Inspectorate	 examined	 318	 of	 the	 556	 PULSE	 incidents	where	 there	was	 no	
charge or summons recorded;
•	 In	60%	of	a	sample	of	incidents	reviewed,	the	detected	date	was	the	same	as	the	
reported date for the crime;
•	 A	number	of	crimes	were	shown	as	‘no	proceedings	authorised	by	a	district	
officer’,	but	 the	PULSE	record	had	no	rationale	 to	explain	why	the	case	was	
detected;
•	 Many	of	the	detections	on	PULSE	were	claimed	well	in	advance	of	meeting	the	
criteria for detecting a crime;
•	 In	relation	to	young	offenders	there	was	a	practice	of	prematurely	detecting	
a crime before a young offender was deemed suitable for the diversion 
programme;
•	 A	 significant	 number	 of	 JLO	 cases	 recorded	 as	 detected,	 even	 though	 the	
person	was	marked	on	PULSE	as	unsuitable	for	the	scheme;
•	 Progressing	 cases	 deemed	 unsuitable	 for	 a	 Garda	 Youth	 Diversion	 Office	
(GYDO)	caution	varied	across	the	divisions	visited;
•	 The	reasons	for	retaining	a	detection	after	a	non-conviction	must	be	recorded	
on	PULSE.	Otherwise,	 the	PULSE	record	should	be	amended	 to	change	 the	
incident as not detected;
•	 Divisions	and	districts	have	conducted	audits	of	drug	cases	and	found	large	
numbers of cases where drugs have been seized and no proceedings have been 
taken;
•	 Volume	Crime	Review	Cases,	twenty-nine	out	of	158	cases	were	recorded	as	
detected.	Of	those	twenty-two	were	correctly	recorded;
•	 There	is	no	adult	caution	system	for	possession	of	drugs;
•	 Garda	Síochána	are	recording	some	incidents	as	crimes	on	PULSE	and	showing	
a	detected	crime	under	the	category	of	‘Informal	Caution’.	This	process	creates	
a crime and creates a detection. This is usually for less serious offences, but 
such a detection adds to the overall detection rates. The Inspectorate does not 
support	the	use	of	‘Informal	Cautions’;
•	 There	are	opportunity	to	extend	the	use	of	Fixed	Charge	Penalty	Notices	to	
include other minor crimes;
•	 Crimes	 that	 were	 reclassified	 as	 part	 of	 ‘Operation	 Look-Back’	 were	 in	
most	 cases	 reclassified	 to	 a	 less	 serious	 crime.	 For	 these	 crimes,	 there	were	
no	 suspects	and	 they	were	undetected.	 In	many	of	 the	 cases	examined,	 the	
Inspectorate did not agree with the change in category;
•	 Offenders	are	not	always	informed	that	a	crime	is	shown	as	detected	against	
them;
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•	 In	 one	 district	 the	 district	 officer,	 detective	 superintendent	 and	 a	 detective	
sergeant made decisions to change burglary offences to a less serious crime 
where	there	was	no	rationale	to	explain	why	a	crime	was	moved	to	another	
category. A reduction in the number of recorded crimes such as these burglary 
offences	automatically	improves	an	existing	detection	rate	for	that	particular	
crime category, without solving any more crimes;
•	 Incidents	 initially	 recorded	 on	 PULSE	 in	 a	 non-crime	 category	 such	 as	
Attention	 and	 Complaints,	 where	 the	 identification	 of	 a	 suspect	 was	
subsequently made and a detection claimed was accompanied by a 
reclassification to a crime;
•	 Many	examples	where	a	crime	was	shown	in	a	less	serious	category	than	the	
PULSE	record,	the	victim’s	statement	of	the	case	file	suggested;
•	 Detection	 rates	 are	 lower	 than	 those	 claimed	 and	 this	 does	 not	 take	 into	
account	crimes	that	are	not	recorded	on	PULSE	or	crimes	that	are	shown	in	the	
wrong	category.	Crime	must	be	recorded	accurately,	so	that	claimed	detections	
are correct;
•	 Inspectorate	advocates	an	internal	auditing	process	for	crime	counting	rules,	
conducted	by	a	Garda	Crime	Registrar,	outside	of	the	operational	command	
and without responsibility for crime recording or crime detecting;
•	 An	annual	 inspection	of	detections	should	be	conducted	by	an	independent	
body;
Investigation 
Outcomes
Recommendation 11.15
•	 Many	 less	 serious	cases	go	very	close	 to	 the	six	month	 time	 limit	before	an	
application is made for a summons;
•	 Significant	 delays	 in	many	non-time	 statute	 barred	 cases,	 often	 taking	 over	
twelve months to reach summons application stage;
•	 Not	all	divisions	track	warrants	to	check	service;
•	 Inefficient	system	for	service	of	summonses;
•	 Opportunities	 to	 reduce	 the	number	of	 repeat	witness	 summonses	 in	 court	
trials;
•	 There	are	many	occasions	when	a	garda	is	aware	that	an	offender	needs	to	
be	summonsed,	but	they	fail	to	start	the	process	within	the	six	month	time	
limit;
•	 An	absence	of	supervision	to	ensure	that	cases	were	progressed	or	that	cases	
about to lapse were progressed in time;
•	 In	one	district,	progress	is	monitored	to	ensure	that	action	is	taken	to	serve	a	
summons;
•	 Where	summonses	are	not	served,	 in	some	cases	 there	can	be	up	to	five	re-
issues;
•	 Unable	 to	obtain	data	 to	determine	how	many	summonses	were	not	served	
and	were	not	re-issued;
Court and 
Prosecution 
Processes
Recommendation 11.16
•	 Absence	of	good	data	created	and	shared	between	the	Court	Service,	the	DPP,	
the Garda Síochána and other agencies involved in the prosecution process;
•	 Development	of	good	partnership	data	will	enable	criminal	justice	partners	to	
take action to address obstacles in bringing cases to an earlier conclusion;
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Court Processes
Recommendation 11.17
•	 Recommends	a	review	of	district	court	structures	to	ensure	the	best	possible	
alignment with the proposed changes to the Garda Síochána structures;
•	 Cases	can	be	dismissed	where	there	were	unacceptable	and	undue	delays	in	
investigations;
•	 Cases	may	be	dismissed	because	of	failure	to	properly	disclose	evidence;
•	 Cases	 are	 often	 remanded	 on	 several	 occasions	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 for	 long	
periods of time;
•	 A	district	court	visited	estimated	that	80%	of	cases	are	adjourned;	
•	 Pre-trial	hearings	are	a	welcome	process	which	should	be	extended	to	district	
court cases listed for trial;
•	 Wide	 variation	 in	 who	 presents	 cases	 in	 court	 and	 the	 abilities	 of	 those	
performing this role. The Inspectorate observed several members in courts 
and while most were very proficient, some lacked the skills to perform this 
role;
•	 Court	presenting	is	not	a	rank	dependant	position	but	requires	a	person	with	
the skills to present criminal cases in court;
•	 Court	 presenting	 scheme	 should	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 state	 prosecution	
scheme for district courts, not only deal with first hearings but also present 
all contested cases at district court level; 
Inefficiencies in 
Criminal Justice 
Processes
Recommendation 11.18
Recommendation 11.19
Recommendation 11.20
•	 Charge	sheets	are	sometimes	not	provided	in	good	time	to	courts;
•	 Arranging	 court	 dates	 around	 garda	 rosters	 and	 annual/sick	 leave	 often	
provides enormous challenges and cases are sometimes listed on dates when 
key garda witnesses are unavailable;
•	 Data	 is	not	collected	on	cases	 that	are	struck	out	due	 to	 the	non-attendance	
of victims or witnesses. It is important to collect that data for analysis and to 
identify trends;
•	 Non-controversial	 written	 witness	 statements	 should,	 where	 possible	 be	
admissible in evidence. Through increased use of this provision, there is 
great potential to significantly reduce the numbers of professional and private 
witnesses that are called to court;
•	 Breaches	of	suspended	sentences	are	not	always	brought	to	the	attention	of	a	
court;
•	 The	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 would	 be	 assisted	
through	the	provision	of	pre-charge	advice	to	investigators;	
•	 Gardaí	perform	a	host	of	court	roles	such	as	general	security	and	outside	of	the	
DMR,	looking	after	jurors;
•	 Examples	given	of	court	convictions	and	suspended	sentences	not	recorded	on	
PULSE;
•	 Use	 of	 video-linking	 by	 the	 Courts	 Service,	 the	 Prison	 Service	 and	 by	 the	
Garda Síochána is a welcome initiative;
•	 Other	countries	have	strategic	partners	on	criminal	justice	boards	that	remove	
operational	barriers	in	criminal	justice	processes;
•	 Other	 police	 services	 operate	 divisional	 criminal	 justice	 groups	 to	 bring	
together partner agencies;
•	 Many	other	police	services	have	criminal	justice	units	at	a	divisional	level	that	
manage post charge criminal cases and provide a single point of contact for all 
prosecutions.
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Overview of the 
Guerin Report
•	 The	Guerin	Report	 specifically	 relates	 to	 the	 review	of	one	 specific	district	
although	 the	 report	 identifies	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 the	 Cavan/Monaghan	
division.	The	Report	states	“the	purpose	of	this	review	is	not	to	make	findings	
of	fact	or	to	determine	any	disputed	question	of	fact	or	law.”;
•	 Inspectorate’s	 findings	 in	 the	 Crime	 Investigation	 Report	 refer	 to	 seven	
divisions;
•	 The	Crime	Investigation	Report	contains	over	200	recommendations	and	on	
reviewing	 the	 issues	 identified	 in	 the	Guerin	Report	 it	 does	not	make	 any	
additional	recommendations	to	the	Crime	Investigation	Report;
First Steps at a 
Crime Scene and 
Incident Recording
•	 The	Guerin	Report	highlighted	issues	in	relation	to	gathering	evidence	at	a	
crime	scene	and	inaccurate	entries	on	PULSE	including,	delays	in	retrieving	
evidence, no entries in garda note books, missing reports, inaccurate and 
incorrect	entries	on	PULSE,	alternation	to	the	narrative	on	PULSE;
•	 Inspectorate	found	similar	issues	and	has	made	recommendations	to	address	
each of these points made including: the removal of the ability to change 
the	 narrative	 on	 PULSE;	 introduction	 of	 a	 crime	 investigation	 and	 case	
management system and recommendations to improve the recording of calls 
through the introduction of a national electronic recording system; 
Crime Investigation •	 The	 Guerin	 Report	 highlighted	 poor	 standards	 in	 crime	 investigation	
including: delays in taking statements; delays in completion of investigations; 
absence	 of	 note	 book	 entries;	 flaws	 in	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 chain	 of	
evidence; late summonses and issues with identification parade management 
and interviewing;
•	 Inspectorate	found	similar	issues	and	has	made	recommendations	to	address	
each of these points raised including; the adoption of minimum standards of 
investigation; the introduction of dedicated investigative units and enhanced 
technology to allow for crime investigations to be accurately recorded and 
cases tracked through an electronic case management system;
Crime Management •	 The	Guerin	Report	 highlighted	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 late	 submission	 of	
case	files;	undated	statements;	non-reassignment	of	investigation	files	when	
the investigating officer is on long term leave and investigative actions not 
progressed;
•	 Inspectorate	 found	 similar	 issues	 and	 has	 made	 recommendations	 to	
address each of these points raised including: a crime investigation and case 
management system that captures all information relating to a crime and the 
introduction of crime management units at divisional level;
Addendum
This	part	is	the	result	of	a	request	by	the	Minister	for	Justice	and	Equality,	
Ms	Frances	Fitzgerald,	T.D.	pursuant	to	section	117	of	the	Garda	Síochána	Act,	
2005 to carry out an inquiry into all the crime investigation and other garda 
management, operational and procedural issues identified in the Guerin 
Report.
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Supervision •	 The	Guerin	 Report	 highlighted	 issues	 in	 respect	 of	 senior	 garda	 visibility	
including:	 front-line	 supervision;	 performance	 monitoring;	 abstractions;	
frequency of turnover of superintendents; absence of inspectors and failure to 
comply with directions from superior officers went without action;
•	 Inspectorate	 found	 similar	 issues	 and	 has	 made	 recommendations	 to	
address each of these points raised including: enhanced supervision for call 
handing, incident recording, crime management, crime investigation and 
detections; a new divisional structure for enhanced supervision; clear roles of 
responsibility	for	supervisors	and	increased	front-line	supervision	to	ensure	
crime is effectively investigated;
Training •	 The	Guerin	Report	identified	issues	in	respect	of	gathering	evidence	at	a	crime	
scene	including:	inaccurate	entries	on	PULSE;	monitoring	arrangements	for	
probationary	gardaí	and	inexperienced	gardaí	investigating	crime;
•	 Inspectorate	found	similar	issues	and	has	made	recommendations	to	address	
each of these points raised including: conducting a training needs analysis of 
front-line	gardaí	to	identify	gaps	in	skills	and	to	provide	training	to	address	
priority areas;
Victims •	 The	Guerin	Report	 highlighted	 issues	with	 the	 interaction	with	 victims	 at	
the	 time	 of	 reporting	 a	 crime	 including:	 follow-up	 contact	 with	 victims;	
unsatisfactory treatment of victims; misleading victims on progress of case 
files; discouragement of victims proceeding with an investigation and passive 
treatment of victims with occasions when victims were brought face to face 
with a suspected offender by gardaí;
•	 Inspectorate	found	similar	issues	and	has	made	recommendations	to	address	
each of these points raised including: a process of contacting victims; 
establishing the service provided and obtaining customer feedback;
Detections and 
Monitoring of 
Suspects
•	 The	 Guerin	 Report	 highlighted	 issues	 with	 the	 management	 of	 suspects	
involved in crime and the recording of detections including: management of 
bail at garda stations; recording of detections prematurely; number of statute 
barred cases and discrepancies in custody and bail records;
•	 Inspectorate	found	similar	issues	and	has	made	recommendations	to	address	
each of these points raised including: management of named suspects in a 
crime requiring immediate attention; enhanced supervision of detections; 
changes to custody management; and bail and warrant management which 
should be electrically monitored;
Communication and 
Use of Intelligence
•	 The	 Guerin	 Report	 highlighted	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 sharing	 of	
information and contact between senior gardaí and members including: poor 
communication	between	ranks,	divisions,	within	stations	and	with	external	
organisations; important information not shared across divisions and the 
recording	of	children	on	PULSE;
•	 Inspectorate	found	similar	issues	and	has	made	recommendations	to	address	
each of these points including: improvement in how the Garda Síochána 
facilitate good information sharing internally across the organisation and 
externally	with	partners	to	tackle	crime	and	disorder	and	an	urgent	review	of	
the	recording	of	children	on	PULSE;
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Discipline •	 The	Guerin	Report	 identified	 issues	 in	 the	disciplinary	process	 for	dealing	
with neglect of duty and highlighted that no case led to disciplinary 
proceedings being brought against supervisors or management;
•	 Inspectorate	 found	 issues	 relating	 to	 supervision	 including:	 investigations	
not conducted in a prompt and efficient manner and no action was taken to 
address any lack of supervision in these cases, with the focus appearing to be 
solely on the individual garda that dealt with the original response call;
•	 Inspectorate	 did	 not	 examine	 the	 disciplinary	 process	 issue	 in	 the	 Crime	
Investigation	report.	These	are	not	matters	which	fall	within	the	Inspectorate’s	
remit. The Inspectorate proposes that the efficiency of the internal disciplinary 
process	be	further	considered	by	the	Department	of	Justice	and	Equality	in	
conjunction	with	the	Garda	Síochána	and	the	Garda	Síochána	Ombudsman	
Commission;
Bailieboro 
Examination 2010
•	 The	 Guerin	 Report	 identified	 an	 examination	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Garda	
Professional	Standards	Unit	(GPSU)	of	the	Bailieboro	District	and	highlighted	
an issue regarding policing processes;
•	 Inspectorate	 reviewed	 the	 GPSU	 examination	 of	 Bailieboro	 together	 with	
template questions and notes of interviews. The full review and findings of 
this	examination	by	the	Inspectorate	are	outlined	in	the	Addendum	to	this	
report.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
Recommendation 1 
The Garda Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality establish 
and task a criminal justice service group, 
comprised of the agencies and stakeholders that 
are responsible for community safety in Ireland, 
with overseeing the implementation of all of the 
recommendations accepted from this report.
Part 1
Crime Prevention
Recommendation 1.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops and implements a crime 
prevention strategy that articulates how garda 
resources will be used to prevent crime. (Short 
term)
Recommendation 1.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána agrees a protocol with local authorities 
to ensure that major development planning 
applications are reviewed by crime prevention 
officers trained in environmental design. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 1.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a Standard Operating 
Procedure for the use of crime prevention officers 
to reduce offending opportunities. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Review	 the	 need	 to	 deploy	 sergeants	 and	
sworn	members	as	crime	prevention	officers.	
Recommendation 1.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána National Crime Prevention Unit 
provides central co-ordination and support 
to crime prevention officers activity to ensure 
consistency of deployment. (Short term).
Recommendation 1.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a national standard for 
conducting crime surveys and providing crime 
prevention literature. (Medium term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Create	a	national	standard	crime	prevention	
pack	 for	 Garda	 Síochána	 priority	 crime	
victims;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 gardaí	 are	 trained	 to	 an	
appropriate	 level	 to	 conduct	 an	 effective	
crime	prevention	survey;
•	 Ensure	 that	 surveys	 for	 businesses	 are	
monitored	and	checked	for	compliance	and	
crime	outcomes.
Recommendation 1.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the process for providing 
information to text alert schemes and explores 
options for enhancing the information that is 
provided. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 1.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an analysis of crime hot-
spots to identify priority areas for re-launching 
dormant schemes or developing new ones. (Short 
term).
Recommendation 1.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the provision of crime 
prevention advice on the Garda Website and 
seeks to adopt best international practice. (Short 
term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Promote	crime	prevention	 information	that	
is	available	on	the	Garda	Website.
Recommendation 1.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána promotes property marking initiatives 
through local Neighbourhood Watch and 
Community Alert schemes and explores the 
application of DNA products. (Medium term).
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To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Consider	sponsorship	opportunities.
Recommendation 1.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána tasks garda analysts to conduct enhanced 
analysis of crime in respect of identifying trends 
in victims and developing activity to reduce 
victimisation rates. (Medium term).
Recommendation 1.11
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána explores new technology opportunities 
for the use in prevention and detection of crime. 
(Medium term). 
Recommendation 1.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts analysis of call data on a 
divisional basis to identify the top places that 
generate demand for policing services and 
introduces initiatives to reduce the impact on 
local policing. (Medium term).
Recommendation 1.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of the use of anti-
social behaviour legislation and ensures that the 
available powers are used effectively. (Medium 
term).
Recommendation 1.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána designates chief superintendents to 
engage key strategic partners to address key 
issues that impact on all partner agencies and 
to develop joint plans to tackle local crime and 
disorder. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 Joint	 Policing	 Committees	 are	
fully	engaged	in	crime	prevention	activity.
Part 2
Divisional Policing
Recommendation 2.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a new divisional model of 
delivering policing services. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 divisional	 approach	 to	 the	
deployment	of	detective	units;
•	 Create	a	single	divisional	intelligence	hub;	
•	 Develop	 a	 single	 divisional	 administration	
unit	and	redeploy	any	additional	resources	
to	crime	investigation	or	front-line	policing	
services;
•	 Develop	 a	 divisional	 approach	 to	 the	
deployment	of	regular	units;	
•	 Develop	 a	 divisional	 approach	 for	 the	
deployment	 of	 specialist	 units	 i.e.	 drugs	
units,	traffic	and	community	policing;	
•	 Seek	all	opportunities	to	utilise	police	staff	
to	release	gardaí	for	operational	roles.		
Recommendation 2.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a bureaucracy taskforce on a 
national level that brings together representatives 
from divisions and specialist units to prioritise 
key actions for reducing unnecessary bureaucracy 
and waste of resources. (Short term).
Recommendation 2.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a new model of functionality 
for divisional superintendents. (Medium term). 
(See Delivery Divisional Model Functionality 
Responsibilities Chart 2.11)	
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following actions need to be taken:
•	 Establish	 key	 functional	 roles	 at	 the	
divisional	level	and	appoint	superintendents	
to	fill	these	roles;	
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•	 Appoint	 a	 detective	 superintendent	 or	
crime	 manager	 for	 each	 division,	 with	
responsibility	 for	 crime	 investigation	 and	
criminal	justice	issues;
•	 Line	management	of	all	divisional	detectives	
and	other	crime	resources	to	be	placed	with	
the	senior	detective.	
Recommendation 2.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a new model for posting 
people and particularly those on promotion. 
(Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Restrict	the	number	of	people	that	are	forced	
to	travel	long	distances;	
•	 Engage	 chief	 superintendents	 in	 selection	
processes	 for	 senior	 staff	 by	 creating	 role	
specific	requirements	for	the	post;	
•	 Allow	 chief	 superintendents	 to	 decide	 on	
the	specific	posting	of	superintendents	and	
senior	staff;	
•	 Succession	 planning	 for	 chief	
superintendents	 and	 superintendents	
should	 include	 a	 period	 of	 working	
alongside	the	incumbent	officer;
•	 Introduce	 minimum	 term	 tenure	 for	 chief	
superintendents	and	superintendents;	
•	 Develop	a	new	approach	to	the	posting	and	
deployment	 of	 superintendents	 and	 other	
supervisors.
Recommendation 2.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a visibility model for senior 
gardaí and a model for engagement with staff. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 2.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a policing model that has 
at least one uniform inspector on duty in each 
division at all times. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Create	 new	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
inspectors.
Recommendation 2.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a policing model and that 
has at least one dedicated uniform patrol 
sergeant on duty in each division at all times. 
(Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Create	 new	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
patrol	sergeants.
Recommendation 2.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a policing model that places 
detective inspectors under the line management 
of a divisional detective superintendent. (Medium 
term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Update	 the	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 of	
detective	inspectors.
Recommendation 2.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a policing model for 
divisional detective units that provides effective 
supervision of detective resources. (Medium 
term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Create	 new	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
detective	sergeants.	
Recommendation 2.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána designs a national resource allocation 
model that allocates resources fairly and matches 
resources to policing needs. (Long term).1
1	 This	 recommendation	 was	 contained	 in	 the	 Report	 of	 the	
Garda	Síochána	 Inspectorate,	Resource	Allocation,	October	
2009	(page	7).
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Recommendation 2.11 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána design a national vehicle allocation 
model that allocates resources fairly and matches 
resources to policing needs. 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Take	 account	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review	recommendations.
Recommendation 2.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána completes the review of the pilot roster, 
with particular focus on the availability of front-
line supervisors and the impact of the roster on 
detective units and on the investigation of crime.
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Take	 account	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review	recommendations.
Recommendation 2.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a system that delivers an 
effective briefing, tasking and de-briefing process 
to all operational members. (Short term).
Recommendation 2.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a performance management 
system that holds individuals to account and 
deals with under performance. (Medium term).2
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Take	 account	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review	recommendations.
2	 Report	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 Inspectorate,	 Resource	
Allocation,	October	2009,	(Page	7).
Part 3
First Response
Recommendation 3.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a command and control 
system that accurately records calls for service 
and effectively identifies and uses all available 
resources to manage demand more efficiently. 
(Medium term).3
Recommendation 3.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána (i) allows only trained members to create 
and update live CAD messages and (ii) improves 
practices in non-CAD stations. (Medium term).
Recommendation 3.3
The Inspectorate recommends a Department of 
Justice and Equality working group review the 
feasibility and impact of a single non-emergency 
number.4 (Long term).
Recommendation 3.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána rationalises the number of control 
rooms in operation and moves towards a small 
number of call centres.5 (Medium term).
Recommendation 3.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a broader range of Computer 
Aided Dispatch (CAD) incident assignment codes 
and ensures that divisions without CAD are 
accurately recording the type of incident and the 
full details of what has happened. (Short term).
3	 Report	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 Inspectorate,	 Resource	
Allocation,	 October	 2009	 made	 several	 recommendations	
covering	this	matter.
4	 A	 similar	 recommendation	 on	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 non-
emergency	 number	was	made	 in	 the	 Inspectorate’s	 report,	
Resource	Allocation,	October	2009.
5	 A	similar	recommendation	on	the	number	of	Control	Rooms	
was	made	in	the	Inspectorate’s	report,	Resource	Allocation,	
October	2009.
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Recommendation 3.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides an estimated time of arrival 
at the first point of contact and updates callers 
with details of undue delays in attendance. (Short 
term).6 
Recommendation 3.7 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduces divisional data on call 
demand and performance data against Garda 
Charter targets for management review and 
action. (Short term). 
Recommendation 3.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána (i) grades all calls received from the 
public, (ii) records the time a unit is deployed, the 
time of arrival and the time a unit is finished with 
a call. (Short term).7
Recommendation 3.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements minimum staffing levels 
for control rooms and ensures compliance. (Short 
term).
Recommendation 3.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána explores all opportunities to reallocate 
police support staff to control room duties, 
thereby releasing gardaí for front-line duties. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 3.11
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a system of control room 
supervisors. (Long term). 
Recommendation 3.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána immediately activates the portable 
radio and vehicle location systems. (Short term).
6	 Report	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 Inspectorate,	 Resource	
Allocation,	October	2009
7	 As	 previously	 recommended	 in	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 Garda	
Síochána	Inspectorate,	Resources	Allocation,	October	2009.
Recommendation 3.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána maintains the current CCTV links with 
any move to centralised call centres. (Long term).
Recommendation 3.14
The Inspectorate recommends that all control 
rooms have details of all operational units to 
allow for direct deployment to calls. (Short term).
Recommendation 3.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána fully utilises the skills and training 
provided to reserves in an operational capacity. 
(Long term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Where	 a	 reserve	 is	 assessed	 as	 competent,	
allow	them	to	conduct	independent	patrol;	
•	 Where	 a	 reserve	 is	 assessed	 as	 competent,	
provide	 them	with	 the	authority	 to	enforce	
powers	for	which	training	was	provided.
Recommendation 3.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána: 
 (i) Implement a resource management system 
that is fully integrated with CAD and any 
other management deployment system. 
(Medium term).
 (ii) In the interim, ensure that all available 
divisional and national unit staff book on and 
off with regional or divisional control rooms. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 3.17
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána delivers awareness training to all call 
takers on the importance of gathering, recording 
and actioning information received during the 
first call. (Short term). 
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Recommendation 3.18
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a risk assessment process that 
identifies and relays important information that 
should be available to gardaí who are assigned to 
an incident. (Medium term).
Recommendation 3.19
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that all gardaí notify a control 
room when they come across an incident directly 
and where that incident will require further 
action. (Short term).
Recommendation 3.20
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána improves the mobility of garda 
resources by developing mobile technology for 
use by gardaí and particularly for use in vehicles. 
(Long term).
Recommendation 3.21
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a Standard Operating 
Procedure based on the concept of ‘getting it right 
first time’. (Short term).
Recommendation 3.22
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the role of first response and 
develops a new model of response policing. 
(Medium term). 
Recommendation 3.23
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops new approaches to responding 
to calls for service, such as using appointment cars 
and burglary reporting units. (Medium term).8 
Recommendation 3.24
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops new approaches in control 
rooms to ensure that members are pro-active to 
fast time information and crimes that are being 
reported. (Short term).
8	 Report	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 Inspectorate,	 Resources	
Allocation,	October	2009.
Recommendation 3.25
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates and implements minimum 
standards of investigation for key crime types, 
including the volume offences of burglary, 
robbery, theft, domestic violence and assault 
reviewed in this report. (Medium term).
Recommendation 3.26
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops new Standard Operating 
Procedures for Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs). 
(Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Review	the	standard	training	for	CSEs,	and	
ensure	 consistency	 with	 international	 best	
practice;
•	 Ensure	 that	 CSEs	 have	 appropriate	
equipment	 to	 retrieve	 evidence	 at	 crime	
scenes;
•	 Provide	 better	 station	 facilities	 to	 allow	
examinations	 to	 be	 conducted	 in	 a	
professional	manner;
•	 Develop	additional	 forensic	databases	such	
as	tool	and	shoe	marks;	
•	 Establish	 performance	 indicators	 for	 all	
CSEs;
•	 Provide	CSEs	with	continuous	professional	
development;	
•	 Provide	 ongoing	 training	 for	 all	 gardaí	 on	
crime	scene	management.	
Recommendation 3.27
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures a clear rationale is recorded as 
to why no PULSE incident number was created 
where CAD and paper records for calls suggest 
that a crime has taken place. (Short term).
Recommendation 3.28
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that CAD incidents are not 
closed without a PULSE incident number or in 
cases where there are outstanding actions or 
outstanding suspects. (Short term).
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Recommendation 3.29
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develop a broader range of CAD 
incident result codes that accurately record the 
type of incident. (Short term).
Recommendation 3.30
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána audits public office facilities and 
improves their design to facilitate a more 
customer focussed environment. (Long term).
Recommendation 3.31
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates a Standard Operating Procedure 
for dealing with victims of crime. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Provide	 clear	 guidelines	 about	 when	 to	
record	a	formal	statement	of	complaint;
•	 Develop	 a	 standard	 national	 approach	 for	
follow-up	enquiries	with	victims	who	have	
left	 a	 crime	 scene	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	
gardaí;	
•	 Promote	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 first	
interaction	with	a	victim	of	crime.	
Recommendation 3.32 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduce a National Standard for 
Incident Recording. (Long term).
In the interim, the following key action needs to 
be taken:
•	 Appoint	 a	 lead/champion	 for	 incident	
recording	 standards	 (See	 Part	 5	
recommendation	for	crime	recording).
Part 4
Incident Recording
Recommendation 4.1 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops additional categories and 
sub-categories on PULSE that provide better data 
descriptions of key crime types and non-crime 
types. (Medium term).
Recommendation 4.2 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a new national crime 
investigation/records management system 
that records all information and actions 
taken relating to the investigation of a crime. 
This system must be compatible with new 
CAD and resource management systems as 
recommended in Part 3. (Long term).
Recommendation 4.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána informs the Garda Information Service 
Centre (GISC) of any non-sensitive operations 
that will require additional GISC assistance. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 4.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána designates one senior manager as the 
lead for both crime counting rules and the Garda 
Information Service Centre. (Short term). 
Recommendation 4.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána increases the number of mandatory 
fields on PULSE, (nationality, GPS etc.), to ensure 
more information is obtained to provide greater 
accuracy in PULSE incident recording. (Medium 
term).
For this to take place, the Garda Síochána must:
•	 Consult	 with	 Garda	 Síochána	 Analysis	
Service	 (GSAS)	 and	 the	 Central	 Statistics	
Office	 (CSO)	 to	determine	what	mandatory	
fields	 are	 necessary	 to	 support	 accurate	
details	for	crime	data	and	analysis.	
Recommendation 4.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána enforces the policy for members to 
contact GISC from the location of an incident 
to create a PULSE report, rather than contacting 
GISC at the end of a tour of duty. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following action needs to be taken:
•	 Resolve	the	issue	of	garda	radios	terminating	
contact	to	GISC	after	a	certain	length	of	time.	
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Recommendation 4.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána enforces the policy that all divisions 
achieve a minimum of a 95% compliance rate for 
using GISC to create PULSE incidents. (Short 
term).
Recommendation 4.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána enforces compliance with the 
policy that all PULSE crime incidents are 
recorded as soon as possible and in any case 
within a tour of duty. (Short term).
Recommendation 4.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates drop-down menus or other 
prompts to assist GISC call takers in obtaining 
appropriate investigative details to ensure the 
right crime classification is created at the time of 
the initial call from a garda. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	 quality	 assurance	 processes,	
inclusive	 of	 supervisory	 review,	 to	 ensure	
that	crimes	are	correctly	recorded.
Recommendation 4.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána immediately establishes policy that 
prohibits the changing of narratives and any 
other records on the PULSE system. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 an	 IT	 solution	 to	 prevent	 the	
ability	 to	 change	 original	 narratives	 or	
other	records	on	the	PULSE	system;
•	 Create	 PULSE	 tabs	 for	 all	 PULSE	 record	
changes,	 including	 updates,	which	 include	
the	 name	 of	 the	 member	 making	 the	
changes,	and	the	time	and	date	that	changes	
were	made.
Recommendation 4.11 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána takes action to improve the quality of 
the PULSE narratives. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Explore	 opportunities	 to	 increase	 the	
narrative	 character	 field	 in	 the	 PULSE	
system;	
•	 Improve	 narrative	 recording	 through	
development	 of	 clear	 guidelines	 and	
minimum	 information	 requirements	 for	
narratives	 and	 other	 records	 generated	 in	
the	PULSE	system;
•	 Improve	the	quality	of	PULSE	records	with	
timely	 incident	 recording	 and	 updates	 on	
crime	investigations;	
•	 Ensure	that	any	updates	to	a	PULSE	incident	
record	 clearly	 articulate	 what	 updates	
occurred	and	why.
Recommendation 4.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána audits PULSE to determine the level and 
scope of change of PULSE information records 
after their initial creation. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following needs to be audited:
•	 Changes	to	any	of	the	following	fields	after	
initial	entry:
o	 PULSE	narrative;
o	 Individual	intelligence	records	(fields	to	
include	name,	date	of	birth	and	vehicle	
registration	numbers);
o	 Court	sentences;
o	 Warrants;	
o	 Specific	 crime	 types	 or	 incidents	 types	
where	changes	are	more	prevalent,	such	
as	 the	volume	 crime	offences	 identified	
in	this	report.
•	 Staff	who	have	repeated	actions	of	changing	
PULSE	information	records.
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Recommendation 4.13 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops and circulates policy clearly 
defining the roles and responsibilities of 
GISC and front-line supervisors in respect of 
classification of crimes and supervision of the 
initial investigation of a crime or other incident. 
(Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key area needs to be addressed:
•	 A	PULSE	record	must	contain	a	mandatory	
supervisory	 approval/review	 field	 to	
capture	 supervision	 and	 review	 of	 the	
PULSE	records	by	front-line	supervisors.9
Recommendation 4.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána directs that all information and updates 
regarding criminal investigations are recorded on 
PULSE rather than on paper memoranda. (Short 
term).	
Recommendation 4.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána institutes security standards for the 
access and review of PULSE records, using an IT 
security solution, such as levels of access rights, 
to prevent unauthorised and unofficial access to 
PULSE records. (Medium term).
Recommendation 4.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the Central 
Statistics Office should receive all PULSE record 
incident data including non-crime categories 
to facilitate analysis and reporting of crime 
statistics. (Short term).
Recommendation 4.17
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána establishes a target for GISC to review 
PULSE incidents within 72 hours of the initial 
report. (Medium term).
9	 The	 Garda	 Síochána	 has	 recently	 introduced	 a	 new	
supervisory	tab	for	sergeants	to	monitor	crime	investigation.	
Recommendation 4.18
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates a robust internal governance 
practice by establishing a Standard Operating 
Procedure for PULSE record entries and their 
audit and review. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Create	 a	 quality	 assurance	 process	 to	
evaluate	the	crime	classification	decisions	of	
GISC	Reviewers;	
•	 Introduce	 control	 measures	 to	 reduce	 the	
number	 of	 review/clarifications	 that	 are	
currently	generated;
•	 Develop	 an	 IT	 solution,	 such	 as	 a	 prompt	
on	 the	Garda	 Síochána	 Portal,	 to	 inform	 a	
member	and	their	supervisor	that	there	is	a	
PULSE	review/clarification	pending;
•	 Stop	the	practice	of	using	PULSE	to	recognise	
good	work;
•	 Ensure	 that	 GISC	 reviews	 and	 review/
clarification	 requests	 remain	 open,	 visible	
and	accessible	to	GISC;
•	 Develop	 a	 mandatory	 completion	
requirement	 in	 the	 PULSE	 information	
record	 system	 for	 all	 GISC	 review/
clarification	requests.	
Recommendation 4.19
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána designates GISC to be the final decision 
maker in the classification of a crime or an 
incident. (Short term). 
Part 5
Crime Management
Recommendation 5.1
The Inspectorate recommends that divisions hold 
a daily accountability meeting that is structured 
and reviews incidents and crimes on a divisional 
basis to ensure appropriate action and tasking. 
(Short term). 
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Recommendation 5.2 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a crime screening process with 
established solvability factors. (Short term).
Recommendation 5.3 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána establishes a crime management unit 
model on a divisional basis. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Development	 of	 operating	 protocols	 for	 all	
crime	management	units.	
Recommendation 5.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality initiate a 
process, in which the CSO should have a central 
role, towards the development of new Crime 
Counting Rules. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 5.5 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána publishes policy establishing the roles 
and responsibilities of all staff in regard to 
the reclassification and invalidation of PULSE 
incident records, with GISC having the final 
decision authority. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Allow	 GISC	 full	 PULSE	 incident	 access,	
including	the	ability	to	view	records	that	are	
reclassified	or	invalidated.
Recommendation 5.6 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduces a system of Dedicated 
Decision Makers on a divisional basis. (Short 
term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Develop	 policy	 that	 requires	 members	 to	
obtain	Dedicated	Decision	Maker	 approval	
prior	 to	 any	 request	 for	 reclassification	 or	
invalidation	of	a	PULSE	incident	record.	
Recommendation 5.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduces National Crime Recording 
Standards. (Medium term).
Recommendation 5.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduce a Force Crime Registar 
(FCR) with responsibility for the accuracy and 
integrity of the recording of incidents, crimes and 
detections. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 The	FCR	needs	to	be	outside	of	operational	
line	command;	
•	 Subject	to	any	selection	process,	an	interim	
FCR	should	be	immediately	appointed.	
Recommendation 5.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality initiate a 
process, in which the CSO should have a central 
role, towards the designation of a baseline year 
for crime recording. (Short term).
Recommendation 5.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality consider 
appointing an independent body to conduct 
annual audits of incident and crime recording 
standards. (Medium term). 
Part 6
Investigating Crime
Recommendation 6.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána aligns all district detective units into a 
divisional model. (Medium term).
Recommendation 6.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reduces the current abstractions that 
take detectives away from crime investigation. 
(Medium term).
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Recommendation 6.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána identifies the unnecessary deployment of 
all detectives in non-investigative roles and assigns 
them into criminal investigation posts. (Medium 
term).
Recommendation 6.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána extends the Regional Support Units 
across all regions. (Long term).
Recommendation 6.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the selection, training, 
appointment and transfers of detectives. (Long 
term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Create	 a	 structured	 selection	 and	 training	
programme	for	future	detectives;
•	 Develop	a	selection	process	that	is	perceived	
as	 fair	 and	 selects	 the	 best	 possible	
candidates	for	the	role	of	detective;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 current	 detectives	 are	
sufficiently	 skilled,	 including	 additional	
detective	training	as	required;
•	 Ensure	 new	detectives	 are	 trained	 prior	 to	
appointment;
•	 Review	 the	 process	 of	 detective	 transfers	
and	the	loss	of	detective	status.	
Recommendation 6.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a training package on crime 
investigation that includes disclosure training for 
all gardaí involved in crime investigation. (Long 
term).
Recommendation 6.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a Training Needs Analysis 
for members that completed foundation training 
post 2005, and develops a training programme 
that addresses any identified gaps in garda 
investigation skills. (Long term). 
Recommendation 6.8
The Inspectorate recommends, in the interim 
period of any operational or structural changes, 
that the Garda Síochana ensures that a divisional 
or regional detective superintendent take 
responsibility from district officers for the 
investigation of a  murder or other major enquiry. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 6.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána develops an Internal Affairs 
investigation unit and removes garda internal 
investigations from the remit of Investigation 
Section. (Medium term).
Recommendation 6.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána removes the specialist crime 
investigations from Investigation Section and 
reallocates those crimes to other investigation 
units. (Medium term).
Recommendation 6.11
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána replaces “Job Books” with a 
Major Investigation Management System to 
electronically record all actions in connection 
with a major incident. (Long term).
Recommendation 6.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána replaces the use of diaries and other 
ledgers with a national standard Garda decision 
making log. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 6.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána includes the Serious Crime Review 
Team (SCRT) as part of a new major investigation 
team. (Medium term). (See also recommendation 
6.16)
Recommendation 6.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána ensures that cold case 
review recommendations provided to Senior 
Investigating Officers (SIOs) are reviewed and 
progress monitored. (Short term).
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Recommendation 6.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops Independent Advisory 
Groups. (Medium term).
Recommendation 6.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops major incident investigation 
teams that investigate murders and other specified 
serious crimes. (Long term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Remove	 the	 responsibility	 for	 homicide	
investigation	 from	 the	 district	
superintendent	 to	 a	 major	 incident	
investigation	team;	
•	 Establish	 major	 incident	 teams	 on	 a	
geographical	 basis	 that	 meet	 the	 policing	
demands	of	major	incident	investigations;
•	 Utilise	existing	National	Bureau	of	Criminal	
Investigation	 (NBCI),	 Technical	 Bureau,	
regional	 and	 divisional	 resources	 to	 create	
the	new	teams.
Recommendation 6.17
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements victim-centred policy and 
good investigative practices in rape and other 
sexual offences. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Train	 dedicated	 officers	 to	 undertake	 the	
initial	 investigation	 of	 a	 serious	 sexual	
assault,	 including	 the	 taking	 of	 a	 victim’s	
statement.	 The	 training	 should	 include	
forensic	 retrieval,	 rape	 trauma,	 victim	 care	
and	statement	taking;
•	 Allocate	 all	 investigations	 to	 trained	
detectives;	
•	 Implement	 a	 formal	 review	 process	 for	
undetected	sexual	offences.
Recommendation 6.18
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána, working with Cosc and key strategic 
partners, implements victim-centered policy and 
good investigative practices in Domestic Violence 
(DV). (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 The	Domestic	Violence	 and	Sexual	Assault	
Investigation	Unit	 (DVSAIU)	must	perform	
a	 national	 monitoring	 function	 to	 ensure	
compliance	 with	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 DV	
Policy;	
•	 Assign	 secondary	 investigation	
responsibility	 for	 DV	 crimes	 to	 dedicated	
investigation	teams;
•	 Conduct	 analysis	 of	 domestic	 related	
murders	 to	 inform	 garda	 policy	 on	 harm	
reduction;
•	 Engage	 victims	 of	 DV	 and	 support	
agencies	 to	 improve	 garda	 awareness	 of	
the	 particular	 needs	 of	 DV	 victims.	 This	
should	 form	 part	 of	 a	 garda	 training	 and	
awareness	programme;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 calls	 for	 DV	 are	 properly	
supervised	from	the	receipt	of	the	call	to	the	
recording	of	the	crime	or	incident;
•	 Ensure	that	all	crime	of	DV	and	incidents	of	
domestic	 dispute	 are	 recorded	 on	 PULSE,	
irrespective	of	the	willingness	of	a	victim	to	
make	a	statement	of	complaint;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 positive	 action	 is	 taken	where	
there	are	clear	opportunities	to	arrest;
•	 Implement	a	risk	assessment	process	that	is	
completed	at	all	DV	incidents;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	corporate	 training	package	
on	DV	is	delivered	to	all	front-line	officers;	
•	 Update	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 website	 with	
information	that	is	easy	to	find	and	provides	
clarity	on	the	service	that	a	victim	of	DV	can	
expect;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 requirement	 for	 follow	 up	
visits	is	recorded	and	supervised;	
•	 Ensure	that	all	DV	incidents	are	reviewed	at	
Daily	Accountability	Meetings;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 victims	 of	 DV	 and	 parties	
involved	in	domestic	disputes	receive	details	
of	DV	support	organisations.
Recommendation 6.19
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a victim-centered policy and 
good investigative practices in racial, homophobic 
and other similar crimes to encourage victims to 
report offences. (Medium term).
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To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 crimes	 containing	 elements	
of	 hate	 or	 discrimination	 are	 flagged	 on	
PULSE;
•	 Create	 clear	 modus	 operandi	 features	 on	
PULSE	that	allow	the	accurate	recording	of	
the	nine	strands	of	the	Diversity	Strategy;10	
•	 Develop	 third	 party	 reporting	 sites	 to	
accommodate	victim	reporting;	
•	 Review	 the	 decision	 to	 merge	 the	 role	 of	
ELO/LGBT	officers.	
Recommendation 6.20
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops investigation plans for crimes 
that are recorded on PULSE. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Investigation	 plans	 must	 be	 approved	 by	
supervisors	and	recorded	on	PULSE.
Recommendation 6.21
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that all investigation updates 
are recorded on PULSE e.g. CSE examinations. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 6.22
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a national audit of lapsed 
criminal cases and introduce a system to ensure 
that investigations are progressed in a timely 
manner. (Short term).	
This	is	linked	to	a	recommendation	in	Part	11,	with	
regard	to	lapsed	cases	that	are	recorded	as	detected.
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Address	the	causes	for	lapsed	cases;
10	 The	Garda	Síochána	Diversity	Strategy	covers	nine	strands	
of	diversity	but	PULSE	does	not	have	MO	features	that	allow	
the	accurate	recording	of	crimes	under	each	strand.
•	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 electronic	 case	
management	 system,	 develop	 a	 filing	 and	
tracking	 system	 to	 significantly	 reduce	 the	
number	 of	 cases	which	 are	 not	 progressed	
in	a	timely	manner.
Recommendation 6.23
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána conducts a review of the 
availability and deployment of child specialist 
interviewers and with the HSE, to review 
the process of creating interview transcripts. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 6.24
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an urgent review of the 
approach taken to computer examination and 
significantly reduces the time taken to provide 
evidence to investigators. This should include the 
resources required to provide an effective service 
and to explore options for creating units in key 
geographic locations. (Short term). 
Recommendation 6.25
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality and the Garda 
Síochána engage telephone service providers to 
reduce the current delays in providing call data. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 6.26
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reduces the time scales for crime 
investigation from three months to a maximum of 
twenty-eight days. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Record	 all	 suspected	 offenders’	 details	 on	
PULSE;
•	 Develop	 a	 search	 facility	 on	 PULSE	 to	
identify	named	suspects	not	yet	arrested;	
•	 Take	 witness	 and	 victim	 statements	 at	 the	
time	of	dealing	with	a	crime	where	there	is	a	
likelihood	that	a	suspect	will	be	arrested;
•	 Re-allocate	 crime	 investigations	 for	 any	
garda	who	 is	 transferring,	 retiring	or	 is	on	
extended	absence	from	work.	
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Recommendation 6.27
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a national CCTV database that 
contains details of all systems that are operating. 
(Long term).
Recommendation 6.28
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána should, with its partner agencies, 
explore the option of developing Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition system (ANPR) on 
existing camera networks. (Long term).
Recommendation 6.29
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a standard national case 
file. (Short term).
Recommendation 6.30
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a national electronic case file 
management system. (Long term).  
In the absence of an electronic case file 
management system, the following actions need 
to be taken: 
•	 Reduce	the	number	of	unnecessary	case	files	
that	are	created;	
•	 Keep	 original	 or	 primary	 case	 files	 in	 a	
secure	place	and	ensure	that	access	is	tracked	
and	 that	 they	 are	 available	 if	 required	 for	
investigative	purposes;	
•	 Ensure	that	case	files	are	not	taken	outside	of	
a	garda	station	without	the	permission	of	a	
supervisor;	
•	 Develop	 an	 electronic	 process	 for	 passing	
cases	 files	 from	 one	 unit	 to	 another	 and	
particularly	to	the	DPP.
Recommendation 6.31
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements systems to improve the 
quality of supervision of crime investigation, 
including the development of a tab on PULSE to 
record all supervision of an investigation. (Short 
term).
Recommendation 6.32
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduces a national policy and 
procedure for bringing an investigation to a 
conclusion. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 process	 includes	 formal	
updates	to	victims,	witnesses	and	suspects.
Recommendation 6.33
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops new systems for recording and 
investigating crime. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	telephone	reporting	and	telephone	
investigation	of	crime;
•	 Further	develop	opportunities	for	extending	
on-line	 reporting	 of	 crime	 and	 reduce	 the	
bureaucracy	of	the	current	process.
Recommendation 6.34 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates divisional investigation units to 
investigate designated volume crimes. (Medium 
term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Release	 regular	 units	 from	 investigating	
high	volumes	of	crime;
•	 Create	volume	crime	investigation	units	that	
utilise	detective	resources;
•	 Publish	 clear	 protocols	 about	 the	 type	 of	
crimes	units	will	investigate.
Recommendation 6.35
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides clarity about the crime 
investigation role of divisional specialist units, 
such as drugs and other tasking units, traffic units 
and community policing units. (Medium term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Publish	 clear	 protocols	 about	 the	 type	 of	
crimes	specialist	units	will	investigate.
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Part 7
The Victims 
Experience
Recommendation 7.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána updates PULSE letters to reflect the free 
phone number for the Crime Victims Helpline. 
(Short term).	
Recommendation 7.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána improves the information provided 
to victims and particularly to victims of sexual 
assaults, domestic violence or those who are 
vulnerable for any other reason. (Short term).
In support of the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 card	 or	 information	 leaflet	with	
support	 agency	 and	 other	 contact	 details,	
particularly	 for	 domestic	 violence	 and	
sexual	 assault	 to	 provide	 to	 victims	 at	 the	
time	of	recording	the	crime.
Recommendation 7.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduces compliance rates for 
divisions of 100% for sending Letter 1 and 
a minimum of 90% for sending Letter 2. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 7.4 
The Inspectorate recommends in the absence of a 
case management system, that the Garda Síochána 
explores software options that would provide a 
reminder that a victim needs to be updated. (Short 
term).
Recommendation 7.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána adopts the following practice in its 
policy and approach to dealing with victims and 
witnesses. (Short term):
•	 Create	 a	 national	 standard	 for	 victim	 and	
witness	 contact	 with	 set	 timescales	 and	
set	events	that	will	result	in	an	update	to	a	
victim	or	witness;
•	 When	a	victim	of	crime	or	a	witness	contacts	
a	 garda	 station	 for	 an	 update	 to	 create	 a	
process	where	someone	takes	ownership	of	
that	enquiry;
•	 Provide	 clear	 guidance	 and,	 where	
necessary,	 training	 to	 all	 gardaí	 on	 their	
roles	 and	 responsibilities	 with	 regard	 to	
victims	of	crime;
•	 Create	 a	 mandatory	 field	 on	 PULSE	 that	
identifies	repeat	victims	of	crime;	
•	 Create	a	policy	and	a	process	for	identifying	
and	managing	repeat	victims	of	crime;	
•	 Create	a	 tab	on	PULSE	to	record	all	victim	
updates	or	attempts	to	update	a	victim;
•	 Provide	 external	 e-mail	 access	 for	 all	
investigating	gardaí;	
•	 Review	the	approach	taken	by	gardaí	to	the	
initial	 contact	 with	 victims	 of	 assault	 and	
domestic	 violence	 (this	 complements	 the	
recommendations	on	DV	in	Part	6);
•	 Ensure	 a	 consistent	 standard	 of	 victim	
referral	to	support	agencies;
•	 Ensure	 that	 in	 appropriate	 cases	 victims	
are	 provided	 with	 the	 Victim	 Impact	
Assessment	Guidelines;	
•	 In	consultation	with	the	DPP	to	consider	the	
use	of	Community	Impact	Assessments.
Recommendation 7.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the approach and quality 
assures the supervision of victim contact. 
(Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 quality	 call	 back	 system	which	
monitors	the	quality	of	the	service	provided	
to	victims	of	crime	to	ensure	that	the	good	
work	 of	 gardaí	 is	 acknowledged	 as	 well	
as	 dealing	 with	 those	 who	 consistently	
provide	a	poor	service;
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•	 Provide	 guidance,	 and	 where	 necessary	
training,	to	existing	supervisors	and	newly	
promoted	 supervisors	 on	 their	 roles	 and	
responsibilities	 for	 ensuring	 appropriate	
victim	care.
Part 8
Intelligence Led 
Policing
Recommendation 8.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the security vetting process 
to consider a need for additional vetting 
prior to specific appointments or promotions. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 8.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of the use and 
prioritisation of surveillance and the availability 
of surveillance equipment and training to non-
national surveillance units. (Medium term).
Recommendation 8.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of the training 
and development for decision making and 
recording of decisions for those managing 
pre-planned and spontaneous incidents. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 8.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of the training and 
availability of on-scene commanders to take 
command of pre-planned and spontaneous armed 
incidents. (Medium term).
Recommendation 8.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensure that technology is upgraded 
before the implementation of 4G. (Medium term).
Recommendation 8.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána designates GSAS as the professional 
lead for developing standards for the collating, 
analysis and evaluation of intelligence to ensure 
that professional standards are maintained. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 8.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides GSAS analysts with full access 
to PULSE data. (Short term).
Recommendation 8.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a national intelligence 
model/process. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	national	standards	for	the	way	that	
intelligence	 units	 operate	 at	 national	 and	
divisional	levels;	
•	 Develop	a	corporate	intelligence	tasking	and	
co-ordinating	meeting	 that	 is	 chaired	 by	 a	
senior	officer;	
•	 Develop	 a	 regional	 and	 divisional	
intelligence	 tasking	 and	 co-ordinating	
process;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 every	 operational	 garda	 and	
reserve	is	assigned	a	daily	intelligence	task;	
•	 Conduct	 a	 review	of	 all	national	units	 that	
are	 operating	 intelligence	 units	 and	 to	
ensure	 that	 GSAS	 analysts	 are	 aligned	 to	
intelligence	units;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 check	 points	 and	 other	 pro	
active	initiatives	are	intelligence	led,	outputs	
are	accurately	recorded	and	evaluations	are	
conducted	to	identify	what	works	well.
Recommendation 8.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána amalgamates the current 
National Support Services intelligence 
units into a single intelligence hub. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 8.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of Interpol Unit 
and in particular the management of enquiries, 
minimum staffing levels of the unit and the IT 
infrastructure. (Medium term).
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To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Create	a	Standard	Operating	Procedure	for	
Desk	Officers.
Recommendation 8.11
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops divisional intelligence units. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 8.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates a Standard Operating Procedure 
clarifying the functions and operating practices 
of a criminal intelligence officer. (Short Term).
Recommendation 8.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that the Garda Information 
Service Centre, investigators and specialist staff 
include modus operandi in all PULSE incident 
records. (Short term).
Recommendation 8.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána implements a system of regular 
intelligence audits and daily spot checks to 
ensure that intelligence on the PULSE system 
is only accessed for a legitimate purpose. (Short 
term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Introduce	 a	 process	 to	 ensure	 that	
supervisors	 check	 the	 intelligence	 that	
their	 staff	 are	 accessing	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
searches	conducted	are	linked	to	a	criminal	
investigation,	a	pro	active	operation	or	other	
legitimate	purpose;
•	 Explore	IT	security	solutions	that	will	limit	
access	to	intelligence	records	based	on	user	
security	levels.
Recommendation 8.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides a basic training programme 
to members and police staff, including GISC, on 
intelligence led policing, to increase awareness 
of the value of criminal intelligence, to provide 
information on data protection issues and to 
provide clarity on the system operating in the 
Garda Síochána. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 drop-down	 menu	 for	 GISC	 to	
improve	 the	 quality	 of	 intelligence	 on	
PULSE.	
Recommendation 8.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that supervisors check the 
quality of intelligence records submitted by 
members. (Short term).
Recommendation 8.17
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an urgent review of the 
recording of childrens’ details as an intelligence 
record on PULSE. (Short term).
Recommendation 8.18
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána restricts the creation of PULSE 
intelligence records to a Criminal Intelligence 
Officer. (Short term).
Recommendation 8.19
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána tasks Criminal Intelligence Officers 
with a review of PULSE for duplicate records and 
inaccurate intelligence records. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Introduce	 a	 system	 to	 identify	 and	 remove	
intelligence	that	is	inaccurate	or	misleading;
•	 Allow	 CIOs	 to	 recommend	 removal	 of	
inaccurate	information	with	the	approval	of	
a	supervisor;	
•	 Provide	 clear	 direction	 on	 the	 merging	 of	
duplicate	intelligence	records.	
Recommendation 8.20
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides clear guidance on the retention 
and disposal of collators’ cards which contain 
personal identifying information. (Short term).
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Recommendation 8.21
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána tasks regional Criminal Human 
Intelligence Sources units to engage with 
divisions to encourage the referral of persons 
who are suitable to be considered for registration. 
(Medium term). 
Recommendation 8.22
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of the corporate 
approach to the use of Criminal Human 
Intelligence Sources to ensure that it provides 
measurable outcomes in relation to volume 
crime. (Long term).
Recommendation 8.23
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of the use of 
Crimestoppers and Garda Confidential. (Medium 
term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Evaluate	outsourcing	Crimestoppers	so	that	
it	is	independent	of	the	Garda	Síochána;
•	 Provide	one	24/7	365	confidential	line;
•	 Develop	electronic	 reporting	 for	 the	public	
to	 be	 easily	 able	 to	 report	 intelligence	
information;	
•	 Implement	 a	 central	 tracking	 system	 that	
ensures	 that	 intelligence	 is	 effectively	
actioned.
Recommendation 8.24 
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána initiates a process with public service 
information bodies, including the Central 
Statistics Office, to develop on-line crime 
mapping information. (Medium term).
Part 9
Investigation 
and Detention of 
Suspects
Recommendation 9.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the current PULSE status codes, 
in conjunction with recommendation 11.2 to 
clarify investigation and detection status codes. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 9.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an examination of the process 
of dealing with named suspects in a criminal 
investigation. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 national	 Standard	 Operating	
Procedure	 to	 reduce	 delays	 in	 identifying	
and	 locating	suspects;	and	 to	provide	clear	
protocols	for	arrest	and	charging	suspected	
offenders;	
•	 Ensure	that	suspected	offenders	are	arrested	
at	the	earliest	opportunity;
•	 Develop	the	use	of	photo	fit	identification	as	
an	investigative	tool;
•	 Review	 and	 update	 as	 necessary,	 the	
guidance	 provided	 by	 the	 Garda	 Crime	
Investigation	Techniques	Manual.
Recommendation 9.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána reviews the programme 
of examinations conducted by the Garda 
Professional Standards Unit (GPSU). (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	GPSU	are	 tasked	pursuant	
to	 the	 high	 risk	 issues	 including	 those	
identified	 in	 the	 Crime	 Investigation	
Report,	 such	 as	 reviews	 of	 compliance	 of	
PULSE	policies	on	entries,	classification	and	
reclassification	of	crime	and	detections;
Crime Investigation Report       Recommendations
Recommendations  |  19
•	 Establish	a	robust	process	of	monitoring	the	
implementation	of	GPSU	recommendations.	
Recommendation 9.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides all future GPSU reports to the 
Garda Inspectorate. (Short Term).
Recommendation 9.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána issues rigid handcuffs to gardaí trained 
in their use. (Short term).
Recommendation 9.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a working group to explore the following 
recommendations in respect of health care 
provision and demand reduction for persons in 
custody. (Long term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Review	 and	 implement	 international	 best	
practice	 for	 improvement	 in	 health	 care	
provision	for	persons	detained	in	custody;
•	 Develop	 clear	 and	 unambiguous	 protocols	
among	 the	 strategic	 partners	 for	 dealing	
with	 persons,	 in	 both	 public	 and	 private	
locations,	 that	 are	 suffering	 from	 mental	
health	issues	and	in	urgent	need	of	medical	
attention;
•	 Establish	clear	and	unambiguous	protocols	
among	strategic	partners	for	an	appropriate	
response	 to	 young	 persons	 who	 are	 taken	
to	 garda	 stations,	 particularly	 after	 normal	
office	hours;	(See	page	28,	Young	Offenders	
in	Custody)
•	 Ensure	 a	 comprehensive	 risk	 assessment	
process	for	detention	of	prisoners.
Recommendation 9.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána engages key partner agencies to 
develop an effective drug arrest referral 
scheme for those detained in garda stations. 
(Medium term). 
Recommendation 9.8   
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána develops and implements a 
technology based custody system to ensure 
appropriate oversight and management of 
persons in custody. The Inspectorate recognises 
that this a long term solution, but the planning 
and development should start now. (Long term). 
In the interim, to achieve the above 
recommendation, the following key action needs 
to be taken:
•	 Develop	a	more	user	 friendly	 and	detailed	
paper	 custody	 record	 which	 contains	 all	
relevant	 information	 for	 a	detained	person	
and	ensures	through	active	supervision	that	
entries	are	accurate.	
Recommendation 9.9 
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána conducts a full review of 
custody provisions to include centralisation/
rationalisation of facilities, and potential 
for improvements to security arrangements, 
supervision and training. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
Facilities
•	 Rationalise	 the	 current	 custody	 facilities	
and	move	to	a	smaller	number	of	improved	
purpose	built	custody	suites;	
•	 Centralise	 custody	 facilities	 on	 a	 regional	
basis	 (urban	 areas)	 and	 a	 divisional	 basis	
outside	of	cities;	(Long	term)
•	 Seek	opportunities	to	share/develop	custody	
facilities	with	partner	agencies;	
•	 Introduce	digital	clocks	in	custody	suites.	
Operations
•	 Appoint	 dedicated	 custody	 sergeants	 with	
responsibility	for	persons	in	custody;
•	 Appoint	civilian	detention	officers;
•	 Ensure	 that	 only	 trained	 personnel	 are	
deployed	into	custody	suites;	
•	 Ensure	that	all	gardaí	are	fully	aware	of	the	
provision	to	suspend	custody;
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•	 Provide	effective	supervision	and	guidance	
to	 investigators	 dealing	 with	 a	 person	 in	
garda	detention;
•	 Ensure	 that	 prisoner	 logs	 are	 completed	
correctly.
Recommendation 9.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána considers the implementation of case 
progression units aligned to centralised custody 
facilities. (Medium Term). 
Recommendation 9.11 
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána addresses the existing 
skills gap for gardaí trained in interview 
techniques, statement taking and disclosure. 
(Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Identify	 and	 assess	 the	 skills	 gap	 in	
interview	techniques	training;
•	 Train	 all	 garda	 members	 involved	 in	 the	
interviewing	 of	 witnesses	 or	 suspects	 to	
Level	1	and	2	standard;	
•	 Provide	 Level	 3	 and	 4	 training	 courses	 to	
ensure	 sufficiently	 trained	 garda	members	
are	available	to	interview	suspects	involved	
in	serious	crime;	
•	 Introduce	 a	 line	 management	 protocol	 to	
check	the	quality	of	taped	interviews.
Recommendation 9.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána improves investigative skills for 
gathering best evidence, including the taking 
of witness statements, arresting, interviewing 
suspects, gathering CCTV and the disclosure of 
evidence. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	that	garda	notebooks	are	completed	
to	 a	 high	 standard	 and	 that	 supervisors	
check	notes	books	as	outlined	in	the	Garda	
Code;	
•	 Ensure	that	all	gardaí	present	at	an	incident	
complete	 a	 notebook	 entry	 including	 any	
evidence	of	an	arrest	or	 incidents	 that	 took	
place;	
•	 Consider	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 separate	
booklet	for	completing	arrest	notes;
•	 Develop	clear	guidance	on	the	recording	of	
contemporaneous	notes;		
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 statements	 are	 dated	 and	
signed	at	the	foot	of	each	page	and	after	the	
last	line	of	a	person’s	statement;		
•	 Introduce	 a	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	
supervisor	checks	the	quality	of	statements	
taken	from	victims	and	witnesses;	
•	 Implement	a	national	standard	for	the	taking	
of	a	withdrawal	witness	statement;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 PULSE	 is	 used	 to	 record	 the	
gathering	and	attempts	to	gather	evidence.
Recommendation 9.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that where appropriate, 
addresses of detained persons are searched. 
(Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	a	Standard	Operating	Procedure	for	
conducting	 address	 searches	 for	 detained	
persons;
•	 Develop	a	national	standard	form	for	search	
logs.
Recommendation 9.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an urgent examination 
of the whole process of fingerprinting and 
photographing persons detained in custody and 
those who are convicted of an indictable offence 
at court. (Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Use	 AFIS	 Livescan	 digital	 fingerprinting	
technology	for	all	fingerprints;
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•	 Implement	 a	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
requirements	 of	 Section	 28	 Criminal	
Justice	 Act,	 persons	 subject	 to	 mandatory	
fingerprint	identification,	are	fulfilled;
•	 Train	 all	 frontline	 gardaí	 to	 take	 AFIS	
fingerprints	and	how	to	obtain	results;	
•	 Develop	 a	 Standard	 Operating	 Procedure	
to	ensure	100%	compliance	with	the	taking	
of	 fingerprints,	 photographs	 and	 other	
samples;	
•	 Reduce	 the	 authority	 level	 for	 authorising	
fingerprints	from	an	inspector	to	a	custody	
sergeant;	
•	 Provide	divisions	with	regular	management	
information	on	fingerprint	compliance;	
•	 Introduce	a	 tracking	system	to	monitor	 the	
progress	of	fingerprint	identifications;
•	 Create	 a	 protocol	 to	 search	 for	 and	merge	
multiple	 intelligence	 records	 with	 AFIS	
records	 to	 ensure	 proper	 identification	
information	 exists	 in	 the	 PULSE	 records	
system.
Recommendation 9.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána examines the effectiveness of the 
current process for conducting identification 
parades and moves towards an electronic system 
of identification parades where appropriate. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 9.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an urgent examination of 
the current process for exhibit and property 
management. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Implement	 an	 integrated	 IT	 solution	 to	
record	 all	 property	 seized	 and	 to	 track	 its	
movements	across	all	of	 the	systems	 (Long	
term);	
•	 Complete	 the	 roll	 out	 of	 the	 Property	 and	
Exhibits	Management	System	(PEMS)	across	
all	divisions	and	national	units;
•	 Develop	a	national	drugs	register	to	ensure	
consistent	 inventory	 and	 data	 entry	 by	 all	
drugs	units;	
•	 Review	 the	 production	 of	 exhibits	
(photographs/maps)	 at	 court	 and	 seek	
opportunities	 to	 use	 technology	 to	 reduce	
costs;
•	 Introduce	 technological	 opportunities	 to	
provide	 immediate	 transfer	 of	 crime	 scene	
exhibits	for	examination;
•	 Nominate	 a	 person	 at	 national/divisional	
level	 to	 have	 responsibility	 for	 forensic	
samples	to	ensure	they	are	sent	for	analysis.	
Recommendation 9.17
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene a 
working group to explore options for legislative 
change to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of crime investigations. (Long term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Extend	 the	 detention	 time	 in	 custody	
without	charge;	
•	 Address	 the	 legislative	 gap	 in	 the	 powers	
of	 gardaí	 to	 detain	 a	 person	 arrested	 for	
minor	offences,	who	after	 six	hours,	 is	 still	
incapable	of	looking	after	themselves;	
•	 Provide	 authority	 for	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	
to	 fingerprint,	 photograph	 and	 obtain	
DNA	 from	all	persons	detained	at	 a	 garda	
station,	as	commensurate	with	international	
identification	standards;
•	 Consolidate	 all	 legislation	 dealing	 with	
powers	 of	 arrest,	 search	 and	 detention	 to	
facilitate	compliance	and	ensure	consistency	
across	relevant	legislation;
•	 Develop	a	Code	of	Practice	for	the	treatment	
and	detention	of	persons	in	garda	custody;
•	 Consider	mandatory	drug	testing	of	persons	
detained	for	“trigger	offences”	including	but	
not	limited	to	burglary	and	robbery;
•	 Remove	 the	 requirement	 to	
contemporaneously	 record	 notes	 at	 the	
time	of	a	taped	interview;
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•	 Resolve	 the	 issues	 in	 respect	 of	 tape	
transcripts	and	a	move	to	a	Written,	Record	
or	Tape	and	Interview	(WROTI)	type	system;	
•	 Designate	 a	 custody	 record	 as	 primary	
evidence,	 to	record	all	actions	 in	a	person’s	
custody	 record	 and	 to	 remove	 the	 need	
for	 statements	 to	 be	 completed	 for	 all	
interactions;	
•	 Introduce	an	Independent	Custody	Visitors	
Scheme	 to	 provide	 for	 custody	 care	
assurance;
•	 Improve	 the	 use	 of	 technology	 in	 court	
documentation	 and	 exhibits	 in	 criminal	
justice	cases;
•	 Establish	the	process	of	identification	parades	
in	law	and	to	consider	the	implications	when	
a	suspect	refuses	to	participate;
•	 Review	the	requirements	for	maintaining	a	
chain	of	evidence	for	an	exhibit	and	seek	to	
reduce	 the	 necessity	 for	 chain	 of	 evidence	
witnesses	 completing	 statements	 and	
attending	court.	
Part 10
Offender 
Management
Recommendation 10.1
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene a 
cross-departmental and multi-agency working 
group to progress the development of a co-located 
and fully integrated youth offender service. (Long 
term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Examine	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Garda	 Youth	
Diversion	 Office	 (GYDO),	 in	 pre-charge	
decision-making	 processes	 involving	
juvenile	 offenders	 suspected	 of	 serious	
crimes	such	as	murder	and	rape;
•	 Consider	 the	 application	 of	 a	 suitable	
engagement	 or	 diversionary	 scheme	 for	
those	 aged	 under	 twelve	who	 come	 to	 the	
notice	of	the	Garda	Síochána;
•	 Promote	 the	use	of	 restorative	processes	 in	
accordance	with	the	Children	Act,	2001;
•	 Introduce	 an	 information	 sharing	 protocol	
between	 Juvenile	 Liaison	 Officers	 and	
diversion	 programmes	 to	 assist	 in	 the	
identification	and	 treatment	of	behavioural	
issues;	
•	 Reassess	the	process	of	formal	and	informal	
cautions;
•	 Produce	 evidence-based	 performance	
measures	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 planning	 of	
diversionary	activity;
•	 Engage	with	a	research	partner	to	develop	
best	 practice	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 GYDO	
process	and	 the	Garda	School	Programme	
to	ensure	efficiency	and	effectiveness;	
•	 Review	 the	 participation	 requirements	 for	
treatment	programmes	for	young	offenders	
and	particularly	those	who	have	committed	
sexual	offences.	
Recommendation 10.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána improves the current operation of the 
Garda Youth Diversion Programme. (Short term)
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	that	all	eligible	cases	are	referred	to	
GYDO	for	decisions;
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 processing	 of	 young	
offenders	is	completed	in	a	timely	manner;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 cases	 deemed	 as	 unsuitable	
for	 JLO	 cautions	 are	 progressed	 towards	
prosecution;
•	 Evaluate	 and	 clarify	 garda	 policy	 in	 the	
application	of	multiple	cautions.
Recommendation 10.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to progress the 
development of a co-located multi-agency and 
fully integrated adult offender management 
service. (Long term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
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•	 Focus	on	those	who	present	the	highest	risk	
to	community	safety;	
•	 Promote	the	use	of	restorative	processes;	
•	 Evaluate	 the	 treatment	 of	 offenders	 with	
addictions	during	short	term	sentences;	
•	 Review	 the	 process	 for	 managing	 those	
offenders	due	to	be	released	from	prison;
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 provisions	 in	 law,	 such	 as	
Civil	 Orders	 for	 managing	 offenders	 post	
sentence,	 are	 considered	 in	 appropriate	
cases;
•	 Consider	 electronic	 monitoring	 and	 other	
initiatives	to	monitor	offenders;
•	 Research	 and	 publish	 performance	
measurements	 of	 offender	 management	
effectiveness.
Recommendation 10. 4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána improves the current operation of the 
adult offender management programme. (Short 
term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Increase	 the	 divisional	 and	 regional	 co-
ordination	 of	 the	 management	 of	 prolific	
offenders;	
•	 Promote	the	application	of	restorative	justice;
•	 Provide	the	Probation	Service	with	a	copy	of	
the	precís	or	statement	of	facts	to	assist	with	
preparation	of	pre-sanction	reports;
•	 Fully	inform	the	Probation	Service	of	garda	
views	 for	 pre-sanction	 reports,	 to	 ensure	
that	probation	reports	contain	 the	views	of	
the	investigating	garda;
•	 Develop	the	use	of	post	release	Civil	Orders.
Recommendation 10.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána, HSE and the Probation Service conduct 
annual reviews of the progress of individual 
SORAMs. (Medium Term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Provide	oversight	and	governance	to	 locate	
those	offenders	who	have	 failed	 to	provide	
proper	notice	pursuant	to	the	requirements	
of	the	Sex	Offenders	Act	2001;
•	 Assess	the	exchange	of	information	between	
the	 agencies	 with	 ongoing	 review	 of	 IT	
solutions	for	improved	data	sharing;
•	 Ensure	that	all	members	of	SORAM	receive	
appropriate	 training	and	particularly	 those	
involved	in	the	risk	assessment	process;
•	 Provide	 for	 interagency	 communication	
and	training	to	ensure	that	good	practice	is	
shared;
•	 Mandate	 that	 divisions	 provide	 bi-annual	
information	 returns	 on	 registered	 sex	
offenders;	
•	 As	part	of	a	functional	model	for	divisions,	
the	 detective	 superintendent	 should	 be	
responsible	for	SORAM.
Recommendation 10.6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána assesses the working practices and 
technology needs of the Sexual Offences 
Management Unit and the Paedophile 
Investigation Unit. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Resolve	 the	 current	 IT	 issues	 that	 are	
impacting	 on	 service	 delivery	 such	 as	 the	
sharing	of	potential	evidence,	 the	delays	 in	
examination	of	images	and	the	potential	for	
two	 investigations	 to	 run	 concurrently	 on	
the	 same	 suspect(s)	 (See	 Recommendation	
6.24);	
•	 Ensure	minimum	staffing	levels	rather	than	
all	members	in	the	unit	resting	on	the	same	
day;
•	 Ensure	that	all	persons	convicted	of	sexual	
offences	have	their	fingerprints,	photographs	
and	DNA	taken.	
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Recommendation 10.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to consider 
the following changes to the registration and 
management of sex offenders. (Long term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Following	a	conviction	in	court	to	ensure	that	
all	offenders	are	notified	of	a	requirement	to	
register	under	the	Sex	Offenders	Act;
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 Sexual	 Offences	
Management	 Unit	 are	 always	 informed	 of	
an	order	made	against	an	offender;	
•	 Consider	 a	 reduction	 from	 seven	 days	 to	
three	 days	 in	 the	 requirement	 to	 register	
with	 the	 garda	 and	 to	 a	 requirement	 to	
register	at	the	garda	station	where	they	will	
be	residing;
•	 Consider	 a	 requirement	 for	 an	 offender	 to	
confirm	registration	annually.
Recommendation 10.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána in conjunction with the Courts Service 
reviews the process for tracking warrants from 
the courts to garda stations. (Short term).
Recommendation 10.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates a Standard Operating Procedure 
for identity verification. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 10.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána reviews the system of PULSE warning 
markers and sources an IT solution to ensure that 
markers are automatically flagged to an address 
or an incident on PULSE to which that person is 
connected. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 10.11
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána seeks opportunities, such as media, 
to engage the general public in helping to find 
wanted persons. (Short term). 
Recommendation 10.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána provides the same level of access to 
garda and partner agency IT systems for all 
warrant unit staff. (Short term). 
Recommendation 10.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána initiates a prosecution for persons, who 
having entered into a bond fail to appear at court. 
(Short term).
Recommendation 10.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts a review of historical warrants 
to establish if the original case is still capable of 
proof. (Short term).
Recommendation 10.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a standard policy about when 
a warrant can be cancelled. (Short term).
Recommendation 10.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops a Standard Operating 
Procedure for the management of warrants. 
(Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Move	 to	 a	 divisional	 approach	 for	 the	
management	of	warrants;
•	 Confirm	 that	 all	warrants	 are	 entered	onto	
the	PULSE	system;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 reasonable	opportunities	 to	
execute	a	warrant	are	explored	and	entered	
on	PULSE;
•	 Provide	 for	 good	 supervision	 around	
dealing	 with	 warrants	 and	 failures	 to	
execute	warrants;	
•	 Provide	 appropriate	 staffing	 levels	 in	 all	
warrant	units;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 a	 person	 in	 garda	 custody	 is	
never	 released	 without	 searching	 for	 and	
executing	outstanding	warrants.
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Recommendation 10.17
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to examine 
and consider the following changes to the 
processing of warrants. (Long term). 
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	a	centralised	location	for	warrants	
and	charge	sheets;
•	 Provide	 for	 a	 centralised	 and	 dedicated	
warrants	court;	
•	 Reconcile	court	warrant	records	and	PULSE	
warrant	records;	
•	 Remove	 the	 requirement	 for	 an	 arresting	
garda	to	attend	court	on	the	first	appearance	
for	a	person	arrested	solely	on	a	warrant;	
•	 Develop	 a	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 warrants	
are	placed	on	PULSE	immediately;	
•	 Review	the	requirement	for	High	Court	and	
Circuit	 Court	 bench	 warrants	 to	 return	 to	
those	courts	on	a	first	appearance;	
•	 Consider	 the	 scanning	 of	 warrants	 onto	
PULSE	 and	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 scanned	
PULSE	copy	by	 the	court	 in	 the	absence	of	
the	original	warrant;	
•	 Review	 the	 process	 of	 managing	 penal,	
estreatment	 and	 similar	 warrants	 and	
consider	 other	 options	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	
non-payment	of	fines;	
•	 Review	 the	 practice	 of	 issuing	 stayed	
warrants;
•	 Review	Section	13	Criminal	Justice	Act	1984	
in	respect	of	 the	twelve	month	time	period	
to	bring	a	prosecution	to	court;	
•	 Improve	 the	 process	 for	 obtaining	 search	
warrants	out	of	court	hours;
•	 Consider	 the	 use	 of	 electronic	 committal	
warrants	from	courts	to	prisons.	
Recommendation 10.18
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an urgent examination of 
the use of bail. A national Standard Operating 
Procedure should be created for the whole process 
of bail management. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 consistent	 standards	 in	 the	 use	 of	
station	bail	and	cash	lodgements;	
•	 Ensure	 objections	 for	 bail	 are	 raised	 in	 all	
appropriate	cases;
•	 Review	the	types	of	bail	conditions	imposed	
on	 offenders	 and	 provide	 guidance	 to	
investigating	officers	 to	ensure	a	consistent	
approach;	
•	 Ensure	that	bail	conditions	are	entered	onto	
an	person’s	PULSE	intelligence	record	with	
a	warning	marker;	
•	 Provide	 appropriate	 legal	 awareness	 and	
other	 update	 training	 for	 those	 managing	
bail;	
•	 Provide	protocols	and	supervisory	oversight	
for	effective	management	of	bail	conditions	
that	require	sign-on	at	garda	stations;	
•	 Promote	 the	 use	 of	 curfews	 as	 a	 bail	
condition;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 gardaí	 are	 tasked	 to	 monitor	
compliance	with	bail	conditions;
•	 Improve	 the	 current	monitoring	 of	 bail	 on	
PULSE	and	ensure	that	the	IT	infrastructure	
allows	electronic	monitoring;	
•	 Ensure	that	breaches	are	always	brought	to	
the	attention	of	a	court;
•	 Ensure	 that	 Section	 2A	 of	 the	 Bail	 Act	 is	
used	in	appropriate	circumstances;	
•	 Develop	a	court	presenters	scheme	for	High	
Court	applications;
•	 Promote	the	use	of	video-links	for	court	bail	
applications	wherever	possible;	
•	 Improve	 the	 recording	 of	 bail	 and	 court	
convictions	 on	 PULSE	 and	 create	 a	 more	
efficient	 system	 for	 extracting	 information	
for	court	cases.	
Recommendation 10.19
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to consider the 
following changes to the operation of bail 
processes. (Long term).
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To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Provide	a	power	of	arrest	 to	gardaí	 to	deal	
with	bail	offences;
•	 Develop	 a	 bail	 notification	 system	 from	
courts	to	garda	divisions;	
•	 Review	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 rationale	
for	 the	 current	 system,	 where	 those	 on	
temporary	release	are	required	to	sign-on	at	
garda	stations.	
Part 11
Detecting and  
Prosecuting Crime
Recommendation 11.1	
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality initiate a 
process, in which the CSO should have a central 
role, towards the development of new Crime 
Counting Rules for detections. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 11.2
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána creates two distinct procedures and 
data fields for recording the investigation update 
and the detection status of an incident on PULSE. 
(Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Create	 a	 mandatory	 field	 on	 PULSE	 that	
notes	the	name,	rank	and	registered	number	
of	the	person	recording	a	crime	as	detected;
•	 Create	 new	 Detection	 Status	 Codes	 that	
reflect	the	accurate	detection	outcome;
•	 Create	a	new	investigation	status	field	which	
reflects	the	current	status	of	an	investigation;	
•	 Mandate	 that	 each	 Detection	 Status	 Code	
which	 refers	 to	 ‘proceedings	 commenced’	
or	 ‘proceedings	 completed’	 have	 a	 charge,	
summons	or	caution	directly	linked	to	it.
Recommendation 11.3
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Information Service Centre (GISC) is assigned 
responsibility for ensuring that detections are 
authorised and correctly recorded on PULSE. 
(Short term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Include	detections	as	part	of	the	mandatory	
GISC	review	process;
•	 Develop	 a	 drop-down	 menu	 or	 aide	
memoire	 to	 assist	 GISC	 call	 takers	 to	
validate	detections;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 a	 review	 of	 detection	 status	
is	 conducted	 in	 respect	 of	 cases	 where	 a	
conviction	is	not	obtained	at	court.	
Recommendation 11.4
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána appoints and trains Dedicated Decisions 
Makers on a divisional basis with  responsibility 
for approving a PULSE record to be recorded as 
detected. (Short term).
Recommendation 11.5
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Crime Registrar as described in Part 5 has 
responsibility for validating detections and 
ensuring compliance with the Crime Counting 
Rules. (Medium term).
Recommendation 11. 6
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána amends the PULSE system to remove the 
facility for retrospectively recording a detection 
date. (Short term).
Recommendation 11.7
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána develops Standard Operating 
Procedure, which stipulate that all detections 
should only be claimed on the day that a charge, 
summons or caution is delivered for adults and 
young offenders. (Short term).
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Recommendation 11.8
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána conducts an audit of all lapsed cases and 
any that are shown as detected must be changed 
to undetected status. (Medium term).
Recommendation 11.9
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a working group to consider extending the 
legislation governing the adult cautioning 
scheme to include possession of drugs and other 
suitable offences. (Medium term).
Recommendation 11.10
The Inspectorate recommends that the Department 
of Justice and Equality convene a working group 
to consider extending the legislation governing 
the adult cautioning scheme to include conditional 
cautioning. (Medium term).
Recommendation 11.11
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ceases the practice of issuing informal 
cautions as a detection option and expunges 
PULSE records that contain this detection status. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 11.12
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene a 
working group to consider extending the use 
of fixed charge penalty notices to include other 
minor crimes and to cease the practice of sending 
unpaid FCPNs to gardaí to issue summonses. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 11.13
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána ensures that suspected offenders are 
formally notified about any crime shown as 
detected against them. (Short term).
Recommendation 11.14
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene a 
working group to consider the implementation of 
an annual audit of detections by an independent 
body. (Medium Term).
Recommendation 11.15
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene 
a working group to ensure a more efficient 
summons process system. (Medium term).
To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Examine	the	issue	of	summons	service	and	
explore	new	ways	to	deal	with	summonses	
such	as	E-Service;	
•	 Introduce	a	court	and	garda	tracking	system	
to	monitor	actions	taken;
•	 Reduce	the	time	taken	from	the	date	of	the	
offence	to	the	first	court	date;
•	 Introduce	 a	 performance	 management	
system	for	all	stages	of	the	process;
•	 Remove	 the	 need	 to	 routinely	 re-issue	
witness	 summonses	 for	 cases	 that	 are	
remanded	to	another	date;
•	 Ensure	 court	 outcomes	 are	 correctly	
recorded	on	PULSE	(See	page	37);	
•	 Extend	the	court	presenter	scheme	to	cover	
summons	courts.
Recommendation 11.16
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene a 
working group to develop, design and implement 
a system which provides joint criminal justice 
performance data on case management. (Medium 
term). 
Recommendation 11.17
The Inspectorate recommends that in the interim, 
the Garda Síochána extends the role of the court 
presenters scheme to include all the prosecution 
role in courts, across all divisions. (Medium term). 
Recommendation 11.18
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality convene a 
working group to examine the current process 
for providing pre-charge advice and feedback 
to investigators on why a case is unsuitable for 
prosecution. (Medium term).
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Recommendation 11.19
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána introduces Criminal Justice Units. 
(Medium term).
Recommendation 11.20
The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda 
Síochána, along with key partner agencies 
introduces criminal justice groups at a divisional 
level. (Medium Term).
Recommendation 11.21
The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality consider 
the establishment of a Criminal Justice Board 
equivalent to deliver a more effective criminal 
justice service. (Medium term).
The following matters need to be considered:
•	 Ensure	that	criminal	cases	do	not	lapse;
•	 Consider	the	extension	of	pre-trial	hearings;
•	 Address	 inefficiencies	 with	 charge	 sheet	
processes	and	court	orders;	
•	 Reduce	 unnecessary	 and	 repeated	 court	
appearances	by	witnesses;
•	 Ensure	specialist	measures	are	available	for	
victims	and	witnesses;
•	 Develop	joint	agency	data	on	case	timeliness	
and	factors	affecting	the	outcome	of	criminal	
cases;
•	 Accurately	 capture	 court	 conviction	
information	in	all	courts;
•	 Develop	video-linking	 to	create	efficiencies	
for	garda	and	other	witnesses;
•	 Review	the	use	of	gardaí	in	court	security	
roles	and	escorting	of	remand	prisoners;
•	 Review	 the	 management	 and	 process	 for	
dealing	 with	 those	 offenders	 who	 commit	
offences	whilst	on	suspended	sentences.
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2. Garda Structure
The Irish police service, the Garda Síochána, 
is headed by the Garda Commissioner, who is 
responsible to the Minister for Justice and Equality, 
who in turn is accountable to the Irish Parliament 
(Oireachtas). The core functions of the service are:
•	 The	detection	and	prevention	of	crime;
•	 The	protection	of	national	security;	and	
•	 Improving	road	safety	through	prevention	
and	enforcement	strategies.	
At	 the	 time	 of	 commencing	 the	 inspection,	
the	 senior	 management	 team	 consisted	 of	
a Commissioner supported by two Deputy 
Commissioners, a Chief Administrative Officer, 
nine Assistant Commissioners, and Executive 
Directors of Finance and Services, Information 
and	 Communication	 Technology,	 Director	 of	
Communications and a Chief Medical Officer. 
The	staffing	of	the	Garda	Síochána,	as	at	31	August	
2014,	is	set	out	in	Chart	1.
1. Background
This report arises from a request by the Minister for Justice and Equality for 
an	 inspection	 of	 the	 allocation	 of	 garda	 resources	 to	 crime	prevention	 and	
investigation.	
The terms of reference set out by the Minister required the Inspectorate:
 “to examine and report on the allocation of garda resources, in particular detective 
resources at district and divisional levels, for the purpose of crime prevention and 
investigation. The examination should identify relevant best international practices 
and have particular regard to:
•	 Garda policies, practices and procedures for preventing and investigating crime;
•	 Crime-related	demands	on	the	Garda	Síochána	and	the	allocation	of	personnel	and	
other resources to meet them;
•	 Garda	systems	for	recording	crime,	managing	crime	caseloads	and	monitoring	the	
progress of individual crime investigations;
•	 Arrangements	for	the	selection,	appointment	and	training	of	detectives;
•	 Establishment	of	local	ad	hoc	specialist	units	to	investigate	crime;
•	 Availability	of	specialist	support	for	complex	investigations.”
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Chart 1
Garda Síochána Strength, 31 August 2014
Commissioner 0
Deputy Commissioner* 1
Chief Administrative 
Officer
1
Assistant Commissioner 8
Executive Director of 
Finance and Services 
1
Principal Officer 5
Chief Superintendent 41
Superintendent 140
Assistant Principal Officer 14
Inspector 300
Higher Executive Officer 79
Sergeant 1,946
Executive Officer 84
Garda 10,447
Staff Officer/District 
Finance Officer
187
Clerical Officer 1,371
Other support staff 
(including teachers)
66
Industrial (including 
cleaners)
247
Reserves 1,143
Total 16,081
Source:	Department	of	Justice	and	Equality,	October	2014.
*Acting	as	the	Interim	Commissioner
Geographically,	 the	 country	 is	 divided	 into	 six	
regions,	 each	 of	 which	 is	 headed	 at	 Assistant	
Commissioner	 level.	 Each	 region	 is	 divided	 into	
divisions commanded by a chief superintendent 
(divisional officer) and each division is divided 
into districts commanded by a superintendent 
(known as a district officer). The structure then 
descends from superintendent to inspector, 
sergeant,	and	to	garda	level.	Divisions	and	regions	
also have a number of police support staff in a 
variety	 of	 different	 grades.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	
service	introduced	a	cohort	of	garda	reserves	who	
provide	assistance	to	gardaí	on	a	voluntary	basis.	
There	 are	 twenty-eight	 garda	 divisions	 and	 564	
garda	stations	in	the	country.
Mayo
Galway
Kerry
Donegal
Clare
Tipperary
Meath
 Limerick
Laois/
Offaly
Wexford
Sligo/
Leitrim
Wicklow
Cork North
Kildare
Cavan/
Monaghan
Westmeath
Waterford
Roscommon/
Longford
Kilkenny/
Carlow
Louth
 DMR
Cork West
Cork 
      City
Garda Síochána Regions
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3.	Level	of	Crime	in	Ireland
It	is	important,	when	considering	the	allocation	of	
garda	 resources,	 to	have	a	 clear	understanding	of	
the	level	and	type	of	crimes	being	reported	and	the	
systems operated by the Garda Síochána to prevent 
and	 detect	 crime	 and	 the	 overall	 management	 of	
crime	investigations.	
As is the case in other countries, the rate of crime 
recorded by the police in Ireland does not represent 
the total level of crime committed. The Crime 
Survey	 for	 England	 and	 Wales1 has estimated 
that one out of every four crimes committed 
are represented in official police statistics. A 
major	 reason	 for	 under-recording	 is	 victim	
and/or witness reluctance to report crime. For 
example, the most recent national survey on 
crime and victimisation in Ireland (the Central 
Statistics Office Quarterly National Household 
Survey	 2010),	 reported	 that	 45%	 of	 assaults	
were	 not	 reported	 to	 the	 gardaí	 and	 that	 “the	
most	 commonly	 cited	 reason	 for	 not	 reporting	
assaults	 to	 the	 gardaí	 was	 that	 the	 incident	 was	
not	sufficiently	serious	enough.”	Similar	findings	
were noted for thefts without violence, thefts 
from	 vehicle,	 burglary,	 and	 vandalism.	 The	
CSO	 Interpreting	 Crime	 Statistics	 briefing	 note	
suggests	other	factors	influence	the	reporting	rate,
1	 ONS	(2013)	Crime	in	England	and	Wales,	Year	Ending	June	
2013.	London:	Office	for	National	Statistics.
such	as	“the	need	to	report	for	insurance	purposes,	
perceptions about the likely success of criminal 
proceedings	and	the	severity	of	sentence.”	
While	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 number	 actually	
committed, the number of crimes reported to and 
recorded	by	the	gardaí	are	an	important	 indicator	
of crime levels and crime trends, and form a critical 
basis	for	garda	strategic	and	operational	plans.	
In addition to reported incidents, crimes also come 
to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 gardaí	 through	 patrols,	
routine enquiries, alarm activations, pro-active 
investigations	or	surveillance	work.	
Most countries have written rules, (usually referred 
to	 as	 Crime	 Counting	 Rules)	 stipulating	 the	 way	
crime	data	 is	 recorded	 for	 statistics.	The	counting	
unit can vary from the offence, the case or court 
outcome. In Ireland, as in many other countries, 
a criminal offence is recorded when there is a 
reasonable probability that a criminal offence 
took place and there is no credible evidence to the 
contrary. The test is that of reasonable probability 
– whether it is more likely than not that a criminal 
offence took place. If that criterion is satisfied, even 
where the victim does not want the matter taken 
any further, a criminal offence should be recorded. 
Chart 2
Total Recorded Crime in Ireland 
2006 to 2013
Source:	CSO	crime	data,	aggregated	by	Garda	Inspectorate.	 
2006	marks	first	year	of	use	of	Irish	Crime	Classification	System	which	replaced	the	Headline/Non-Headline	classification.
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Charts	 2	 to	 4	 show	 an	 indication	 of	 (1)	 overall	
crime	levels,	(2)	the	overall	detection	rates,	and	(3)	
the number of recorded crimes per police officer 
in Ireland. This information is provided for the 
purposes	 of	 a	 general	 context	 only	 at	 this	 stage,	
and later parts in this report provide a deeper 
examination of crime levels and deployment of 
resources. 
The Garda Inspectorate wanted to compare recorded 
and detected crime in Ireland with other similar 
jurisdictions. Internationally, this is not a current 
practice	that	is	generally	used	due	to	differences	in	
crime	 definitions,	 legislation,	 accounting	 periods	
and	 the	 crime	 recording	 categories.	 Comparing	
crime between jurisdictions in this way can 
misrepresent the actual incidence of crime. 
Having	 consulted	 with	 relevant	 stakeholders,	 it	
was decided not to draw direct comparisons with 
the data of other police services, but to look at 
crime trends in Ireland over an extended period of 
time.	In	2006,	Ireland	changed	the	way	that	crime	
was	 categorised	 and	 adopted	 the	 Irish	 Crime	
Classification System, which is in operation today. 
This	further	increased	the	difficulty	in	conducting	
international comparisons. 
Chart 2 shows the total recorded crime incidents 
between	2006	and	2013.	This	includes	the	majority	
of crimes but excludes traffic offences and some 
miscellaneous	 categories	 as	 the	 volume	 of	 these	
incidents distorts the crime picture. The trend line 
shows	 a	 peak	 of	 total	 recorded	 crime	 of	 296,705	
in 2008, and a consistent year on year reduction 
in	 crime	 to	 229,579	 in	 2013.	 Total	 recorded	 crime	
in most jurisdictions can be affected by police 
generated	activity,	such	as	drugs	and	public	order	
offences.	 Comparing	 the	 recorded	 crime	 in	 2008	
with	 2013	 shows	 a	 reduction	 of	 recorded	offences	
of	 over	 67,000.	 The	 following	 figures	 show	 the	
difference	in	specific	crime	categories	between	2008	
and	2013:		
•	 11,025	less	offences	of	intoxicated	driving;
•	 Nine	fewer	homicides;
•	 8,000	fewer	drug	offences;
•	 More	than	25,000	fewer	public	order	offences;
•	 Just	over	1,400	more	burglary	offences;
•	 Criminal	 damage	 reduced	 by	 over	 15,000	
offences.
Chart	 3	 shows	 the	 total	 detection	 rate	 in	 Ireland	
for	 all	 recorded	 crime	 2006-2012.	 Detection	 rates	
reached	 a	 peak	 of	 69%	 in	 2008	 and	 have	 slightly	
reduced	 to	 66%	 in	 2012.	As	 previously	 explained,	
countries use different rules to record a crime as 
detected. 
Chart 3
Crime Detection Rates In Ireland  
2006 -2012
Source:	CSO	detection	data,	aggregated	by	Garda	Inspectorate.
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Though	the	Inspectorate	would	have	liked	to	have	
compared	Ireland	with	other	policing	jurisdictions,	
the same complications outlined above also 
apply in respect of detection rates. In some police 
jurisdictions, detections can only be claimed when 
there	is	a	specific	disposal,	i.e.	a	charge,	summons	
or a caution. In addition, detection rates may vary 
across	crime	categories.	
Chart	 4	 shows	 the	 average	 number	 of	 crimes	 per	
member per year over a seven year period. This 
peaked	in	2006	at	just	under	twenty-one	crimes	per	
member, and has shown a steady decline to just over 
seventeen	 crimes	per	member	 in	 2013.	Workloads	
are	further	explored	in	Part	6.	
4.	Methodology
Following	consideration	of	the	terms	of	reference,	
it was decided to focus this inspection on volume 
crime, i.e. crimes which due to their frequency 
have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 community	 and	
the	ability	of	the	local	gardaí	to	tackle	it.	Volume	
crime	 offences	 such	 as:	 street	 robbery,	 burglary,	
vehicle crime, domestic violence and assaults 
are typically committed by prolific offenders. 
Targeting	police	 resources	on	hotspots,	 recidivist	
volume crime offenders and repeat victims can 
have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 crime	 levels	 and	
community safety. The main focus of this report is 
on	the	following	volume	crimes:
•	 Assaults;
•	 Burglary	and	related	offences;
•	 Domestic	Violence;
•	 Vehicle	crime;
•	 Robbery.
This type of crime may often be considered 
to	 be	 less	 serious	 than	 highly	 profiled	 crime	
such as murder or subversive activity but in 
reality,	 volume	 crime	 can	 have	 a	 high	 impact	 in	
Chart 4
Average Crimes per Member per Year  
2006-2013
Source:	CSO	crime	data;	strength	data	supplied	by	the	Garda	Síochána	aggregated	by	Garda	Inspectorate.	
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a	 community	 and	 lead	 to	high	 levels	of	 fear	 and	
insecurity.	It	therefore	demands	a	highly	efficient	
and professional response. 
Serious crime is low in Ireland, but when such 
a	 crime	 occurs,	 victims	 rightly	 expect	 that	 an	
experienced	investigator	will	take	on	their	case	and	
bring	it	to	an	effective	conclusion.	This	inspection	
examined	the	process	of	serious	crime	investigation	
and in particular, the choices that are made by 
the	 Garda	 Síochána	 about	 who	will	 investigate	 a	
particular	 type	 of	 crime,	 the	 training	 received	 by	
the	 investigator,	 the	support	provided	by	national	
and specialist units, the timeliness and the quality 
of	the	investigation	conducted.		
Prior to the inspection, the Inspectorate conducted 
a series of familiarisation visits to divisions to 
obtain	a	general	overview	of	crime,	which	broadly	
informed	 the	 inspection	 planning	 process.	 The	
inspection	then	gathered	material	through:
•	 Formal	 information	 requests	 to	 the	 Garda	
Síochána;
•	 Structured	interviews	and	focus	groups;	
•	 Field	 visits	 to	 all	 garda	 regions	 and	 seven	
divisions	therein;
•	 Detailed	data	analysis	of	the	garda	incident	
recording	system	(PULSE2);	
•	 Examination	of	case	files;
•	 Examination	of	samples	from	the	Computer	
Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and paper 
based	dispatch	records;
•	 Field	visits	to	comparable	jurisdictions;	
•	 Desk-based	research.
Having	 met	 with	 the	 then	 Garda	 Commissioner	
and	the	Garda	Síochána	senior	management	team,	
the	 Inspectorate	 visited	 seven	 of	 the	 twenty-eight	
garda	divisions,	one	in	each	garda	region	and	two	
in	 the	Dublin	Metropolitan	Region.	The	divisions	
chosen provided a balance of urban and rural 
policing	challenges.
2	 PULSE	 is	 an	 acronym	 for	 Police	 Using	 Leading	 Systems	
Effectively.	PULSE	is	an	I.T.	enabled	Service	Delivery	Project.	
PULSE	 comprises	 of	 seventeen	 operational	 and	 integrated	
system	areas,	e.g.	Crime	Recording,	Processing	of	Prisoners	
and	Traffic	Management.
Field Visits
Each	field	visit	 to	garda	divisions	and	all	national	
units involved structured interviews with rank-
specific	 focus	 groups,	 specialist	 focus	 groups,	
police staff, local association representatives and 
reserves,	 thereby	 ensuring	 representation	 of	 all	
relevant	 garda	 stakeholders.	 Approximately	 1,000	
garda	 members	 and	 staff	 were	 interviewed	 in	
either	 one–to–one	 interviews	 or	 in	 rank/grade	
specific	focus	groups.	To	assist	with	the	field	visits,	
the Inspectorate asked the seven selected divisions 
and all national units to complete a pre-visit self 
assessment	template	with	background	information	
on the specific areas under review. 
These field visits were facilitated by the local 
divisions and national units. This included 
releasing	 staff	 to	meet	with	 the	 Inspectorate.	 The	
participation,	 ideas	 and	 suggestions	 provided	 by	
all those interviewed is very much appreciated by 
the Inspectorate. The contributions of all the people 
that	met	with	the	Inspectorate	are	reflected	in	many	
of the recommendations in this report. 
External Stakeholders
During	field	visits,	interviews	were	also	conducted	
with local representatives of the Probation Service, 
the HSE, the Courts Service, the relevant State 
Solicitor,	County	Manager,	 the	Chairperson	of	 the	
Joint	Policing	Committees	and	some	victim	support	
services.	Each	field	visit	was	followed	by	de-briefing	
the divisional officer on key observations. A full list 
of	stakeholders	is	provided	at	Appendix	1.	
Research Visits
International field visits were made to the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), Police 
Scotland,	 London	 Metropolitan	 Police	 (MPS),	
Surrey	 Police	 Service,	 Hertfordshire	 Police,	West	
Yorkshire	 Police,	 Greater	 Manchester	 Police,	
South	Wales	Police	and	the	Danish	Police	Service.	
Meetings	were	also	held	with	the	Home	Office	in	
London	 and	 the	 police	 inspectorates	 in	 England	
and	 Wales,	 Scotland	 and	 Northern	 Ireland.	 In	
addition,	the	Chief	Inspector	gathered	material	at	
two	major	police	conferences	in	the	USA	with	chief	
officers of the major city police departments in the 
USA,	Canada	 and	UK.	A	 questionnaire	 template	
was	also	circulated	 to	a	 large	network	of	US	and	
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Canadian police. The Inspectorate also held video-
conference	calls	with	the	Western	Australian	and	
New Zealand police. 
Data Analysis
The	 material	 gathered	 from	 the	 interviews	 in	
Ireland	was	 cross-checked	 against	 five	main	 data	
sets from samples of:
1.	 Volume	Crime	Case	Reviews;
2.	 PULSE	entries;	
3.	 Computer	 Aided	 Dispatch	 (CAD3) and 
control	room	call	data;
4.	 Case	files	and	custody	records;
5.	 Formal	 information	 request	 to	 the	 Garda	
Síochána.
These	data	sets	will	be	referenced	regularly	in	every	
part of this report. 
PULSE Crime and Incident Recording
The Garda Síochána has an incident and crime 
recording	system	called	PULSE.	When	a	crime	or	an	
incident	is	reported	to	the	Garda	Síochána,	a	PULSE	
record is required to be completed and a crime 
recorded when there is reasonable probability that 
a crime took place.  
Volume Crime Case Reviews
An	important	component	of	the	crime	investigation	
report	 was	 the	 identification	 and	 tracking	 of	 158	
calls made by members of the public to the Garda 
Síochána	in	2012,	reporting	that	a	crime	had	taken	
place.  
During	 field	 visits	 to	 the	 seven	 divisions,	 the	
Inspectorate checked electronic and paper records 
of	 calls	 received	 at	 garda	 stations	 to	 reports	 of	
assault,	 burglary,	 domestic	 violence,	 robbery	 and	
vehicle crime. These are the types of crimes that are 
dealt	with	on	a	daily	basis	by	garda	districts.	
The	158	calls	selected	consisted	of	at	least	four	calls	
per division inspected, for each of the above five 
crime	categories.	In	some	cases,	it	was	unclear	from	
the record of the call as to what action was taken 
with the crime and as a result, some additional 
3	 Computer	 Aided	 Dispatch	 (CAD)	 is	 an	 electronic	 system	
that	records	the	details	of	all	emergency	and	non-emergency	
calls.
calls were also included. The calls were randomly 
selected from the available records and on the 
basis that a member of the public, who contacted 
the Garda Síochána, stated that a crime had been 
committed when they made the call. 
Each	 call	 identified	was	 categorised	as	a	 case.	All	
information recorded by the Garda Síochána on 
the	 158	 cases	 was	 requested	 and	 reviewed	 from	
the	first	point	of	the	call,	through	to	the	conclusion	
of	 the	 investigation.	 The	 information	 requested	
included	 any	 PULSE	 record	 that	was	 created	 for	
the calls received, the details of any suspect that 
was	identified	and	any	case	files	or	records	relating	
to an arrest, detection or prosecution. 
In its examination of these cases, the Inspectorate 
focused on calls received, in most cases, twelve 
months before the Inspectorate conducted field 
visits.	 By	 concentrating	 on	 calls	 received	 in	 2012,	
it allowed the examination to consider the full 
process	 of	 a	 crime	 investigation	 over	 a	 twelve	
month	 period	 from	 reporting	 through	 to	 a	
prosecution.	 It	 also	 provided	 a	 good	 opportunity	
to	 review	 incident	 recording	 and	 record	 keeping,	
which	 are	 vital	 for	 the	 proper	 and	 thorough	
investigation	of	crime.	
The process of examination conducted by the 
Inspectorate	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Volume	 Crime	
Case	 Reviews.	 The	 examination	 of	 these	 cases	
focused on:
•	 The	recording	of	the	original	calls	from	the	
public;
•	 The	initial	response	and	investigation	of	the	
incident	or	crime;
•	 The	recording	of	the	incidents	or	crimes	on	
PULSE;
•	 The	 investigation	 process	 and	 who	
investigated	the	crime;
•	 Management	 of	 any	 suspects	 and	 the	
detection	(solving)	of	a	crime;
•	 The	 outcome	 of	 any	 court	 prosecution	 or	
other	criminal	justice	disposal;
•	 And	most	importantly,	the	service	that	was	
provided to victims. 
Following	 the	 request	 for	 information	 on	 these	
cases,	 the	 Inspectorate	 received	 a	 large	 amount	
of	 related	 PULSE	 records,	 case	 files	 and	 other	
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documents. In response to the information supplied, 
the Inspectorate requested additional information 
and documentation from the seven divisions.  
Parts	2	to	11	of	this	report	examine	what	happened	
to	 those	 158	 cases	 from	 the	 time	 of	 that	 first	 call	
to	 the	 Garda	 Síochána,	 through	 to	 any	 court	
appearance for a suspect that was identified. 
PULSE Data Analysis and Sampling
As part of the inspection process the Inspectorate 
carried	out	extensive	analysis	of	the	use	of	PULSE	
as	 an	 incident	 and	 crime	 recording	 system.	 The	
analysis included: 
•	 Initially,	 a	 desktop	 examination	 of	 data	
provided	by	the	Garda	Síochána	following	a	
request for information by the Inspectorate. 
This	 information	 request	 sought	 data	 on	 a	
range	 of	 topics	 including	 deployment	 and	
fleet	 information	as	well	as	details	 relating	
to	incident	recording;	
•	 The	 second	 involved	 direct	 sampling	 of	
almost	1,500	PULSE	crime	 incident	records	
by	 the	 Inspectorate.	 This	 sampling	 took	
the form of a number of visits to Garda 
Headquarters	 to	 examine	 the	 PULSE	
system.	 The	 exercise	 in	 sampling	 resulted	
in	 the	 collection	 of	 PULSE	 incident	 record	
information, which became the basis of 
the Inspectorate’s analysis on incident 
classification, reclassification and detections. 
Contact with Victims
Victims	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 report	 and	 the	
Inspectorate reached out to victims in a number 
of ways. The intention was to establish the level of 
service provided by the Garda Síochána or other 
criminal justice partners and most importantly to 
understand	the	experience	of	victims.	Following	the	
selection	 of	 the	 158	Volume	Crime	Case	Reviews,	
the Inspectorate wrote a letter to some of the callers 
who	 contacted	 the	 gardaí	 about	 those	 crimes,	
asking	 for	 an	 opportunity	 to	 discuss	 the	 level	 of	
service provided. The Inspectorate did not attempt 
to	 contact	 callers	 in	 cases	 involving	 domestic	
violence	 or	 assaults	 where	 a	 letter	 might	 cause	
difficulties for the person who called for help. The 
Inspectorate	 sent	 the	 letter	 via	 the	Garda	Victims	
Liaison	Office	who	 sent	 an	 accompanied	 letter	 to	
the victims of those crimes. The Inspectorate also 
spoke to victims of crime who were referred by the 
Crime	 Victims	 Helpline	 and	 non-governmental	
organisations	 (NGOs).	 The	 Inspectorate	 was	 also	
contacted directly by victims of crime. 
The material provided by the victims who spoke 
to the Inspectorate has been very valuable in 
the	 consideration	 of	 this	 report	 and	 has	 greatly	
informed the recommendations. 
5.	Structure	of	this	Report
This inspection was the most extensive piece 
of work conducted by the Inspectorate to date. 
It examined the whole operation of the core 
investigative	 functions	 of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána,	
including	crime	policies,	procedures	and	training.	
This	 report	 contains	 a	 large	 number	 of	
recommendations	 designed	 to	 assist	 the	 Garda	
Síochána	 in	delivering	 the	 best	 possible	 customer	
service efficiently. It includes recommendations 
to improve implementation of policy and to 
modernise	equipment	and	 technology.	 In	order	 to	
ensure maximum opportunity for implementation, 
the recommendations are divided into those which 
can be implemented in the short term (zero to six 
months), medium term (six to twenty-four months) 
and	 long	 term	 (more	 than	 twenty-four	 months).	
Most of the recommendations are directed towards 
action by the Garda Síochána but there are other 
responsible	organisations	and	authorities	within	or	
relevant	to	the	efficiency	of	the	crime	investigation	
process. The Department of Public Expenditure 
and	 Reform,	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 and	
Equality, the Irish Prison Service, the Office of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the 
Courts Service, Probation Service, Forensic Science 
Laboratory	 and	 other	 partner	 agencies	 all	 have	
parts	 to	play	 in	ensuring	that	 the	criminal	 justice	
and	 investigation	 system	 runs	 efficiently	 and	
effectively.	Change	within	the	Garda	Síochána	will	
make	a	difference,	but	 it	 is	only	 through	a	 cross-
organisational	collaborative	approach	that	real	and	
lasting	progress	can	be	made.	
It should be noted that this report has been written 
prior to the establishment of the proposed Garda 
Síochána Authority. It may be that the Authority 
will be responsible for some of the functions 
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relevant to the recommendations in this report. 
At the time of the completion of this report, the 
Inspectorate was not in a position to assess the 
impact of the establishment of the Authority on 
the ownership of recommendations. This is a 
matter which will have to be considered by the 
Department of Justice and Equality, in conjunction 
with the Inspectorate, once decisions on the roles 
and functions of the Authority have been finalised. 
A number of the recommendations fully reiterate or 
update recommendations previously made by the 
Inspectorate. It is the Inspectorate’s view that had 
action been taken to implement several of those 
recommendations,	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 inspection	
would be quite different. 
Presentation of the Report
Because	of	the	complexity	of	each	step	in	the	crime	
investigation	 process,	 the	 report	 is	 divided	 into	
eleven separate parts which can be read separately, 
but which are intrinsically linked. The report is 
constructed as follows:
•	 Part	1	outlines	the	crime	prevention	process;	
•	 Part	 2	 focuses	 on	 the	 crime	 investigation	
context,	structure	and	deployment;
•	 Part	 3	 examines	 calls	 for	 service	 and	 the	
first	steps	in	an	investigation;
•	 Part	 4	 reviews	 the	 recording	 of	 crime	
incidents;	
•	 Part	5	looks	at	crime	management;	
•	 Part	6	examines	how	crime	is	investigated;
•	 Part	 7	 is	 a	 very	 important	 part,	 reviewing 
how victims are dealt with in the 
investigation	of	crime;	
•	 Part	8	explores	the	gathering	and	evaluation	
of	 information	 for	 policing	 intelligence	
purposes;	
•	 Part	 9	 focuses	 on	 the	 investigation	 of	
suspects	and	detention	at	garda	stations;
•	 Part	10	examines	young	and	adult	offender	
management;
•	 Part	11	completes	the	review	of	the	process	
with a very important section on detection 
of	crime	and	bringing	offenders	to	justice.	
The Appendices include additional charts and a 
list	of	the	groups	interviewed.
During	 the	 final	 stages	 of	 this	 inspection,	 the	
Minister for Justice and Equality requested the 
Inspectorate to examine the issues identified in 
the	 Guerin	 Report	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Crime	
Investigation	inspection.	The	Inspectorate’s	report	
on this matter is included as an Addendum. 
It must be noted that the overall impression 
gleaned from the field visits is of an organisation 
with a majority of very dedicated and committed 
staff who strive to make their communities 
safer places in which to live, visit and work. The 
lengths to which many members go to do their 
duty properly may not always be clear to the 
general public, but the Inspectorate met many 
committed members and staff, some of whom 
take personal risks on a daily basis to make 
Ireland a safer place. The findings in this report 
in no way diminish their efforts. On the contrary, 
the report shows that despite poor technology, 
some weak processes and gaps in supervision, a 
lot of decent men and women work very hard on 
a daily basis to deliver a good policing service. 
6.	The	Way	Forward
This	 report	 contains	 a	 large	 number	 of	
recommendations for action by the Garda 
Síochána	 and	 other	 organisations,	 whose	 work	
impacts on the delivery of criminal justice in 
Ireland.	 The	 report	 highlights	 areas	 requiring	
immediate action. It is essential that the report 
is considered holistically to ensure that the 
maximum benefit can be derived from this 
inspection. 
 Recommendation 1 
 The Garda Inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and Equality establish 
and task a criminal justice service group, 
comprised of the agencies and stakeholders 
that are responsible for community safety in 
Ireland, with overseeing the implementation 
of all of the recommendations accepted from 
this report.
The Inspectorate has also been requested to 
review the structure and operational deployment 
of	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 under	 the	 Haddington	
Road	Agreement.	Throughout	 this	 inspection,	 the	
Inspectorate identified issues which will be further 
developed	in	the	Haddington	Road	Review.	These	
issues are referenced in this report. 
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1.1 Introduction
The number one priority for any police service must be the prevention of crime.
Before embarking on the journey through the crime investigation process, it 
is important to remember that many crimes can be prevented. Police services 
place great emphasis on trying to prevent a crime from occurring in the first 
place. The crime prevention process is also about reducing police demand and 
particularly reducing the numbers of people who become a victim of crime. 
Prevention saves personal costs to victims, organisational costs across the 
public sector, particularly in the criminal justice services, as well as societal 
costs. 
Most crime is opportunist, such as the burglar who commits a crime because 
a possibility arose and not because it was planned. New opportunities for 
crime arise through new products entering the market, and criminals find 
new ways to commit offences. It is important that police services influence 
manufacturers and architects to design products and buildings that reduce 
offending opportunities for criminals.
Early in the 19th Century, Sir Robert Peel outlined nine basic principles of 
policing, which became the foundation for policing in countries around the 
world. The following are three of those principles that refer to crime prevention 
and are still relevant today: 
•	 The	basic	mission	for	which	the	police	exist	is	to	prevent	crime	and	disorder;
•	 Police	 must	 secure	 the	 willing	 co-operation	 of	 the	 public	 in	 voluntary	
observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the 
public;
•	 The	test	of	police	efficiency	is	the	absence	of	crime	and	disorder,	not	the	
visible evidence of police action in dealing with it. 
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Parts of the report Crime Prevention activity
Part 2  
Divisional Policing 
•	 Change	to	a	divisional	structure	to	release	gardaí	for	pro-active	patrolling;
•	 Focus	superintendents	on	crime	prevention	and	crime	investigation;	
•	 Enhance	front-line	supervision;	
•	 Develop	a	resource	allocation	process	that	matches	resources	to	policing	demands;	
•	 Review	the	Garda	Síochána	roster	to	ensure	that	it	matches	resources	to	demands;	
•	 Ensure	that	all	operational	units	are	briefed,	tasked	with	a	crime	prevention	initiative	
and	de-briefed	at	the	end	of	a	tour	of	duty.
Part 3  
First	Response	
•	 Improve	the	recording	of	calls	from	the	public	and	deployment	of	available	resources;
•	 Respond	to	fast	time	crime	incidents	by	re-deploying	resources	to	prevent	further	
crimes;
•	 Provide	data	on	call	demand	to	allow	better	deployment	of	resources;	
•	 Deploy	garda	reserves	in	a	more	pro-active	way	such	as	patrolling	crime	hot	spots;
•	 Improve	the	quality	of	crime	scene	examinations	to	identify	offenders.
Part 4 
Incident	Recording	
•	 Improve	the	categorisation	of	crime	to	allow	for	more	accurate	analysis;
•	 Increase	garda	visibility	by	ensuring	that	gardaí	do	not	have	to	return	to	a	garda	
station	to	complete	a	record	of	a	crime;
•	 Ensure	that	GPS	co-ordinates	are	included	in	all	crime	records;
•	 Reduce	delays	in	completion	of	crime	recording	to	allow	for	more	accurate	analysis	of	
particular	crime	types	and	dissemination	of	data	for	crime	briefings.
Part 5 
Crime Management
•	 Improve	the	re-categorisation	of	crime	to	allow	for	more	accurate	analysis	of	particular	
crime	types	and	patterns	of	offending;
•	 Improve	crime	management	processes	to	release	gardaí	for	pro-active	patrolling.
Part 6 
Investigating Crime 
•	 Reduce	crime	investigations	required	by	regular	unit	gardaí	to	release	uniform	units	to	
conduct	crime	prevention	activity;
•	 Reduce	incidents	of	domestic	violence	by	providing	a	better	service	to	victims	and	
focusing	on	violent	offenders;
•	 Effectively	use	CCTV	and	ANPR	in	crime	prevention	and	crime	investigation;
•	 Reduce	the	time	taken	to	investigate	crime	and	to	deal	with	suspected	offenders.	
Part 7 
The	Victims	Experience	
•	 Provide	information	on	support	organisations	and	networks	for	victims	of	crime;
•	 Develop	a	policy	to	identify	and	respond	to	repeat	victims	of	crime.
Part 8 
Intelligence	Led	Policing
•	 Use	intelligence	to	task	all	operational	units	daily;
•	 Focus	Garda	Síochána	operations	on	those	offenders	who	present	the	greatest	risks;
•	 Develop	information	sharing	protocols	with	key	partners	agencies;
•	 Develop	Covert	Human	Intelligence	Sources	on	volume	crime	offending;
•	 Enhance	confidential	call	lines	to	encourage	members	of	the	public	to	report	suspicious	
and	criminal	behaviour.
Part 9 
Investigation	and	Detention	of	
Suspects	
•	 Reduce	the	time	taken	to	investigate	crimes	with	named	suspects;
•	 Improve	garda	skills	in	gathering	evidence	and	interviewing	suspects;
•	 Develop	an	early	arrest	referral	scheme	for	those	prolific	offenders	who	are	drug	users.
Part 10 
Offender	Management	
•	 Develop	a	multi-agency	co-located	integrated	youth	offending	service;
•	 Promote	the	use	of	restorative	justice	processes;
•	 Develop	a	multi-agency,	co-located	and	integrated	adult	offender	management	service;	
•	 Ensure	that	high	risk	sex	offenders	are	closely	monitored;
•	 Prioritise	high	risk	warrants	and	warrants	for	high	risk	offenders;
•	 Ensure	that	high	risk	offenders	on	bail	are	closely	monitored.
Part 11 
Detecting	and	Prosecuting	 
Crime 
•	 Ensure	that	cases	with	named	suspects	are	progressed	effectively;	
•	 Reduce	delays	in	bringing	cases	to	court;
•	 Reduce	the	number	of	gardaí	involved	in	court	processes	and	release	members	for	
operational	duties.	
1.2 Crime Prevention
In all parts of this crime investigation report, crime 
prevention is strongly featured. The following 
table shows the aspects of crime prevention that 
are covered in Parts 2 to 11 of this report and how 
changes in police activity can prevent crime.
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The table highlights the importance of crime 
prevention activity to prevent crime through 
intelligence led policing and good offender 
management processes. 
1.3 Crime Prevention in the 
Garda Síochána
Crime prevention policy in the garda 
síochána
In 2013, the Garda Síochána published a 
document entitled ‘Community Crime Prevention 
Programmes’. The document highlights the 
importance of engaging local communities 
in	 activity	 that	 encourages	 the	 two-way	 flow	
of information between the police and the 
community and engages local people in looking 
after their own communities. However the Garda 
Síochána has not published a crime prevention 
strategy that articulates how all available 
resources will be used more effectively to reduce 
crime. The Inspectorate believes that crime 
prevention should be the number one priority for 
the Garda Síochána and that there should be one 
comprehensive and strategic document outlining 
how garda resources will be used to prevent crime.
 recommendation 1.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops and implements a crime 
prevention strategy that articulates how 
garda resources will be used to prevent crime. 
(short term)
White paper on Crime and anti-Crime 
strategy 
The Inspectorate is aware that work by the 
Department of Justice and Equality on the 
development of a White Paper on Crime, which 
incorporates	a	National	Anti-Crime	Strategy;	 is	 at 
an	 advanced	 stage,	 following	 an	 extensive	
consultation process. As policing responses are 
a key component of the Strategy, finalisation of 
this	 project	 needs	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 context	
of developments with respect to the review 
of governance arrangements for the Garda 
Síochána.
Designing out Crime
‘Designing	out	crime’	 is	a	concept	which	explores	
crime prevention opportunities at the stage of 
product development or creating plans for major 
developments and is an important aspect of crime 
prevention. In the US, Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) is a component 
in all police crime prevention units. The Garda 
Síochána are also committed to CPTED and offer 
services on the Garda website, but the Inspectorate 
found limited evidence that the Garda Síochána 
are engaged with manufactures and architects to 
design out crime in new homes and buildings in 
Ireland. In the UK, ‘Secure by Design’ (SBD) is a 
well established crime prevention process in the 
design phase of building developments. Research 
over thirty years shows that police recorded crime 
levels are lower on SBD estates, residents in those 
estates felt safer and importantly offenders felt less 
comfortable entering SBD properties. 
garda national Crime prevention Unit
The Garda National Crime Prevention Unit (NCPU) 
is part of the Community Relations Division and 
is centrally based in Dublin. This is a small unit 
that provides support to operational divisions and 
national units in respect of crime prevention advice. 
In particular, the unit provides support to divisions 
that are trying to establish new Community Alert 
and Neighbourhood Watch schemes. 
The unit also provides crime prevention advice 
on the Garda Portal (the Garda Síochána internal 
website) and for the benefit of the public on the 
Garda	Síochána	external	website.	
As a result of budgetary limitations during the 
last four years, the unit has had limited capacity to 
supply literature, such as crime prevention packs 
for victims. It has also stopped hosting an annual 
conference for garda crime prevention officers. 
The unit has the remit for developing crime 
prevention policy, but there has been limited policy 
development over the last few years.
garda Crime prevention officers
Each division should have a dedicated Crime 
Prevention Officer (CPO), usually at sergeant 
rank. The Inspectorate supports the use of crime 
prevention officers, although assignments should 
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be based on skills and should not be dependant on 
rank or sworn powers status. Some of the divisions 
visited did not have a CPO at the time of the field 
visit and divisions were told that the vacancy 
could not be filled. The Inspectorate understands 
that authority to replace those CPOs has now been 
granted. 
In other jurisdictions, crime prevention specialists 
are particularly engaged at the early stages of 
planning applications for new major developments, 
providing advice on all aspects of crime prevention 
design. As part of the planning application process, 
plans are sent to local police divisions for their views. 
In major developments, police crime prevention 
officers play a significant role and planning 
committees take into account recommendations 
from crime prevention officers, before planning 
decisions are made. Sometimes changes can 
be small, such as increased lighting or security 
fencing and sometimes the recommendations can 
be	 extensive,	 such	 as	 including	CCTV	 systems	 or	
redesigning parts of the development. Currently 
in Ireland, there is no formal process to pass plans 
to CPOs. As part of the inspection process, the 
Inspectorate met with County or City Managers 
across the seven divisions and CPOs in post. All 
of those interviewed saw obvious merits in this 
approach, but currently have no formal process for 
referring such plans. This needs to be addressed to 
ensure that crime prevention is fully considered in 
any major development. Some of the Garda CPOs 
are trained in environmental design, but these 
skills are not always sought or applied. 
 recommendation 1.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána agrees a protocol with local 
authorities to ensure that major development 
planning applications are reviewed by crime 
prevention officers trained in environmental 
design. (medium term).
This is a recommendation that may need to be 
considered in conjunction with the Department 
of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government. 
Deployment of Crime prevention officers 
The Inspectorate found an inconsistent approach to 
the use of CPOs across the seven divisions visited. 
Some CPOs are invited to attend local crime 
management meetings and some are not included. 
The Inspectorate believes that CPOs should be fully 
engaged in all crime meetings and particularly 
at	 tasking	 and	 co-ordinating	 meetings.	 In	 terms	
of crime prevention, a good model of approach is 
to	 focus	on	Victim,	Offender	 and	Location	 (VOL).	
CPOs can play a key role in both victim and location 
target hardening,1 which will greatly impact on 
offender behaviour. 
good practice
During field visits, the inspectorate identified 
the following good practice initiatives led by 
crime prevention officers:
•	 Developing	local	business	watch	schemes;
•	 Launching	text	alert	schemes;
•	 Participating	in	local	radio	shows;
•	 Crime	prevention	initiatives	such	as	‘Farm	
Watch’ that included cross border co-
operation with the psni.
A CPO described crime investigation and crime 
detection as only impacting on a very small 
percentage of the public, but crime prevention can 
help everyone.
 recommendation 1.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a standard operating 
procedure for the use of crime prevention 
officers to reduce offending opportunities. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Review	 the	 need	 to	 deploy	 sergeants	 and	
sworn members as crime prevention officers. 
1 A security term for crime prevention initiatives to strengthen 
the security of a business or a home to reduce the risk of a 
crime.
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Crime prevention officers informed the Inspectorate 
that the National Crime Prevention Unit (NCPU) 
used to provide more literature and more direction. 
Initiatives previously generated by the NCPU 
included monthly crime prevention themes that 
ensured that Garda CPOs were consistently 
deployed. 
 recommendation 1.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána national Crime prevention 
Unit provides central co-ordination and 
support to crime prevention officers activity 
to ensure consistency of deployment. 
(short term).
Crime surveys
CPOs and gardaí conduct crime surveys to improve 
home and business security and provide crime 
prevention advice. Crime surveys are generally an 
assessment of the security of a home or a business 
with recommendations to improve security and 
safety. This can be practical advice, such as better 
window locks in a home and information to 
businesses about safer cash handling arrangements. 
Surveys are often completed after a crime has taken 
place, although it is more productive to try and offer 
a crime survey to prevent a crime from occurring. 
CPOs do not have the capacity to complete crime 
surveys for the majority of people who require 
crime prevention advice. This is usually provided 
by a garda at the time of dealing with a crime, or 
a community garda is asked to provide security 
advice to a person or community group concerned 
about becoming victims. The Garda Síochána must 
ensure that gardaí are provided with the necessary 
skills to conduct crime prevention surveys. 
Following burglary offences, community gardaí 
are often tasked to revisit a victim and to call on 
neighbouring properties to advise occupiers that a 
burglary has taken place. This is good practice, as it 
alerts communities to the fact that a burglar may be 
operating in that area. 
CPOs are usually tasked to complete surveys for 
businesses, or after a serious crime has taken place 
or where the victim is particularly vulnerable. 
With business premises, there was an inconsistent 
approach to the monitoring of crime surveys. Some 
CPOs complete business surveys, but do not check 
to see if recommendations were implemented. Some 
CPOs	 re-visit	 businesses	 and	 are	 often	 frustrated	
when recommendations are not put in place as they 
do not have authority to ensure compliance.
Across the divisions visited, the Inspectorate 
found an inconsistent approach in the provision of 
crime prevention packs to victims of crime. Crime 
prevention packs are usually provided to victims of 
burglary to try and minimise the opportunity of a 
repeat offence. In some divisions, crime prevention 
information was made available to victims of 
burglaries. In other divisions, no literature was 
available. The Inspectorate believes that there 
should be a national standard to delivering crime 
prevention advice and to the provision of literature 
to victims of crime.
 recommendation 1.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a national standard for 
conducting crime surveys and providing 
crime prevention literature. (medium term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Create	a	national	standard	crime	prevention	
pack for Garda Síochána priority crime 
victims;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 gardaí	 are	 trained	 to	 an	
appropriate level to conduct an effective 
crime	prevention	survey;
•	 Ensure	 that	 surveys	 for	 businesses	 are	
monitored and checked for compliance and 
crime outcomes.
Text	Alert	
The	 NCPU	 launched	 ‘Text	 Alert’	 in	 2013,	 which	
allows	the	gardaí	 to	send	fast-time	 information	 to	
members of the public who have signed up to the 
scheme. This is now operating in several divisions 
and requires members of the scheme to pay a small 
sum to receive messages. 
During community meetings attended by the 
Inspectorate, there was some very positive feedback 
on	 text	 alert	 schemes	where	 communities	 receive	
regular information. The Inspectorate was also 
informed	 that	 some	 text	 alert	 schemes	 often	 rely	
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on an individual garda to send out alerts. It was 
reported that if that garda is not at work, members 
of the scheme do not receive information. Some 
police	 services	 have	 incorporated	 text	 alert	 into	
police telephony systems and messages are sent 
directly from control rooms, rather than relying 
on an individual officer to send out messages. The 
Inspectorate is aware of successful notifications 
from	 text	 alert	 schemes	 that	 have	 led	 to	 the	
prevention of a crime or the arrest of an offender. 
 recommendation 1.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the process for providing 
information	to	text	alert	schemes	and	explores	
options for enhancing the information that is 
provided. (medium term). 
How Can the public Help?
As mentioned earlier, many crimes are opportunist 
and CPOs publish messages through local radio, 
newspapers and Crimecall to remind people 
not to leave items on display in vehicles and for 
householders to remember to lock doors and close 
windows when they are going out. Another public 
message reminds young people who are stopped 
and asked for the time by a stranger to be careful 
as this can be used as an opportunity to snatch and 
steal their mobile phone.
The Garda Síochána needs the public to report 
suspicious behaviour before a crime takes place. 
Where a person believes that a crime is about to 
be committed they should dial 999 and report the 
circumstances. In Part 8 of this report, there are 
details of other options on how to report suspicious 
activity	 to	 the	Garda	 Síochána	 in	 non-emergency	
circumstances.
Watch schemes
Since 1985, the Garda Síochána has developed 1,345 
Community Alert Schemes (rural schemes), 2,345 
Neighbourhood Watches Schemes (urban schemes) 
and a number of business watch and specialist 
schemes such as Campus Watch. Half of all 
Neighbourhood Watches are operating in Dublin. 
These schemes are developed locally by districts 
and divisions and rely on support from community 
policing gardaí and local crime prevention officers. 
The	 various	 schemes	 are	 an	 excellent	 way	 of	
engaging local communities and businesses in 
crime prevention initiatives and particularly to 
look after members of the community who are 
vulnerable.	 Schemes	 require	 local	 co-ordinators,	
who operate on a street and area level for 
maximum	 effectiveness.	 This	 allows	 gardaí	 to	
link into a small number of representatives from 
individual	schemes,	who	co-ordinate	the	activity	of	
scheme members. 
Schemes are often initially very effective as 
community members are engaged and focused on 
activity to reduce crime. Whilst schemes should be 
self-sufficient,	 they	 require	 information	on	 crimes	
that are occurring and occasional visits at meetings 
from local gardaí. Over time, and particularly if 
successful in reducing crime, community members 
can lose interest in the scheme, which can become 
dormant (inactive). Of the schemes in operation, 
gardaí	have	estimated	that	approximately	30%	are	
currently	 dormant	 and	 need	 to	 be	 re-launched.	
Schemes are most successful when members are 
actively involved by reporting incidents to the 
gardaí and holding meetings with residents. 
During field visits, the Inspectorate found that all 
divisions had reduced the numbers of community 
gardaí	 and	 two	 divisions	 effectively	 had	 no	 full-
time community officers. The Inspectorate was 
informed that the loss of community officers was 
already impacting on the service provided to 
community watch schemes.
On an annual basis, divisional chief 
superintendents and district officers are required 
to meet with Neighbourhood Watch and 
Community Alert members operating in their area. 
are schemes in the right place and are they 
Working?
Apart from the numbers of Neighbourhood Watch 
and other schemes in operation, there are very few 
garda metrics that measure the success of schemes. 
The Inspectorate was unable to establish if schemes 
are	actually	operating	in	crime	hot-spots	and	in	the	
right places and whether crime in the areas where 
schemes are operating is increasing or decreasing. 
The identification of the location of schemes and 
crime	hot-spot	locations	would	assist	prioritisation	
in	 re-launching	 dormant	 schemes	 or	 developing	
new ones. 
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 recommendation 1.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an analysis of crime 
hot-spots to identify priority areas for re-
launching dormant schemes or developing 
new ones. (short term).
Fear	of	Crime	
Fear of crime can often be disproportionately 
higher than the reality of becoming a victim. This 
can have a major impact on peoples’ lives and can 
affect particular community groups, such as the 
elderly. Fear of crime can be impacted by a number 
of factors, such as high profile incidents and 
increased or sensationalised media reporting. The 
visible presence of patrolling gardaí and regular 
information about crime in a community area can 
significantly help to reduce the fear of crime. 
Most districts maintain a register of vulnerable 
members of the community and gardaí are tasked to 
call on people to provide reassurance and practical 
crime prevention advice.
There are currently no indicators in place to 
measure the fear of crime. The last Public Attitude 
Survey (PAS) was completed by the Garda Síochána 
in 2008. At the time of finalising this report, the 
Inspectorate was informed that the Garda Síochána 
intends to conduct a PAS and has invited tenders 
for the contract.
garda Website 
Most	 CPOs	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 the	 Garda	
Website for crime prevention could be improved. 
The Inspectorate was informed that businesses and 
local people often use websites other than the Garda 
Síochána website, for crime prevention advice. 
 recommendation 1.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the provision of crime 
prevention advice on the garda Website and 
seeks to adopt best international practice. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Promote	crime	prevention	 information	that	
is available on the Garda Website.
new Community policing model
A new community policing model has been 
introduced in the North Central Division of the 
Dublin Metropolitan Region.
good practice
in this division, the customer base has been 
segmented along geographic, demographic, 
and socio-economic lines, with specific focus 
on local garda ownership of geographically 
defined small areas (based on the Cso census 
data 2011). individual community gardaí have 
adopted a targeted approach to formal, pro-
active management of key customer groups and 
their	respective	requirements;	analysing	those	
requirements and responding to them through 
investigations and operations. Key groups 
covered include victims, main stakeholders, 
residents of the small areas and recidivist 
offenders. all issues are logged and tracked 
using internal structures, which includes close 
management oversight and accountability.
the model focuses on a customer-centric 
approach and customer information is 
obtained through local community interviews 
and questionnaires. the response to issues 
raised includes policing operations such as 
‘Tempest’	 and	 ‘Spire’,	 which	 tackled	 anti-
social behaviour associated with drug related 
activity.
property marking
During the inspection the Inspectorate found that 
property marking had not really progressed as a 
concept. CPOs informed the Inspectorate that there 
is limited equipment made available to do this. 
Property marking equipment is not provided from 
central budgets. 
In other policing jurisdictions, concerted efforts 
have been made to encourage the members of 
watch schemes to mark property and particularly 
items of sentimental or high value. Neighbourhood 
Watch and Community Alert schemes provide an 
excellent	 platform	 to	 encourage	 and	 help	 people	
to mark their property. The marking of property 
serves two purposes. Firstly, to deter criminals 
from stealing property that may be traced back to 
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the scene of a crime and secondly, to enable the 
police to return any recovered property. Bicycles are 
frequently stolen and often police services recover 
bicycles, but are unable to restore them to the 
rightful owner. Marking bicycles though schools 
and Neighbourhood Watch schemes is an area that 
could be utilised. In some jurisdictions, ultraviolet 
marker pens are sponsored and distributed at 
neighbourhood watch meetings. In the US, some 
police stations have electric marking tools that are 
available to Neighbourhood Watches to mark items 
of property. 
Use of Dna
DNA is increasingly being used as a crime 
prevention tool and it has opened up a new 
approach to crime prevention and detection. DNA 
products can be applied to property items and can 
be linked to a specific address. This approach to 
property marking is operating in New Zealand, the 
U.S. and in the UK. 
Businesses can install DNA systems that activate 
when a burglary occurs, coating a suspect with a 
fine DNA spray. The spray leaves a DNA imprint 
that	 is	 only	 visible	 under	 ultra	 violet	 (UV)	 light.	
Home owners are able to use DNA kits to mark 
items of value, which can be traced back to where 
it was stolen. Some police services are also using 
DNA in decoy vehicles, where an item is left on 
display and a suspect breaking into the car is 
coated in DNA. Officers conducting searches on a 
suspect’s	 address	use	UV	 lamps	and	many	police	
stations	 now	 have	 UV	 lamps	 at	 points	 of	 entry	
for offenders brought into custody. Notices of the 
application of the system are posted as a deterrent 
to a criminal entering an area or approaching 
a house. This system is of benefit to businesses 
and private homes and the return of items of 
sentimental value can have a significant impact on 
a victim’s recovery. In some policing areas, the local 
authority and the police provide DNA marking 
kits for areas where burglary offences are most 
prevalent. 
The issue of providing property marking equipment 
including DNA may be suitable for sponsorship 
activity.
 recommendation 1.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána promotes property marking 
initiatives through local neighbourhood 
Watch and Community alert schemes and 
explores	 the	 application	 of	 DNA	 products.	
(medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Consider	sponsorship	opportunities.
victims
For targeted crime prevention advice, there is a 
need for more detailed analysis of crime to identify 
if a particular crime is impacting on a particular age 
group of victims or a particular community. This 
allows far more targeted crime prevention activity.
 recommendation 1.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána tasks garda analysts to conduct 
enhanced analysis of crime in respect of 
identifying trends in victims and developing 
activity to reduce victimisation rates. 
(medium term).
Distraction Burglaries
There are a number of criminals who target 
vulnerable people by using deception to gain 
entry into homes or businesses, using a variety 
of	 methods;	 such	 as	 purporting	 to	 be	 officials	
from utility companies or the gardaí. Once inside, 
offenders steal property and often leave a victim 
unsuspecting that a crime has taken place. The 
impact of this sort of crime is significant and 
sometimes victims are too embarrassed to report 
the crime. In cases of very vulnerable people, 
offenders often return and victims are repeatedly 
targeted.
Other police services use digital systems, which 
are	 effectively	 small	 CCTV	 cameras	 that	 can	 be	
concealed in suitable places. The devices are fitted 
by the police, who download recordings following 
a crime to identify and prosecute suspects. This sort 
of evidence removes the need to rely on the evidence 
of a victim, who may not be able to identify the 
suspect, and often the footage provides sufficient 
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evidence to secure a conviction at court. It is 
another initiative where police and local authorities 
have purchased devices and deploy them to protect 
vulnerable members of the community. 
 recommendation 1.11
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda	 Síochána	 explores	 new	 technology	
opportunities for the use in prevention and 
detection of crime. (medium term). 
reducing Demand
Internationally, police services regularly attend the 
same locations to deal with similar types of calls, 
sometimes involving repeat victims and suspects, 
or a particular nightclub, a street or a person 
that regularly comes to notice. Often, different 
police officers are sent to deal with the identical 
situations and there is no ownership to look for a 
long term solution. Other policing organisations 
have	examined	hot-spot	 locations	and	people	 that	
generate regular calls for police services. Western 
Australia Police identified the top twenty places 
that required police attendance. By focusing on 
problem solving and crime prevention initiatives, 
the	number	of	calls	to	these	places	reduced	by	50%.	
New Zealand Police identified the fifteen most 
difficult areas to police, and targeted resources on 
tackling the issues that led to high incidents of crime 
and	 anti-social	 behaviour.	 Problem	 Orientated	
Policing is a much used international model for 
addressing long term community problems. 
 recommendation 1.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts analysis of call data on a 
divisional basis to identify the top places that 
generate demand for policing services and 
introduces initiatives to reduce the impact on 
local policing. (medium term).
Dealing with anti-social Behaviour
During community meetings attended by the 
Inspectorate,	 participants	 said	 that	 anti-social	
behaviour is not effectively addressed and that 
community members regularly contact the gardaí 
about	 recurring	 problems.	 Addressing	 complex	
problems with sometimes very challenging 
individuals is not always the sole remit of the Garda 
Síochána. Often individuals causing problems are 
known to more than one agency. In many police 
services, long term problem solving is taken on by 
community or neighbourhood officers who engage 
partner agencies to look for long term solutions. 
With the reallocation of community police officers 
the Garda Síochána will need to consider what 
partner agencies should be involved and internally 
who will deal with long term community issues.
With	 regard	 to	 anti-social	 behaviour	 legislation,	
the Inspectorate found some evidence of divisions 
issuing behavioural warnings to persons causing 
harassment, alarm or distress but limited evidence 
of	 any	 banning	 orders	 obtained	 or	 full	 anti-
social	 behaviour	 orders	 in	 existence.	Obtaining	 a	
banning order requires the issuing of three or more 
behavioural	warnings	in	a	six	month	period.	This	
enables a power of arrest for any breach. 
 recommendation 1.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a review of the use of anti-
social behaviour legislation and ensures that 
the available powers are used effectively. 
(medium term).
CCtv mobile Buses 
Marked	and	highly	visible	CCTV	mini-buses	are	a	
good	 example	 of	 interagency	working	 in	 the	UK.	
In many cases, they are funded by local authorities 
and	in	Westminster	(London)	two	CCTV	buses	are	
fully operated by local authority staff. The buses are 
used to prevent crime and not to deal with traffic 
matters. The buses overtly record as they patrol 
and	are	parked	in	key	hot-spot	locations	to	prevent	
crime	and	disorderly	behaviour.	The	CCTV	buses	
provide a good deterrent in high crime areas and, if 
a crime occurs, provide an opportunity to identify 
suspects who may have been captured on footage.
partnership Working 
In the UK, legislation ensures that partner agencies 
work closely together to tackle crime and disorder. 
Local authorities often take the lead for crime 
prevention and other community safety initiatives. 
West Yorkshire Police has developed the Safer Leeds 
Community Safety Partnership that brings together 
the police, local authority and other key parties. 
This	 initiative	 includes	 co-location	 of	 police	 and	
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partner agency resources and the local authority 
head of services is responsible for the partnership. 
Responsibilities of the partnership include 
management	 of	 the	 counter-terrorism	 strategy	
and	 the	 co-ordination	 of	 various	 multi-agency	
panels	 for	 monitoring	 high	 risk	 sex	 offenders,	
domestic violence victims and perpetrators of 
violent crime. The partnership has an intelligence 
unit	that	analyses	crime	and	disorder,	co-ordinates	
the sharing of information and has easy access to 
partner data, such as health and social care.
There are many crimes and challenges that 
impact on more than one agency, such as domestic 
violence,	 anti-social	 behaviour,	 street	 drinking 
and violence. The Inspectorate believes that 
divisional chief superintendents should engage 
local senior partners in key organisations, such 
as local authorities and the HSE, to tackle long 
term issues that impact on all services. Partner 
agencies also regularly visit vulnerable people at 
home. Other police services have engaged health 
workers and social workers and briefed them on 
what information would help the police to prevent 
a person from becoming a victim. This 
arrangement also allows the police to receive 
notifications from partner agencies.
At present in Ireland, partner agencies are not 
statutorily required to collaborate to tackle crime 
and disorder and partnerships across the seven 
divisions visited operated in many different ways. 
The Inspectorate did not identify any division 
where	 partner	 agency	 staff	 are	 co-located.	 Local	
authorities	visited	in	the	seven	divisions	expressed	
an interest in how partnerships operate in other 
policing jurisdictions and particularly where joint 
working arrangements are in place. The absence of 
a statutory footing for partnerships allows some 
agencies to disengage from joint working. 
Joint Policing Committees (JPCs) were established 
under the Garda Síochána Act in 2005 to allow 
collaboration on local policing issues between 
garda divisions, local authorities, elected members 
and community representatives. JPCs currently 
operate	 in	 all	 twenty-eight	 divisions.	 The	
Inspectorate believes that these groups should be 
fully engaged in crime prevention activity.
The Inspectorate believes that tackling crime 
and disorder and making places safer requires 
many agencies to work together, to agree shared 
priorities,	to	co-locate	resources	where	appropriate	
and to facilitate sharing of partner data. A stronger 
divisional focus, with a single point of contact, will 
facilitate enhanced partnership development and 
working.
 recommendation 1.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána designates chief superintendents to 
engage key strategic partners to address key 
issues that impact on all partner agencies and 
to develop joint plans to tackle local crime 
and disorder. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 Joint	 Policing	 Committees	 are	
fully engaged in crime prevention activity.
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2.1 Introduction
Ireland is divided into six policing regions, each managed by an assistant 
commissioner. Within those regions there are a total of twenty-eight policing 
areas called divisions. In general, divisions are aligned to county boundaries, 
although a number of divisions cover two counties. Each division is commanded 
by a chief superintendent with responsibility for the delivery of all policing 
services, including crime investigation. Within divisions there are a number 
of garda districts that are managed by superintendents.
In Ireland, divisions and districts are the real heart of the police service, 
having responsibility for the day-to-day contact with members of the public, 
particularly victims of crime and delivering the vast majority of front-line 
policing services. 
This part of the report looks at the crime profiles at divisional level, the current 
divisional management structure, the role of senior managers and particularly 
the responsibility of detective supervisors for the deployment of resources to 
investigate crime. It also introduces the various resources currently available to 
tackle crime and broadly indicates how alternative deployment could provide 
a better service. A more detailed examination of current garda resources and 
the process of investigations is provided in further parts of this report. This 
part of the report recommends a model for the delivery of local investigative 
policing services.
2.2 Divisional Crime Profiles
For statistical purposes, all crime reported in 
Ireland is recorded in the division where the offence 
took place. There are some small variations to this, 
such as when a complex fraud takes place and it 
is difficult to determine where the crime actually 
occurred. In these circumstances, the crime is 
recorded at the division where the victim made the 
complaint about a crime. 
response to Complaints of Crime
As mentioned in the introduction to this report, the 
Inspectorate visited seven of the twenty-eight garda 
divisions, two in the Dublin Metropolitan Region 
and one in each of the other five garda regions. The 
intention was to visit at least one division in each 
region to allow comparison across the regions and 
to visit a broad range of divisions that provided a 
balance of both urban and rural policing challenges. 
Throughout this report, a number of types of crime 
are specifically examined, and the Inspectorate 
focused on what happened when a victim or 
someone on their behalf contacted the Garda 
Síochána to report that a crime had occurred. 
The Inspectorate took the following approach to 
determining how the Garda Síochána manages 
calls for service and crime investigation:
•	 What	 was	 the	 initial	 response	 by	 the	 first	
garda that dealt with the victim and the 
action taken to gather evidence;
•	 If	a	crime	occurred,	how	was	that	recorded	
on the Garda Síochána crime recording 
system;
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•	 Who	 investigated	 the	 crime	 and	 how	 long	
did it take;
•	 What	was	the	outcome	of	the	investigation;
•	 Was	the	victim	updated	on	developments	in	
their case. 
types of Crime
Serious Crimes
Serious crime in Ireland is relatively low compared 
to other police jurisdictions.1 These crimes are 
by their definition, the more serious and violent 
offences that occur, such as murder, rape and 
aggravated burglary. This inspection has examined 
what happens when a serious crime takes place, 
who is in charge of the investigation and what 
resources are used to conduct an investigation.
There are a large number of national and specialist 
units that are available to provide assistance with 
a serious crime. This report examines what takes 
place when a more serious crime occurs and the 
support provided by national units. 
Volume Crime 
The majority of crimes that gardaí investigate are 
those that are referred to as volume crimes.2 These 
are crimes, which through their sheer volume have 
a significant impact on the community and are the 
types of crimes that gardaí deal with on a daily 
basis. Examples of crimes in this category include 
assault, burglary, car crime, robbery and domestic 
violence. Some of these volume crimes  are clearly 
serious offences.
Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a high volume crime that has a 
dramatic impact on victims and extended families. 
It is a crime where the offence often takes place in the 
home and the offender is known from the outset. In 
Ireland, domestic violence is not a specific category 
of crime. This means that an assault committed 
within the home by somebody in a relationship, or 
a previous relationship with the victim, should be 
categorised as an assault and a marker placed on the 
crime record to show that it was a domestic violence 
offence. This is really important, as the failure to 
1  Serious crime is fully explained in Part 6 of this Report.
2  Volume crime is fully explained in Part 6 of this Report.
correctly mark a crime as domestic violence related, 
will make it very difficult to establish the true levels 
of such crimes. 
Sometimes arguments take place within the home 
where no specific crime has taken place. Where 
gardaí are called to such an incident and there is 
no specific crime apparent or criminal complaint 
made, the incident must be recorded as a ‘domestic 
dispute – no offence disclosed ’. This is not a distinct 
crime in law, but an incident category, and the 
PULSE entry under this category is a formal record 
of garda attendance. 
Other Crimes of Note
Whilst drug offences are not one of the main 
crimes that feature in this report, the Inspectorate 
recognises that many of the volume crimes 
committed are carried out by those who may 
commit crime to fuel a drug habit. As part of this 
report, the Inspectorate will specifically look at that 
category of offender and identify opportunities 
to divert them away from crime. The Inspectorate 
examined cases of possession of drugs and the 
outcomes of those cases. 
Cybercrime is another crime that is not specifically 
featured in this report, but the Inspectorate 
recognises that this is a crime with increasing 
reports and will become a significant volume crime 
in the future with the growth in new and expanding 
technology. 
158 volume Crime Case reviews 
Throughout this report, each Part will discuss the 
findings of a sample of calls to the Garda Síochána 
selected by the Inspectorate from each of the seven 
divisions.  Following field work visits to divisions in 
the six regions, the Inspectorate randomly selected 
at least twenty calls per division for a total of 158 
calls across the following five crime types: 
•	 Assault;
•	 Burglary;
•	 Domestic	Violence;
•	 Robbery;
•	 Vehicle	Crime.	
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The selection of calls made in 2012 was designed 
to allow a minimum of twelve months to elapse in 
order to see what action was taken following the call. 
It will become evident in the various parts of this 
report that this request caused significant difficulty 
for the Garda Síochána. In providing details and 
case files for each call, and it identified discrepancies 
in recording and investigative practices. 
The process of examining these cases is referred 
to in each part of the report as the Volume Crime 
Case Reviews. The Inspectorate conducted most of 
the field visits in 2013; and selected calls for review 
received by the Garda Síochána from members of the 
public some twelve months earlier. 
2.3 Divisional Crime Levels
Chart 2.1 shows the overall recorded crime statistics 
across the twenty-eight divisions in 2012. This is based 
on information provided by the Garda Síochána to 
the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and excludes some 
traffic offences and some other minor offences. The 
inclusion of traffic offences significantly impacts 
on crime statistics. The information is displayed by 
the number of crimes per 100,000 population and 
the position of each division relative to the national 
average, of the 243,968 total crimes reported in 2012. 
This display is not for comparison purposes but to 
show recorded crime levels.
Chart 2.1 shows a wide variance across the divisions. 
It is important to recognise that a smaller residential 
population, high footfall and higher crime levels 
will obviously impact on this data.
chart 2.1
all recorded Crime in ireland 
By Division 2012 per 100,000 population 
chart 2.2
all recorded Crime per 100,000 population 
in the selected garda Divisions and the national average 2012
Source: Garda Inspectorate calculations using CSO 2012 data and CSO 2013 data.
Source: Garda Inspectorate calculations using CSO 2012 data and CSO 2013 data.
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Crime Levels in the Divisions visited 
Chart 2.2 shows the total crime levels recorded 
in 2012 per 100,000 population for the divisions 
examined as part of this inspection. 
The variances in crime levels in the divisions visited 
are also highlighted in this chart. 
Crime types 
Charts showing the crime levels for four of the 
five volume crimes, which are the focus of this 
inspection, are contained at Appendix 3. This crime 
data is important when considering the various 
sampling processes that are discussed in later parts 
of the report. The Garda Síochána was unable to 
provide reliable data for domestic violence crimes.
2.4 A Divisional Approach to 
Local Policing 
Divisional model of policing
In most comparable policing services, the equivalent 
of a division is the heart of local policing and while 
there will be a number of other police stations 
operating within a division, the model is very much 
divisionally based. 
This crime investigation report will highlight a 
number of significant and compelling issues that 
support a move away from the current district 
structure, towards a divisional model. This can 
effectively happen overnight, without additional 
cost and with limited impact on local policing. The 
main change is to the management of functions, 
as outlined in this part and changes to working 
practices from district to divisions can be sequenced 
over a period of time. 
Divisional Chief superintendents
Divisions are generally aligned to county 
boundaries with a chief superintendent in overall 
charge. The Inspectorate found variations in the 
way that chief superintendents operated across the 
seven divisions visited. In some divisions, chief 
superintendents appeared to be involved in all 
elements of policing and in others appeared to be 
more policy-oriented and district officers were the 
focal point for operational decision making. The 
number of gardaí in each division varies greatly, 
with some chief superintendents working with 
more than 600 members and some working with 
less than 300. 
gardaí in non-operational posts 
In garda districts, the Inspectorate found a 
significant number of members in non-operational 
roles. Of particular note were the high numbers 
working in administration units, doing functions 
that did not require sworn powers or police 
expertise and are more suitable for police support 
staff. In one division, the Inspectorate found five 
gardaí deployed in a divisional administration unit. 
The Inspectorate acknowledges that there will be 
occasions when gardaí are restricted to a station, 
but where practicable should be in roles that release 
other gardaí for patrol, such as public offices 
or control rooms, not in administration units. 
The Inspectorate believes that across Ireland, a 
significant number of garda resources could be 
released and reinvested into crime investigation or 
other front-line services. 
administration Units
In all divisions visited, each district has:
•	 Its	own	separate	administration	unit;
•	 A	 further	overall	divisional	administration	
unit, sited within one of the district stations.
Some divisions also had other units doing 
administrative tasks, such as a sergeant-in-charge 
office.
All staff in these units reported duplication of 
some functions. With regard to crime investigation 
and case files, the Inspectorate found many 
examples where both the divisional and the district 
administration units were keeping copies of the 
same case file in the same building. 
Other policing jurisdictions have moved to 
a single divisional model of administration. 
The Inspectorate believes that all the district 
administration units should be amalgamated 
into one unit that services the needs of the 
division. A single divisional administration unit 
would be more efficient and would release a 
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considerable number of people currently working 
on administrative duties for assignment to other 
operational roles. 
Unnecessary administration
Throughout the fieldwork, the Inspectorate found 
that case papers, case files and reports dominate the 
operation of divisions. In one district station: 
•	 The	administration	unit	logs	correspondence	
and reports; 
•	 Sends	them	to	the	Public	Office	(in	the	same	
building); 
•	 The	same	documents	are	logged	in	another	
register which are then collected by 
individual sergeants who maintain their 
own register. 
The Inspectorate was informed by senior gardaí 
that they are still expected to write and sign reports 
that are sent to regional offices and headquarters, 
when in many cases an e-mail would appear to be 
sufficient. There are clearly opportunities for better 
use of the e-mail system and reducing the volume 
of unnecessary reports that form part of every day 
life in divisions. 
The issue of bureaucracy should be addressed as a 
national and corporate issue rather than individual 
divisions trying to break through the many 
obstacles and barriers that exist to prevent change. 
good practice
the inspectorate found some good examples 
where individual administration units were 
scanning documents and reducing the amount 
of paper records kept. the introduction of 
a national garda síochána correspondence 
system to some divisions is seen as good 
practice and the inspectorate would encourage 
the roll-out across all divisions to be completed 
at the earliest opportunity.
operational structure
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
should develop a new policing model to deliver local 
policing services. Divisions are well established and 
the Inspectorate supports the retention of divisions, 
but recommends a new approach that changes 
the current district structure to a divisional one. 
This approach will not necessarily require station 
closures. The lead for a division should remain as 
a chief superintendent, supported by a number 
of superintendents with specific roles for key 
functions. The intention is to free up senior garda 
time from administrative tasks and to allow them 
to spend more time with front-line gardaí and local 
communities. These functions will be discussed in 
section 2.6. 
Within districts, there are a number of units and 
individuals that must be part of a new divisional 
structure. This includes detective units and 
Criminal Intelligence Officers (CIOs) who should 
be amalgamated into divisional units. CIOs are 
fully discussed in Part 8 and should be co-located 
in newly developed divisional intelligence hubs. 
Throughout this report, the Inspectorate will 
recommend changes to the way crime is investigated 
that will support a new model of policing.
The Inspectorate notes that the Garda Síochána 
has already considered models for operating at 
divisional level and assigning senior gardaí to 
functional roles, rather than with geographic 
responsibilities. The Inspectorate believes that the 
Garda Síochána are ready to remodel the delivery 
of local policing based on divisions, rather than 
on the current district structure. This crime 
investigation report contains recommendations to 
deliver better policing services and more effective 
crime investigation. The current district structure 
is a barrier to delivering a more efficient service and 
the time is right to move to a new and more efficient 
way of using resources.  
A move to a divisional structure will remove many 
of the inconsistencies that currently exist and the 
Inspectorate believes that it will be much easier 
to implement and monitor Garda policies across 
twenty-eight divisions, rather than ninety-six 
districts. 
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 recommendation 2.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a new divisional model 
of delivering policing services. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 divisional	 approach	 to	 the	
deployment of detective units;
•	 Create	a	single	divisional	intelligence	hub;	
•	 Develop	 a	 single	 divisional	 administration	
unit and redeploy any additional resources 
to crime investigation or front-line policing 
services;
•	 Develop	 a	 divisional	 approach	 to	 the	
deployment of regular units; 
•	 Develop	 a	 divisional	 approach	 for	 the	
deployment of specialist units i.e. drugs 
units, traffic and community policing; 
•	 Seek	all	opportunities	to	utilise	police	staff	
to release gardaí for operational roles.  
 recommendation 2.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a bureaucracy taskforce 
on a national level that brings together 
representatives from divisions and specialist 
units to prioritise key actions for reducing 
unnecessary bureaucracy and waste of 
resources. (short term).
2.5 Delivery of Local Policing 
Districts and District officers
Within divisions there is a further structural 
breakdown into garda districts, and within these 
districts there are a number of stations. Districts 
have responsibility for the delivery of policing 
services in clearly defined geographical areas. The 
numbers of districts within a division ranges from 
two in Meath to six in Galway. As at April 2014, 
there are twenty-eight divisions, ninety-six districts 
and 564 garda stations in Ireland.
Garda districts are managed by uniformed 
superintendents, referred to as the district officer. 
Each district officer has responsibility for providing 
policing services in their assigned areas with key 
responsibilities including:3
•	 Identifying	 district	 priorities	 and	 creating	
plans and operational goals; 
•	 Consulting	and	engaging	local	communities	
and other stakeholders;
•	 Crime	investigations;
•	 Prosecutions;	
•	 Crime	detection;
•	 HR,	resource	and	finance	functions;
•	 Investigating	Garda	Síochána	Ombudsman	
Commission complaints and internal 
discipline; 
•	 Ensuring	discipline	and	professionalism	of	
all staff. 
At the time of the inspection, the number of people 
in each district managed by district officers varied 
greatly from approximately thirty in the smaller 
districts to nearly 300 in the larger ones. The 
Inspectorate does not believe that management or 
cost efficiencies are delivered by a superintendent 
supervising very small numbers of staff. In effect, 
at the smaller stations and, in the absence of other 
supervisors, superintendents are performing a 
front-line supervision role, in addition to their 
management responsibilities.
A district officer is in sole charge of a defined 
geographical area within a division. Within a 
district, a superintendent has responsibility for 
providing a good police response to emergency 
calls, for ensuring that crime is effectively 
investigated and for making decisions as to whether 
to prosecute people for certain crimes committed in 
that area.
District officers informed the Inspectorate that 
they believe success or failure as a district officer 
is based on whether crime is rising or falling in 
the district and the ability to detect offences that 
have occurred. This perception of success criteria 
has, in some divisions visited, encouraged district 
3 Source: The Garda Code: Superintendent management and 
leadership responsibilities.
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officers to focus solely on their specific district, 
rather than looking across all the other districts 
in the division and making decisions based on the 
best needs of the whole division. The Inspectorate 
found that in many cases, districts operate almost 
as separate entities within their divisions. This can 
manifest itself in pockets of competition between 
superintendents within the same division and in 
some places it hindered the better deployment 
of resources. Conversely, where superintendents 
worked well together and shared resources, the 
Inspectorate found a much more co-ordinated 
response to crime.
good practice 
in one division, the inspectorate found a good 
example where two superintendents shared 
resources to tackle a spate of burglaries and 
car crimes. this resulted in two cross-district 
crime operations that reduced the crime levels 
in this area.
The district officer carries the full weight of 
responsibility for all operational matters, is the 
ultimate decision maker in all aspects of crime 
investigation and is responsible for the management 
and welfare of their staff. During field work visits 
to regions and divisions, the Inspectorate found 
a gap in senior management police staff support 
in terms of human resource management and 
financial expertise. This level of staff support is 
not available locally to divisions and districts and 
a large proportion of senior garda time is spent on 
people management, welfare and finance; which 
takes superintendents away from their main role of 
providing an effective policing service in their area. 
This	will	be	further	addressed	in	the	Haddington	
Road Review. 
An additional function for district officers outside 
of the Dublin Metropolitan Region (DMR) is the 
responsibility for prosecuting criminal cases in 
the local district courts. This is time-consuming in 
terms of case preparation, court time and completing 
case files at the conclusion of a court sitting. This 
is a role that could be performed by other gardaí, 
and the Inspectorate has previously made a 
recommendation about releasing superintendents 
from this process.4 The role of presenting court 
cases is further discussed in Part 11 of this report 
and	the	forthcoming	Haddington	Road	Review.
Another function that takes up a lot of a 
superintendent’s time is the investigation of public 
complaints against gardaí made to the Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission. Currently, 
30% of those complaints are returned to the 
Garda Síochána for investigation. District officers 
are nominated to investigate complaints against 
members in other districts and do not investigate 
their own staff. As a result, district officers have to 
travel to conduct interviews and in more rural areas 
the distance can be considerable. This is an area 
that is currently under review by the Department 
of Justice and Equality. If changes are made to the 
authority responsible for the investigation of garda 
complaints, the number of complaints investigated 
by the Garda Síochána is likely to fall. Another 
area of responsibility is the number of internal 
garda investigations for breaches of discipline. This 
function also takes many superintendents away 
from the main management role of preventing and 
investigating crime and disorder in the local area. 
Throughout this inspection and during 
pre-inspection visits to garda stations, the 
Inspectorate met with many district officers. 
Their skills and experience varied greatly from 
those with good experience of managing crime 
to those with limited exposure and experience 
in this area. District officers are the key decision 
makers for all aspects of crime and particularly 
in deciding what category of crime will be 
recorded and whether that crime is shown 
as detected (solved). There are ninety-six 
individual district officers making key decisions 
about crime. In regard to the Crime Counting 
Rules,5 the Inspectorate found wide inconsistency 
in the way that the rules are interpreted and 
applied. 
4 This recommendation, contained in the Report of the 
Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Policing in Ireland - Looking 
Forward, August 2007 (page 27), was rejected by the Garda 
Síochána, and was restated in the Report of the Garda 
Síochána Inspectorate, Front-Line Supervision, April 2012, 
(page 27).
5 Crime counting rules are a standard approach to categorise, 
record, measure and analyse crime.
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When senior gardaí were interviewed as part of this 
process and questioned about decision making with 
regard to crime, it was clear that district officers are 
viewed as the person with full responsibility for 
making decisions. This report will show that there 
is very little evidence of intrusive supervision at 
an organisational level about how districts operate 
and the decision-making of the district officer. A 
district officer effectively has the final decision on 
all aspects of crime and how it is managed. 
this report will show that the isolated and 
unsupervised nature of decision-making has 
direct consequences for the way that incidents are 
managed, the way that crime is recorded and the 
way that detections are claimed.
regional Detective superintendents
In the five regions outside of the DMR, there 
are regionally based detective superintendents 
with responsibility for more than one division. 
Assistant commissioners were very positive 
about the contribution of the regional detective 
superintendents and saw their role as pivotal 
in managing organised criminality and serious 
offending that crossed divisional and international 
borders. These superintendents are not directly 
accountable for local divisional crime and in many 
ways perform an advisory role to the divisions. 
Regional detective superintendents have additional 
responsibility for specialist units such as regional 
armed support and surveillance units. 
Divisional Detective superintendents
Within the DMR, detective superintendents are 
attached to each division and although more 
engaged with local divisional crime, they are still 
highly focused on more serious cases; such as 
organised criminality and offenders operating 
across divisions. The detective superintendent in 
the DMR usually has responsibility for managing 
divisional crime scene examiners (forensic experts), 
but does not control any of the divisional detective 
resources, including the divisional detective 
inspector. 
The relationship between the divisional detective 
superintendents and the district officers is on the 
whole a very good one, but in some divisions, the 
Inspectorate found it to be more complex and at 
times it is somewhat strained in respect of funding 
of operations and criminal investigations. Detective 
superintendents do not control any budgets and are 
required to approach individual district officers 
when operations require funding. 
Some of the detective superintendents who met 
with the Inspectorate were unclear about their role 
within a division. In many respects they are used 
in a similar advisory role to those operating on a 
regional basis and are used to assist and support 
district officers. The Inspectorate believes the 
current deployment of detective superintendents is 
a lost opportunity for using many of these detective 
superintendents crime investigation skills to 
address the challenges posed by volume crime.
2.6 Functionality versus Geographical 
Responsibilities of all Divisional 
Superintendents 
There are two main models of divisional police 
management used by police services. 
The first is the geographical model used by the 
Garda Síochána, which aligns superintendents 
to defined geographical areas. Within that area 
the superintendent is responsible for all policing 
issues, including all crime investigation, traffic 
administration, providing a 24/7 response to 
calls from the public and delivering community 
policing. This model relies on an omnicompetent 
superintendent. The Garda Síochána views the 
alignment of superintendents on a district level as 
very important to local communities. 
The second model more commonly used by 
police services is a functionality model that aligns 
superintendents to particular areas of responsibility 
such as: 
•	 Crime	investigation	and	prosecutions;
•	 Operations	 (responding	 to	 calls	 from	 the	
public) and public order planning;
•	 Partnerships,	 community	 policing	 and	
administrative functions.
In this model, a division has one superintendent 
leading on a key area of responsibility, rather than 
the system used by the Garda Síochána, where 
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every district officer leads on the same functions, 
but within their own districts. The functionality 
system provides much greater consistency in 
approach to key functions e.g. one superintendent 
leads on responding to calls from the public and 
ensures that across the division there is consistency 
in approach. It also allows a chief superintendent to 
look at the skills of the superintendents and to post 
people to roles that best suit their skills or to align 
a superintendent to a function which addresses an 
area of development.
In other policing jurisdictions, the functional role 
of crime investigation and prosecution falls to 
the most senior detective, which is seen as best 
use of their crime investigation skills. Uniform 
superintendents usually perform all of the other 
roles in a functional model. 
Barriers 
The district structure has many barriers that 
negatively impact on delivery of policing services. 
Police services operating the functionality model 
find that it provides much greater flexibility to 
move resources around divisions, without having 
to negotiate with other superintendents. In other 
police services, an officer posted to a division can 
be moved anywhere within that division. In the 
case of a serious crime, the Inspectorate identified 
a case where a detective inspector had to ring all of 
the district officers in the division to request some 
of their detective resources. In most cases such 
requests are not refused, but this process added an 
unnecessary delay to the investigation of a serious 
crime. In one of the seven divisions visited, there 
was a complete imbalance of sergeant numbers 
across the various districts. Despite a severe 
shortage of sergeants at one district and a larger 
number in another, the chief superintendent was 
reluctant to direct people to move.  
Inconsistency with decision making and operating 
procedures features throughout this report 
and sometimes within the same division. The 
Inspectorate found that units were deployed in 
a variety of ways and decision-making in respect 
of crime investigation and policy compliance was 
inconsistent. A move to functionality would ensure 
a much more consistent approach to decision-
making and application of Garda Síochána policies.
Functional responsibilities would also allow senior 
managers to look at where all of the divisional 
units are located and, if more efficient, to relocate 
units to provide a better customer service. For 
example, it might be more efficient to move all 
detective resources to one or two central locations, 
or to operate units from garda stations with good 
custody facilities. Functionality allows managers 
to focus on their areas of responsibility and make 
choices about where resources should be located in 
order to improve service delivery. 
The Inspectorate acknowledges that the geography 
of some divisions, particularly with regards to very 
remote areas, presents policing challenges not faced 
in more urban divisions. In addition, the numbers 
of staff and crime levels are very different across 
the divisions and a functionality model will need 
to be adjusted for urban and rural needs. As part 
of	 the	Haddington	Road	Review,	 the	 Inspectorate	
will further develop divisional management team 
models.
 recommendation 2.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a new model of functionality 
for divisional superintendents. (medium term). 
(see Delivery Divisional model Functionality 
responsibilities Chart 2.11) 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following actions need to be taken:
•	 Establish	 key	 functional	 roles	 at	 the	
divisional level and appoint superintendents 
to fill these roles; 
•	 Appoint	 a	 detective	 superintendent	 or	
crime manager for each division, with 
responsibility for crime investigation and 
criminal justice issues;
•	 Line	management	of	all	divisional	detectives	
and other crime resources to be placed with 
the senior detective. 
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2.7 Postings and Transfers
There are three types of postings that apply 
to gardaí. Firstly, on completing foundation 
training, gardaí are posted to one of the twenty-
eight divisions. Secondly, on promotion, chief 
superintendents, superintendents, inspectors and 
sergeants	are	posted	by	Human	Resources	Division	
at	 Garda	 Headquarters	 to	 fill	 vacancies	 within	
divisions, national units and specialist posts. 
Finally, when a member wants to transfer or move to 
a specialist post, a transfer application is submitted 
and	managed	centrally	by	Human	Resources.	
With regard to people posted on promotion, the 
Inspectorate found that many people are posted 
very long distances away from their home, which 
has a considerable impact on travel arrangements 
and personal circumstances. For some, this involves 
long journeys to work on a daily basis and for others 
it entails finding accommodation nearer to the new 
place of work. 
There are a number of consequences to this 
approach and one of the main disadvantages is the 
reluctance of some excellent candidates to apply for 
promotion. There is also a significant cost factor for 
the Garda Síochána in terms of payments for those 
who have to relocate closer to the new place of work. 
With regard to postings, divisional chief 
superintendents play no part in determining 
the transfer of superintendents to their division 
and have no influence on their assignment as a 
superintendent within the division. There are a 
number of divisions that are more demanding than 
others and this would include divisions with high 
crime rates or those that manage large sporting 
events. These posts often require specialist skills 
and are not always the best place to send a newly 
promoted superintendent, particularly where the 
member has limited operational experience. In 
other policing jurisdictions, it is usual for a division 
to publish the role that is available, and to highlight 
the necessary skills that are required for the post. 
Within a division, a chief superintendent should 
be able to decide the best role for a newly arriving 
superintendent, based on the skill and experience 
required, and also to allow for the re-assignment of 
other superintendents who may wish to change their 
role. Succession planning for chief superintendents 
and superintendents should include a period of 
working alongside the incumbent officer.
‘Travelling superintendents’ was a term frequently 
mentioned during field visits. This refers to a 
superintendent, usually posted on promotion to 
a district that is a long way from home. There are 
some exceptions to the rule, but in many cases the 
superintendent does not want to work a long way 
from home and most importantly, the members 
and police staff in that district become aware very 
quickly that the superintendent does not want to be 
there. During one field visit, the Inspectorate found 
that a newly promoted superintendent handed 
in a transfer application on their second day in 
the new post. This is not an isolated occurrence, 
and the Inspectorate is aware of one district that 
had four new ‘travelling superintendents’ in four 
years. The Inspectorate was also informed that 
some individuals who are posted a long way from 
home are committing to Dublin-based projects or 
other initiatives that regularly take them back to 
the area in which they previously worked. This 
is an additional abstraction that takes them away 
from managing their district. The constant churn of 
superintendents and other supervisors is not good 
for leadership, management of the district, crime 
management or for building relationships and trust 
with the local community and key partners. The 
Inspectorate also received negative feedback from 
partner agencies that have to regularly build new 
relationships with senior gardaí.
The working patterns of these superintendents were 
also raised as a issue, with some superintendents 
arriving in the district at some point on a Monday 
and leaving at some point on a Thursday. Policing 
is a 24/7 business and it requires superintendents 
to be available at all times of the day, particularly at 
weekends for local community events. With regard 
to crime investigation, it is very important that a 
superintendent is fully engaged in the role and has 
the time and commitment to robustly supervise the 
investigation of crime. 
The Inspectorate also met a number of supervisors 
who were travelling long distances to work or 
living away from home for extended periods, who 
provide an excellent service. The Inspectorate 
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welcomes the recognition of this issue by the 
Interim Commissioner and the transfers that took 
place recently to move people closer to home.
Other policing jurisdictions take a different 
approach to postings, inviting those selected on 
promotion to nominate places where they can 
travel to without necessitating a change of personal 
address. It is good practice to have a clear tenure 
policy and agree tenure with newly promoted or 
transferred officers. Internationally, many police 
services place a minimum tenure of two to three 
years for divisional chief superintendents and for 
superintendents taking up a new post. As part of 
the	Haddington	Road	Review,	the	Inspectorate	will	
address the area of promotions and postings.
 recommendation 2.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a new model for posting 
people and particularly those on promotion. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Restrict	the	number	of	people	that	are	forced	
to travel long distances; 
•	 Engage	 chief	 superintendents	 in	 selection	
processes for senior staff by creating role 
specific requirements for the post; 
•	 Allow	 chief	 superintendents	 to	 decide	 on	
the specific posting of superintendents and 
senior staff; 
•	 Succession	 planning	 for	 chief	
superintendents and superintendents 
should include a period of working 
alongside the incumbent officer;
•	 Introduce	 minimum	 term	 tenure	 for	 chief	
superintendents and superintendents; 
•	 Develop	a	new	approach	to	the	posting	and	
deployment of superintendents and other 
supervisors.
2.8 Senior Garda Visibility
A gap identified throughout this inspection is the 
disconnect between Garda Síochána policy and the 
implementation of that policy in daily policing. The 
current role of a superintendent is to ensure that 
garda policy is transferred into operational activity. 
Ensuring that adherence to policy requires senior 
managers to be visible and to spend time with staff. 
During focus groups with all ranks, the perceived 
lack of visibility of senior gardaí was raised. While 
many senior gardaí stated that they have an ‘open 
door policy’, it was highlighted that very few step 
outside of that door and engage with their staff. 
The lack of meaningful engagement between 
members and senior gardaí was noted by the 
Inspectorate. With divisions and districts where 
members and police support staff are working in 
different buildings and on different shifts, the 
contact was far less and in some cases non-existent. 
When asked about patrolling, senior gardaí 
generally reported that they do patrol, but when 
questioned, it appeared that this was usually as 
part of a local event such as a concert. The feedback 
from focus groups reported a limited amount of 
patrolling by senior gardaí. This may seem like 
a small issue, but the leadership importance of 
spending time with those delivering front-line 
services cannot be underestimated. Spending time 
with staff allows people to raise issues that senior 
managers can address and often those on front-
line duties have good ideas about how to resolve 
policing problems. 
In garda national units, where chief 
superintendents, superintendents, senior gardaí 
and members were in the same building, it was 
often easier for members to have contact with 
managers. It was however noticeable that with 
national units, there was very little structured 
interaction between senior gardaí and their staff. 
In many units it was reported that the focus 
groups conducted by the Inspectorate at the time 
of field visits were, for many, the first structured 
opportunity to raise issues about working practices. 
Most superintendents reported being overburdened 
with administrative tasks and this reduces their 
ability to spend more time with their staff. 
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To ensure senior manager visibility, the 
Inspectorate recommends that divisions and 
national units should have a system of allocating 
responsibility of visibility to a senior manager on 
rotation. Each senior manager must be given specific 
tasks to complete, such as to attend a number of 
parades, to go on patrol and to have meaningful 
engagements with staff. Assigning specific periods 
to senior gardaí does not stop another member 
of the senior team from engagement activity, but 
it does ensure that every week, at least one of the 
senior members is providing visibility.
The Inspectorate welcomes the recent introduction 
of communication meetings with all staff led by the 
Interim Garda Commissioner. 
There are other good divisional practice 
initiatives that operate in other policing services, 
which include annual divisional commendation 
ceremonies for officers and police staff for 
members of the public to recognise acts of 
bravery or outstanding performance of duty. The 
presentation of the annual divisional Policing Plan 
to all staff is another such opportunity, allowing 
senior managers to meet with every member 
of staff to discuss the policing priorities for the 
year ahead, to deliver key messages and most 
importantly, to engage and consult with staff.
 recommendation 2.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a visibility model for senior 
gardaí and a model for engagement with staff. 
(medium term).
2.9 Supervision of Crime and 
Incidents 
Uniform inspectors 
Uniform inspectors are key to supporting the work 
of district officers. At the time of the inspection 
visits, the numbers of uniformed inspectors varied 
greatly across divisions visited; from thirteen 
in the DMR North to one in Mayo. In the DMR, 
some of the inspectors are in charge of units that 
provide first response to calls from the public, but 
with limited numbers outside of the DMR, this is 
not always possible. In one division visited, the 
number of inspectors allocated has decreased 
from eleven to six and resulting in an absence of 
inspector coverage on a 24/7 basis. In most other 
policing jurisdictions, an equivalent division will 
always have an inspector on duty at all times. 
This is key to ensuring that serious incidents are 
well managed from the outset, that garda policies 
are implemented and to provide leadership and 
visibility for operational members and police staff.
The Garda Code sets out specific roles and 
responsibilities for all garda members by rank. 
In addition to those responsibilities, districts 
and divisions also allocate responsibilities 
to supervisors. The Inspectorate found that 
inspectors have large portfolios of responsibilities, 
which include some crime investigation elements, 
such as domestic violence, sex offenders, case 
files and warrant management. When vacancies 
arise in the inspector rank the responsibilities 
of those who leave a division or a national unit 
are assigned to the remaining inspectors. During 
focus groups with inspectors, it was clear that 
as the breadth of responsibilities expands, their 
crime responsibilities do not always receive the 
attention required. In one division, an inspector 
had twenty-nine specific responsibilities, 
including the very significant one of domestic 
violence.	As	part	of	the	Haddington	Road	Review,	
the Inspectorate will examine the numbers and 
deployment of inspectors and deliver a model for 
more effective supervision.  
 recommendation 2.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a policing model that has 
at least one uniform inspector on duty in each 
division at all times. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Create	 new	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
inspectors.
Front-Line Uniform sergeants
Perhaps one of the most important elements in 
garda supervision is the role of a uniform sergeant. 
Traditionally, regular units were led by a number of 
sergeants who provided that first line of supervision 
in terms of briefing gardaí before patrol, attending 
incidents to ensure a good response and checking 
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that crimes are correctly recorded and investigated. 
Throughout this inspection, the allocation of 
sufficient numbers of these front-line supervisors 
was raised as a real area of concern for the Garda 
Síochána. Prior to the implementation of the new 
garda roster, some regular units were already 
operating without a sergeant on each unit, as 
identified in the Front-line Supervision Report. The 
introduction of the roster has further reduced the 
presence of sergeants in front-line operational roles. 
With the recommendation to change to a divisional 
model, the Inspectorate believes that there are 
opportunities to amalgamate regular units. This 
must be accompanied by the allocation of dedicated 
patrol sergeants that cover 24/7 to respond to calls 
and to provide guidance to patrolling units. This 
cannot be a sergeant that has other administrative 
functions. The Inspectorate’s Front-Line Supervision 
Report completed in 2012 recommended that each 
station operating a 24/7 service should have a 24/7 
patrol sergeant.6 This report will show that there is 
an absence of front-line supervision and the lack 
of availability of sergeants is having a detrimental 
impact on crime investigation. 
 recommendation 2.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops a policing model 
and that has at least one dedicated uniform 
patrol sergeant on duty in each division at 
all times. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Create	 new	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
patrol sergeants. 
6 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Front-Line 
Supervision, April 2012, Recommendation 3.
2.10 The First Responders
regular Units 
As required under the pilot roster,7 districts have 
five dedicated teams 24/7 (A-E) called regular units, 
deployed from each district station. Their primary 
role is to respond to both emergency and non-
emergency calls received from the public. 
the first responders to calls are most likely to be 
the garda that investigates the crime or incident 
recorded as a result of the call. 
Members on regular units also fill 24/7 positions 
within a garda station such as the public office 
dealing with callers, control rooms answering 
telephone calls and looking after people who are 
arrested. 
This report will show that regular unit gardaí are 
responding to most calls received from the public 
and investigating the vast majority of crimes 
recorded in districts. Coupled with a reallocation 
of regular unit gardaí, due to the implementation 
of the new roster, members are under pressure and 
mistakes are being made in criminal investigations. 
This report will recommend some major changes 
to the way that first responders are deployed in the 
future, with a view to releasing members from the 
volume of investigations that they currently hold. 
This approach will allow regular units to become 
responders to calls and not full-time investigators 
of crime. 
2.11 Detective Resources
All divisions have access to senior detectives at 
both superintendent and inspector ranks. DMR 
divisions have an added advantage in having both 
a detective superintendent and detective inspectors 
within their divisions; but outside of the DMR, 
detective superintendents usually operate on a 
regional basis, covering more than one division. 
Detective inspectors 
Within the DMR, detective inspectors are based 
in each district. Whilst there is a detective 
superintendent covering the division, the inspector 
is primarily the most senior detective in the district. 
7 A new roster was introduced in April 2012 on a pilot basis.
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This officer has responsibility for all detectives 
working in their district and reports to the district 
officer.
Outside of the DMR, detective inspectors operate 
on a divisional basis and are effectively the most 
senior detective within the division. The detective 
inspector is in a similar position to the detective 
superintendent, who is not responsible for all 
of the detective resources in districts within the 
division. A district officer has responsibility for 
all of their resources and similarly to the detective 
superintendent, the detective inspector has to 
approach individual district officers for use of 
resources and funding8 for operations. In other 
policing jurisdictions, senior detective managers 
can deploy resources to deal with crime and have 
a dedicated budget to fund their own policing 
operations. Whilst a detective inspector officially 
reports to a district officer and in some places to the 
divisional chief superintendent, in practice they see 
the detective superintendent as the main person to 
whom they report.
If a serious crime takes place in a division or a 
district, the detective inspector will usually take on 
the role of the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). An 
SIO leads an investigation and for a period of time 
this will reduce their ability to manage day-to-day 
divisional crime investigations.
 recommendation 2.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops a policing model 
that places detective inspectors under the 
line management of a divisional detective 
superintendent. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Update	 the	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 of	
detective inspectors.
8 Travel and subsistence expenses and overtime costs.
Detective sergeants
Detective sergeants are key individuals in the 
day-to-day supervision of crime investigation and 
managing detective resources. The allocation of 
detective sergeants to this function is an issue for 
the Inspectorate. With the implementation of the 
new roster, many detective sergeants are effectively 
not available Monday to Friday during office 
hours, when they are most needed for advice and 
guidance. 
In some districts with limited detective sergeants 
providing supervision across five units working 
the garda roster is challenging and detective 
sergeants on the roster struggle to maintain regular 
contact with detectives. (This is further discussed 
in Part 6). Some detective sergeants have decided 
to remove themselves from the roster to provide 
better coverage and better supervision. The 
Inspectorate believes that the impact of the roster 
on the availability of detective sergeants and their 
ability to effectively supervise detective resources 
has been negative. 
 recommendation 2.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops a policing model 
for divisional detective units that provides 
effective supervision of detective resources.
(medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Create	 new	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
detective sergeants. 
Detective gardaí and Detective aides
The Inspectorate found that where divisional 
officers felt that they needed additional detectives, 
they were restricted in the ability to appoint new 
detectives into vacant posts. As a result, some 
divisions are managing with what they have 
and others have supplemented detectives with 
uniform gardaí attached to detective units. These 
gardaí are referred to as ‘detective aides’. Some 
divisions have reached a point where there are 
comparable numbers of detectives and detective 
aides. 
Detective aides do not receive any formal detective 
training, but alongside detective colleagues, are 
investigating the full range of crimes. The use of 
detectives and detective aides is fully explored in 
Part 6. 
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2.12 Deployment of Resources
The terms of reference for this inspection 
specifically requested that the Inspectorate 
should examine the allocation of garda resources, 
in particular detective resources at district 
and divisional levels, for the purpose of crime 
investigation; and that this examination should 
have regard to relevant international practice. 
The most valuable resource available to the Garda 
Síochána are the actual members, support staff and 
reserves. This inspection has specifically looked at 
how people resources are used and where there are 
opportunities to use them more effectively. 
Regular units are supported by other uniformed 
district and divisional units, such as traffic units 
and community policing officers that generally 
have responsibility for a specific geographical area. 
There are also a number of other groups of persons 
that provide support for crime investigation, such 
as juvenile liaison officers, criminal intelligence 
officers, crime prevention officers and crime scene 
examiners.
Armed support in Dublin is provided by the 
Special Detective and Emergency Response Units 
and outside of Dublin by Regional Support Units. 
These units provide fast time support for incidents 
that pose a significant risk to the safety of the public 
or officers. 
All divisions have officers that are not in uniform, 
but who are available for patrol and operations, 
such as detective units, drug units and task forces. 
Most of the larger divisions have specific task forces 
that are used to tackle crimes such as burglaries 
and robberies. 
The Garda Síochána has conducted an internal 
review of all garda specialist units and the 
Inspectorate will examine that report as part of the 
Haddington	Road	Review.
The use of a large number of specialist units can 
sometimes lead to demarcation of responsibilities 
with units that will only deal with certain calls.  With 
recent reallocation in personnel from specialist 
units to regular units, the Inspectorate believes 
that the Garda Síochána has reached a point where 
many specialist units have become unsustainable 
in	 their	 present	 structure.	 The	Haddington	 Road	
Review will identify opportunities to rationalise 
specialist units at national, regional and divisional 
levels and recommend a modern functional 
structure for the Garda Síochána. 
chart 2.3
Deployment of gardaí by rank and Location as at February 2013
Source: PULSE data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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Deployment of all garda members
Chart 2.3 shows the deployment of all garda 
members by their rank across three main duty 
types. 
There are a significant percentage of people in 
specific ranks such as inspector and sergeant 
working in non-operational roles at Garda 
Headquarters,	as	outlined	in	the	chart.	
The garda rank accounts for the largest number of 
members. Chart 2.4 shows the deployment of all 
garda members in three main locations across the 
twenty-eight divisions. 
The majority of gardaí are based in divisions, but 
there are a significant number of gardaí in specialist 
duties	 and	 in	 Headquarters	 as	 outlined	 in	 Chart	
2.4.	The	Haddington	Road	Review	will	recommend	
a structure that will release gardaí from non-
operational posts back to front-line policing duties.
Divisional Deployment of gardaí in the 
selected Divisions
Chart 2.5 shows the deployment of gardaí across 
the twenty-eight divisions into eight duty types.
Across all twenty-eight divisions, only 56% of gardaí 
are attached to regular units, the main cohort that is 
currently investigating crime as outlined in Chart 
2.5. The significant percentage of gardaí engaged 
in administrative and non-operational duties is 
noteworthy, with more gardaí in administrative/
non-operational posts than in community policing 
and an equivalent amount deployed on detective 
duties. 
chart 2.4
Deployment of gardaí
chart 2.5
Deployment of gardaí in operational Divisions as at February 2013
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána February 2013
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána February 2013
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Deployment by Duty type in seven 
Divisions 
To build on the previous chart (2.5), chart 2.6 shows 
a breakdown of garda deployments by each of the 
selected divisions in the eight categories. In this 
chart, the highlighted areas show the divisions 
with the highest (in red) and the lowest (in orange) 
percentage of gardaí deployed in that duty type. 
Chart 2.6 shows variations in deployments of 
gardaí to particular duties. The new garda roster 
is impacting on the choices made by divisions and 
is reflected in the removal of some community 
policing units. The Inspectorate noted that two 
divisions have more gardaí in administrative duty 
roles than in detective duties.
Detective and Detective aide Divisional 
Deployments
Chart 2.7 shows the deployment of gardaí in 
detective and detective aide roles across the twenty-
eight divisions as a percentage of total divisional 
resources as at February 2013.
chart 2.6
analysis of Deployment in the selected Divisions as at February 2013
Deployment 
Duty
D.M.r. 
northern
D.M.r. 
southern
Donegal Kildare limerick Mayo Waterford average of 
7 Divisions
administration/
non operational
9% 9% 9% 8% 9% 10% 12% 9%
community 
Policing
11% 10% 6% 0% 11% 1% 19% 8%
crime task 
Force/crime Unit
4% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2%
Detective Duty 14% 15% 8% 10% 13% 8% 9% 11%
Drugs Duty 4% 4% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3%
operational 
support
4% 6% 3% 3% 3% 3% 5% 4%
traffic Policing 3% 2% 7% 13% 6% 7% 8% 6%
Uniform regular 
Unit
51% 52% 64% 65% 56% 69% 41% 57%
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: PULSE data supplied by the Garda Síochána
chart 2.7
Deployment of Detectives/Detective aides in operational Divisions
Source: PULSE data supplied by the Garda Síochána February 2013
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The number of appointed detectives is an important 
factor for crime investigation. The chart shows 
a wide variance from division to division in the 
numbers of detectives and detective aides deployed. 
The investigative role of detectives and detective 
aides is further explored in Part 6.
allocation of people resources 
During the inspection process, the Inspectorate did 
not meet any senior garda who was able to explain 
the rationale behind the numbers of people in 
particular divisions or in national units; and could 
not recall when the allocation of resources was last 
reviewed. The Garda Síochána has a model called 
GERM (Garda Establishment Resource Model) 
created in 1999 for allocating garda resources, but 
it has been a considerable period of time since 
this model redistributed staff. In many divisions 
and national units, it was difficult to determine 
the rationale behind the allocation of staff and 
it appeared that this was based on historical 
decisions that were not always still applicable and 
staffing levels were determined by the numbers of 
retirements or transfers. To enable planning at the 
start of a policing year, it is imperative that a head 
of unit knows how many people will be available 
at various points of the year. From the analysis of 
deployment data and from field visits to divisions 
and national units, it is clear to the Inspectorate that 
garda resources are not currently deployed in terms 
of policing need and crime levels.
A move to a divisional model of policing is an 
ideal opportunity to look at the choices made 
about where gardaí and support staff should be 
deployed	 in	 the	 future.	 The	 Haddington	 Road	
Review will provide more details about where 
those choices should be. Following any additional 
recommendations	 in	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review, the Garda Síochána must develop a new 
resource allocation formula that allocates resources 
efficiently, effectively and fairly to meet local 
policing and community demands.
 
 recommendation 2.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána designs a national resource 
allocation model that allocates resources 
fairly and matches resources to policing 
needs. (Long term).9
2.13 Allocation of Other 
Resources
vehicle Fleet 
The vehicle fleet was raised as an issue during every 
field visit by gardaí of all ranks. There are clearly 
issues about the quality and type of vehicles used 
and the number available for use. These difficulties 
are having an impact on the ability of the Garda 
Síochána to respond to calls from the public and 
to provide a visible policing presence in some of 
the more rural parts of Ireland. This position is 
further exacerbated by the high number of daily 
abstractions, such as prisoner escorts that takes 
gardaí and vehicles away from other duties. The 
vehicle fleet issues are impacting on all operational 
units. 
A lack of suitable vehicles has many impacts and the 
following issues were raised with the Inspectorate 
during field visits: 
•	 Impact	on	garda	responses	to	emergency	calls;
•	 Overlap	shifts	in	more	rural	areas	are	sometimes	
left without transportation to patrol; 
•	 Insufficient	 vehicles	 for	 investigators	 impacts	
on the ability to take statements and conduct 
other enquiries;
•	 Vehicle	pursuits	are	conducted	in	cars	that	are	
not designed for such activity;
•	 Reduced	garda	visibility;	
•	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 station	 van,	 cars	 are	 used	
to transport non-compliant persons to garda 
stations.
In one district visited, the only district detective 
had no access to a car and as a result the detective 
was moved to another garda district.
9 This recommendation was contained in the Report of the 
Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resource Allocation, October 
2009 (page 7).
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With the closure of garda stations and particularly 
in more rural areas, the mobility of gardaí is very 
important to provide a physical policing presence 
in these areas. The Inspectorate is aware that the 
Garda Síochána is trying to address the issues 
with the vehicle fleet and central funding has been 
provided to assist with additional vehicles. 
Sometimes a police service may have insufficient 
resources, and sometimes those resources may not 
be in the right place. The Inspectorate believes that 
both of those conditions exist with the vehicle fleet.
Chart 2.8 shows the allocation of garda cars by the 
main location types and a breakdown of whether 
the cars are marked (with police markings) or 
unmarked. 
A significant proportion of garda vehicles are 
deployed in specialist roles, where there are 
significantly less gardaí. The percentage of 
unmarked cars is very high and as a proportion of 
the vehicle fleet, is much higher than in other police 
services. The Inspectorate is aware that this can 
be affected by the earlier replacement of marked 
cars that are used far more often. A rebalancing 
towards additional marked cars is more expensive, 
but provides a much more visible policing presence 
than uniformed garda patrolling in a car without 
garda markings.
Linked to the allocation of people, the Inspectorate 
was unable to determine a rationale behind the 
allocation of garda cars to divisions. Chart 2.9 
shows a comparison of garda cars per number of 
members across the twenty-eight divisions. There 
are wide variations in the allocation of cars to garda 
members ranging from one division, where the 
ratio of cars to members is eight, to another division 
with a ratio of just under sixteen members to each 
car.
chart 2.8
Deployment of garda Cars
Source: Data as at 31 December 2012 supplied by the Garda Síochána
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Chart 2.10 shows the ratio of members to cars in 
the selected divisions, with one division having 
fourteen gardaí to one car and another with eight.
abstractions
Planned abstractions for vehicles and gardaí 
include conducting cash escorts, protection duties 
and fixed posts on a number of facilities. These 
abstractions remove both people and vehicles for 
that day. Whilst the Inspectorate still believes that 
other solutions for these tasks should be found, at 
least this is a known commitment. In addition, there 
are the unplanned abstractions of large numbers of 
gardaí and vehicles for escorts to and from courts 
and prisons. This impacts on staffing levels of all 
uniform units and disrupts any planned activity 
that an individual may have for that particular day. 
The net result is fewer officers and cars to deal with 
calls from the public and broken appointments, 
where members have arranged to visit a victim 
of crime. The issue of escorts is the subject of a 
recommendation in Part 11.10
10 A recommendation to this effect was made in the Report 
of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Policing in Ireland - 
Looking Forward, August 2007, page 27.
chart 2.9
garda to Car ratio in operational Divisions
chart 2.10
garda to Car ratio in selected operational Divisions
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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 recommendation 2.11 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána design a national vehicle allocation 
model that allocates resources fairly and 
matches resources to policing needs. 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Take	 account	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review recommendations.
2.14 Garda Roster
In the 2009 Resource Allocation Report by the 
Garda Inspectorate, a recommendation was made 
to change the Garda roster in operation at that time. 
The Inspectorate recommended that the new roster 
should match resources to demand and comply 
with the European Working Time Directive. At that 
time the Inspectorate did not recommend any roster 
options and the Inspectorate was not involved in 
the development process for the current roster. 
A change of Garda Síochána roster in April 
2012 was a significant step, that moved the 
organisational roster effectively from a four shift 
and four unit (eight hour) roster, to a five shift 
(ten hour) roster. This required the creation of 
an additional fifth unit. This new roster applies 
to most inspector, sergeant and garda members; 
regardless of the role performed and the needs 
of their units. The new roster operates around 
members working six longer days followed by 
four days off duty. 
Throughout the inspection, operational problems 
with the roster featured in every visit and during 
most focus groups. The impact of a ‘one size fits 
all’ roster is having a serious impact on policing 
in Ireland. The various parts of this crime 
investigation report will provide many examples of 
the difficulties that it has created. From a member’s 
perspective, many people like the roster and the 
period of four days off. As the pilot has been in 
effect for over twenty-four months, members have 
arranged their personal circumstances around the 
roster and any subsequent change may impact on 
those arrangements. 
The roster provides additional gardaí at particular 
times of the week who are available to deal with 
late night policing issues, but it also provides for 
additional members during an equal amount of time 
when not needed. The Garda Síochána planned to 
conduct a twelve month review of the roster, and at 
the time of the completion of this report it had not 
been finalised. 
No additional staffing was reallocated to create 
the  fifth unit and personnel had to be found from 
other units. The impact of the roster on working 
practices is perhaps greatest on regular units, 
district detective units and national units. In 
districts, members were taken from other regular 
units and from specialist duties to create a fifth 
unit. In some places, the net effect was that 
numbers in regular units were divided by five 
instead of four. Now each unit currently operates 
with greatly reduced numbers. This problem 
was particularly evident in rural districts. Some 
districts reduced the numbers of garda on traffic 
and community policing and some removed all 
full-time community gardaí. 
the introduction of a four day off period is having 
a negative impact on the timely investigation of 
crime and particularly in respect of progressing 
investigations and maintaining contact with 
victims and witnesses. 
Police services introduce rosters to ensure that 
resources better match policing demands and to 
ensure compliance with working time directives. 
The new roster does not meet the demands of 
policing in Ireland and many garda patrol and 
investigation days are now lost as a result of this 
change.
impact of the roster on Detectives
The new roster changed the way that detectives 
operate. Previously, they worked very much a 
Monday to Friday roster with limited coverage at 
weekends and generally two days off. This work 
schedule worked well for crime investigation and for 
court appearances. The pilot roster divided already 
small detective teams into smaller ones, operating a 
six days on and four days off pattern. In interviews, 
most senior managers and many detective gardaí 
described the roster as negatively impacting on 
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crime investigation. The four day break has greatly 
impacted on the continuity of investigations and 
for serious crime; the unavailability of detectives 
is a major problem. Many detective supervisors are 
working the new roster and are often unavailable 
for advice when needed most. In national units, the 
Inspectorate is aware that many detective gardaí 
are working the roster and are at work at times 
when not needed and are subsequently unavailable 
when they are required.
The	roster	is	part	of	the	Haddington	Road	Review	
and will be the subject of further consideration in 
that report. 
 recommendation 2.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána completes the review of 
the pilot roster, with particular focus on the 
availability of front-line supervisors and the 
impact of the roster on detective units and on 
the investigation of crime.
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Take	 account	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review recommendations.
2.15 Impact of the District Model 
on Operational Policing 
Crime Briefings: ‘Front-Line supervision’ 
report 
The Garda Inspectorate completed a report in April 
2012 entitled ‘Front-Line Supervision’. The report 
identified a number of key issues that required 
action and contained eleven recommendations for 
implementation. In respect of this part of the Crime 
Investigation Report, the following matters are still 
unresolved today: 
•	 Significant	 gaps	 in	 front-line	 supervision,	
particularly with patrol sergeants; 
•	 Parades	 and	 briefings	 do	 not	 occur	 in	 all	
divisions at the start of every tour of duty.
A traditional function in any police service is the 
holding of a parade or briefing at the start of each 
tour of duty (usually held three times per day at 
the times that regular units start their duty). This 
provides an opportunity for supervisors to check 
who is on duty, to ensure that members have all 
their equipment and to provide a briefing on recent 
criminal intelligence. A key element of a briefing is 
the allocating of tasks to be completed for that day. 
There	 is	 a	 Garda	 HQ	 Directive	 that	 places	
responsibility with district officers to ensure that 
there is a structured briefing for all operational 
members on the commencement of a tour of duty 
(referred to as ‘parade’). The Inspectorate, in its 
report ‘Policing in Ireland – Looking Forward’ 
recommended a structured briefing of garda 
units at shift changeovers.11 This should include 
information on incidents that have just occurred and 
intelligence on crime trends and active criminals.
Under the current district structure, small numbers 
of gardaí are starting their duty at different garda 
district stations across a division. During the 
inspection, the Inspectorate attended some of the 
district stations and found that there was an absence 
of parades in most places and invariably there was 
no sergeant or other garda supervisor available to 
brief members. There is an organisational risk when 
gardaí are sent out on patrol without information 
that is readily available about a person or an address 
where there is a potential risk to an officer’s safety.
In most districts visited, members are very much 
left to work on their own initiative and in more 
rural districts, the Inspectorate observed numbers 
of gardaí coming on duty and going out on patrol 
without any briefing.
The Inspectorate observed a very good regular unit 
parade, which was well attended and members from 
several	units	also	took	part.	However,	following	the	
parade, members confirmed to the Inspectorate 
that this was not usual practice. During parades, 
most members did not take out their garda note 
books to record information that was provided. 
This information included specific details of cars 
of interest and the names and details of wanted 
suspects. It is important that information provided 
is recorded before people leave a garda station. 
Some of the parades observed were lacklustre and 
11 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Policing in 
Ireland - Looking Forward, August 2007, Page 27.
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the Inspectorate did not feel that the supervisor 
was sending out a well briefed, tasked or motivated 
team. 
Most police services’ parades now have access 
to video-linking, which provides a facility for 
supervisors to ensure that all units receive a 
personal targeted briefing.
Crime tasking
The most important part of any parade is the 
allocation of intelligence-led tasks to individual 
officers. Where no sergeant was present at a 
parade, there was a distinct absence of tasking, 
although at one district, tasking was allocated 
via a ‘Duty Detail’ station book system. At some 
districts, members were allocated tasks and these 
were usually to conduct checkpoints for crime or 
mandatory alcohol testing (MAT).
Besides	 being	 allocated	 tasks,	 it	 is	 equally	
important that officers provide details of whether 
they completed the task and what the outcome 
was. In terms of checkpoints, the Garda Síochána 
was unable to quantify what the actual outcomes 
were from checkpoints, such as how many arrests 
and prosecutions have resulted from this activity. 
This information is critical to determine if the check 
points were in fact conducted and if they were 
conducted in the right places. 
Good tasking includes checking those offenders 
who have bail conditions and patrolling in defined 
areas (hot spot crime areas) to prevent crimes or to 
catch offenders. In Scotland and West Yorkshire, 
patrol officers are given specific crime areas 
(intelligence-led default tasking) to patrol when 
not dispatched to deal with an incident. This places 
officers in the right place at the right time, where 
crime is likely to be committed. The Inspectorate 
firmly believes that every patrolling member 
should be given a specific intelligence-led task for 
each tour of duty and should provide the result for 
that task at the end of the day. One division visited 
had a good system in place for conducting checks 
on people with bail conditions.
De-briefing
At the end of a tour of duty, a short de-brief by a 
supervisor is essential to ensure that all members 
are accounted for, to make sure that all incidents are 
correctly recorded and that any welfare needs of 
staff are catered for. It is also important to hand over 
any relevant information to the on-coming shift. 
The Inspectorate found a complete absence of de-
briefing across all divisions, and a lost opportunity 
to ensure that all the tasks of the day are correctly 
recorded. This de-briefing process can be short, but 
it is essential to close that day’s work. With gardaí 
sometimes working alone and in remote locations, 
it is important that supervisors check to make sure 
that they have returned safe and well after their 
day’s work.
The consequences of failing to de-brief gardaí after 
each shift contributes significantly to many of the 
problems that will be outlined in this report in 
respect of incident and crime recording. 
De-briefing after serious incidents
Following a serious incident, it is good practice 
to hold a separate de-brief to discuss the incident 
and ensure that all evidence is gathered. It is 
equally important to ensure that any gardaí that 
are or may be affected by the incident receive 
immediate support. Most gardaí that met with 
the Inspectorate had dealt with serious incidents 
and the vast majority were not formally de-
briefed on the day and some did not receive the 
welfare support required. Peer Support (members 
designated to provide support) was mentioned as 
an option available in such cases, but most members 
preferred to talk to a trained professional, rather 
than a colleague. 
the introduction of good parades and end of shift 
de-briefs should operate daily at every division in 
ireland. 
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good practice
one division has introduced an integrated 
briefing held on tuesday and thursday 
mornings. all available staff are required to 
attend and a combination of different units 
are briefed. the district officer hosts the 
briefing, which is used to tell people about 
recent criminal intelligence and to discuss 
new policies or procedures. those attending 
find the briefings useful and to some extent 
they fill a void arising from the reduction 
in divisional training days. this is not an 
operational briefing where people are tasked, 
but it is a good way of providing information 
and allowing staff an opportunity to discuss 
recent events and new policies and to interact 
with senior officers.
 recommendation 2.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a system that delivers 
an effective briefing, tasking and de-briefing 
process to all operational members. (short 
term).
2.16 Performance Management
The Inspectorate is aware that the Garda Síochána 
is developing a new Performance and Learning 
Framework (PALF), but it is at an early stage 
and unlikely to be used to hold an individual to 
account for poor performance. There is a real sense 
of frustration throughout the Garda Síochána 
that unproductive members are not dealt with 
appropriately.
another common theme that emerged throughout 
this inspection was that most members work hard 
and do their very best, but a small number are 
underperforming and do very little. in smaller 
units, the impact of those who do very little is felt 
greater by the rest of their colleagues. 
Currently, the ethos in the Garda Síochána is to 
assess performance on a team basis, rather than 
as an individual. This can allow underperforming 
staff to do very little and still be credited as part of 
a high performing unit. 
Specialist units in divisions also raised concerns 
that many of their tasks, such as community officers 
running local events or attending meetings, are not 
recorded on any IT system; so that supervisors can 
view their good work that contributes to community 
safety. 
Western Australia Police Service use a document 
called a ‘Running Sheet’ to log officer activity. Each 
officer completes a record of their activity for that 
day and it contains details of what was done and 
when tasks were completed. At the end of duty, 
the officer hands this to a supervisor, who checks 
it to see the officer’s return of work. This running 
sheet holds no fear for those who work hard, but 
has identified those who do very little. It also allows 
officers to record activity that is important, but will 
not appear in any management information.
Performance management is a key theme that will 
be	part	of	the	Haddington	Road	Review.	
 recommendation 2.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops a performance 
management system that holds individuals 
to account and deals with under performance. 
(medium term).12
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Take	 account	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	
Review recommendations.
Divisional model and Functionality 
responsibilities
Chart 2.11 is an optional model based on 
functionality that is only intended to show how a 
division might look like in the future. It is included 
only to demonstrate functionality.
Some units are included that were not discussed in 
Part 2, but will be introduced later in other parts 
of this report. The Inspectorate understands that 
the twenty-eight divisions have different policing 
demands and different staffing levels. Any model 
will need to be flexible to cater for both rural and 
urban policing challenges.
12 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resource 
Allocation, October 2009, (Page 7).
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As	 part	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	 Review,	 the	
Inspectorate will recommend operational models 
for implementation. 
When considering this model, the most important 
elements are the functionality responsibilities 
for superintendents and the new structure for 
managing detective resources. 
2.17 A New Model of Service 
Delivery
Divisional approach to Local policing
The Inspectorate has recommended a move to a 
divisional rather than a district model of policing. 
The divisional chief superintendent must be the 
focal point for delivering performance, supported 
by a number of senior managers with functional 
responsibility.
As	 part	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	 Review,	 the	
Inspectorate will look at options to release senior 
gardaí to enable them to lead their staff and increase 
their visibility. 
Assigning a detective superintendent on a 
divisional basis will be a positive step and one 
that the Inspectorate believes should be applied 
across Ireland. This is a common feature in other 
jurisdictions, where a detective superintendent 
usually takes the lead, not just for serious crime, 
but for all divisional actions involving crime 
investigation and criminal justice. 
In the new divisional model, superintendents 
would change from the role of district officer to a 
functional role with responsibility for all divisional 
resources.
The Inspectorate acknowledges the importance 
placed on the presence of senior gardaí in a 
community, but that can be achieved through other 
means. Most police services have a superintendent 
assigned full-time to partnership and community 
issues. The coverage in a wider community of one 
person doing the role full-time, is significantly 
higher than three superintendents who have other 
roles that take them away from engaging local 
people and partner agencies.
The investigation of Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission complaints and conducting internal 
discipline investigations is a time-consuming 
activity that takes district superintendents away 
from their primary role. During development of 
a new structure, in the interim, there could be a 
case for using one of the superintendents to have 
administrative functions such as dealing with 
complaints and internal misconduct. 
Divisions
As can be seen from the information presented so 
far in this report, there are significant differences 
in the demands placed on divisions and there are 
variances in the allocation of resources. Most other 
policing jurisdictions have looked at the delivery of 
front-line services and have significantly reduced 
the number of divisions. Key drivers include 
increased efficiencies and a desire to reduce 
management numbers, whilst trying to retain front-
line policing numbers. 
To enable a divisional model to function effectively 
the	 Garda	 Síochána	 needs	 to	 develop	 HR	 and	
financial support on a divisional or a regional basis. 
regions 
Currently, regions are led by an assistant 
commissioner, with responsibility for between four 
and six divisions. Assistant commissioners see their 
role as supporting divisions with serious crime 
investigations, whilst holding them to account for 
crime performance. What is less clear, is their role 
in respect of the allocation of people and other 
resources. Primarily, the allocation of resources is 
managed centrally and assistant commissioners 
have little discretion in changing those allocations. 
The Inspectorate’s 2007 report ‘Policing in Ireland’, 
recommended greater devolution to the regions; 
but to date that level of devolution has not 
materialised. Some of the current post holders have 
other responsibilities such as traffic, organisation 
development and strategic planning and share their 
time between two roles. 
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Civilianisation (Workforce modernisation)
During the inspection, the Inspectorate found 
many functions that do not need to be performed 
by a fully trained garda. At divisional level, these 
include gardaí in administration units, in control 
rooms and those in public offices. At a national 
level, gardaí are assigned to roles more appropriate 
to police support staff, such as the Press Office, 
Housing,	HR	and	Finance.	Recommendation	1	in	the	
2009 Inspectorate report on ‘Resource Allocation’, 
highlighted that the Garda Síochána should plan 
to bring the ratio of police staff to police officers 
in line with international norms. Limited progress 
has been made to date. 
the inspectorate believes that the garda síochána 
has an excellent opportunity to reshape the 
delivery of front-line policing services in a more 
efficient and effective way. opportunities for 
change will be fully explored in the Haddington 
road review.
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3.1 Introduction
The accessibility of police officers and the experience of that first encounter are 
critical to creating confidence amongst members of the public in their police 
service. Indeed, for many people the service provided in their first encounter 
may well shape their future views of the police service. 
Recording of calls received from the public provides a good indication of the 
varying demands on a police service. Accurate recording of call data provides 
excellent management information on call demand and the effectiveness of 
the first response. Conversely, inaccurate data will result in poor decisions 
about resource allocation and weak deployment of available resources. Call 
data also provides invaluable information for crime research and analysis.
This part of the report explores the various ways that members of the public 
contact the Garda Síochána, how that contact is managed and recorded, and 
the levels of service provided. 
The first police attendance at the scene of an incident is a critical part in the 
investigation of a crime. Other police services use the ‘Golden Hour’ principle 
when dealing with a serious incident. The investigation during the first hour 
of an incident will have a significant impact on any subsequent investigation. 
The first officer needs to quickly assess the situation and provide a professional 
response to victims and witnesses. The responding officer may have an 
opportunity to find and detain a suspect and, importantly, must preserve and 
gather evidence that will be central to the success of the investigation. 
Many police services focus on “getting it right first time” at an incident. The 
first responder must be sent with a mindset to investigate a crime, rather than 
attending to simply take a report of an incident. Effective early investigation 
can remove the need for an officer to return to a crime scene at a later date. This 
is particularly important in rural locations, where officers are travelling long 
distances. Good initial investigation at first instance also assists a supervisor 
in deciding what further action needs to take place. 
This part examines the initial steps in a crime investigation by the first 
responders to an incident.
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3.2 The Garda Inspectorate 
Report on ‘Resource Allocation’ 
October 2009
The Garda Inspectorate completed a report in 
October 2009 titled ‘Resource Allocation’. The 
report made twenty-seven recommendations and 
at that time advocated a national Computer Aided 
Dispatch (CAD) system for Ireland, operating out 
of two call centre locations. CAD is an electronic 
recording system containing initial details of 
the incident reported to the Garda Síochána and 
information on the unit assigned to respond to the 
call.
Although the focus of this current inspection is 
different to the one previously conducted, the 
various processes around CAD and deployment of 
resources are considered to be critical components 
of this inspection. In the absence of good structures, 
systems and working practices; the first response to 
a crime investigation will not be an effective one.
While many of the recommendations in the 
resource allocation report with regard to CaD 
are still under consideration, most of the concerns 
raised in 2009 have not been adequately addressed 
and the need for good call support data is similar 
to the one found five years ago. 
The key areas for improvement and 
recommendations from the 2009 report listed below, 
are still awaiting action. The recommendations 
included the introduction of systems to:1
•	 Improve	 the	 quality	 of	 computer	 aided	
dispatch data;
•	 Improve	 call	 handling	 with	 constant	
monitoring of standards;
•	 Improve	incident	recording;
•	 Electronically	record	all	999	calls	received	in	
every control room;
•	 Publish	a	single	non-emergency	number;	
•	 Improve	supervision	in	control	rooms.	
1 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resource 
Allocation, October 2009. (pages 6 to 10)
The report also highlighted concerns about serious 
gaps in CAD and IT systems that are standard 
technologies in place for decades in most European 
and North American police agencies. The report 
noted that the Garda Síochána did not have systems 
in place to accurately measure:
•	 Workloads;
•	 Average	response	times	to	calls	for	service;
•	 Nature	of	calls;	
•	 How	long	officers	spend	dealing	with	most	
incidents.
This inspection has found that these areas have 
still not been addressed and a major omission is 
the failure to implement an electronic system that 
records all calls made to the Garda Síochána. 
The lack of  good detailed information on call 
demand prevents the Garda Síochána from 
accurately matching garda resources to demands 
for policing services. This part of the report will 
outline major issues with poor recording practices 
and show that a CAD enabled system must be 
introduced to ensure that all calls received are 
recorded electronically. 
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3.3 Recording Calls from the 
Public	
The first steps in a crime investigation start with 
the initial contact between a member of the public 
calling for assistance and the representative of the 
Garda Síochána that receives that call. 
Traditional methods of contacting police services 
are still in operation in Ireland, such as:
•	 Using	 the	 999/112	 system	 for	 emergency	
services;
•	 Approaching	gardaí	directly	in	the	street;
•	 Telephoning	or	visiting	garda	stations;
•	 Using	a	third	party	such	as	a	local	councillor;
•	 Writing	directly	to	a	garda	station;
•	 Using	anonymous	contact	numbers	to	report	
criminal activity. 
A relatively new Garda Síochána initiative is on-
line reporting of some theft crimes. 
Calls for service 
Emergency Calls 
The Garda Síochána receives approximately half a 
million emergency calls for service per year via the 
999 system. Chart 3.1 details the total number of 999 
calls made over a twelve month period to the Garda 
Síochána, broken down by division. Emergency 
calls are made to a private service provider that 
answers the initial call and puts that call through to 
the relevant garda division. 
Computer aided Dispatch (CaD)
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) is an electronic 
system that records the details of all emergency 
and non-emergency calls. It is also used to record 
information from telephone calls made directly 
to local garda stations. Not every telephone call 
received needs to be recorded on CAD, but it should 
be used to record all calls that require a police 
response. 
Chart 3.1
999 Calls received by the garda síochána 
october 2011 - october 2012
Division total 999 Calls average no of Calls per Month
DMr 250,870 20,905
Cavan / Monaghan 9,142 761
Clare 9,360 780
Cork City 35,424 2,952
Cork north 8,119 676
Cork West 4,390 365
Donegal 10,171 847
Galway 20,147 1,678
Kerry 10,150 845
Kildare 19,279 1,602
Kilkenny / Carlow 14,420 1,201
Laois / offaly 15,237 1,269
Limerick 27,481 2,290
Louth 17,237 1,436
Mayo 10,336 861
Meath 12,979 1,081
roscommon / Longford 10,534 877
sligo / Leitrim 7,508 625
tipperary 12,739 1,061
Waterford 12,539 1,044
Westmeath 11,252 937
Wexford 12,931 1,077
Wicklow 12,420 1,035
total 554,665 46,222
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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A CAD system has operated in Dublin since 1989 
and there is a centralised Central Command and 
Control Centre (CCC) covering all calls for the 
six divisions in the DMR. The CCC also provides 
a number of national functions, including out of 
office hours press enquiries, responding to high risk 
missing children, liaison with international police 
services and calling out specialist garda units. 
At the time of the Inspectorate’s field visits, a 
number of stand alone CAD pilot programmes 
were operating in Cork, Limerick, Galway and 
Waterford.	
Divisions without CAD use paper based systems 
for recording calls received. The Garda Síochána 
would like to roll out CAD across all regions and 
would eventually like to move towards a number of 
regional control rooms. The Inspectorate is aware 
that the Garda Síochána has made a business case 
to try to secure funding for a CAD system for all 
divisions. 
Call Data and Data Quality 
The absence of a national CAD system is a major 
gap in the ability of the Garda Síochána to precisely 
record and monitor calls received for policing 
services and therefore accurately identify demand. 
In all other police services visited as part of this 
inspection, an electronic call management system 
was operating in most places and the systems in 
operation were significantly more advanced than 
the CAD system currently used in Ireland. Data 
quality of calls received by the Garda Síochána 
for service in the CAD based divisions was 
significantly better than those divisions that 
are using paper based systems to record calls. 
However, within divisions operating CAD, input of 
important data sets, such as times of arrival had poor 
compliance2 rates and the results that were shown 
for those calls provided limited information. 
With	 non-CAD	 systems,	 the	 data	 quality	
was poor and in many cases, indecipherable 
handwriting made entries hard to understand. 
Most call takers in non-CAD control rooms 
had not received formal training and the 
recording of data was lacking detail. For 
example in paper records, there was no 
2 Compliance in this context means the data was not entered 
on the CAD system.
evidence of any incident grading, no risk 
assessment, no times of dispatch, no times of arrival 
and very few results.
CaD recording
Four of the seven divisions visited had no CAD 
system. There was an absence of analytical 
information that would tell managers how busy 
the units are, what sort of calls are being dealt 
with, how long units spend on those calls and what 
the outcomes are. Most of the regional assistant 
commissioners would like a proper command 
and control system for their areas, but believe that 
with reduced budgets this is going to be difficult to 
introduce. ‘Command and control’ is terminology 
used to describe a well directed call handling and 
deployment system. Most DMR divisions also have 
officers within their district stations that are tasked 
daily to receive telephone calls directly from the 
public, to create a CAD message and to assign local 
resources to deal with lower level incidents.
The Inspectorate supports the intention to roll out 
a national CAD system across all divisions, but 
this is unlikely to happen without investment in 
modern technology. The Inspectorate is aware that 
the planned roll out of the current CAD system 
to divisions will be a more limited version of the 
dated system currently used in the DMR. A new 
regional control room will undoubtedly receive 
calls for locations that are covered by another 
region, but the proposed CAD system will not 
allow a region to transfer such a call electronically 
to the regional centre covering the incident’s 
location. During this inspection, questions were 
raised to the Inspectorate about the resilience of 
the new regional CAD control rooms and what will 
happen to calls, if anything disrupts the service to 
one of the new regional control rooms.
 recommendation 3.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a command and control 
system that accurately records calls for service 
and effectively identifies and uses all available 
resources to manage demand more efficiently. 
(medium term).3
3 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resource 
Allocation, October 2009 made several recommendations 
covering this matter.
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Calls made Directly to garda stations
During field visits to divisions in the DMR and 
through checking CAD messages, the Inspectorate 
found that a large number of emergency and non- 
emergency calls are made directly to garda stations. 
In fact, in the DMR, the Inspectorate found that 
more calls are made directly to district stations than 
to the DMR CCC.
The current telephony system used in garda 
stations is outdated, does not provide call waiting 
information and it does not give an engaged signal 
to callers. The Inspectorate has spoken to members 
of the public who have given up trying to get 
through to a garda station when the telephone rings 
out repeatedly. 
Other police services have moved away from a 
system where members of the public ring a local 
station towards a more centralised call centre 
approach. This ensures that calls are answered 
far more quickly, and with the advent of better 
telephony systems and the routing of calls to call 
centres, this has greatly improved the service 
provided to the public. 
Effective training of control room staff is very 
important and particularly for those using the CAD 
system. As previously mentioned, a significant 
percentage of calls created on CAD result from a 
call made directly to local garda district stations. In 
these stations, gardaí are operating the CAD system 
and creating CAD messages without any formal 
training. Some members received familiarisation 
training, but reported that this was informal peer 
training. The Inspectorate does not believe that it is 
a good approach to allow members to operate CAD 
without any formal training. Detail and accuracy 
at this stage significantly assist in the quality of 
initial response and in the conduct of any later 
investigation.	Where	a	call	requires	an	emergency	
response, a district station sends the CAD message 
to	 CCC	which	 deploys	 units.	Where	 the	 call	 is	 a	
non-emergency, the local district station deploys 
units to the call.
 recommendation 3.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána (i) allows only trained members to 
create and update live CaD messages and 
(ii) improves practices in non-CaD stations. 
(medium term).
single non-emergency number
Internationally, separate emergency and non-
emergency numbers are used by the public to contact 
the police. All emergency and non-emergency calls 
are directed to a small number of call centres. 
Non-emergency incidents include minor traffic 
collisions and damage to property. The non-
emergency call numbers have removed a significant 
number of calls that were previously managed 
through	police	stations.	Greater	Manchester	Police	
informed the Inspectorate that a significant level of 
calls previously received on the 999 emergency call 
system are now received on their non-emergency 
number 101. The development of such a system in 
Ireland would provide a much quicker answering 
service for emergency calls, a more consistent 
Chart 3.2
CaD Data for the period January 2012 - september 2012
Division recorded at Command & Control recorded at station % recorded at station
D.M.r. eastern 8,828 16,596 65%
D.M.r. north Central 14,754 18,720 56%
D.M.r. northern 17,960 26,415 60%
D.M.r. south Central 15,985 18,369 53%
D.M.r. southern 16,221 23,301 59%
D.M.r. Western 20,942 29,860 59%
total DMr region 94,690 133,261 58%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
Chart 3.2 shows a nine month period of calls 
made to CCC and to garda stations in the six DMR 
divisions.
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approach to dealing with calls and the dispatching 
of calls to the appropriate unit or person. It is good 
practice to ensure that sufficient resources are used 
to answer telephone calls and generally members of 
the public are far more satisfied once the police are 
aware of the call. 
 recommendation 3.3
 the inspectorate recommends a Department 
of Justice and equality working group review 
the feasibility and impact of a single non-
emergency number.4 (Long term). 
Control Room Resources
In 2009, there were twenty-two control rooms 
across Ireland and most of those are still operating 
today. Other police services operate a much 
smaller number of call centres and have moved to 
centralised	 locations.	 Greater	 Manchester	 Police	
operate from three call centres, which receive 
approximately	 3,000	 calls	 a	 day.	 The	 PSNI	 also	
operate from three call centres. Centralisation 
increases response efficiency, reduces duplication 
and ensures resources are better directed to front-
line needs. 
Centralised control rooms are generally very busy 
environments, managing large volumes of calls 
from the public and deploying appropriate units 
to	 deal	 with	 those	 calls.	 With	 regard	 to	 crime	
investigation, control rooms play a significant role 
in assessing each call individually and deciding on 
the priority in which those calls will be dealt with. 
An effective control room is generally one that has 
sufficient numbers of well trained operators; where 
there is a physical presence of supervisors, and 
there are systems for the effective deployment of all 
available resources through direct communications 
with response units. 
 recommendation 3.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána rationalises the number of control 
rooms in operation and moves towards a small 
number of call centres.5 (medium term).
4 A similar recommendation on the introduction of a non-
emergency number was made in the Inspectorate’s report, 
Resource Allocation, October 2009.
5 A similar recommendation on the number of Control Rooms 
was made in the Inspectorate’s report, Resource Allocation, 
October 2009.
This recommendation will be further developed in 
the Inspectorate’s  Haddington Road Review.
Creating a CaD Call message 
On receipt of a telephone call in a CAD enabled 
control room or at a district station that operates this 
system, an incident is created on CAD by the call 
taker and it generates a unique reference number. 
The call taker should obtain as much information 
as possible from the caller to determine the type 
of incident which has occurred and to determine 
the level of response that is required. The time of 
all entries is recorded and dated along with the 
details of the call taker or person updating the CAD 
message. 
Categorising Calls 
A call taker must categorise an incident on CAD by 
choosing from a number of abbreviated incident 
codes	e.g.	burglary	is	coded	as	BURG.	
With	 the	 current	 CAD	 incident	 codes,	 some	
crime categories such as domestic violence and 
sexual assault are grouped together with the code 
DV/SA.	 This	 compilation	 of	 two	 incidents	 with 
one code is unhelpful when searching to find 
particular types of incidents or analysing call 
demand. The Inspectorate believes that each type 
of incident should have its own unique CAD code. 
 recommendation 3.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops a broader range of 
Computer aided Dispatch (CaD) incident 
assignment codes and ensures that divisions 
without CaD are accurately recording the 
type of incident and the full details of what 
has happened. (short term). 
estimating time of arrivals and Call Backs 
In the 2009 Resource Allocation Report, the 
Inspectorate recommended that for all incidents, 
a call taker should provide the caller with an 
estimated time of arrival for a unit. This is also a 
commitment in the Garda Charter.6 From sampling 
CAD and paper records, the Inspectorate found no 
evidence to show that this was happening. This is 
6 The purpose of the Garda Charter is to inform the public 
as to the standards and service they can expect from their 
interaction with An Garda Síochána.
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particularly important in serious incidents, where a 
victim or caller is clearly distressed, or where there 
is likely to be a delay in a unit attending.
The Inspectorate found limited evidence of a control 
room contacting a caller to explain any previously 
unforeseen delays in a unit attending. This is an 
important issue for good customer and victim care. 
The Inspectorate did find CAD incidents where 
callers rang back to see why there was a delay in an 
officer attending. The Inspectorate also found calls 
where there were long delays in garda attendance 
and the victim or witness had left the scene by the 
time the garda attended. 
 recommendation 3.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána provides an estimated time of arrival 
at the first point of contact and updates callers 
with details of undue delays in attendance. 
(short term).7 
Control rooms outside of the Dmr
In the majority of divisions outside of the DMR, 
calls for police service are put through to the 
divisional control room, which is the first point 
of garda contact with the caller. A control room 
outside of the DMR usually consists of one or two 
gardaí with responsibility for answering telephone 
calls from the public and deploying units. The 
control room also deals with radio enquiries from 
gardaí, such as requests to conduct car and name 
searches.
Calls received by these control rooms are recorded in 
manuscript in a variety of different books, registers 
and paper pro formas. On examination of these 
paper records, the Inspectorate found that there 
was often sparse detail with limited information 
about the incident which had occurred. The limited 
information gathering at this stage represents lost 
opportunities in obtaining important information 
from a caller. Other missing information included 
the time that units were deployed, time spent on the 
call and, most importantly, details of the result.
7 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resource 
Allocation, October 2009
Where	a	call	received	in	the	divisional	control	room	
needs to be sent to a district station within that 
division, the call is transferred by telephone and the 
new receiving station should record the details of 
the call. The Inspectorate has found cases where the 
receiving district station did not record the details 
of a transferred call. This part of the report will 
show that without a message log being completed 
the district station have no record of the call, do not 
know who dealt with it and, in some cases, do not 
know if a unit went to deal with the call. 
In comparing CAD and paper records, the 
Inspectorate found that on most occasions 
the electronic CAD record contained far more 
information about an incident and information on 
the outcome, than an incident that was recorded in a 
paper based system. CAD records were more likely 
to have descriptions of suspects and details about 
what	 had	 actually	 happened.	 Paper	 records	 often	
just recorded the fact that a 999 call was received for 
a robbery or an assault. 
A recommendation by the Inspectorate in 2009 
to electronically record all 999 calls in non-
CAD environments was accepted by the Garda 
Síochána, but has not been implemented. The 
use of paper records is a vulnerability in terms of 
call management, and paper records provide no 
easily extractable data on call demand and police 
response. The use of paper records is an antiquated 
practice that must be stopped and an electronic 
recording system is now even more essential than 
in 2009 for recording both emergency and non-
emergency calls for police services.
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3.4 Control Room Operations 
garda síochána incident grading
All CAD calls are graded by the call taker. This is 
an important process as it determines the priority 
given to particular calls and the speed and level 
at which resources are deployed to deal with it. 
Chart 3.3 highlights the grades used and provides 
examples of the types of calls for those grades.
In non-CAD control rooms, there was no evidence 
of any formal system of grading calls received and 
prioritisation is left to those working in control 
rooms. The grading of calls is an important process, 
as it will determine which calls are dealt with and 
in which order. It is also important that non-CAD 
divisions also grade calls to ensure that calls for 
service are prioritised. 
response times to emergency Calls
Most police services focus on making sure that 
officers attend emergency calls and non-emergency 
calls within specified targets and at the earliest 
opportunity.
As mentioned earlier, the Garda Síochána has 
specific targets as part of the Garda Charter. These 
include a target to answer “80% of calls within 7 
seconds and deploy resources immediately and 
give an estimated time of arrival”. In urban areas, 
members endeavour to attend an incident within 15 
minutes of receiving the call and as soon as possible 
in rural areas. 
Chart 3.4 shows the response times in the DMR for 
the period January to September 2012. The response 
time is calculated by recording the time that a CAD 
message is created to the time it takes for a unit to 
reach the scene of an incident. Later in this part of 
the report, analysis will show that in a sample of 
CAD messages, the Inspectorate found that only 
69% of messages had a time of arrival shown.8 
This is important data that needs to be recorded to 
measure response times to calls.
8 Source: Volume Crime Case Reviews
Chart 3.3
CaD Call grades 
Grading example of call types 
emergency Code e a bomb scare or danger to life 
incident Priority Code 1 a serious crime is in progress e.g. an intruder on premises 
incident Priority Code 2 a burglary where an intruder is not on premises
incident Priority Code 3 a minor incident or offence 
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
Chart 3.4
average response time (in minutes) to CaD Calls for 
service in Dmr Divisions
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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good practice
across the six divisions the response times to 
emergency and priority 1 calls are excellent 
and well within the target time.
This data is invaluable to measure the demands 
placed upon individual divisions and to look at 
performance against targets. 
Outside of the DMR there is little data to allow 
analysis of how well the Garda Síochána is 
performing.	 In	 the	 West	 Yorkshire	 Police,	 each	
division receives a weekly breakdown of the 
number of calls for service, the type of incidents 
and whether demand is changing. A breakdown of 
response times to emergency incidents is provided, 
including whether targets are achieved in attending 
such calls within fifteen minutes.
 recommendation 3.7 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduces divisional data on call 
demand and performance data against garda 
Charter targets for management review and 
action. (short term). 
times of arrival at Calls 
To ensure the accuracy of data and to measure the 
time it takes to respond to a call, it is important 
that units inform a control room when they arrive 
at	 the	 scene	 of	 an	 incident.	 Without	 that	 data,	 it	
is impossible to measure how long it took for a 
unit to attend and how long it took to deal with 
an incident. As part of the inspection process, the 
Inspectorate examined a number of CAD calls for 
service and identified that in 30% of cases, no time 
of arrival was shown.9 In non-CAD control rooms, 
the Inspectorate found that many messages did 
not contain any detail about the time a unit was 
assigned and the time of arrival at a call was not 
recorded in most cases. 
In some other police services visited, analysis of 
the response times for different types of crimes 
showed wide variances in attendance times. 
Of particular note were the differences in the 
response times to a call to a suspected burglar in 
a property, and the time taken to attend a call to a 
9 Source: Volume Crime Case Reviews
violent offender for domestic violence in a home. In 
essence, there was a significantly slower response 
time to calls to domestic violence incidents. This 
point is made to illustrate that the absence of such 
data prevents these sorts of issues from being 
identified and addressed.
 recommendation 3.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána (i) grades all calls received from the 
public, (ii) records the time a unit is deployed, 
the time of arrival and the time a unit is 
finished with a call. (short term).10
Control room staffing Levels
The DMR CCC is well established and it has a 
combination of gardaí and support staff. It is a busy 
control room, which has just changed its staff shift 
roster to provide better coverage at peak times. The 
CCC operates in a similar way to call centres in 
other police services. In the CCC and divisions that 
are using CAD systems, the operating functions 
are usually split between call takers (those who 
answer the telephone and create an electronic 
incident record for the call received) and call 
dispatchers (those who receive those incidents, 
assign resources and monitor the incident until it 
is completed). The job of dispatcher is a specialist, 
skilled role which requires good decision-making 
skills and an ability to make good use of available 
resources; particularly in fast moving incidents. 
The role does not have to be performed by a police 
officer, but it is a post that requires operational 
knowledge. CCC support staff are currently only 
deployed as call takers. 
Outside of the DMR, gardaí are generally deployed 
to perform all of the control room functions. 
During inspection visits, the Inspectorate 
witnessed these control rooms operating below 
locally set minimum staffing levels, which impacts 
on the quality of service provided. At the times of 
the visits there were usually two gardaí deployed in 
a control room. 
The Inspectorate was told by those working 
in control rooms that, at busy times, the unit 
is physically unable to deal with the volume of 
telephone calls and do not have sufficient units 
10 As previously recommended in the Report of the Garda 
Síochána Inspectorate, Resources Allocation, October 2009.
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to deal with the amount of calls. The pressure 
of the numbers of incoming calls has led to the 
development of some poor practices, such as 
cancelling telephone lines that are ringing.
Shortages of control room staff also impact on the 
service provided to their fellow members who are 
out on patrol. Not allocating sufficient staffing 
reduces the ability of control rooms to risk assess a 
call and to supply important information to gardaí 
who are dispatched to crime scenes or who are 
dealing with potential suspects for crime. 
The staffing of control rooms sometimes causes a 
dilemma for district officers and, in some cases, 
they run below the minimum control room staffing 
levels, in order to put additional gardaí on patrol. 
 recommendation 3.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements minimum staffing levels 
for control rooms and ensures compliance. 
(short term).
Use of police support staff in Control 
rooms 
The use of police support staff as call takers in the 
DMR CCC is a positive step and provides significant 
savings for the Garda Síochána. Extending this 
across Ireland provides an opportunity to release 
more gardaí for front-line services, which is a 
critical foundation for good crime investigation. In 
most other police services, police staff are now fully 
utilised in both call taking and call dispatching. 
In these services police staff started in call taker 
posts, but have now progressed to become effective 
dispatchers and control room supervisors. The 
move to a regional CAD system across Ireland 
should coincide with a new approach to the 
staffing of control rooms. The continued use of 
sworn officers in all control room roles no longer 
represents the most effective approach, given front-
line policing demands. 
 recommendation 3.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána explores all opportunities to 
reallocate police support staff to control room 
duties, thereby releasing gardaí for front-line 
duties. (medium term).
3.5 Supervision in Control Rooms
Good supervision in control rooms is seen as the 
key to providing an effective service and ensuring 
that calls that require crime scene management 
and investigation, are well managed from start to 
the finish. In the DMR CCC, sergeants are routinely 
assigned to control rooms, but outside of the DMR 
there was a general absence of a formal supervisor. 
Control rooms regularly ask if there is any unit 
available to deal with a call, rather than directly 
assigning a unit to deal with a particular incident. 
Control rooms operate far more effectively when 
calls are given to specific units, rather than through 
the appeal for “any unit to deal”. 
Throughout the inspection process, examples 
were provided about individuals and units that 
do not respond to their radios and requests to 
deal with calls. The Inspectorate found a real 
sense of frustration from members that this often 
goes unchallenged by supervisors. In many 
places, members felt that individual gardaí were 
choosing the calls which they wanted to go to and 
ignoring other calls. This is not new to policing, 
but it requires strong management, not just within 
control rooms, but also with support from front-line 
supervisors. For example, a local sergeant will know 
who is available and should be challenging their 
non-response to calls. In police services that have 
tackled this particular issue, there is regular input 
on the radio by patrol sergeants and inspectors 
challenging those that are not answering radios or 
unavailable for a particular call. In Ireland, there is 
currently an absence of regular radio intervention 
by supervisors. 
The Inspectorate believes that a move to regionally 
based control rooms requires strong leadership and 
the full time presence of a supervisor.  
 recommendation 3.11
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a system of control room 
supervisors. (Long term). 
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3.6	Deployment	of	Units
Deployment technology
Most garda control rooms have limited technology 
available to assist with managing calls. Good 
deployment in most police services is supported 
by high level technology, which includes mapping 
facilities (street maps). This technology must 
be rolled out across regional control rooms and 
is particularly important if those dispatching 
resources are unfamiliar with the geographical 
area of dispatch. 
The Garda Síochána has the technology to track 
and pinpoint locations based on the position of 
garda radios and patrol cars, but it has not yet 
been fully activated in any area apart from DMR 
North Central. The technology is called Automatic 
Vehicle Location System (AVLS). The Inspectorate 
has viewed the benefits of this technology in 
operation in the pilot environment and believes 
that, notwithstanding the migration issues, 
the system should be fully activated as soon as 
possible, and linked to mapping facilities. This 
would allow dispatchers to see exactly who is on 
duty, where all the resources are and to deploy the 
most appropriate or nearest unit to a call. 
This location technology also allows dispatchers to 
see which units are attending incidents for which 
there are no dispatch details. Self deploying of units 
occurs in other police services, where an individual 
unit or an officer decides to attend a call even 
when there are already sufficient units deployed 
to	deal	with	 it.	South	Wales	police	have	also	used	
this technology to address police officers driving 
at unnecessarily high speeds. As a result of action 
taken,	 South	 Wales	 Police	 have	 reduced	 police	
officer collisions by 50%. 
Technology is also available on garda radios to 
identify the location of a member who calls for 
assistance. The technology will pinpoint the 
location of the garda and allow assistance to 
reach them more quickly. The technology provides 
a historical footprint of where units have 
patrolled on a given day. This is important when 
confirming to see if instructions given to units to 
patrol certain areas at certain times, were actually 
completed.  
 recommendation 3.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána immediately activates the portable 
radio and vehicle location systems. (short 
term).
CCtv Links
There are many excellent local authority Closed 
Circuit Television (CCTV) systems currently linked 
into garda divisions. These are part of the current 
control room configuration and are high quality 
systems, covering many cities and some town 
centres.	With	any	move	to	centralised	call	centres,	
the CCTV links should be transferred to any new 
regional control rooms.
 recommendation 3.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána maintains the current CCtv links 
with any move to centralised call centres. 
(Long term).
non physical Barriers that prevent Better 
Deployment
During the inspection, the Inspectorate found 
limited evidence of cross district deployment 
(within the same division) and even rarer 
were examples of gardaí dealing with calls on 
neighbouring	 divisions.	 A	 move	 to	 regional/
centralised control rooms and a divisional 
approach to policing will provide better 
deployment based on the nearest unit to the call 
(see	also	Part	2	of	 this	report).	Better	supervision	
in and out of control rooms and use of technology 
will also improve the way that garda resources 
are used. The Inspectorate acknowledges that 
members will always break such barriers to 
go to the help of another member that needs 
assistance, but in other cases, crossing district 
and divisional boundaries is less common.
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inefficient Deployment of specialist and 
other Units 
During the inspection, the Inspectorate identified 
other inefficiencies with the deployment of 
resources. For example, many forensic Crime Scene 
Examiners (CSEs) reported occasions whereupon 
returning to a garda station, have found a fax 
message requesting attendance at a crime scene in 
an area that they had just left. This is particularly 
relevant in rural parts of Ireland, where distances 
travelled are far greater. CSEs should be booked 
on with a control room and should be contacted 
directly by radio or telephone with details about a 
crime scene. 
 recommendation 3.14
 the inspectorate recommends that all 
control rooms have details of all operational 
units to allow for direct deployment to calls. 
(short term).
garda reserves 
The Garda Reserve programme has been in place 
for over seven years, but the Inspectorate believes it 
could play a far greater role in assisting the Garda 
Síochána to deal with calls for police services. 
Other police services use the equivalent of reserves 
in a more pro-active and productive way. They 
have provided far greater powers and trained their 
reserves to perform the full range of policing duties. 
The current practice of placing a reserve as a third 
person in a patrol car is a waste of a valuable 
resource. The Inspectorate met with reserves 
during all field visits and identified a sense of 
frustration with underutilisation. Many of these 
reserves have excellent people skills and could be 
used far more effectively to interact with the public. 
Reserves have received training in powers and 
procedures, but are not currently permitted to use 
them. It is inefficient for reserves to be accompanied 
by a garda and the programme offers a great 
opportunity to increase uniform policing visibility. 
Reserves could be used in many ways including:
•	 Patrolling	crime	hot	spots	to	prevent	crime;
•	 Tackling	 quality	 of	 life	 issues	 such	 as	 anti	
social behaviour or public order issues;
•	 Engaging	local	communities.
Many reserves come on duty where there is no 
supervisor present and often waste time waiting 
for someone to accompany them on patrol. Not all 
supervisors are fully aware of the reserve’s function 
and role. The Inspectorate believes that the role of 
reserves should be developed towards patrolling, 
without the need for supervision by a garda and 
used as a resource that can be deployed to specific 
calls. 
 recommendation 3.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána fully utilises the skills and training 
provided to reserves in an operational capacity. 
(Long term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Where	 a	 reserve	 is	 assessed	 as	 competent,	
allow them to conduct independent patrol; 
•	 Where	 a	 reserve	 is	 assessed	 as	 competent,	
provide them with the authority to enforce 
powers for which training was provided. 
3.7 Responding to calls
operational staff Booking on and off 
In the majority of control rooms visited during 
the inspection, staff were unaware of the totality 
of resources that were available to them on that 
day. It is good practice for all garda units that are 
available for patrol and assignment of calls to notify 
their	 control	 room.	With	 community	 officers,	 it	 is	
important to know their hours of duty, where they 
are patrolling and have clear protocols about the 
sort of calls that they can deal with. In the absence 
of an IT system to complete this function, control 
rooms could use white boards or other systems to 
record all available units. 
In many divisions there is poor compliance with 
people booking on and off with control rooms. 
There is no standard process for booking on and 
off. In some places there is good compliance, while 
in other places there is not. The Inspectorate was 
told that officers are regularly reminded to do so, 
but if compliance is not checked on a daily basis 
then it becomes a process that deteriorates over 
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time. As found in a previous inspection, some 
district officers are at times unaware of who is on 
duty and available for deployment.
The Garda Síochána must have a resource 
management system fully integrated with CAD, 
providing a daily list of all staff on duty and 
detailing what their duty is for that day.11 In the 
absence of such a system, it is important that all 
operational units provide control rooms (CAD or 
non-CAD) with the details of who is on duty, the 
times of duty and the types of calls that they are 
available to deal with. From visiting control rooms 
it was noted that there was varied success with 
ensuring people book on. 
 recommendation 3.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána: 
 (i) implement a resource management system 
that is fully integrated with CaD and any 
other management deployment system. 
(medium term).
 (ii) in the interim, ensure that all available 
divisional and national unit staff book on and 
off with regional or divisional control rooms. 
(short term).
3.8 Starting the Investigation
the First Contact 
One of the regions visited is keen to implement 
a pilot that focuses on call takers starting the 
investigation process at the point of taking a 
call. This would include obtaining more detailed 
information from victims or witnesses about 
possible suspects and advising callers on issues 
such as what items not to touch (forensics). Any 
additional information would be passed to the 
officers attending that call. This is good practice 
and should be adopted as a standard operating 
procedure. This approach also emphasises that the 
investigation starts with that first call. 
11 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resources 
Allocation, October 2009.
 recommendation 3.17
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána delivers awareness training to all 
call takers on the importance of gathering, 
recording and actioning information received 
during the first call. (short term). 
risk assessment 
Police	call	centres	in	other	jurisdictions	risk	assess	
calls that are received and where possible provide 
information to officers attending calls. Such 
information may include an address that police 
have attended several times in the last few weeks or 
one which officers could face a potentially violent 
suspect. This sort of information is well received by 
officers, but current control rooms in Ireland do not 
always have the time to do this and the technology 
is not in place to facilitate it. The Inspectorate was 
informed that members often ask a colleague at 
their district station to check an address to obtain 
any intelligence on the people or the location that 
they are attending. 
 recommendation 3.18
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops a risk assessment 
process that identifies and relays important 
information that should be available to gardaí 
who are assigned to an incident. (medium 
term).
recording incidents Dealt with Directly
Where	a	garda	not	assigned	to	a	call	comes	across	an	
incident such as a traffic collision, it is good practice 
to inform a control room that they are dealing with 
an incident. In response, the call taker should create 
a CAD incident or a paper record. This ensures that 
a record is created and allows the incident to be 
recorded and supervised. The original garda is then 
shown as unavailable for other calls. Not every call 
needs to be recorded, but where the garda will have 
to take further action, it is good practice to record 
the activity. In the absence of such a record, the 
incident could stay in a garda notebook and if an 
enquiry is later made, it can be difficult to establish 
which garda dealt with that incident.
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 recommendation 3.19
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that all gardaí notify a 
control room when they come across an 
incident directly and where that incident will 
require further action. (short term).
patrol Car technology
Unlike	 most	 other	 international	 police	 services,	
garda patrol cars are not fitted with Mobile Data 
Terminals (MDT).12 Other police services have 
MDTs in patrol cars that allow CAD calls and other 
messages to be sent directly to the patrol car, and 
facilitates name and vehicle enquiries without 
having to contact a control room. Having the facility 
to do this reduces the traffic over radio airwaves 
and keeps radios clear for emergencies. MDTs allow 
patrol units to easily enter the time of arrival at a 
call and to enter the result.
Another missing feature from garda patrol vehicles 
is a satellite navigation system or similar equipment 
to help patrol officers to find locations quickly. This 
is certainly an issue in more rural parts of Ireland, 
where officers face difficulty in finding remote 
locations. The introduction of individual postcodes 
for every house or building in 2015 will assist in 
identifying the exact location of calls for service. 
technology 
The Garda Síochána must become more mobile and 
must look at technology opportunities to modernise 
the response to incidents and incident recording. 
The Inspectorate was informed that the Garda 
Síochána has just launched an initiative in the 
DMR, where gardaí will have some remote access 
to conducting name and vehicle searches through 
a mobile phone application. The Inspectorate 
welcomes the use of new technology to help gardaí 
who are dealing with incidents. The availability of 
additional applications could allow gardaí to access 
guidance notes and other information when away 
from a garda station.
Other police services are developing the use of 
palm or hand held devices, such as tablets to 
record incidents and allow that information to be 
downloaded directly onto crime recording systems. 
This technology allows exhibits to be digitally 
transferred fast time from crime scenes. 
12 Also known as Mobile Data Computers (MDC).
Body Worn video Cameras
Many other police services are trialling the use of 
Body	Worn	Video	 equipment	 issued	 to	 patrolling	
officers. This is used to record conversations and 
evidence when officers are dealing with incidents. 
The trials are at an early stage, but some of the 
results are promising. One police service found that 
police complaints reduced; there was a 26% drop 
in minor offences and an increase in the number 
of early guilty pleas in court cases. There are thirty 
international trials currently running and the 
evaluation of those should provide a good basis 
for consideration of their application by the Garda 
Síochána. 
 recommendation 3.20
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána improves the mobility of garda 
resources by developing mobile technology 
for use by gardaí and particularly for use in 
vehicles. (Long term).
3.9 Deployment of First 
Responders
the First responder 
For most cases, the first responder to a victim 
of crime will be the person who conducts an 
investigation. In the majority of cases, this will be 
gardaí on regular units. 
Many other policing jurisdictions have reviewed 
and significantly changed their approach to 
responding to calls from the public. Most police 
services assign dedicated resources, whose 
primary function is to be the first responder 
to an incident, ensuring arrival at the earliest 
opportunity. These officers are usually freed 
up from other responsibilities, such as crime 
investigation. In these jurisdictions, the first 
responder will attend a crime scene and complete 
the initial investigation. These officers are expected 
to complete a thorough investigation and to gather 
all available evidence. The case is usually allocated 
to a dedicated investigator that will continue with 
the investigation. The first responders hand over 
responsibility for most investigations when they 
finish duty, having completed all the necessary 
reports for that case.
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The situation in Ireland is very different. The 
regular units are, in most cases, the first responder 
and will not only complete the initial investigation, 
but also the continuing investigation of that crime. A 
problem raised by all regular units is that members 
are often under pressure to move from a call they 
are dealing with to the next call for service. This 
often results in incomplete initial investigations 
and actions that should be completed at the time, 
are postponed to another day. Enquiries that are 
not always completed include: taking a victim or 
witness statement; calling on neighbours (house 
to house enquiries); or, seizing CCTV. The role of 
regular units investigating crime is fully discussed 
in	 Part	 6	 and	 recommendations	 are	 made	 about	
where some of the criminal investigations currently 
conducted by them should be moved. 
The Inspectorate believes that there must be a real 
commitment to deal with today’s crime today. 
 recommendation 3.21
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a standard operating 
procedure based on the concept of ‘getting it 
right first time’. (short term).
 recommendation 3.22
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the role of first response and 
develops a new model of response policing. 
(medium term). 
Burglary investigation Units
Many other police services use a dedicated car 
(often staffed by a detective) for responding to 
all burglary incidents. This means that a much 
smaller number of officers are attending burglary 
incidents, which removes some of the pressures 
on first response units. These investigation units 
complete a thorough initial investigation and focus 
on completing all enquiries at the time to reduce 
the need to return to the crime scene. Experience 
in	 the	UK	has	 shown	 that	 the	 intelligence	picture	
gathered from a crime scene is more comprehensive 
and detection rates higher when an investigation 
unit is dispatched. These units retain responsibility 
for the investigation of all burglaries. 
scheduled appointment Cars
Scotland	 and	 West	 Yorkshire	 police	 services	 use	
appointment cars to respond to incidents or crimes 
that do not require an immediate response. They are 
assigned through control rooms and only require 
one officer’s attendance. Other units, are released 
for crime patrolling and fast time responding to 
incidents that require the immediate presence 
of an officer. Appointment cars usually operate 
between 0700-2200 and are popular with the public, 
who can effectively arrange a suitable time for an 
officer to call. The success of the initiative very 
much depends on keeping the appointments. They 
work particularly well in urban environments, but 
with lower staffing numbers and greater distances 
to travel in more rural areas, this can prove more 
difficult to manage. 
The DMR is implementing a new way of responding 
to minor crimes and burglary cases where a suspect 
is not present at the scene. These calls are removed 
from the workload of regular units and are assigned 
to other units such as community policing officers. 
This was not in operation at the time of the field 
visits, but the Inspectorate supports the use of 
scheduled appointments. 
 recommendation 3.23
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops new approaches to 
responding to calls for service, such as using 
appointment cars and burglary reporting 
units. (medium term).13 
Directing resources to reduce Further 
Crimes 
Greater	Manchester	Police	has	extended	the	remit	of	
their control rooms to include identifying fast time 
trends in crime and moving resources immediately. 
Where	 a	 call	 is	 received	 to	 a	 recent	 burglary,	 the	
control room reviews where resources are and can 
move resources to stop a potential second offence 
from happening. This is a far more pro-active 
approach to responding to crimes. In addition, all 
units (whether intending to patrol or office based) 
in the station are required to book on with the 
control room. If there are insufficient numbers of 
13 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Resources 
Allocation, October 2009.
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units to deal with the number of calls, non-patrol 
officers working in offices are dispatched to come 
out and help. This is a major cultural change, but 
is focused on giving a better service to the public. 
 recommendation 3.24
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops new approaches in control 
rooms to ensure that members are pro-active 
to fast time information and crimes that are 
being reported. (short term).
3.10 Actions at a Crime Scene 
minimum standards of investigation
The Inspectorate found an inconsistent approach in 
most garda districts around what action would be 
completed at an incident or a crime scene. In some 
districts, members try to take statements from 
victims and do house to house enquiries at the 
time of the initial recording of a crime and at some 
districts this does not happen. 
In other police services, there are minimum 
standards of investigation required by officers who 
attend certain calls, e.g. those crime types that are 
deemed to be a priority. The Inspectorate found 
many examples of good practice from other police 
services that are used for offences such as robbery 
and burglary. Minimum standards are just that: 
the minimum points that would be expected to be 
included at every crime scene. For burglary offences, 
this includes making enquiries with neighbours 
and obtaining CCTV or showing photographs of 
potential suspects to a victim. These standards 
ensure that officers cover the key points for crime 
scenes. On completing a record of the crime, officers 
should complete those reports using the minimum 
standards to cover all of the salient points. 
With	robbery	offences	committed	on	people	in	the	
street, criminal research shows that many suspects 
operate in areas close to where they live. It is good 
practice to return to the crime scene (ideally with 
the victim or any witnesses) within a short period 
of the crime taking place and at times thereafter 
(called anniversary visits), as suspects often return 
to the same places to commit further crimes. 
 recommendation 3.25
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates and implements minimum 
standards of investigation for key crime types, 
including the volume offences of burglary, 
robbery, theft, domestic violence and assault 
reviewed in this report. (medium term).
3.11 Gathering Evidence
victim and Witness statements
Improvements in statement taking could release 
a lot of garda time. Officers are routinely taking 
statements for crimes that, due to lack of evidence, 
are never going to be prosecuted. In some places, 
statements are taken on first response and on 
other occasions taken weeks or even months 
later. In burglary cases, a statement taken at the 
time may help with a later prosecution, but that 
is only likely to be in cases where there is other 
available evidence such as CCTV footage or DNA or 
fingerprint evidence. In one case, the Inspectorate 
noted a burglary where there were no suspects 
for the crime and yet an officer went back seven 
months later to take a formal statement from the 
victim. Throughout the inspection, members have 
reported taking a large number of statements and 
in the vast majority of cases, no prosecutions ever 
took place. In Denmark, statements are only taken 
in cases that are serious or where it is likely to result 
in a prosecution. Most police services record the 
victim’s account in a notebook and use this as the 
basis for an investigation. 
This is an area that needs to be clarified and there 
are significant opportunities to reduce the volume 
of unnecessary statement taking. This issue is 
further	 explored	 in	 Part	 6	 and	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 a	
recommendation.
supervision of incidents
A model of intrusive and supportive supervision is 
crucial in terms of ensuring effective investigations 
at crime scenes. The availability of an inspector 
or a sergeant to attend a crime scene provides 
reassurance to gardaí dealing with a serious 
or complex crime. The Inspectorate’s report on 
Front-Line Supervision highlighted that there 
were insufficient available and properly allocated 
sergeants and inspectors to provide appropriate 
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guidance and visibility to front-line officers. The 
relationship between a control room supervisor and 
the patrol sergeant is seen as important to ensuring 
that calls for service are well managed. 
The report also noted that most supervisors 
would like to be able to spend more time out of 
the station on patrol with their officers, but with 
growing administrative responsibilities this is not 
always possible. Since the introduction of the pilot 
roster, the Inspectorate has found the situation to 
be far worse than when the Front-line Supervision 
report was written. As a result many regular units 
and other teams do not always have a dedicated 
supervisor and in most divisions visited during the 
inspection, there was an absence of supervision at 
incidents. 
There are many Garda Síochána operational 
policies in place on crime investigation and 
converting policies into action requires that first 
line supervisors ensure that gardaí understand 
the policy and then check compliance. The 
Inspectorate views the absence of patrol sergeants 
as a major contributor to the deficiencies in crime 
investigations found in this inspection.
Forensics 
Forensic evidence is an increasingly important 
aspect of crime investigation and crime scene 
management. It is important that the first 
responder identifies and secures any potential 
exhibit opportunities for examination by a 
forensic expert. Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) are 
dispatched to attend a variety of different crime 
scenes and will deal with most crimes reported at 
divisions, particularly burglary offences. Again, the 
first response is very important and gardaí should 
have good knowledge about what CSEs can and 
cannot do and should be able to identify good 
opportunities for a CSE to find evidence. 
CSEs are locally based forensics experts that 
operate on a divisional basis. They are all gardaí, 
some are detectives, and most CSE units have a 
sergeant that supervises them. In most other police 
services, the function of crime scene examination is 
now performed by non-sworn police support staff. 
When	a	serious	crime	occurs,	a	local	CSE	may	still	
deal with the forensic elements of the crime scene, 
but could be supported by other experts from the 
Technical Bureau at Garda Headquarters or the 
Forensic Laboratory. 
Focus groups with Cses
During field visits, the Inspectorate met with CSEs 
from all seven divisions who raised a number of 
key issues:
•	 CSEs	are	often	called	to	crime	scenes	where	
there are no forensics opportunities;
•	 All	 gardaí	 require	 refresher	 forensic	
training, particularly about what a CSE can 
and cannot retrieve at a crime scene;
•	 Criminals	 are	 becoming	 more	 forensically	
aware and are careful to avoid leaving trace 
evidence.
Forensic issues
During the inspection the Inspectorate identified 
the following issues:
•	 Whilst	there	is	a	fingerprint	database,	there	
are no garda databases for other retrievals 
such as tool or shoe marks. The Forensic 
Laboratory holds a database on shoe marks, 
but receives very few from crime scenes. 
This is a matter on which other police 
services have refocused and are starting to 
see positive results. 
•	 Some	CSEs	struggle	to	deal	with	the	volume	
of calls on certain days; and may not keep up 
with appointments.
•	 The	 use	 of	 CSEs	 appears	 to	 be	 focused	 on	
quantity and not quality of crime scene 
examinations.
•	 CSE	 statements	 are	 completed	 for	 crime	
scenes where evidence is found; but in the 
majority of cases there is no prosecution.
•	 CSEs	 act	 as	 couriers,	 personally	 delivering	
exhibits to the laboratories in Dublin, and for 
rural divisions furthest away from Dublin, 
this can result in the loss of two CSEs for a 
day. 
•	 CSEs	 operate	 generally	 in	 poor	 working	
conditions, with poor quality and antiquated 
equipment e.g. powder and latent print tape.
•	 Very	 little	 CSE	 examination	 results	 are	
placed	 onto	 PULSE	 and	 are	 still	 being	
entered on ledger books at the station. 
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outputs and outcomes 
CSEs need to play an integral role in crime 
investigation by finding evidence that can link a 
suspect to a crime. Internationally, CSEs are varied 
in performance with some who will achieve far 
better results than others. It is important to identify 
those top performers and use their skills to develop 
others. Many senior managers believe that CSEs 
could be used more productively.
As part of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
submitted an information request to the Garda 
Síochána requesting the following types of data to 
determine the outputs from CSEs (what was found 
and what was submitted) and outcomes (positive 
identifications):
•	 Numbers	of	crime	scenes	attended;
•	 Numbers	 of	 retrievals	 by	 CSEs	 at	 crime	
scenes;
•	 Number	 of	 those	 retrievals	 that	 were	
converted into evidence;
•	 Number	of	arrests	that	resulted	from	those	
identifications; and
•	 Number	of	arrests	that	resulted	in	a	charge	
or other judicial outcome. 
This information is available in many other police 
services but is not currently available in Ireland. 
There are many CSEs who are excellent examiners, 
but there is no data to show how their work 
contributes to identifying offenders. 
technical Bureau 
Exhibits found at crime scenes are sent to Technical 
Bureau in Garda Headquarters. The Garda 
Technical Bureau has developed expert status in 
certain fields, such as fingerprints and photographs. 
Technical Bureau receive many of the exhibits from 
CSEs and conduct examinations of fingerprints 
or photographs from crime scenes. The quality 
of submissions sent to Technical Bureau varies, 
with some good submissions that are turned into 
evidence and some poor submissions, where many 
items are sent for examination, but none of the 
items have any retrievable evidence. Some CSEs are 
regularly submitting large volumes of exhibits from 
crime scenes, without successful identification. 
training 
Currently, CSEs receive five week’s training at the 
Garda College, compared to nine week’s training in 
other police services. The Garda course has a 100% 
pass rate for CSEs, compared to some other police 
services where the pass rate is 75%.14 There are some 
elements of the course, such as photography, where 
CSEs receive limited training relative to the level of 
expertise required. An investment in selection and 
training processes for CSEs could make a significant 
difference to the quality of criminal investigations. 
 recommendation 3.26
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops new standard operating 
procedures for Crime scene examiners 
(Cses). (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Review	the	standard	training	for	CSEs,	and	
ensure consistency with international best 
practice;
•	 Ensure	 that	 CSEs	 have	 appropriate	
equipment to retrieve evidence at crime 
scenes;
•	 Provide	 better	 station	 facilities	 to	 allow	
examinations to be conducted in a 
professional manner;
•	 Develop	additional	 forensic	databases	such	
as tool and shoe marks; 
•	 Establish	 performance	 indicators	 for	 all	
CSEs;
•	 Provide	CSEs	with	continuous	professional	
development; 
•	 Provide	 ongoing	 training	 for	 all	 gardaí	 on	
crime scene management. 
When an incident is not actually a Crime
There are occasions when a call is received to an 
incident that appears to suggest a crime has taken 
place, but when officers attend, they find that there 
is no credible evidence that a crime has occurred. 
For example, a person reports a stolen car, but when 
officers arrive they find that a family member had 
lawfully taken the car. In such cases, it is good 
international practice to record a clear rationale 
on CAD or on a paper record to explain why a 
crime is not going to be recorded. In Ireland, this 
14 Source: Data as per Garda Technical Bureau
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does not happen, and if an enquiry or complaint is 
later made, the officer that dealt with the call has 
to be contacted to find out what happened. Over 
time, this becomes far more problematic and 
unnecessary time is wasted. The practice of logging 
a clear rationale for not recording an incident as a 
crime should be implemented immediately and it 
can happen without any cost or technical change. 
 recommendation 3.27
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures a clear rationale is recorded 
as to why no pULse incident number was 
created where CaD and paper records for calls 
suggest that a crime has taken place. (short 
term).
Keeping CaD Calls open and Linking 
CaD and Crime it systems 
Once a garda unit informs a control room that they 
have finished dealing with a call, the CAD message 
is	 formally	 closed.	 Without	 showing	 a	 CAD	
message as closed, call takers are unable to assign 
the unit to another call. This should be changed, as 
it is not a complication in other places with similar 
CAD systems where a unit can be de-assigned from 
a CAD message that is left open.
Other police services do not close CAD incidents 
if there is still action to be taken or a call awaits 
a	 result.	 In	 Scotland	 and	 West	 Yorkshire	 police	
services, a CAD message cannot be closed without 
including a crime reference number (where 
applicable). This links the CAD system and the crime 
system. This also ensures that control rooms check 
that an officer has completed a crime report before 
finishing their duty. Incidents are also kept open 
if there is a named suspect wanted in connection 
with a crime e.g. in a domestic violence case where a 
suspect	left	prior	to	police	arrival.	Keeping	the	CAD	
message open ensures that oncoming officers are 
aware of the incident and can be tasked to find that 
individual.	 Scotland	 and	West	 Yorkshire	 produce	
a handover package for domestic violence cases 
which is used to brief oncoming teams to continue 
to look for identified individuals. 
 recommendation 3.28
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that CaD incidents are not 
closed without a pULse incident number or in 
cases where there are outstanding actions or 
outstanding suspects. (short term).
results and Closure of incidents
Where	an	incident	 is	managed	on	CAD,	there	 is	a	
process to formally close the message. This requires 
a dispatcher to place a code in the results part of 
the message. There is a choice of six options and the 
most frequently used result code found during this 
inspection	is	RPSTN	“report	to	station”.	When	this	
code is used, it is intended that a garda will complete 
a report for the incident. From a supervisory point 
of view and a management information perspective, 
this code is inadequate as it does not indicate the 
type of report that the garda intends to complete 
and in the case of a crime, what crime was actually 
committed. 
In a review of calls for service incidents, the 
Inspectorate found that the majority of incidents 
are coded as “report to station”, but there is often no 
accompanying report.
In one dip sample of CAD messages, the 
Inspectorate checked twenty-three CAD calls for 
one division and all twenty-three CAD incidents 
checked had a result entered as ‘report to station’. 
On checking the outcomes of each incident the 
Inspectorate found that only twelve reports were 
ever completed.15 This code appears to be used as 
a catch-all for resulting incidents, irrespective of 
whether a report will ever be completed. In non-
CAD control rooms there was generally an absence 
of any results written on the paper records. 
In completing call message logs, it would be far 
more useful if a qualified code was used for a 
result, such as a report is going to be completed 
for an assault or a missing person. There is no cost 
or technical reason that precludes this from being 
immediately implemented. It is the Inspectorate’s 
view that in the longer term, CAD incident result 
codes must be updated to provide more alternatives 
for the outcomes of calls. 
 recommendation 3.29
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develop a broader range of CaD 
incident result codes that accurately record the 
type of incident. (short term).
15 Source: Volume Crime Case Reviews
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3.12 Domestic and Sexual Assault 
Calls	and	Positive	Action
Domestic Violence (DV) is a high volume incident 
that requires particular attention. As previously 
mentioned, DV shares the same CAD code (which 
is DVSA) with sexual assaults and this makes it 
difficult to analyse DV CAD incident data. The 
following data is from all DMR Divisions between 
January and September 2012. Chart 3.5 shows the 
number of total calls received with the CAD code 
DVSA, the number of those calls which had a result 
code	of	“report	to	station”	(RPSTN)	and	the	number	
which	shows	that	prisoners	(PTSN)	were	arrested	at	
the time of the call.
During this period a total of 10,373 calls shown as 
DV/SA	were	received	and	recorded	on	CAD.	A	high	
volume of calls show the result as Report to Station 
(RPTSN).	 From	 analysis	 of	 other	 CAD	 incident	
data	 where	 the	 result	 was	 shown	 as	 RPSTN,	 the	
Inspectorate found that in 50% of the cases no 
reports were actually completed. 
The Garda Síochána has a positive arrest policy 
for domestic violence cases. During field visits, 
the Inspectorate found a complete absence of 
supervision in such cases and an absence 
of management data on how divisions were 
performing. The sample conducted by the 
Inspectorate shows that out of 10,373 cases, only 
247 CAD calls had a CAD result recorded as 
Prisoner	to	Station	(PTSN).	On	checking	those	cases	
where an arrest was made, it was often for a breach 
of a domestic violence barring order, rather than for 
crimes such as an assault. 
3.13 Crime Reporting at Garda 
Stations
The public office in a garda station deals with 
general enquiries from the public, either in person 
or by telephone. This office has the dedicated 
station telephone number and is usually staffed 
by gardaí who have responsibility for dealing with 
visitors, answering and recording telephone calls 
from the public and managing persons detained 
in custody. The multiple functions of this role can 
put individuals under pressure to deal with the 
competing demands placed upon them.
The physical environment of public offices varied 
greatly from station to station. Some were bright, 
open spaces that were customer friendly, while 
others were far less inviting. Reception areas 
were often very small and privacy was an issue, 
particularly for those wishing to report an incident 
of a sensitive nature. Some stations did not have a 
suitable room available for a person who wished to 
discuss a matter in a private setting. 
The Inspectorate found inconsistency with the 
information and literature that was available and 
displayed in garda stations. Some stations had 
posters about particular crimes and details about 
Chart 3.5
Dvsa CaD Call Data in Dmr - January to september 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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support agencies. Conversely, some stations had 
little information available or had posters that were 
not maintained and were out of date. 
 recommendation 3.30
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána audits public office facilities and 
improves their design to facilitate a more 
customer focussed environment. (Long term).
Volume Crime Case Reviews  
158 Calls for Service
volume Crime Case reviews
A major component of this crime investigation 
report was the tracking of 158 calls from 
members of the public to the Garda Síochána 
across the seven divisions visited. 
intention 
The intention was to track selected calls from 
the time the call was made through to the final 
outcome.
This part of the report will examine: 
•	 The	 recording	of	 the	original	 calls	 from	
the public;
•	 The	initial	response	and	investigation	of	
the incident or crime; 
•	 How	many	of	 those	calls	were	recorded	
as crimes or incidents.
Further parts of the report will follow these 
same incidents through the garda investigation 
process including:
•	 Where	a	crime	took	place,	who	investigated	
the crime;
•	 Management	 of	 any	 suspects	 and	 the	
detection (solving) of a crime;
•	 The	 outcome	 of	 any	 court	 prosecution	 or	
other criminal justice disposal;
•	 And	most	 importantly	 the	 service	 that	was	
provided to the victims. 
Call selection 
The selection of the 158 calls was chosen on a 
random basis from lists of CAD records and from 
control room paper records. All calls were chosen 
on the basis that the member of the public who 
contacted the Garda Síochána stated that a crime 
had been committed when the call was made. 
Crimes from the five categories of assault, 
burglary, domestic violence, robbery and vehicle 
crime were chosen. These are categories of 
crimes that are generally referred to as volume 
crimes and are the types of crimes that are dealt 
with daily at garda districts. 
A minimum of four calls for each crime category, 
for each division were selected. 
The Inspectorate selected calls that were received 
in mid-2012 and approximately twelve months 
prior to the visits to each division in late 2012 and 
2013. At some more rural divisions and for some 
crime types the time frame for selection was 
extended to find calls in certain crime categories. 
The selection of the calls from 2012 allowed the 
Garda Síochána twelve months to conduct an 
investigation. 
Each call has been categorised as a case. In total, 
158 cases were selected and reviewed from the 
first point of call, through to the conclusion of 
the case.
The Garda Síochána has an incident and crime 
recording	 system	 called	 Police	 Using	 Leading	
Systems	 Effectively	 (PULSE).	When	 a	 crime	 or	
an incident is reported to the Garda Síochána, a
PULSE	record	should	be	completed	and	a	crime	
recorded when there is reasonable probability 
that a crime took place. 
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3.14 Volume Crime Case Reviews 
The Findings for Calls for Service
recording of Calls for service 
In divisions operating a CAD system, the process 
of indentifying calls for the Volume Crime Case 
Reviews was reasonably straightforward. However, 
in divisions not operating CAD, this proved to be 
a far more complex and time consuming process. 
In two garda districts without a CAD system, the 
Inspectorate found that no paper records were used 
to record any 999 or non-emergency calls received. 
In the absence of any record of calls received, 
there is no way to identify how many calls a year 
are received; what types of calls; who dealt with a 
specific incident and what the results were. In these 
districts, there is no record of work demands and 
without a record of calls, a supervisor is unable 
to check if all calls received were correctly dealt 
with. The absence of call recording was brought 
to the attention of the relevant divisional chief 
superintendents at the time of the visits. 
In garda districts working on paper records, the 
Inspectorate identified that in some district stations 
the recording of calls received from the public was 
inconsistent. In one district, there were gaps of up 
to a week in the recording of calls. From speaking 
to members, it appeared that individual gardaí 
made decisions on whether or not to record the calls 
received. 
Where	paper	records	existed,	they	were	often	hard	
to read and contained limited details of the incident 
in respect of how the call was managed and what 
the result was. 
At most garda districts, the Inspectorate found little 
or no evidence of a supervisor checking paper or 
CAD records to make sure that incidents were dealt 
with appropriately and recorded correctly.
information request for Call Details
Following the field visits and having selected 
calls for service from each visit, the Inspectorate 
requested information on the calls through Garda 
Headquarters.
An information request was submitted with a series 
of questions about the cases. The request also asked 
for copies of any of the following documents:
•	 A	PULSE	report;	
•	 An	investigation	case	file;
•	 A	 custody	 record	 for	 any	 persons	 arrested	
and interview records; 
•	 A	prosecution	file	or	court	papers.
The information that the Inspectorate requested 
would be routinely available in other police services. 
During meetings with other police services, it was 
estimated that such information should be available 
within days. 
The Inspectorate recognised that this request for 
cases would be a good exercise in checking the 
accuracy of recording of incidents and to find any 
associated case papers. The first request to a division 
for information on twenty-one incidents took four 
and a half months to arrive and when it did, two 
cases were missing and were shown as still under 
investigation. The quickest response received took 
three months to reach the Inspectorate. Extensive 
delays that followed the requests, show that there 
are deficiencies in the ability of the Garda Síochána 
to find and provide such information. Most cases 
sent to the Inspectorate consisted of a copy of a 
PULSE	 incident,	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	 a	 victim’s	
statement or a garda investigation pro forma.
Calls not on pULse
In each division, it was clear that difficulties arose 
when	an	incident	was	not	recorded	on	PULSE.	In	the	
absence	of	a	PULSE	record,	divisions	had	to	go	back	
to the original call on CAD or to paper records. The 
next stage was to try and identify who dealt with 
the call. In particular, the limited information on 
paper records made it very difficult to ascertain 
who was actually assigned to the calls. Even those 
divisions operating CAD were in some cases 
unable to determine who dealt with a particular 
call and the action taken. 
In selecting calls that were by this stage over twelve 
months old, the situation was exacerbated by the 
fact that some gardaí had retired, had transferred 
or were off duty on extended absences. The 
Inspectorate received large numbers of internal 
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garda memoranda for cases where individual gardaí 
and sergeants were questioned about whether they 
could remember dealing with a call and what the 
result was. In some cases none of the gardaí on duty 
at the time of the call were able to recollect details 
of the incidents.
Calls with no record of attendance
Of the original 158 calls received by the Garda 
Síochána, there are eight calls where a unit should 
have attended an incident, but there is no record of 
actual attendance. 
There are a further three calls to domestic violence 
incidents, where the caller subsequently re-
contacted the garda to cancel a unit attending. In 
these cases, it is good practice to still attend a call to 
check on a person’s welfare and to make sure that 
the person is not under any duress. There is still 
one  assault case, where eighteen months later the 
division has not responded on the outcome of the 
call.
In respect of the eight calls where a unit does 
not appear to have attended the incident, the 
contributing factors appear to be the poor systems 
for recording calls from the public and an absence 
of supervision to ensure that a call is properly dealt 
with. In some of these cases, all of the gardaí on 
duty on the day have no recollection of receiving 
information about the incident.
In an effort to respond to the Inspectorate’s request, 
some divisions decided to contact the people who 
made the original call, at time periods ranging from 
twelve to eighteen months later, to determine what 
happened on the day that the gardaí were called. 
At least one division decided not to contact the 
caller to establish what happened on the day.
The following are four examples out of the eight 
calls, where gardaí did not attend an incident  and 
where the division is unable to confirm if anyone 
attended and what action was taken. 
•	 In	 May	 2012,	 a	 caller	 stated	 that	 her	
husband had beaten her and hit her 
with a small table. Shortly afterwards, 
the woman called back to say that her 
husband had just left the address. The 
garda control room recorded on the CAD 
record that gardaí would still call to check 
on her welfare. The result to the call on 
CAD is shown as a report to station. The 
unit assigned to the call has since reported 
that the members were cancelled to the 
call by the control room. This information 
conflicts with the details contained on the 
CAD message. The potential ramifications 
for this are serious. No one called to check 
on the victim’s physical condition and this 
incident was never recorded. One year 
later, and after the Inspectorate’s request, 
gardaí attended the address to speak to the 
caller about the incident. 
•	 In	 September	 2012,	 a	 call	 was	 received	
to a robbery where two males stole 
charity money. A unit is shown on 
CAD as assigned to the call and a result 
is shown as a ‘report to station’. The 
division concerned has reported to the 
Inspectorate that it was not possible to 
establish what happened to the call and 
whether a unit attended.
•	 In	 May	 2012,	 a	 caller	 stated	 that	 her	
boyfriend was beating her and also had 
tried to choke her. A unit was assigned 
and the CAD message recorded that 
the unit arrived on scene within eight 
minutes and left the scene six minutes 
later. The call is recorded as a report 
to the station. This incident was never 
recorded	on	PULSE.	All	members	spoken	
to do not recall dealing with this incident. 
In February 2014, gardaí attended the 
caller’s address and took a statement from 
the original caller.
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•	 In	 May	 2012,	 a	 caller	 stated	 that	 there	
was a domestic incident and that a family 
member was causing problems. The 
original call went to the divisional control 
room and it was later transferred to a 
district station to assign a unit. The district 
station has no record of receiving this call 
and all members canvassed on that day, 
do not recall dealing with the incident. 
The division reported that it was busy on 
that day, with other incidents. The district 
officer submitted a report stating that it was 
highly probable that the call was recorded 
by a member and that it was dealt with and 
brought to a successful conclusion. 
The examples highlight poor recording and 
deployment practices and, in some cases, may have 
it resulted in the non-attendance of a garda unit 
to an emergency call.
This inspection has identified a gap in the 
transferring of calls received in divisional non-CAD 
control rooms that are subsequently transferred to 
a district station to deploy a unit to deal with the 
incident. In some district stations, no written record 
of the call that was transferred can be found. 
Following	the	supply	of	PULSE	records	and	other	
documents in the 158 cases, the Inspectorate sent 
further information requests to each division. In 
many	 cases,	where	 a	 PULSE	was	 not	 created	 and	
supplied to the Inspectorate, no information or 
explanation was supplied to explain the absence of 
a	PULSE	report.	
The follow up enquiries included requests for 
information on: 
•	 Why	the	call	was	not	recorded	as	a	crime;
•	 Copies	of	documents	that	were	not	supplied	
as requested;
•	 Verification	 of	 information	 that	 was	
supplied. 
In the majority of cases, divisions provided the 
follow-up information that was requested. In 
two cases, divisions returned the request for 
more	 information	with	a	PULSE	record	 for	a	 case	
where	it	had	initially	reported	that	that	no	PULSE 
incident was created. At the time of completion 
of this report, responses are still awaited to some 
follow up questions and requests for information.
garda notebooks
Members have official garda notebooks which are 
used to record incidents that they deal with and to 
note crimes or arrests. 
Where	 a	 crime	 was	 not	 recorded	 on	 PULSE,	 or	
there was no explanation as to why a crime was not 
recorded, the Inspectorate asked for a copy of the 
rationale for not recording a crime. In some cases, 
the Inspectorate specifically asked for a copy of 
the members’ notebooks for particular incidents. 
Notebooks should have records of the details of 
any investigation and action taken at the time. In 
October 2013, the Inspectorate requested copies of 
notebook entries for eight cases from one division. 
At the time of the completion of this report, three 
responses were received on typed memoranda, and 
no notebook entries have been received. There was 
no response in relation to the other five cases. 
attending incidents 
Chart 3.6 shows call data selected from the seven 
divisions visited by the Inspectorate. The data was 
taken from CAD incidents and from paper records 
maintained on calls for service. Information 
includes average response times to the 158 calls 
for service, the time taken to arrive, the time spent 
dealing with the call and the incidents for which a 
result is shown. In non-CAD divisions most of the 
data was not included in records of calls. 
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general Findings 
In relation to the recording of call details, the 
Inspectorate found significantly more information 
recorded on electronic CAD systems about the 
actual incident than on paper records e.g. the unit 
assigned and the time of assignment was always 
recorded:
•	 In	 the	 three	 locations	 where	 CAD	 is	 in	
operation, on average the time of arrival at 
incidents was recorded in 69% of the calls 
received; 
•	 The	 average	 time	 at	 crime	 scenes	 ranged	
from one minute for an assault to 185 
minutes for a robbery incident;
•	 All	 bar	 two	 CAD	 incidents	 had	 results	
shown as “report to station”, but in less than 
50% of incidents, a report was created;  
•	 For	non-CAD	divisions,	a	result	was	shown	
in only 12% of calls;  
•	 For	non-CAD	divisions,	no	times	of	arrival	
were usually shown and there was no data 
as to how long units spent dealing with calls. 
incident recording 
In most policing jurisdictions, where a call from 
the public is received which suggest that a crime 
has occurred, an incident record would normally 
be completed. This is particularly the case when 
a person states that they have been the victim of a 
property crime, such as a burglary or a car crime. 
In domestic violence cases, there will be occasions 
where a crime has not been committed strictly in 
law, but such incidents should usually be recorded 
as an incident and categorised as a “domestic 
dispute – no offence disclosed”. Not all callers will 
be able to identify the precise crime category, but 
a victim knows if they have been an injured party 
in an assault or that an item of their property was 
stolen. There will always be some occasions where a 
person contacts the police to report a crime that had 
not in fact taken place. 
Chart 3.7 shows the percentage of the 158 cases 
recorded	 as	 incidents	 on	 the	 PULSE	 system	
across the selected divisions. The majority of the 
incidents were recorded at the time the call was 
first received, but the Inspectorate noted that an 
average of 28% of the calls were never recorded 
on	 PULSE.	 Following	 a	 request	 for	 information	
about these calls for service, the Inspectorate 
further noted a number of incidents were recorded 
after the Inspectorate’s request. This amounted 
to 9% of the calls for service. The information 
request was made over twelve months after the 
call was initially made in 2012. In the event that 
a	call	 for	 service,	 is	not	 recorded	on	PULSE,	 the	
Inspectorate expected to see a rationale recorded 
on the case papers reviewed. The chart also shows 
where a rationale was outlined on CAD or on 
the case papers for not recording an incident on 
PULSE.	
Chart 3.6
volume Crime Case reviews – Calls for service attending incidents
Division number of 
incidents 
average response 
times (minutes)
% incidents with 
time of arrival 
shown 
average time at 
the crime scene 
(minutes) 
% of incidents with 
a result shown
DMr north (CaD) 21 22 67% 25 95% (all bar 2 
rPstn)
DMr south (CaD) 23 8 70% 70 100% rPstn
Donegal 21 not recorded not recorded not recorded 28%
Kildare 23 not recorded not recorded not recorded not recorded
Limerick 24 not recorded not recorded not recorded not recorded
Mayo 23 not recorded not recorded not recorded 21%
Waterford (CaD) 23 9 70% 36 100% rPstn
total 158 na na na na
Source: Data provided by the Garda Síochána.
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Findings
•	 The	average	conversion	rate	from	the	call	for	
service	to	the	creation	of	a	PULSE	incident	is	
low at 63%;
•	 9%	 of	 the	 incidents	 were	 recorded	 in	 2013	
after the request from the Inspectorate;
•	 In	 the	majority	 of	 cases	where	 an	 incident	
was	 not	 recorded	 on	 PULSE,	 there	was	 no	
rationale recorded on CAD or paper records 
to explain why a crime was not recorded;
•	 It	is	noted	that	in	one	division,	35%	of	calls	
for	 service	 were	 not	 recorded	 on	 PULSE.	
This is a significantly high rate of under- 
recording.
The	 incidents	 recorded	 on	 PULSE	 twelve	months	
later (after the Inspectorate’s request) included 
offences from all of the five categories including:
•	 Three	robberies;
•	 Two	thefts	from	vehicles;
•	 Five	domestic	incidents.
The following is an example of a case where the 
PULSE	record	was	created	in	2013.
In June 2012, a caller stated that her husband 
had raped her in the past and had hit her on that 
day. Caller wanted him arrested, she has five 
children and is scared. The CAD result is shown 
as report to station. Although gardaí are shown 
as spending 62 minutes at the scene of this call, 
no	record	of	the	incident	was	created	on	PULSE	
at	the	time.	In	June	2013,	a	PULSE	incident	was	
created for the domestic dispute, and the record 
says “husband not present when gardaí arrived. 
No	 offences	 disclosed”.	 The	 PULSE	 record	
created some 12 months later is in direct conflict 
with the information supplied to the garda call 
taker. In this case, a sergeant described the non-
recording at the time as an “oversight”.
Chart 3.8 examines the call data from the five 
selected crime types relating to the 158 cases 
and examines the recording rates for each crime 
category.
Chart 3.7
volume Crime Case reviews 
Conversion rate of Calls for service to pULse records
Division number of calls 
for service
% calls for service 
recorded on 
PULse at the time 
of the first call
% calls for service 
not recorded on 
PULse
% calls for 
service incidents 
recorded after 
with inspectorate 
request
% calls for service 
without a clear 
rationale for not 
recording on PULse
DMr north 21 71% 29% 0% 100%
DMr south 23 61% 26% 13% 83%
Donegal 21 62% 19% 19% 75%
Kildare 23 69% 22% 9% 100%
Limerick 24 63% 33% 4% 100%
Mayo 23 65% 31% 4% 100%
Waterford 23 52% 35% 13% 88%
total 158 63% 28% 9% 92%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 3: First Response
Part 3  |  27
Key Findings
In comparison to all of the sample:
•	 For	property	crimes	such	as	burglaries	and	
robbery crime offences, there is a much 
higher recording rates; 
•	 For	domestic	violence	and	assault	cases	the	
conversion	rates	from	the	call	to	PULSE	was	
significantly lower;
•	 Domestic	 violence	 cases	 accounted	 for	
the largest percentage of cases that were 
recorded after the Inspectorate’s request in 
2013.
Categories recorded on pULse
In	Part	4	of	 this	report,	 the	Inspectorate	examines	
the category that the incident was placed into and 
whether the Inspectorate agreed with that decision. 
Conversion from a Call to a Crime
Chart 3.9 shows the number of calls that were 
recorded	 as	 incidents	 on	 PULSE	 and	 the	 number	
that were recorded as crime incidents.
Chart 3.9
volume Crime Case reviews Conversion 
rate of Calls for service to pULse Crime 
records
number 
of calls for 
service
number 
of calls 
for service 
recorded on 
PULse 
number 
of PULse 
incidents 
recorded as 
a crime
% calls 
for service 
recorded as 
a crime
158 114 90 57%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
general Finding
•	 Only	 57%	 of	 the	 total	 calls	 received	 were	
recorded as crimes.
non-recorded Cases
The following are some of the themes that are 
present from the sixty-eight cases out of the original 
158 calls for service, that were either not recorded 
on	PULSE	or	were	recorded	in	a	non-crime	category.
victims unwilling to make a statement 
of complaint
This is an issue which arose in many of the sixty-
eight	incidents	that	were	not	recorded	on	PULSE	
at the time of reporting. A statement of complaint 
is effectively a written statement taken from a 
victim outlining the nature of the offence and an 
agreement by the victim or a witness to assist in 
the prosecution of an offender and if necessary to 
attend court to give evidence. 
A difficulty arises when a victim reports that a 
crime has taken place, but declines to provide a 
written statement of complaint. The Inspectorate 
found examples where gardaí stated that the 
crime was not recorded, because the victim 
would not make a written statement of complaint. 
The refusal to provide a statement of complaint 
can be very frustrating for gardaí and can often 
occur in cases of domestic violence and other 
assaults. However, the rules around this state 
that if there is reasonable probability that a crime 
occurred (and no evidence to the contrary) then 
even if the victim does not want the matter taken 
any further, a crime should be recorded (Crime 
Counting Rules).
Chart 3.8
volume Crime Case reviews 
Conversion rate of Calls for service to pULse records by Crime type
Crime type number of calls 
for service
% calls for service recorded 
on PULse at the time of the 
first call
% calls for service not 
recorded on PULse
% calls for service recorded 
after inspectorate request
assault 30 47% 47% 6%
Burglary 40 87% 10% 3%
Domestic Violence 33 39% 45% 15%
robbery 27 78% 11% 11%
Vehicle Crime 28 61% 28% 11%
average total 158 63% 28% 9%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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victims told to consider their course 
of action
The Inspectorate found a number of calls where 
gardaí recorded that the victim was going to 
think about their course of action and that the 
victim would re-contact the gardaí. This was 
often linked to assault cases, but also in a case 
of robbery and, sometimes, the victim was 
described as being intoxicated. In most police 
services where on the balance of probabilities 
an assault took place, a record of the crime is 
created at the time and contact is made with 
the victim at a later date. In Ireland these same 
rules of recording apply, but it appears that such 
crimes are not always recorded. In the incidents 
that were examined, there was no evidence of 
further contact with victims to establish if the 
victim wanted to report a crime. In most cases 
the victim’s details were known and gardaí 
should make contact at a later date to see if the 
victim wants to report a crime.
victims or callers who left the scene 
before gardaí arrived 
During this analysis, the Inspectorate found 
several calls where victims had left a location 
prior to the arrival of a garda. On occasions, 
this was due to a delayed response by the garda 
attending the incident. Examples include: 
•	 A	call	to	a	hospital	where	there	was	a	victim	
with a suspected broken jaw. It took two 
hours for a unit to attend the hospital and by 
that time the victim had left. 
•	 A	call	to	a	domestic	incident	received	in	the	
early hours of the morning took gardaí over 
two hours to attend; and by that time there 
was no reply at the address.
In these cases, there was no evidence of any 
attempt to re-contact the victim and no crimes 
were subsequently recorded. Reasonable 
enquiries should have taken place to speak to 
the caller or any witnesses.
victims advised to call to a garda station
The Inspectorate also identified calls where an 
arrangement was made for a victim to come to a 
garda station to report an incident or a crime. On 
two occasions, this occurred because it suited 
the victim to do so. In these cases, no crime 
was ever recorded and there is no record of any 
attempts to re-contact the victims to see if the 
person wanted to report the crime.
Best practice 
Many police services have adopted bureaucratic 
processes of exhaustively trying to contact 
potential victims to establish if a crime has taken 
place and whether the victim wishes to report 
it. A sensible approach must be taken in terms of 
trying to contact a victim to see if a crime has taken 
place. The Inspectorate advocates that reasonable 
attempts should be made to contact a person who 
has previously reported a crime to the garda and 
for whatever reason, the crime was not recorded at 
the first notification. Any such attempts to contact 
a caller should be recorded on the original CAD 
message or on the paper record.
 recommendation 3.31
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates a standard operating 
procedure for dealing with victims of crime. 
(medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Provide	 clear	 guidelines	 about	 when	 to	
record a formal statement of complaint;
•	 Develop	 a	 standard	 national	 approach	 for	
follow-up enquiries with victims who have 
left a crime scene prior to the arrival of 
gardaí; 
•	 Promote	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 first	
interaction with a victim of crime. 
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Unrecorded Crimes – individual Decisions 
by gardaí 
As mentioned in the introduction to this report, 
there will always be a number of crimes that are 
not reported to the police. Internationally, under 
reporting is monitored through surveys of various 
types.	 Whilst	 this	 occurs	 across	 the	 full	 range	
of crime types, it is particularly prevalent with 
crime types such as domestic violence, race crime 
or homophobic crimes. Sometimes it is because 
victims do not think that the police will take them 
seriously or they are afraid of retribution. 
In contrast to the decision by a victim not to report 
a crime, the inspection learned of an unacceptable 
practice where individual gardaí were deciding not 
to record a crime.
examples of the type of unrecorded cases that 
were provided to the inspectorate 
•	 In	assault	cases,	gardaí	sometimes	give	the	
victim time to consider their next course of 
action and do not always record the victim’s 
complaint. This is particularly used when a 
victim may have consumed alcohol. Many 
victims later decide not to make a formal 
complaint and a crime is never recorded. 
•	 In	domestic	 violence	 cases,	where	 a	 victim	
has injuries but is unwilling to make a 
statement of complaint, members sometimes 
do	not	 record	 the	 incident	 on	PULSE;	 or	 it	
is	 recorded	 on	 PULSE	 without	 details	 of	
any injuries to the victim and incorrectly 
categorised as a domestic dispute. In the 
latter case, this crime is categorised as a 
“domestic dispute - no offences disclosed”. 
This matter is effectively closed and the 
assault is not recorded. This is a very unsafe 
practice for such a crime.
•	 Where	the	victim	is	a	tourist,	some	members	
do not record the crime as they think that 
the person will not follow-up on the report. 
•	 Some	 low	 level	 incidents	 are	 not	 always	
recorded as the district officer would expect 
a full investigation. 
•	 Some	 crimes	 are	 recorded	 in	 a	 non-crime	
category. This is further discussed in the 
next	part	of	the	report	(Part	4).	
•	 Victims	 are	 sometimes	 asked	 to	 provide	
proof that an offence has taken place before 
a crime is recorded. Examples were given in 
theft of oil cases, where victims were asked 
to provide receipts for oil purchases. In these 
cases, members said that this was completed 
on the instructions of a supervisor.
Members have told the Inspectorate that they are 
aware that the failure to record a crime is likely 
to lead to a disciplinary enquiry. District officers 
informed the Inspectorate that unless a complaint 
or enquiry was later received, it is unlikely to be 
discovered that a crime was not recorded in these 
circumstances. The Inspectorate was informed 
that supervisors cannot guarantee that everything 
goes	 onto	 the	 PULSE	 crime	 recording	 system.	
Some supervisors were unclear on their authority 
to review notebooks. On checking the Garda Code, 
the Inspectorate noted that it sets out the duty of 
supervisors to check garda notebooks. 
In Ireland, there is no formal process for allocating 
crimes for investigation. Other police services 
have formal allocation processes and often have 
investigation teams that deal with particular 
crime types. As the first responding garda usually 
investigates an incident, if a garda records a crime, 
they know that they are allocating an investigation 
to themselves. This means that an individual can 
essentially decide what they will investigate. It may 
also determine whether the incident will ever be 
entered onto the crime incident reporting system 
and also under which category it will be classified. 
This issue is exacerbated by poor supervision.
Heavy workloads were the main reason provided 
by	 gardaí	 for	 not	 recording	 incidents	 on	 PULSE.	
Members explained that all crimes are required to 
be investigated to the same level and where a less 
serious	 crime	 is	 recorded	 on	 PULSE,	 the	 district	
officer will request a full investigation file and send 
out a long list of instructions for the gardaí to carry 
out. 
Failure to record crimes and incidents was 
consistently reported to the Inspectorate across all 
seven divisions. 
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approach of individual officers
The first member to deal with a victim of any crime 
has a critical role and may determine the satisfaction 
levels of the victim with the service provided. The 
Inspectorate was informed by members and victims 
that it can often be the approach of the first officer 
that determines what a victim will do. 
3.15 The Victim’s Experience 
The following are examples of cases brought to the 
attention of the Inspectorate during the course of 
the inspection, that were not recorded as crimes. 
The Inspectorate spoke to the victims in Cases 1 
and 2 and also the witness to Case 3.
Case 1
A victim of a previous burglary was the victim 
of another burglary. Following the second crime, 
the victim received a garda victim’s letter from 
the district officer. This victim had not received 
a victim’s letter for the first crime and assumed 
that the letter was a new garda initiative. A 
subsequent	review	of	the	PULSE	system	showed	
that the first crime had never been recorded.
Case 2
A family on holiday in Ireland were the victims 
of a violent attempted robbery. On seeing two 
gardaí they reported what had happened. The 
members called an ambulance for the victims 
and conducted a short search for the suspects. 
The gardaí informed the victims that they would 
have to report the crime at another station. The 
victims were shocked that the officers did not 
want to take the report. This crime was not 
recorded.
Case 3
A member of the Garda Síochána saw suspects 
at the rear of their neighbour’s house attempting 
to break in and dialled 999. Two gardaí arrived 
in a patrol car. The gardaí did not get out of the 
car or search the back of the house and they left 
without talking to the witness. The incident was 
not recorded as a crime.
Case 4 
A robbery involving the taking of a mobile phone 
was reported to a garda. Three weeks later the 
victim’s mother attended the garda station to get 
a	claim	form	stamped.	On	checking	PULSE	the	
crime was not recorded.
supervision 
During the inspection of CAD and paper call 
recording systems, the Inspectorate found very 
little evidence of supervision to check that a call 
was	 correctly	 dealt	 with.	 With	 regard	 to	 crime	
investigation, it is important that a supervisor 
makes sure that an officer has taken all necessary 
actions at a crime scene and has completed a 
detailed crime report. 
the inspectorate has identified a gap between the 
number of calls that are received from the public 
and the numbers of incidents that are actually 
recorded in electronic and paper records. this 
gap needs to be urgently addressed, and robust 
and meaningful supervision is required to ensure 
that calls are properly recorded and actioned. 
garda action for non-recording of Crimes 
and other incidents 
Out	 of	 the	 158	 calls,	 14	 PULSE	 incidents	 were	
created some 12 months after the call was first 
received by the Garda Síochána and six out of the 
seven divisions created reports after the request for 
documents by the Inspectorate.
The Inspectorate has received some feedback on 
Garda Síochána action taken for the non-recording 
of these crimes and other incidents. This ranged 
from no action taken to several cases of discipline. 
In one division, the Chief Superintendent reported 
that as a result of the Inspectorate’s request for 
cases, two members are under investigation for 
breaches of discipline; one member has retired, 
but if still serving would have faced discipline 
proceedings and three other incidents should 
have been recorded and instructions were given to 
gardaí about this. This is effectively 28% of the total 
cases examined for that division. This showed the 
seriousness in which one division viewed the non-
recording decisions made. Other divisions have 
taken different approaches. 
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These case reviews across the seven divisions 
identified that a large percentage of crimes that 
took place were never recorded and subsequently 
never investigated. 
the analysis of call handling has identified a 
serious problem with the recording of incidents 
and crimes across the seven divisions.
3.16 Not Recording Incidents - 
What	Does	This	Mean	to	Crime	
Recording in Ireland? 
It is almost impossible to determine the level of 
crime that is not currently recorded. However, the 
information provided to the Inspectorate and the 
Volume Crime Case Reviews indicates that it could 
be significant. 
Victims and witnesses who come forward to report 
a crime are entitled to have complete confidence 
that the Garda Síochána will record crimes and 
conduct appropriate investigations. The incidents 
described by the members, the information from 
victims and case file reviews show that this is not 
always the case in crimes reported by the public. 
The failure to accurately record crime at this stage 
has serious ramifications: 
•	 Crime	data	is	inaccurate;
•	 Crime	 policies	 and	 directives	 are	 not	
implemented;
•	 Criminal	offences	are	not	investigated;
•	 Many	 offenders	 are	 not	 dealt	 with	
appropriately;
•	 Early	 intervention	 action	 in	 less	 serious	
crimes is not being taken, which has the 
potential to prevent more serious crimes 
from occurring; 
•	 Analysis	of	crime	and	deployment	of	garda	
resources is not based on the full picture of 
reported crime, resulting in the wasteful 
allocation of scarce resources;
•	 Victims	and	witnesses	are	not	receiving	the	
service they are entitled to expect from the 
Garda Síochána. 
The non-recording of crime is not a new issue. 
The Inspectorate report titled ‘Responding to 
Child Sexual Abuse’, completed in November 
2010, identified a failure by the Garda Síochána to 
record child sexual offences as crimes. The recent 
inspection shows that the recording deficiencies 
found in the Inspectorate’s examination of child 
sexual offences is replicated in many other crime 
areas. The inconsistency in crime recording was not 
isolated to any one of the seven divisions inspected.
the inspectorate believes that the systems, 
processes and supervision are not in place to 
ensure that crime is properly recorded. the 
failure to record and properly investigate a crime 
is unacceptable in any policing jurisdiction. 
this situation must be immediately addressed, 
to maintain public and victim confidence in the 
garda síochána. 
3.17	The	Way	Forward
national standard for incident recording 
(nsir) 
There must be integrity, transparency, consistency 
in interpretation and clear standards of application 
in CAD and crime incident recording in Ireland. 
NSIR	operates	in	the	UK	and	provides	a	set	of	rules	
to ensure that calls are handled in a professional 
and consistent manner. (A similar set of rules 
operate	 in	 the	 USA:	 National	 Incident-Based	
Reporting System). The principal aim of NSIR is to 
ensure that incidents are risk assessed at the earliest 
opportunity, leading to an appropriate response and 
ensuring that incidents are recorded in a consistent 
and accurate manner. Accurate recording helps the 
police and local communities to tackle crime and 
anti-social behaviour. NSIR covers the end-to-end 
process from first point of contact with the police to 
the response. 
In 2000, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC) Report “On the Record” drew attention to 
the possible consequences for the integrity of crime 
statistics when it found that 24% of crimes notified 
to control rooms went unrecorded in crime systems. 
Following the introduction of NSIR the recording 
standards	of	UK	police	services	improved	greatly.	
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With	NSIR,	 an	 incident	 should	 be	 recorded	when	
an event or occurrence disturbs an individual’s, a 
group’s or a community’s quality of life or causes 
them concern. Incidents range from road traffic 
collisions and anti-social behaviour through 
to matters of crime and public safety. Incident 
management is part of the process for restoring 
situations to normality with minimal adverse 
impact on the community. Many police services 
use qualifiers in resulting incidents e.g. a call to 
anti-social behaviour might have a result that said 
that it was youth related. This can alert community 
officers to emerging issues.
Other international police services have a Crime 
Registrar	(discussed	further	in	Part	5)	that	also	has	
responsibility for incident recording. Their role is to 
implement clear processes for recording incidents 
and to ensure consistency, transparency, accuracy 
and integrity across the force area.
 recommendation 3.32 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduce a national standard for 
incident recording. (Long term).
 in the interim, the following key action needs 
to be taken:
•	 Appoint	 a	 lead/champion	 for	 incident	
recording	 standards	 (See	 Part	 5	
recommendation for crime recording).
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4.2 The Crime Recording 
Structures and Key 
Organisations
Crime Counting rules
In common with other countries, Ireland has 
crime counting rules that are applied to categorise, 
record, measure and analyse crime. A criminal 
offence is recorded when there is a reasonable 
probability that a crime was committed and there 
is no credible evidence to the contrary. The test 
is that of reasonable probability and whether it is 
more likely than not that a criminal offence took 
place. If the criteria to record are satisfied, but the 
victim does not want the matter taken any further, 
a criminal offence must still be recorded. There are 
also rules on:
•	 How	 to	 record	 crimes	when	 there	 is	more	
than one victim; 
•	 How	 to	 deal	 with	 multiple	 crimes	 by	 the	
same offender on the same victim;
•	 When	to	change	a	crime	from	one	category	
to another; 
•	 When	to	show	a	crime	as	detected	(solved).
These rules are very important, particularly when 
the performance of police services is often judged 
on whether crime is increasing or decreasing and 
success in identifying offenders, solving crimes and 
bringing offenders to justice. 
Counting rules are one way of benchmarking and 
measuring crime levels. Surveys are another way of 
gauging crime levels. The annual Crime Survey for 
4.1 Introduction
This part of the report explains the process for recording crimes and non-
crime incidents reported to the gardaí. It also examines why some crimes are 
not recorded and what this means for overall crime levels in Ireland. 
The Garda Síochána has a single incident recording system called PULSE that 
is used to record crimes, incidents and garda generated activity. 
The Garda Síochána operates a unique system for the recording of crimes and 
other	incidents.	When	a	garda	has	attended	the	incident,	they	contact	the	Garda	
Information	Services	Centre	(GISC),	based	in	Castlebar	and	report	the	incident	
directly. In this process GISC creates a record of the incident on PULSE. This 
removes the need for gardaí to return to a garda station to complete a report. 
One of the first steps in that telephone call to the centre is a process called 
crime classification. This determines what category of crime is recorded. 
Other policing jurisdictions take great care to ensure that this process is right 
first time, so as to avoid having to change the crime classification at a later 
date. This is not always the case in Ireland and crimes often end up in the 
wrong crime category in the first instance or in some cases as a category not 
recognised as a crime. 
This part also explores a process called review, where a GISC supervisor 
is required to check the crime entry for data quality and to ensure that the 
correct crime classification is shown. 
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England	 and	Wales	 asks	people	 aged	 sixteen	 and	
over living in households about their experiences 
of crime in the last twelve months. This survey 
also indicates the levels of crime that are not 
reported or recorded by the police and some of the 
reasons for not reporting crime. The Irish Central 
Statistics	 Office	 (CSO)	 carries	 out	 a	 quarterly	
national household survey which, from time to 
time, includes a module on crime and victimisation. 
The latest such module was published in October 
2010, in respect of the period January to March 2010. 
The module was previously carried out in 2003 and 
2006. Therefore, unlike other jurisdictions, there 
are few alternative sources of crime data to those 
reported by the Garda Síochána.
Crime Definitions
The method of counting and categorisation of 
crime is important, as it influences crime statistics. 
There are clear definitions for each crime category; 
e.g. what components need to exist for an offence 
to be a burglary or a robbery. To assist with 
varying circumstances and how to apply this to 
the definitions, examples are provided in the rules 
to assist those who are deciding what crime has 
taken place. For traditional offences such as theft 
and burglary, the categorisation is quite straight 
forward.	 With	 e-crime	 and	 fraud	 offences,	 it	 can	
sometimes be more complicated. The definitions for 
these traditional crimes and the interpretations in 
Ireland are predominately the same as those used 
in the UK.
Whilst	 similar	 crime	 categories	 exist	 in	 Ireland,	
there are fewer sub-categories than in many other 
countries. Sub-categories can capture more detailed 
information, such as seriousness, modus operandi, 
target and intent. For example, in respect of 
burglary, UK police services break this down into 
sub-categories such as attempted burglary, artifice 
(distraction	 or	 trick	 offences),	 residential	 (homes)	
and	 non-residential	 offences	 (non	 dwellings).	
Garda analysts have indicated that this sort of 
information would be very useful when analysing 
burglary offences. Sub-categories also allow a 
distinction to be drawn in respect of burglary 
offences and attempted burglary offences. For 
example, it is useful to be able to separate burglaries 
and attempted burglaries in order to identify the 
number of homes or premises that are not actually 
entered by an offender. The Inspectorate also found 
it difficult to extract data in respect of the different 
types of vehicle crime from PULSE. 
 recommendation 4.1 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops additional categories and 
sub-categories on pULse that provide better 
data descriptions of key crime types and non-
crime types. (medium term).
Central statistics office
The	 Central	 Statistics	 Office	 (CSO)	 is	 responsible	
for the publication of Irish crime statistics and 
produces quarterly and annual crime statistics 
reports, using source data which has been collected 
by the Garda Síochána. The CSO also use such data 
in conjunction with its other demographic and 
administrative sources from the criminal justice 
system, in order to provide additional statistical 
information, such as the age or gender of victims 
or offenders. 
police Using Leading systems effectively 
(pULse)
The primary source of Irish crime statistics is the 
PULSE system. PULSE is a national computerised 
incident recording system for the Garda Síochána, 
that was introduced across Ireland in 1999. In 2012, 
PULSE recorded just over 240,000 crimes, 145,000 
offences and a further 600,000 incidents that were 
not crimes. PULSE therefore, records crimes such as 
burglaries and other offences such as speeding and 
other non-crime incidents, such as missing persons 
or lost property. 
PULSE is not a crime investigation system; it is an 
incident recording system. Crime investigation 
systems in other jurisdictions operate very 
differently to PULSE. Their crime investigation 
systems are the main repository for recording all 
information relevant to the crime that is being 
investigated. All entries on these crime systems 
are timed and dated and show the action taken 
and the details of the officer making an entry. For 
a serious or complex crime investigation, the free 
text section for the investigation will often run 
to multiple pages. In contrast, the Inspectorate 
found that the creation of a PULSE record was 
often a once-off event, and sometimes there were 
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no further updates. Entries on PULSE do not 
always identify the person making the entry and, 
without conducting specialist searches, it is hard 
to determine who conducted certain actions and 
the date and time of their completion. The free text 
section for details of the investigation in PULSE 
is restricted to 3,000 characters, but in most cases 
PULSE details of an investigation run to just a few 
lines of text. 
All senior gardaí interviewed during this inspection 
process would like a replacement system for PULSE 
and a crime investigation and case management 
system. The system should be integrated with other 
technology, such as a new CAD1 system. This report 
will provide a compelling business case to show 
that the Garda Síochána must have a new crime 
recording system. 
PULSE would need significant investment, which 
may not be possible with the current system and, 
in any case, the changes may be cost prohibitive. 
This report will highlight major deficiencies with 
the PULSE system. The Inspectorate recommends a 
new system, but in the interim, recommends some 
immediate changes to improve the current working 
practices of PULSE. 
 recommendation 4.2 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a new national crime 
investigation/records management system 
that records all information and actions 
taken relating to the investigation of a crime. 
this system must be compatible with new 
CaD and resource management systems as 
recommended in part 3. (Long term).
1 CAD is the acronym used for the Computer Aided Dispatch 
systems used by police services in many countries. The 
system can be used to log calls for service, the assignment 
of units to respond to the call and other incident related data 
relevant to first response.
the garda information service Centre 
(gisC) 
good practice
ireland operates a unique system for the actual 
recording of crimes and other incidents onto 
pULse. gisC is a call centre operated by 
garda síochána support staff, providing a 24/7 
telephone and tetra radio reporting service 
to gardaí across ireland. responsibilities 
include the creation and review of all incidents 
reported by gardaí on the pULse system. When 
a garda has dealt with a crime or an incident 
there is a requirement to contact gisC directly 
from the crime scene and a gisC call taker 
enters the incident directly onto the pULse 
system. this removes the need for gardaí to 
return to a garda station to complete a crime 
report. this is a good approach designed to 
maximise garda time on patrol.
On average, it takes GISC about six minutes to 
create a PULSE incident; but with some more 
detailed incidents such as road traffic collisions, 
the process can take longer. As well as creating 
crime and non-crime incidents, stop and searches, 
road safety checks and intelligence reports are also 
recorded. GISC also perform other tasks, including 
linking PULSE with local district courts through 
the Criminal Justice Interoperability Programme 
computer	 system	 (CJIP).	These	 links	allow	 for	 the	
issue of a summons, checking compliance with 
document production by drivers and summons 
preparation in non-compliance cases. The Garda 
Síochána now offers a service through GISC to 
report crime on-line for low value theft of property 
crimes. GISC also provides an out of office hours 
IT support function for the Garda Síochána, 
receiving approximately 120 IT related calls per 
week. 
The Inspectorate’s field visit at GISC coincided 
with a national garda traffic related initiative 
that resulted in gardaí contacting GISC to record 
activity to support the operation. GISC staff were 
not notified in advance of this operation. As the 
point of recording, GISC should always be warned 
in advance of any impending operation that will 
require GISC assistance, to ensure sufficient 
resources are available. 
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 recommendation 4.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána informs the garda information 
service Centre (gisC) of any non-sensitive 
operations that will require additional gisC 
assistance. (short term).
The Assistant Commissioner for Organisational 
Development and Strategic Planning has corporate 
responsibility for GISC as well as information 
management and data quality issues. The 
Assistant Commissioner for Crime and Security 
has responsibility for crime administration and 
compliance with crime counting rules. This report 
recommends several changes to the way that 
GISC should operate in the future, which includes 
enhancing their role in terms of compliance with 
crime counting rules. There is an inextricable link 
between the role of GISC in terms of data quality 
of crime recording and ensuring that PULSE crime 
incidents are recorded to a high standard. The 
Inspectorate believes that one senior manager of the 
Garda Síochána should lead on both crime counting 
rules and the management of GISC.
 recommendation 4.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána designates one senior manager as 
the lead for both crime counting rules and 
the garda information service Centre. (short 
term). 
4.3 Recording Entries on PULSE
Call takers and pULse incident Creation 
Approximately 18,000 PULSE incidents are created 
each week and GISC call takers create just under 
16,000 of those reports. The role of GISC is to 
capture the information provided by the member, 
to create the initial PULSE entry for an incident or 
a crime and to provide advice to the member on 
the category of crime that may have taken place. 
This latter function, called crime classification, 
effectively determines what category of crime is 
recorded. In other policing jurisdictions, great care 
is taken to ensure accuracy of the initial entry to 
avoid having to change the crime classification at 
a later date. 
Call takers also have a key role to play in accurately 
recording data and ensuring that all necessary 
PULSE fields are populated. 
mandatory Fields on pULse
When	an	incident	is	created,	there	are	a	number	of	
fields that must be populated; including the date, 
time and location of the incident and when the 
incident was created. There are some elements that 
are not mandatory, but are required for statistical 
information, e.g. the nationality of any persons 
named in the incident. The CSO would like to 
see mandatory completion requirement fields 
on PULSE, as used in other countries. Creating 
mandatory data fields that must be populated 
before a report can be completed, would reduce the 
number of follow-up enquiries that are later issued 
for officers to update their entries. It would also 
assist in the comparability of data. 
 recommendation 4.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána increases the number of mandatory 
fields on pULse, (nationality, gps etc.), 
to ensure more information is obtained to 
provide greater accuracy in pULse incident 
recording. (medium term).
 For this to take place, the garda síochána 
must:
•	 Consult	 with	 Garda	 Síochána	 Analysis	
Service	 (GSAS)	 and	 the	 Central	 Statistics	
Office	 (CSO)	 to	determine	what	mandatory	
fields are necessary to support accurate 
details for crime data and analysis. 
Contacting gisC from incident and 
Crime scenes
In respect of contacting GISC to record incidents, 
the Inspectorate found that some gardaí are 
developing a practice of saving up all the incidents 
dealt with until the end of their tour of duty and 
on return to their garda station, contacting GISC 
to create a number of PULSE reports. This is a 
common practice in the seven divisions visited 
and is unnecessarily placing GISC under pressure 
at shift change-over times. Throughout the 
inspection, members regularly complained about 
slow response times to calls made to GISC. Gardaí 
also complained about poor radio signals as a 
reason for not contacting GISC from crime scenes 
and that, after a period of time, a call over their 
radio is automatically terminated. The creation 
of PULSE reports towards the end of their duty 
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effectively removes a garda from street patrol and 
also reduces the opportunity for a sergeant to check 
a PULSE incident before a garda goes off-duty. 
This is a practice that must be addressed and any 
technical issue with garda radios that may exist 
needs to be resolved. In addition, the creation of 
a PULSE record away from a crime scene reduces 
the opportunity for GISC call takers to obtain 
more details about the crime scene. 
All PULSE incidents have a mandatory field for 
including GPS co-ordinates for a crime scene. 
This enables crime analysts to conduct far more 
accurate evaluations of crime data. A member at a 
crime scene can obtain GPS co-ordinates through 
their Tetra radio. Once a garda leaves the location, 
additional work is needed to fill this information 
gap. 
 recommendation 4.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána enforces the policy for members 
to contact gisC from the location of an 
incident to create a pULse report, rather than 
contacting gisC at the end of a tour of duty. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following action needs to be taken:
•	 Resolve	the	issue	of	garda	radios	terminating	
contact to GISC after a certain length of time. 
Internationally, in other police services, officers 
are still manually inputting crimes onto computer 
systems or are using hand-held devices that 
download information directly onto computerised 
crime recording systems. There are some benefits 
to police officers inputting crime as they become 
very familiar with the points needed for a crime 
scene investigation report. In general, the quality 
of the reports in other jurisdictions visited were far 
more detailed. The lack of detailed information on 
PULSE may be the result of gardaí not having to do 
direct record entry, particularly those who joined 
the police service after PULSE was introduced.
Overall, the Inspectorate believes that the 
establishment of GISC was a progressive move 
at the time, but there is an opportunity to use 
the system far more effectively and create a more 
detailed crime record. The following paragraphs 
highlight issues of efficiency, quality, timeliness 
and the critical stages in the creation of a record. 
Compliance rates for recording pULse 
incidents with gisC 
In order to maximise garda patrol time, members 
are expected to utilise the services of GISC for 
PULSE entries. Chart 4.1 identifies the percentage 
of PULSE incidents created by all divisions in 
contravention of Garda Síochána policy. Many 
divisions have achieved compliance rates in excess 
of 90% for using GISC to record incidents, but as 
shown in Chart 4.1 there are many divisions with 
much lower rates. There is no data available on how 
long it takes a garda to complete a PULSE incident, 
but it is likely to be far longer than the six minutes it 
takes a call taker at GISC. 
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Creating a PULSE incident outside of the GISC 
system requires a member to return to a garda 
station and that reduces garda visibility. The 
presence of a patrol car or a garda on foot patrol is 
a deterrent to criminals. The Inspectorate believes 
that there is no need for individual gardaí to create 
their own PULSE incidents and that all divisions 
should achieve a minimum of 95% compliance.
pULse - Quality assurance 
Chart 4.2 shows the difference in the quality of 
a PULSE record created by GISC and a PULSE 
incident created by individual gardaí. Every PULSE 
incident created is subject to a formal review 
process by GISC to check for data quality and 
to make sure that the correct incident category is 
chosen.	Where	additional	information	is	required,	
or GISC want to clarify an issue with the report, an 
action is generated called a “review/clarification”. 
This action is sent via the PULSE system and is 
usually sent to the investigating garda.
The percentage of PULSE incidents that needed 
further action after creation is outlined in Chart 4.2.
chart 4.1
pULse incident records Created by all garda Divisions 
(January - october 2012)
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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In this sample period, 18% of the PULSE reports 
created by GISC call takers resulted in a requirement 
for additional action, whereas 34% of the PULSE 
incidents created by gardaí in divisions, required 
additional action. Chart 4.2 shows that in one 
division, 49% of the total PULSE records created 
required additional action. 
The requirement for further action fluctuates 
throughout the year but consistently, GISC operate 
at about 10% for further action and divisions are 
three times higher at 30%. This gap in quality 
generates a significant amount of additional and 
unnecessary work both for GISC and for gardaí. 
 recommendation 4.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána enforces the policy that all divisions 
achieve a minimum of a 95% compliance rate 
for using gisC to create pULse incidents. 
(short term).
timeliness in Creating pULse incidents 
It is extremely important that a crime is placed onto 
a crime recording system at the earliest opportunity, 
and by doing so, it provides an opportunity for a 
supervisor to check the report and to make sure that 
any necessary actions are taken at the time. There is 
a clear instruction to gardaí to record a crime or an 
incident on PULSE within the same tour of duty. 
The data in Chart 4.3 shows the compliance rates 
against that policy and includes four specific time 
frames. Firstly those incidents reported to the 
Garda Síochána that were created within twenty-
four	hours	(this	includes	crimes	created	in	the	next	
tour	of	duty,	which	are	outside	of	 the	policy).	The	
next three time periods show rising interval periods 
up to those incidents that were created at least one 
week after the report was made.
chart 4.2
entry by gisC and by Divisions 
pULse incidents requiring Further action (January-october 2012)
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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23
2  Data in chart refers to three week period 5 October 2012 to 25 
October	2012.	(Note	colour	code	Green	=	Completed	within	
24	hours.	Amber	=	Completed	outside	of	the	Garda	Directive.	
Red	=	Poor	compliance	with	the	Garda	Directive)
3	 Note:	Garda	data	does	not	provide	tour	of	duty.	It	can	only	
provide a 24 hour period.
chart 4.3
Difference Between pULse incident reported and Created times2 
difference 
between 
reported 
time and 
created 
time <=24 
hours3 
difference 
between 
reported 
time and 
created time 
>24 hrs and 
<=36hrs
difference 
between 
reported 
time and 
created 
time > 36 
hrs <=48 
hours
difference 
between 
reported 
time and 
created 
time > 48 
hrs <=1 
Week
difference between 
reported time and 
created time > 1 Week
division total 
Incidents 
created 
division
total 
Incidents 
created
total 
Incidents 
created
total 
Incidents 
created
total 
Incidents 
created
no 
Incidents 
created 
total 
Incidents 
created
cavan/Monaghan 1,234 78.8% 4.4% 1.2% 4.2% 141 11.4%
clare 1,327 80.2% 4.5% 0.6% 3.2% 152 11.5%
command and control, 
Harcourt Street, dMr
36 94.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2 5.6%
cork city 3,131 82.7% 3.6% 1.0% 4.3% 265 8.5%
cork north 2,204 83.0% 4.5% 1.0% 3.8% 169 7.7%
cork West 1,654 84.2% 4.0% 1.3% 4.2% 105 6.3%
dMr east 1,505 81.9% 3.0% 0.8% 2.7% 174 11.6%
dMr north 4,222 80.5% 3.7% 0.9% 4.6% 436 10.3%
dMr north central 3,144 79.4% 3.7% 1.3% 3.7% 372 11.8%
dMr South 2,571 75.7% 3.2% 0.7% 4.0% 421 16.4%
dMr South central 2,717 83.3% 3.0% 0.6% 4.4% 236 8.7%
dMr West 4,997 85.2% 2.6% 1.0% 2.8% 420 8.4%
donegal 1,532 80.9% 5.4% 0.6% 4.1% 139 9.1%
galway 2,212 80.6% 3.3% 0.6% 3.0% 276 12.5%
Kerry 1,550 82.3% 4.2% 1.5% 3.4% 134 8.6%
Kildare 1,779 81.7% 4.3% 1.7% 5.7% 118 6.6%
Kilkenny/carlow 1,334 83.4% 4.0% 1.4% 2.8% 112 8.4%
Laois/offaly 1,193 78.0% 3.5% 1.8% 3.7% 154 12.9%
Limerick 3,023 81.2% 4.5% 1.1% 3.7% 286 9.5%
Louth 1,916 83.4% 2.2% 0.2% 4.2% 191 10.0%
Mayo 1,233 74.9% 2.9% 1.3% 3.8% 211 17.1%
Meath 1,533 84.6% 2.7% 0.5% 4.3% 121 7.9%
not assigned division 81 81.5% 1.2% 1.2% 6.2% 8 9.9%
roscommon/ Longford 1,137 83.0% 3.3% 1.3% 3.2% 105 9.2%
Sligo/Leitrim 1,091 84.1% 6.0% 1.0% 3.8% 55 5.0%
tipperary 1,943 83.3% 4.3% 1.9% 3.6% 135 6.9%
Waterford 1,978 83.2% 4.5% 1.7% 2.0% 170 8.6%
Westmeath 1,448 85.4% 2.3% 0.8% 2.6% 127 8.8%
Wexford 1,580 87.8% 2.5% 1.3% 2.2% 98 6.2%
Wicklow 1,448 81.4% 2.8% 1.4% 3.9% 153 10.6%
 total 56,753 82.0% 3.5% 1.1% 3.7% 5486 9.7%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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There are significant numbers of PULSE crimes and 
incidents in the chart that are created at various 
intervals after the 24 hour period. The divisions 
that are highlighted in green show those who are 
performing better than their peers and those in 
red highlight divisions with the lowest compliance 
rates. 
A crime incident should be recorded immediately 
and at least before the end of a member’s duty. Some 
of the crimes shown that were created within 24 
hours are still outside of the Garda Directive as the 
reports were not completed within a tour of duty.
The Inspectorate accepts that the failure to create 
a PULSE incident does not necessarily mean in all 
cases	 that	a	crime	was	not	 investigated.	However,	
the non-recording of crimes affects the accuracy of 
the data and the ability of a supervisor to check that 
all actions were correctly completed. 
Any report created after a tour of duty has finished 
is of interest to the Inspectorate. In this period, 18% 
of all incidents were recorded on PULSE at least 
24 hours after the crime was reported by a victim. 
The Inspectorate particularly noted PULSE reports 
that were created at least one week later. During 
the	three	week	period,	5,486	(and	9.7%	of	the	total)	
reports were created at least one week after the 
crime or incident was first notified to the Garda 
Síochána. 
analysis of Crime Categories submitted 
Using the same PULSE data as in the previous 
chart, Chart 4.4 outlines a number of incident types 
for PULSE records that were recorded at least one 
week after the crime was first notified to the Garda 
Síochána.
chart 4.4
pULse incidents recorded greater than 
1 Week after reporting to the garda 
síochána
PULSe Incident type number of 
incidents 
recorded
affray/riot/Violent disorder 4
assault causing Harm 29
assault Minor 138
assault/obstruction/resist arrest 4
attention and complaints 255
Breach of Bail 297
Burglary 27
criminal Law- Sexual offences act 5
Formal notification to/from the HSe 169
general road offences 1,579
Harassment 16
Insurance 494
Mat checkpoint 116
Murder- threats 5
Possession of drugs for Sale/Supply 34
Possession of Firearms 6
rape of a Female 10
robbery 4
Sexual assault 59
Simple Possession 25
theft (all types) 319
traffic collision damage only 184
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
Chart 4.4 shows that a number of serious crimes, 
such as rape, burglary and robbery, were recorded 
at least one week after the crimes were reported to 
gardaí. 
Within	 the	 greater	 than	 one	week	 time	 period	 in	
this analysis, the Inspectorate found the following 
examples of late PULSE records that were created:
•	 67	days	for	a	notification	report	to	the	HSE;
•	 80	days	to	create	a	crime	of	“theft	person”;
•	 91	days	to	create	a	crime	of	“theft	other”;
•	 131	days	to	create	a	crime	of	harassment;	
•	 160	days	to	create	a	crime	of	assault.
Any delay in recording a crime outside of the Garda 
Síochána policy should be a concern, particularly 
the late recording of crimes such as assaults, sexual 
assaults, robberies and burglaries. 
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timeliness of Completing pULse incidents 
sampling of pULse incidents by the 
inspectorate
During examination of PULSE incident records, 
the Inspectorate found a significant number of 
examples where victims had reported crimes, 
but the PULSE reports were not created during 
that member’s tour of duty. Sometimes the report 
was created on the next day that the member was 
working and on some occasions this stretched to 
weeks and even months later. 
The Inspectorate identified events that appeared to 
coincide with the late recording of a crime incident. 
These	 included	 the	 later	 arrest	 of	 a	 suspect(s),	
which opened up the potential to solve a crime or 
where a further incident took place involving the 
same victim or the same location. In these cases, it 
resulted in the completion of two PULSE reports; 
one for the most recent crime and one for a crime 
that	 occurred	 some	 time	 earlier.	When	 creating	 a	
PULSE incident, various dates are recorded; such 
as the date of the crime, the date that it is reported 
by the victim and the date that it was created on 
PULSE.	 Where	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	 that	 an	
incident record was created at a much later date, 
there was no explanation noted on PULSE for the 
late recording. GISC informed the Inspectorate that 
it is not as part of their role to ask gardaí the reason 
for the delay when contacting GISC to report a 
crime at a much later date.
The following are examples of PULSE incidents 
viewed by the Inspectorate, where crimes were 
recorded much later and after an event that 
appeared to coincide with the recording of the 
initial crime: 
•	 A	burglary	took	place	at	a	church	and	was	
reported to the gardaí. The crime record for 
this burglary was created five weeks after it 
was first reported and after a second crime 
had occurred in the same church. Suspects 
were identified for both cases.
•	 A	case	of	assault	arising	from	a	feud	between	
parties known to each other was reported to 
the gardaí in June 2012. It was not recorded 
as	 a	 crime	 until	 November	 2012,	 after	 a	
second incident between the same parties 
had occurred.
•	 A	 case	 of	 assault	 reported	 to	 the	 gardaí	 in	
June	2012	was	created	in	November	2012	and	
a caution was given to the offender. 
These are not isolated examples and are supported 
by data analysed by the Inspectorate, which 
highlight cases where crimes are recorded when a 
second incident or event follows a late recording of 
the first crime. In the absence of a further incident, 
it is unknown if these crimes would have been 
recorded. Building on from the analysis by GISC of 
late recordings, the Inspectorate applied this to the 
PULSE sampling of specific crime categories. The 
following PULSE data is from a sample period of 
June 2012 for the seven divisions visited. 
Chart 4.5 provides a breakdown by crime types and 
the percentage of reports created after gardaí had 
finished their tour of duty. 
chart 4.5
pULse sampling – Date of Creation
June 2012
crime type Incident record 
created after 
Member’s tour of 
duty
assaults 16%
attention and complaints 14%
Burglary 2%
criminal damage 16%
Harassment 21%
Indecency 14%
Interfering Mechanism 13%
Menacing calls 7% 
Property Lost 12%
robbery Person 4%
theft from the Person 10%
theft other 20%
trespass 7%
average total 14%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records 
by the Garda Inspectorate
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This data shows that an average of 14% of the 
crimes sampled and other PULSE incidents, such 
as Attention and Complaints, were not recorded 
within an officer’s tour of duty. For particular 
crimes, such as theft other, over 20% of the reports 
were completed outside of the times set in the 
Garda	Síochána	HQ	Directive.	The	analysis	shows	
that for offences of robbery and burglary, the 
percentage completed after a tour of duty is lower 
than the other crime categories. 
The late recording of crime by the Garda Síochána 
was a major issue identified in the Inspectorate’s 
report on Child Sexual Abuse.4 At that time, a 
large percentage of crimes were not recorded or 
were recorded at a much later date. Late recording 
of crime remains an issue across a whole host of 
different crime categories, including sexual assault. 
This practice is not isolated to any one division and 
is an area that needs to be urgently addressed.
 recommendation 4.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána enforces compliance with the 
policy that all pULse crime incidents are 
recorded as soon as possible and in any case 
within a tour of duty. (short term).
4.4 Crime and Incident 
Classification 
Every incident recorded on PULSE needs to 
be categorised into a particular incident type. 
This process is called crime classification. It is 
particularly important to ensure that crimes are 
correctly classified in the right category at the 
outset. An incorrect decision made at this time will 
have a negative impact on any crime investigation 
that may commence. 
In other police services, great care is taken in 
the classification process to get it right the first 
time. In the UK, once the classification of a crime 
is confirmed, it will ultimately determine what 
happens next to that crime report and who will 
investigate it. This differs from Ireland, as the 
member who is agreeing the classification will 
most probably investigate the crime. The success 
4 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Responding to 
Child	Sexual	Abuse,	November	2010.
or failure of many international services is often 
based on their performance in the areas of burglary, 
robbery,	assaults	(including	domestic	violence)	and	
car crimes. In other policing jurisdictions, these 
particular crime types are scrutinised to make sure 
that the right crime category is recorded. 
When	 a	 PULSE	 incident	 is	 created,	 a	 member	
should contact GISC, describe the circumstances of 
an incident to the GISC call taker and usually the 
member will identify the category of the incident 
dealt with. The call taker creates the incident under 
the appropriate category and defines the incident 
type. An incident category can be an assault, but 
with a category there are usually a number of 
different levels or types of that offence. For example, 
assault categories include assault causing harm 
(serious	injury	up	to	the	point	of	a	substantial	risk	
of	death)	or	an	assault	minor	(a	less	serious	assault).	
The call taker’s assessment is primarily based on 
the information that the member has provided. 
Generally, the feedback on this process, from both 
call takers and members, was extremely positive 
and in many cases there is agreement about what 
crime has taken place. If the call taker does not 
agree with the views of the garda, they should and 
often do point out the reasons why and advise the 
member accordingly. In the current garda system, 
call takers are in an advisory role and the member 
is	the	final	decision	maker	in	this	process.	When	a	
call taker is concerned that a wrong crime category 
is chosen, a note can be placed on the PULSE record 
highlighting concerns to a GISC supervisor.
Sometimes the classification of a crime is very 
straightforward, e.g. theft from a shop or stealing 
from	a	car.	However,	there	are	some	crime	categories	
that require a good understanding of the definition 
of a crime and what components need to be present 
for that crime to be committed. Examples of this 
include burglary and robbery offences, where 
certain conditions need to exist for an offence to have 
been committed. The definitions are long standing 
in Ireland for these and other traditional offences. 
From sampling PULSE incidents and from visiting 
GISC, the Inspectorate found that call takers have 
developed good knowledge of the components of 
the main crime categories. The Garda Síochána 
previously developed aide memoires/definitions 
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that are available for members and for GISC 
call takers to refer to these when making their 
recommendation on a classification.
During focus groups with call takers, certain 
categories of incidents were identified where the 
call takers believe that the wrong classification is 
regularly selected by a garda at the time that an 
incident is first created. Examples include:
•	 Burglaries	incorrectly	classified	as	criminal	
damage or theft other; 
•	 Attempted	 burglaries	 incorrectly	 classified	
as criminal damage or trespass;
•	 Crimes,	 including	 assaults	 incorrectly	
classified in non-crime categories;
•	 Burglaries	in	garages,	outhouses	or	holiday	
homes are not always classified as burglaries.
The incorrect classification of crime in these 
categories was also raised by a number of other 
sources and provided a platform for the dip 
sampling of PULSE incidents that will follow later 
in this part of the report.
Throughout the data analysis, the Inspectorate 
found inconsistencies with the approach taken by 
some call takers when faced with a crime, where 
the information on PULSE clearly indicated that 
the crime was in the wrong category. On most 
occasions, the call taker made a comment on 
PULSE about concerns over the category shown 
for the crime and referred the matter to a GISC 
supervisor.	However,	the	Inspectorate	found	crimes	
clearly in the wrong category and there was no 
comment on PULSE to that effect made by the call 
taker. This can be a training need for an individual 
call taker in respect of crime definitions or a 
reminder to draw such incidents to the attention of 
a supervisor. The consistency of call takers in their 
approach to incorrect crime classification is an area 
that could be improved.
pULse incident narratives 
Each PULSE incident has a free text section 
called the narrative, which is used to record the 
specific details about a crime or an incident. Any 
information can be entered here, but when a record 
is created the details provided in the narrative field 
by the garda to the call taker at GISC effectively 
determines what the classification will be. The 
narrative	 has	 limited	 availability	 of	 space	 (3,000	
characters	 with	 each	 space	 as	 a	 character)	 and	
whilst it is currently clearly too limited to record 
the details of major investigations, it does provide 
an opportunity for recording more accurate details 
about most incidents. Analysis of the PULSE 
records sampled by the Inspectorate showed that 
on average only 10% - 15% of the available PULSE 
narrative space is currently used. 
Prior to examining PULSE records for this 
inspection, the Inspectorate was frequently told 
by senior gardaí that the narrative was used to 
record the initial investigation at a crime scene and 
for recording updates. This would include crime 
scene forensic results, the arrest of suspects and 
victim updates. During the examination of PULSE 
records, the Inspectorate found very little evidence 
to support those statements. Most PULSE records 
have very little information about the investigation 
that was conducted at the scene and a significant 
percentage of the PULSE narratives viewed in 2013 
had not changed in the twelve months since first 
created.
Quality of narratives
The general quality of narratives on PULSE was 
poor.	 Narrative	 often	 lacked	 details	 about	 the	
crime and in many cases the narrative did not 
explain how the crime had actually occurred. The 
narratives in assault cases were particularly poor 
and on occasions the description of the crime for an 
assault could be as little as “male assaulted”. Often 
there were no details about what the gardaí did at 
the crime scene e.g. seeking witnesses or looking 
for secure CCTV footage. The narrative often had 
very poor descriptions of suspects. In many cases, 
the limited detail in the narrative made it very 
difficult to quality assure if the crime was correctly 
classified and if the investigation at the crime scene 
was completed to a good standard. Although some 
narratives were well completed with good detail 
to inform a timely investigation, this was not the 
norm.
The creation of PULSE reports and the narrative is a 
collaboration between the call taker and the member 
that contacts GISC. The Inspectorate believes 
that this is an area for immediate improvement. 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 4: Incident Recording
Part 4  |  13
Many police services provide drop-down menus 
or written prompts to those who are creating 
incidents and this approach may well help call 
takers to gather more information from a member. 
For example, a description of injuries and how they 
were sustained would be a basic requirement in an 
assault case. A good description of the construction 
of a building is also important in property crimes to 
establish if a burglary offence was committed. Such 
prompts could also be used to help a garda who is 
still at a crime scene. A better quality report at this 
stage will greatly reduce the current waste of time 
and effort that follows a poor recording of a crime. 
 recommendation 4.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána creates drop-down menus or 
other prompts to assist gisC call takers in 
obtaining appropriate investigative details to 
ensure the right crime classification is created 
at the time of the initial call from a garda. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	 quality	 assurance	 processes,	
inclusive of supervisory review, to ensure 
that crimes are correctly recorded. 
In crime investigation systems in other police 
services, there is significantly more narrative space 
and the crime records are very comprehensive. 
In effect, all the details of the investigation are 
recorded and each entry is timed, dated and 
identifies the person making/updating the record. 
Denmark has a similar crime system to Ireland 
(POLSA),	 also	 with	 limited	 narrative	 space,	 but	
without many of the issues that the Inspectorate 
found. The main difference between Ireland and 
Denmark is the focus in Denmark on getting that 
initial classification right. A crime classification 
is rarely changed in Denmark from one crime to 
another, but as shown later in this report, the Garda 
Síochána changes significant numbers of initial 
classifications. The Inspectorate believes that the 
Garda Síochána should make much better use of the 
available narrative space on PULSE, both in terms 
of initial actions at a crime scene and any additional 
investigation actions that take place. 
the inspectorate believes that this is an area that 
should be immediately improved and guidelines 
need to be provided to gardaí about what should 
and what should not be included in the narrative.
The Inspectorate identified that whilst the narrative 
on PULSE cannot be deleted from the system, 
it can be altered and changed from the view of a 
live PULSE record. Viewing any such changes to 
narrative or other parts of a PULSE record requires 
a higher access level to PULSE and a search of the 
history of the PULSE record. On checking a live 
PULSE record, any such previous changes would 
not	 be	 obvious	 to	 the	 person	 viewing	 it.	 Higher	
level users can view the narrative changes that 
have taken place, but even then, it is not always 
possible to see who changed the narrative, and why 
and when it was changed. To view these changes, 
a further specialist search has to be conducted to 
determine when and what changes were made. A 
PULSE record effectively has a number of screens 
and for each significant change, such as a change to 
the narrative, a new screen is created. The previous 
screen is not deleted, but the details are not evident 
on the most current screen available to a viewer. 
Even if a PULSE incident is printed, it will not show 
any changes in text. 
During all of the visits to other policing services, 
the Inspectorate did not find any other crime 
system that allowed such changes to be made to it. 
This report will also highlight a number of other 
areas where PULSE can be changed without it being 
obvious to someone viewing that record.
Changing narratives 
The following are examples of PULSE records 
viewed by the Inspectorate where the original 
narrative that was entered when the PULSE record 
was created, had changed at some later point. In 
these cases the removal of words or sentences 
from the PULSE narrative was accompanied by 
an incorrect reclassification of a crime and on all 
occasions the original crime category moved to a 
less serious offence.
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Examples of narrative that was changed include:
	•	 An	 indecent	 assault,	where	 the	 descriptive	
words of the indecency were removed and 
the classification of the crime was changed 
to a minor crime and a non-sexual assault; 
•	 A	 criminal	 damage	 offence,	 where	 the	
narrative “back door of house forced, no 
entry gained” was removed. The crime was 
an attempted burglary and not a criminal 
damage;
•	 A	crime	recorded	on	PULSE	as	a	stolen	car,	
had the words “car taken overnight, keys 
taken from table beside front door” removed 
from the narrative. In essence, this was both 
a burglary and a car crime, but the removal 
of the words would lead a viewer to believe 
that only a car crime was committed;
•	 A	crime	of	theft	other	committed	in	a	yard,	
where the word “bus” was removed from 
the narrative. The correct classification 
for this crime, on the basis of the original 
narrative, was a theft from a motor vehicle 
and not a theft from a yard.
The changes to the narrative in these four examples 
were coupled with a classification into a less serious 
crime. There was no explanation in the PULSE 
narrative as to why the text was changed or why 
the crime category was changed. 
in the absence of any clear rationale as to why 
the narrative was changed, it left the inspectorate 
with the view that this was an action to reduce 
it to a less serious category. this omission of a 
rationale undermines the integrity of the data on 
the pULse system. 
During the inspection, members informed the 
Inspectorate that data can be changed on PULSE 
in other areas and for other purposes. For example, 
whilst a court conviction on PULSE could not be 
deleted, the sentence or other outcome of the case 
can be changed. 
Garda PULSE records can be changed by altering 
the spelling of a person’s name or a person’s date 
of birth. Many reasons for changing data were 
offered, including that PULSE intelligence records 
cannot be deleted but can be changed to remove the 
association of that intelligence from an individual. 
Specific examples were provided when young 
people are stopped and searched under the Misuse 
of Drugs Act. The association of a young person 
stopped by a drug unit, albeit if no drugs were 
found, will remain on garda records. This can have 
serious connotations for the person’s records on the 
PULSE system. 
Certain crimes, such as sexual offences, have 
restricted PULSE access to prevent unnecessary 
and inappropriate viewing of sensitive and serious 
investigations. If at a later stage, it transpires that 
the crime did not actually occur or is reclassified 
away from a sexual assault, it opens the PULSE 
incident for viewing by a wider audience. The 
Inspectorate viewed a sample of such cases and 
found that gardaí had changed the original narrative 
and removed any words or descriptions that refer 
to a sexual assault. This is not good practice, as the 
original details of any crime investigation should 
always be preserved.
Somewhat less serious, but inadvisable, is where 
members sometimes alter a narrative to include 
information omitted from the original PULSE text. 
This further highlights the current vulnerability of 
the PULSE system. 
The alteration of PULSE data is a matter of 
great importance. A PULSE record is subject to 
disclosure in court cases and changing records 
could undermine the integrity of a criminal 
prosecution. The Guerin Report also highlighted 
many cases where original PULSE narratives were 
later changed and the new version of PULSE and 
its narrative were in complete contradiction to the 
original record. 
The practice and facility to change the PULSE 
narrative or any other information on a PULSE 
record	must	stop	immediately.	Where	a	mistake	has	
been made, an entry highlighting the error should 
be added to explain any factual inaccuracies. 
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 recommendation 4.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána immediately establishes policy 
that prohibits the changing of narratives 
and any other records on the pULse system. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 an	 IT	 solution	 to	 prevent	 the	
ability to change original narratives or 
other records on the PULSE system;
•	 Create	 PULSE	 tabs	 for	 all	 PULSE	 record	
changes, including updates, which include 
the name of the member making the 
changes, and the time and date that changes 
were made.
 recommendation 4.11 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána takes action to improve the quality 
of the pULse narratives. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Explore	 opportunities	 to	 increase	 the	
narrative character field in the PULSE 
system; 
•	 Improve	 narrative	 recording	 through	
development of clear guidelines and 
minimum information requirements for 
narratives and other records generated in 
the PULSE system;
•	 Improve	the	quality	of	PULSE	records	with	
timely incident recording and updates on 
crime investigations; 
•	 Ensure	that	any	updates	to	a	PULSE	incident	
record clearly articulate what updates 
occurred and why.
 recommendation 4.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána audits pULse to determine 
the level and scope of change of pULse 
information records after their initial creation. 
(medium term).
 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following needs to be audited:
•	 Changes	to	any	of	the	following	fields	after	
initial entry:
o PULSE narrative;
o	 Individual	intelligence	records	(fields	to	
include name, date of birth and vehicle 
registration	numbers);
o Court sentences;
o	 Warrants;	
o Specific crime types or incidents types 
where changes are more prevalent, such 
as the volume crime offences identified 
in this report.
•	 Staff	who	have	repeated	actions	of	changing	
PULSE information records.
4.5 Supervision of PULSE Data 
and Incidents
Throughout all the sampling of PULSE incidents, 
the Inspectorate found limited evidence of 
supervision of initial crime investigations. Many 
front-line supervisors believe that GISC is checking 
PULSE incidents and therefore not routinely going 
onto PULSE to check records created. GISC have a 
clear responsibility to ensure that data is recorded 
accurately and provide advice on the category for a 
crime classification. They do not, and it is clearly not 
their responsibility, to supervise the initial action 
taken by a member at an incident. Also, by the time 
that many gardaí contact GISC, members have left 
the crime scene and are back at their station. It 
appears that with the introduction of GISC, many 
supervisors have abdicated their responsibility for 
checking PULSE incidents to GISC. 
The Inspectorate believes that there should be a 
mandatory field on PULSE that requires front-line 
supervisors to record that they have checked and 
approved the initial PULSE report. This action 
should be completed before a member finishes 
their tour of duty. The Inspectorate is concerned 
that there appears to be an absence of supervision 
at the end of a tour of duty, to ensure that crimes 
reported during that day and recorded in members 
note books are entered onto the PULSE system. 
Some sergeants said that you have to trust people 
and that checking note books could be seen to 
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be overbearing conduct. The Inspectorate does 
not	 accept	 this	 view.	Notebooks	 are	 not	 routinely	
checked by supervisors to make sure that incidents 
contained therein are actually recorded properly on 
PULSE. This issue was raised in the Inspectorate’s 
Front-Line Supervision report, published in 
April 2012. 
With	regard	to	improving	supervision,	new	Garda	
Síochána	 HQ	 Directives	 for	 staff	 were	 issued	
in July and September 2013 respectively. These 
directives outline the various responsibilities for 
supervising PULSE incidents, e.g. that sergeants 
should	thoroughly	check	all	incidents.	Whilst	these	
directives rightly highlight many of the issues that 
the Inspectorate found in the inspection, there needs 
to be a robust system of checking to make sure that 
any such instructions are actually complied with.
 recommendation 4.13 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops and circulates policy 
clearly defining the roles and responsibilities 
of gisC and front-line supervisors in respect 
of classification of crimes and supervision of 
the initial investigation of a crime or other 
incident. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key area needs to be addressed:
•	 A	PULSE	record	must	contain	a	mandatory	
supervisory approval/review field to 
capture supervision and review of the 
PULSE records by front-line supervisors.5
Written reports on pULse incidents
Once a PULSE incident is created, much of the crime 
investigation is subsequently recorded in paper 
based	systems.	Whilst	this	will	be	fully	explored	in	
Part 6 of this report, it is worth noting at this point 
that the Inspectorate found unnecessary duplication 
at the stage of completing the initial PULSE entry. 
Members who created PULSE incidents are often 
required by supervisors to write a short factual 
report about the incident that is forwarded to the 
district officer. This is not part of the investigation 
into the crime and the report invariably contains 
the same or slightly more detailed information 
5 The Garda Síochána has recently introduced a new 
supervisory tab for sergeants to monitor crime investigation. 
than contained in the PULSE report. The member’s 
sergeant usually attaches a short memo or note to 
accompany the report from the garda. If a more 
detailed PULSE report was created in the first 
place, it would negate the need for additional paper 
reports to be completed and circulated. A more 
comprehensive PULSE incident would also make 
it far easier for sergeants and other supervisors to 
check a PULSE incident and know immediately 
what has happened at a crime scene. The cost and 
time of this daily occurrence of extra reports is a 
waste of valuable resources.
 recommendation 4.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána directs that all information and 
updates regarding criminal investigations 
are recorded on pULse rather than on paper 
memoranda. (short term). 
restricting access to pULse
Throughout this inspection, many members raised 
concerns about privacy issues on PULSE records 
and information that members withhold from 
entering on PULSE, as there are concerns about 
inappropriate viewing of PULSE records. Other 
international police services have a facility to 
restrict crime reports that are sensitive, that may 
involve a member of staff, or is a crime that is likely 
to attract lots of public interest. The Inspectorate 
believes that PULSE should have restricted viewing 
access to certain records.
 recommendation 4.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána institutes security standards for the 
access and review of pULse records, using an 
it security solution, such as levels of access 
rights, to prevent unauthorised and unofficial 
access to pULse records. (medium term).
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4.6 Classification of Crime and 
Other Incidents - Sampling 
As previously explained classification is the 
process of placing an incident or a crime into a 
PULSE category. This is usually conducted through 
GISC, but as was previously shown, gardaí often 
create their own PULSE records. 
To assess the accuracy of the initial classification 
of incidents, in 2013 the Inspectorate conducted a 
sampling process of 500 PULSE records created in 
June 2012. This process involved the Inspectorate 
attending	 Garda	 Headquarters	 and	 viewing	 live	
PULSE records. 
The sampling predominately focused on the seven 
divisions that were subject to the inspection and 
concentrated on the crime categories of assault, 
burglary, domestic violence, robbery and vehicle 
crime.	Where	 the	 sample	 sizes	 in	 some	categories	
were small, the Inspectorate expanded searches by 
time-frames or on occasions on a national basis. 
With	 regard	 to	 the	 initial	 classification	 of	 an	
incident, the Inspectorate selected nine crime 
categories and two non-crime incident categories 
for analysis. The crime and non-crime categories 
were selected on the basis of information received 
during field visits that crimes are sometimes 
incorrectly classified into less serious crime types 
or recorded as non-crime incidents. 
Crime Categories 
For all of the crime categories listed in Chart 4.6, 
there is a more serious category connected to that 
crime type. For example, with assault minor there 
is a more serious assault category called assault 
harm and for theft, criminal damage and trespass, 
the crime category of burglary is a more serious 
offence. 
The results shown in the chart are grouped into 
three categories: 
•	 Where	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	 the	
classification decision to be correct;
•	 Where	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	 the	
classification decision to be incorrect;
•	 Where	 there	 were	 insufficient	 details	 to	
determine if the classification decision was 
correct or not in making a decision about the 
accuracy of a classification.
The Inspectorate viewed the available details 
contained on PULSE and made a decision on that 
basis. 
The PULSE search demonstrated in Chart 4.6 was 
focused on crimes within the 500 PULSE incidents 
sampled that were classified in the selected 
categories and where crimes were not later changed 
to another category. In effect, where a crime was 
classified as criminal damage in June 2012, it was 
still classified in that crime category 12 months 
later. 
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In respect of the above, the Inspectorate found that 
across all categories 54% of classification decisions 
were correct, 30% of classifications were incorrect 
and 16% had insufficient information to determine 
if the classification was correct. 
Classification – Key Findings 
As Chart 4.6 shows, the Inspectorate found 
significant percentages of crimes that, on the basis 
of the PULSE record, were incorrectly classified.
The following table breaks down the findings 
into the crime categories and highlights the issues 
found: 
chart 4.6
initial Crime Classification 
incidents for selected Divisions  
(period of sample June 2012)
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
18% 42% 40%
28% 18% 54%
25% 8% 67%
27% 20% 53%
28% 15% 57%
39% 16% 45%
67% 4% 29%
21% 79%
14% 86%
Trespass in a
Yard or Curtiliage
Theft other
Theft from person
Menacing phone calls
Interfering with mechanism
of a motor vehicle
Indecency
Harrassment
Criminal Damage
Assault Minor Incorrect
Insufficient Information
Correct
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crime type Findings 
assault Minor •	 Injuries	for	an	assault	minor	would	include	bruising	and	minor	cuts.	In	this	
sample, the Inspectorate found crimes where victims suffered broken fingers and 
broken teeth and were clearly more serious assaults with harm.
•	 In	42	%	of	the	cases	there	was	insufficient	detail	to	determine	what	the	assault	
was e.g. a crime was shown as “victim assaulted with a golf club”. 
criminal damage  
(not by fire)
•	 A	large	percentage	of	crimes	appear	to	be	wrongly	classified.	The	majority	should	
be recorded as burglary or attempted burglary. In one case, the narrative in a 
crime	stated	“patio	door	smashed	with	shovel	and	jewellery	taken”.	
•	 A	large	percentage	of	the	crimes	had	insufficient	details	to	determine	if	the	
classification was correct e.g. “vacant house rear window broken”. In the case 
of a broken window it would be useful to know if the damage is near a lock or a 
point of entry. If so, this is usually a good indicator of someone trying to break in. 
•	 In	10%	of	the	cases	reported	to	them,	GISC	suggested	a	more	serious	offence	was	
committed.
•	 Additional	crimes	were	referred	to	in	the	narrative	of	some	cases,	but	were	not	
recorded as crimes on PULSe.
Harassment •	 79%	were	correctly	recorded.	
•	 21%	of	the	offences	suggested	a	more	serious	crime	was	committed.	
Indecency •	 Most	offences	were	correctly	classified.
Interfering with a 
Mechanism of a Motor 
Vehicle (traffic offence)
•	 A	significant	percentage	of	the	crimes	suggested	a	more	serious	offence	such	
as criminal damage. Most of the offences involved damage to car doors and car 
windows with no suggestion that anyone was interfering with the mechanism 
of the vehicle. examples included “attempted to steal diesel”, and “back window 
smashed”.
•	 No	review/clarifications	were	raised	by	GISC.
Menacing Phone calls •	 A	large	percentage	appeared	to	be	more	serious	offences	e.g.	a	suspect	
threatening serious violence and another threatening to burn down a house.
•	 Again	a	large	percentage	had	insufficient	details	to	determine	if	the	classification	
was correct. In one case, the narrative for an offence said “number of calls made”, 
but there were no details of how many calls were made, over what period of time 
and why the calls were perceived as menacing.
theft from Person •	 Almost	a	third	of	the	crimes	suggested	a	more	serious	crime	of	robbery	was	
committed. 
•	 Examples	included	a	victim	knocked	to	the	ground	and	a	handbag	pulled	off	their	
shoulder, and an elderly victim pushed to the ground causing them to bang their 
head. Where force is used or threatened or a person is put in fear of force being 
used, the correct classification is robbery.
•	 Four	cases	suggested	a	less	serious	crime	was	committed.	
•	 In	15%	of	the	cases,	the	narrative	was	lacking	in	detail	or	conflicting	information	
was shown. 
theft other •	 A	large	percentage	of	cases	suggest	a	more	serious	crime	such	as	burglary.	
examples include “copper tank stolen from derelict house” and “handbag stolen 
through letterbox”. 
•	 16%	of	cases	had	insufficient	details	about	the	structure	of	the	building	and	
whether it was permanent or not. 
•	 GISC	sent	reviews	in	20%	of	cases	questioning	if	the	classification	should	be	for	a	
more serious crime. Most of the reviews did not receive a response and were still 
outstanding over twelve months later.
trespassing •	 25%	of	the	crimes	suggested	that	a	more	serious	category,	such	as	burglary	or	
attempted burglary was committed. examples include “2 culprits forced bedroom 
window and attempted entry”.
•	 One	offence	was	recorded	on	two	PULSE	records	and	it	resulted	in	two	crimes	for	
the one offence. 
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examples of other incorrect Classification
In April 2013, the Inspectorate spoke to a family 
member of a young man seriously assaulted some 
months earlier. During this assault, the victim 
sustained serious head and facial injuries. On checking 
PULSE, the Inspectorate found that this crime was 
recorded as an assault minor. The knowledge of this 
crime, gained from the family member, is the only 
way that the Inspectorate knew that this was clearly 
a very serious assault. The analysis of classification 
shows that this is not an isolated case and that many 
other serious assaults are incorrectly classified.
In the Volume Crime Case Reviews, the Inspectorate 
found a case in April 2012 where a young person 
was head butted in the face, receiving two black 
eyes and a cut to their face. This was incorrectly 
recorded as an assault minor. The case’s papers, 
including statements, refer to the commission of a 
more serious assault.
the inspectorate found that pULse records did 
not always reflect the gravity of the crime that 
was actually committed. in the overwhelming 
number of cases in this sample, the crimes that 
were wrongly classified were placed into a less 
serious crime category. 
4.7	Initial	Classification	of 
Non-Crime	Incidents	-	Sampling	
The second part of the sample of over 500 PULSE 
records looked at incidents that were classified as 
non-crime incidents. These were categories that 
were brought to the attention of the Inspectorate as 
categories where crimes are sometimes incorrectly 
placed.
Classification – Key Findings 
As	 Chart	 4.7	 shows,	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	
significant percentages of crimes that, on the basis 
of the PULSE record, were incorrectly classified in 
a non-crime category. The following table breaks 
down the findings into the categories and highlights 
the issues found.
chart 4.7
initial incident Classification 
incidents for selected Divisions 
(period of sample June 2012)6 
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate
Incorrect
Insufficient Information
Correct
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
6% 94%
16% 12% 72%
Attention & 
Complaints
Property Lost
6
6	 Total	number	of	incidents	identified	for	sampling	=	Attention	
and	Complaints	3,381	and	Property	Lost	799.
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attention and Complaints and property 
Lost analysis
In	 2012,	 167,347	 Attention	 and	 Complaints	 and	
38,880 Property Lost PULSE records were created.
Chart 4.8 shows the numbers of these types of 
incidents that are created each year across the 
seven divisions visited.
Chart 4.8 shows that on average across Ireland, 
divisions are creating just under 6,000 Attention 
and Complaints, and just under 1,400 Property Lost 
incidents per division per year. 
Whilst	 Limerick	 appeared	 to	 be	 particularly	
high in Chart 4.8 for actual numbers of 
Attention and Complaints, Chart 4.9, on the 
next page, compares the number of those 
Attention and Complaints as a percentage of all 
PULSE incident records. Clearly this changes 
the picture about how the Attention and Complaints 
category is used, and places Limerick under the 
national average. This chart shows a large variation 
in the percentage of PULSE incidents that are 
classified as Attention and Complaints, with just 
over	12%	of	 incidents	 in	 the	DMR	North	and	24%	
in	Waterford.
Incident type Findings
attention and complaints •	 16%	of	the	incidents	suggest	that	a	crime	has	been	committed	and	examples	include	
incidents	with	information	such	as	wind	deflectors	stolen	from	a	car,	ex-partner	made	
threats to life and damage to a vehicle’s lock and door. 
•	 GISC	questioned	the	classification	of	the	incidents	that	appeared	to	be	crimes.
•	 In	12%	of	the	incidents	there	was	insufficient	evidence	to	determine	if	a	crime	was	
committed. 
throughout the inspection, the Inspectorate was informed about a number of 
unsatisfactory practices in the attention and complaints category such as:
•	 Assaults	are	often	wrongly	placed	into	this	category;
•	 Where	a	crime	has	taken	place,	but	a	victim	refuses	to	give	a	statement,	it	can	be	
recorded	in	Attention	and	Complaints;	
•	 Most	worrying,	that	cases	of	rape,	where	victims	have	consumed	alcohol,	can	be	
placed into this category, until a victim’s statement is obtained.
Property Lost •	 Most	of	the	incidents	appeared	to	be	correctly	classified.
•	 The	category	was	difficult	to	determine	as	the	narrative	was	often	very	brief.	
•	 6%	of	records	sampled	suggested	a	crime	had	taken	place	e.g.	the	theft	of	golf	clubs	
from	a	hotel.	GISC	questioned	the	classification	of	this	incident	in	July	2012,	but	it	
remained unanswered a year later.
chart 4.8
pULse records Created for attention and Complaints and property Lost 2012 
by the selected Divisions
Source: PULSE data for 2012 supplied by the Garda Síochána
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During the inspection visits, the Inspectorate 
discussed the issue of Attention and Complaints 
categorisation with supervisors, and it is clear that 
there is very little supervision of this category. The 
Inspectorate is concerned that crimes are incorrectly 
placed in Attention and Complaints, which 
indicates a lack of supervision and deficiencies in 
accurate crime management. 
The classification of a crime directly into a non-
crime category is an unacceptable practice and will 
impact on overall crime rates. In ‘Property Lost’, the 
Inspectorate identified that 6% of records suggested 
a crime had taken place. If that was applied to the 
numbers of property lost recorded per year, it could 
equate to over 2,000 offences per year that are not 
currently recorded as crimes. 
The CSO do not receive data on incidents that 
are categorised as non-crime incidents and 
most notably those categorised as Attention and 
Complaints and Property Lost. Following the 
sampling of data and other information received, 
the Inspectorate believes that the CSO should 
receive all PULSE incidents to ensure that all data 
is	checked	and	validated.	Within	 these	categories,	
the Inspectorate found a significant number of 
incidents that were clearly criminal offences and 
should be recorded as crimes.
The Inspectorate believes that Attention and 
Complaints and Lost Property are two categories 
that require urgent action, to ensure that crimes are 
not incorrectly classified into these categories. 
 recommendation 4.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the Central 
statistics office should receive all pULse 
record incident data including non-crime 
categories to facilitate analysis and reporting 
of crime statistics. (short term). 
chart 4.9
attention and Complaints records as a percentage of all pULse records 
for selected Divisions 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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volume Crime Case reviews – 158 Cases 
Classification of incidents
As highlighted in the previous part of this 
report, the Inspectorate tracked 158 calls from 
members of the public to the Garda Síochána 
across the seven divisions visited. 114 of those 
cases were recorded on PULSE, of which ninety 
were designated as a crime.
This section of the report will examine the 
classification of those incidents that were 
recorded on PULSE. 
Classification Decisions 
Chart 4.10 shows the number of calls recorded 
on PULSE, and the Inspectorate’s view on the 
percentage of those classifications that were 
correct or not.
chart 4.10
volume Crime Case reviews 
Classifications of Crime
total 
number 
of calls 
for Service 
recorded 
as a PULSe 
Incident
Incidents 
on PULSe 
correctly 
classified 
per garda 
Inspectorate
Incidents 
on PULSe 
Incorrectly 
classified 
per garda 
Inspectorate
Incidents 
with 
Insufficient 
Information 
to determine 
classification
114 62% 32% 6%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by 
the Garda Inspectorate
As	 outlined	 in	 Chart	 3.7,	 found	 in	 Part	 3	 of	 this	
report, 9% of the PULSE records were created at 
least twelve months after the Garda Síochána was 
first contacted. Of those late PULSE reports created 
in 2013, the Inspectorate viewed that 64% were 
incorrectly classified. 
Chart 4.11 looks at the crime types that were 
sampled and the different recording practices. 
general Findings
•	 Across	 all	 categories,	 the	 Inspectorate	
disagreed with large percentages of the 
classifications shown e.g. 62% of assaults 
and	37%	of	robberies;	
•	 Burglaries,	 robberies	 and	 car	 crime	 had	
much higher rates of correct classifications 
compared to assaults and domestic violence 
incidents.
With	 regards	 to	 classification	of	 those	 crimes	 that	
were recorded in the wrong category, all of the 
changes were to a less serious crime.
chart 4.11
volume Crime Case reviews
Conversion rate of Calls for service to recorded Crime incidents
crime type Incidents on PULSe correctly 
classified per garda 
Inspectorate
Incidents on PULSe 
incorrectly classified per 
garda Inspectorate
Incidents with insufficient 
information to determine 
classification
assault 38% 62% 0%
Burglary 72% 36% 2%
domestic Violence 56% 22% 22%
robbery 63% 37% 0%
Vehicle crime 80% 20% 0%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate
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Crime Classification Continued - Letter Box 
Burglaries
During field visits, the Inspectorate was advised 
about the incorrect classification of offences where 
a burglar removes property through a person’s 
letter box, also known as “letter box burglaries”. 
Like many other countries, Ireland has seen a 
growing trend in ‘letter box’ burglaries. In such 
cases, criminals are using a variety of instruments 
(fishing	 rods	 and	 poles)	 to	 push	 through	 letter	
boxes and pick up car keys, bags or other items that 
are left inside houses close to the letter box. A hand 
or an instrument inserted into a person’s property 
is sufficient for a burglary offence to be committed. 
Invariably, the removal of car keys often results in 
the taking of an occupier’s car. In such cases, two 
crimes	are	committed,	a	burglary	(the	more	serious	
offence)	and	a	car	crime,	both	of	which	should	be	
recorded	and	cased	(linked).
It was not easy to identify these crimes on PULSE. 
The search that was conducted on PULSE focused 
on the PULSE narrative and looked for crimes 
where the word ‘letter box’ was recorded.7 It was 
conducted for crimes that occurred between 
June and December 2012 and was run across all 
28 divisions. The search identified a total of 310 
crimes where ‘letter box’ was mentioned. Of those 
310 crimes, 89 crimes were correctly recorded as 
burglaries. Of the remaining PULSE incidents, the 
Inspectorate identified 100 crimes which could be 
linked to a letterbox burglary. Of those incidents, 
the Inspectorate examined a total of 42 PULSE 
incidents.
chart 4.12
pULse incidents – Letter Box survey 
results - June to December 2012 
number 
incidents 
available 
for 
Sampling
number 
Sampled
Incorrect 
classification
correct 
classification
100 42 97% 3%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records 
by the Garda Inspectorate
7	 The	 crime	 classification	 categories	 checked	 were	 criminal	
damage, interfering with the mechanism of a motor vehicle, 
theft other, trespass and unauthorised taking of a motor 
vehicle.
From the sampling results in Chart 4.12, the 
Inspectorate assessed that in the majority of cases, a 
burglary offence was actually committed. Examples 
of the PULSE incidents examined include:
•	 A	crime	classified	as	theft,	where	a	number	
of bunches of keys were stolen through a 
letter box. A detective supervisor recorded 
on PULSE that as no entry was gained, there 
is no burglary. 
•	 A	 crime	 classified	 as	 trespass,	 where	 the	
victim watched their keys being pulled 
through the letter box.
•	 A	crime	classified	as	theft,	where	the	victim	
grabbed a rod that was placed through their 
letter box and had lifted car keys from a 
table by the front door. 
In the majority of the cases examined, GISC 
questioned the classification of the crime, and 
suggested that burglary offences were the 
appropriate category.
These crimes should have been recorded as 
burglaries and this sample provides more evidence 
of crimes that are incorrectly classified into less 
serious crime categories. 
in part 3 of this report, the inspectorate identified 
crimes which were committed but were never 
recorded on pULse. this part of the report has 
identified the next stage, which are crimes and 
incidents that are recorded on pULse, but are 
classified in the wrong crime category or are 
classified in a non-crime category. adding the two 
elements together, highlights potential under-
recording of multiple crime types and particularly 
in the case of burglary offences. 
recording stop and searches on pULse 
“Stop and search” is a useful tool in tackling 
crime. Most jurisdictions have power to stop 
and search people who are suspected of being in 
possession of stolen property or articles with which 
to commit an offence. This is used particularly 
around investigations of suspected street robberies 
and burglaries. Currently in Ireland, there is no 
provision under stop and search powers to search 
people who may be in possession of stolen property. 
Consequently, this results in stop and searches 
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being conducted under the Misuse of Drugs Act 
legislation. There is a provision to allow searches 
on those who are suspected of carrying offensive 
weapons.  
The Inspectorate has received negative feedback 
from within the Garda Síochána at all ranks about 
the use of stop and search, and that in many cases 
the power under the Misuse of Drugs Act is used 
in	 the	 absence	 of	 other	powers.	When	 a	 search	 is	
conducted under this legislation in Ireland, and no 
drugs are found, it is still recorded on PULSE and 
classified as a search under the Drugs Act. Each 
division has a drugs unit and further inference is 
often drawn from searches conducted by drugs unit 
members. If someone is stopped by the gardaí, an 
inference might be drawn from the data recorded 
arising from a previous search. Clearly, a person 
not found with any stolen property or drugs should 
not be stigmatised or otherwise disadvantaged in 
the future. The Inspectorate is aware that the new 
Vetting Act will provide some safeguards for what 
is and what is not disclosed in the future. 
The Inspectorate tried to obtain stop and search 
data and the outcomes of those searches. Initially, 
the Inspectorate was informed that the data was 
unavailable in the format that was requested. 
The Inspectorate subsequently identified that 
data was available, but the recording of such 
data only commenced in June of 2013. The 
Inspectorate eventually received data on the 
numbers of searches conducted and in a thirteen 
month period from June 2013 to July 2014 a total of 
145,776	 searches	were	 conducted.	Due	 to	 the	 late	
receipt of the data, the Inspectorate did not have 
an opportunity to examine PULSE and local stop 
and search records. This is an activity that will be 
examined in a future inspection. 
4.8 Reviewing PULSE Incidents 
When	 GISC	 was	 established,	 the	 supervisory	
review function previously performed by sergeants 
was replaced with a quality review function 
carried out by GISC. Every incident that is created 
on PULSE should be formally reviewed by a GISC 
supervisor to ensure that the data is accurate, that 
the incident classification is appropriate and that 
there is compliance with crime counting rules. 
District sergeants also have responsibility for 
checking PULSE incidents as soon as practicable 
after creation, to ensure accuracy and that crimes 
are assigned to the correct category and incident 
type.
When	GISC	creates	a	new	incident,	it	automatically	
creates an action called ‘review required’. There 
are some occasions, such as when a member wants 
to charge a person and an immediate review is 
necessary to facilitate the charging process. In 
these circumstances, a sergeant or other authorised 
supervisor can conduct a review of the crime.
reviewers at gisC
At GISC, twenty-five people are currently 
deployed as PULSE incident reviewers. Most 
of the reviewers started as call takers and have 
developed a very good knowledge of the system. At 
present, reviewers are conducting between 16,000 
and	17,000	reviews	per	week.	Some	incidents	only	
require a cursory check of the incident, but other 
incidents, such as crimes, require a more detailed 
review and validation process. Once a reviewer is 
satisfied that the classification is correct and that 
no further actions are required, the incident is 
marked as reviewed. 
During meetings with GISC reviewers, a number of 
key issues were raised:
•	 Reviewers	rely	on	the	narrative	to	determine	
the nature of the crime, but it is often vague 
and unhelpful;
•	 Ultimately	 the	 district	 officer	 has	 the	 final	
say about a crime category even if questioned 
by GISC;
•	 Crimes	are	often	recorded	as	Attention	and	
Complaints; 
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•	 It	is	not	GISC’s	role	to	question	why	a	PULSE	
record is created at a much later date; 
•	 Gardaí	are	changing	PULSE	narratives,	but	
GISC reviewers can view these changes;
•	 Some	 crimes,	 such	 as	 burglaries	 and	
attempted burglaries are incorrectly 
changed to less serious crimes. 
Delays in Completing reviews
Once GISC has conducted a formal review, 
the incident can be recorded and action taken. 
GISC reviewers are allocated specific time 
periods for which reviews are required, e.g. 
to review September 2013 entries. At the time 
of drafting this report and due to the volume 
of reviews that are conducted, there was 
a backlog in review work. GISC reviewers 
were conducting reviews three to four weeks 
(47,000	 outstanding	 reviews)	 after	 the	 incident 
was created. 
As a consequence of the review backlog, the 
Inspectorate found that some incidents that should 
be reviewed by GISC had already been reviewed 
by a district supervisor. In these cases, a district 
supervisor had checked the incident and changed 
the status of the incident to show it as ‘reviewed’. 
This action ultimately drops the incident from the 
list of reviews that a GISC reviewer should check. In 
some of these cases, the Inspectorate found examples 
where a district supervisor had changed the crime 
classification to a less serious crime and showed the 
crime as ‘reviewed’. In these circumstances, GISC 
are unable to complete their validation checks in 
respect of accuracy, completeness and compliance 
with crime counting rules and will be unaware that 
the original classification has already changed. 
Changing Classifications after a gisC 
review
The Inspectorate also identified another practice 
where a reviewer, satisfied that a crime is complete 
and correctly classified, shows the record as 
reviewed. Following this review, the Inspectorate 
found examples where a member has then changed 
the crime to another category and in most cases to 
a less serious crime. Unless this member activates 
a status on PULSE called ‘review required’, GISC is 
completely unaware that this has occurred. If the 
status is updated, then a GISC Reviewer will check 
the PULSE record. The Inspectorate is concerned 
that the PULSE system allows such changes to take 
place and without any oversight from GISC. These 
crimes are ultimately never re-checked by GISC 
and indeed they have no way of knowing that any 
changes of this nature are made. 
The Inspectorate believes that GISC must 
significantly reduce the delay in conducting reviews. 
Ideally,	a	review	should	take	place	within	72	hours	
of the creation of an incident. A new automated 
review process was recently introduced at GISC 
for records of searches of persons and vehicles and 
for liquor licensing inspection of premises. It is 
hoped that this new system will reduce the current 
overall backlog. The Inspectorate also believes 
that access to PULSE must be changed to stop the 
practice of allowing non-GISC supervisors to carry 
out the review function or to make changes to the 
classification of a crime without referring this back 
to GISC. 
 recommendation 4.17
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána establishes a target for gisC to 
review pULse incidents within 72 hours of 
the initial report. (medium term).
4.9 Review/Clarifications
Where	a	reviewer	checks	a	PULSE	record	and	needs	
more information, they generate a process called 
‘review/clarification’. This is a separate process to 
a basic review of an incident and is an action that 
GISC or a district supervisor can generate. These 
actions are generated through the PULSE system 
and requests are primarily sent to the investigating 
member to complete certain fields or to clarify 
information. Many of these enquiries are of a minor 
nature, but a large number are sent in respect of 
concerns about the classification of crimes. Common 
examples of requests from reviewers include:
•	 “Please	submit	GPS	co-ordinates”;
•	 “The	narrative	 suggests	 that	 this	may	be	 a	
burglary - please contact GISC”.
At the time of conducting the visit, the Inspectorate 
found that there were over 420,000 review/
clarifications awaiting responses. A large 
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percentage of review/clarifications are created in 
respect of GPS co-ordinates that are not entered on 
PULSE when the record was first created. As seen 
earlier in this part, the creation of the record away 
from the incident location removes the opportunity 
to log precise location co-ordinates, which are 
available automatically on Tetra radios. This leads 
to a waste of garda and GISC time. 
Where	a	GISC	reviewer	sends	a	review/clarification,	
the Inspectorate identified an unsatisfactory 
practice, where an authorised person on a district 
can ignore the remarks of GISC and show the crime 
as reviewed. Effectively, no response to the review/
clarification is ever made and the action of showing 
the crime as reviewed causes the incident to drop 
off the GISC review list. In these cases, GISC have 
no way of retrieving that incident to check that their 
remarks were ever addressed. This practice was 
widespread across all seven divisions and PULSE 
must be changed to prevent this from happening.  
Use of the review/Clarification 
On checking PULSE incidents across the seven 
divisions, the Inspectorate found a varied approach 
to using PULSE and in particular the review/
clarification process. One division is effectively 
using the review/clarification process as an internal 
supervision tool to pass on messages to members 
and to generate actions that need to be completed. 
The Inspectorate also found some divisions that 
use review/clarification to congratulate staff on 
good	work.	Whilst	 it	 is	 always	 good	 to	 recognise	
such work, it is not advisable to do so in a document 
that may well be disclosed in any subsequent court 
case. Other divisions appear to bypass the review/
clarification process and transactions are carried 
out without leaving any record of the actions taken.
gisC review/Clarifications that are ignored 
A consistent theme that emerged throughout all the 
processes in crime recording is the non-response 
of investigating members to answer the review/
clarifications that are generated by GISC. The 
Inspectorate found the questions and comments 
raised by GISC as being valid and reasonable and 
there is no good reason for not replying to them. 
The Inspectorate is aware that some divisions 
have backlogs of many thousands of outstanding 
review/clarifications. Many of these reviews/
clarifications sampled by the Inspectorate were 
generated over twelve months previously and 
were still outstanding at the time of writing this 
report. Examples include:
•	 A	burglary	recorded	in	May	2012	was	later	
changed to a trespass offence. In June 2012 
GISC generated a review/clarification 
stating that the original classification of 
burglary was a more appropriate category. 
No	response	was	ever	sent	to	GISC.
•	 A	 fraud	 offence	 recorded	 in	 June	 2012	
was later changed to an Attention and 
Complaints. GISC generated a review/
clarification stating that the original 
classification of a fraud was a more 
appropriate category. A supervisor on the 
division concerned reviewed the crime 
without responding to the concern raised by 
GISC and it dropped off the outstanding list 
at GISC.
•	 A	burglary	recorded	in	May	2012	was	later	
changed to a trespass offence. Two GISC 
review/clarifications were sent at different 
times stating that the original classification 
of burglary was a more appropriate category. 
No	response	was	ever	sent	to	GISC.
In respect of the comments made by GISC 
reviewers in PULSE records about incorrect crime 
classifications, the Inspectorate agreed with the 
majority of reviews/clarifications generated by 
them. It is the Inspectorate’s view that both the 
causes of unnecessary reviews/clarifications and 
lack of responses to GISC must be addressed. 
When	 GISC	 send	 a	 review/clarification,	 it	 is	
invariably sent to the member investigating the 
crime. In reality, that member will probably not 
be the person at a garda district who ultimately 
decides what that crime classification should 
be. The Inspectorate has received feedback from 
members in focus groups who often agree with 
GISC about the classification of a particular crime, 
but sometimes perceive they are under pressure 
from local managers to change it to some other 
crime or not record it as a crime in the first place. 
The GISC review/clarifications that are generated 
are generally a once-off request to the investigating 
member and no further action is taken by GISC if 
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the inquiry is ignored. The Inspectorate believes 
that GISC have a role to play in making sure that 
review/clarifications are answered. For example, a 
second request should be elevated to a sergeant and 
a third request to a district officer. 
During the PULSE sampling, the Inspectorate 
found that there was sometimes an inconsistent 
approach amongst reviewers in challenging crime 
classifications. There were many crime incidents 
where GISC reviewers challenged a particular 
crime classification, but on other occasions with 
similar circumstances no such challenge was 
raised. The consistency of GISC reviewing is an 
area that could be improved. The Inspectorate 
believes that senior managers at GISC should be 
quality assuring the reviews conducted at GISC to 
ensure consistency in application.
The internal Garda Síochána Portal does not 
automatically inform a garda of an outstanding 
review/clarification. The Inspectorate believes 
that there should be a prompt on the portal 
informing individual gardaí that there are review/
clarifications awaiting response. This prompt 
should also go to the member’s sergeant.
Throughout all the sampling, the Inspectorate 
found a significant number of review/clarifications 
that are now over twelve months old and the 
questions asked by GISC are invariably still 
unanswered today. 
the failure to respond to gisC review/
clarifications was widespread across all seven 
divisions. the inspectorate believes that it 
is disrespectful to completely ignore such 
requests and supervisors should be directed to 
address this conduct.
reviews for Detections 
Throughout all of the PULSE sampling, the 
Inspectorate did not see any evidence of a review or 
a review/clarification generated in connection with 
the detection aspect of a crime. This will be fully 
explored in Part 11. The Inspectorate found a large 
percentage of crimes, where there were obvious 
questions about the validity of a detection of the 
crime. On checking the latest protocol between the 
Garda Síochána and GISC, the Inspectorate were 
unable to find any mention of detections and who 
has responsibility for checking the validity of the 
detection. Clearly with their crime counting rule 
responsibilities, the Inspectorate believe that GISC 
should be tasked to check the validity of a detection 
and ensure that it complies with crime counting 
rules. In the future, detections should form part of 
the review and validation of a PULSE incident.
 recommendation 4.18
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates a robust internal governance 
practice by establishing a standard operating 
procedure for pULse record entries and their 
audit and review. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Create	 a	 quality	 assurance	 process	 to	
evaluate the crime classification decisions of 
GISC Reviewers; 
•	 Introduce	 control	 measures	 to	 reduce	 the	
number of review/clarifications that are 
currently generated;
•	 Develop	 an	 IT	 solution,	 such	 as	 a	 prompt	
on the Garda Síochána Portal, to inform a 
member and their supervisor that there is a 
PULSE review/clarification pending;
•	 Stop	the	practice	of	using	PULSE	to	recognise	
good work;
•	 Ensure	 that	 GISC	 reviews	 and	 review/
clarification requests remain open, visible 
and accessible to GISC;
•	 Develop	 a	 mandatory	 completion	
requirement in the PULSE information 
record system for all GISC review/
clarification requests. 
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4.10 Crime Classification – 
The Future 
During the sampling of PULSE classifications, the 
Inspectorate found many examples of incorrect 
decision making and widespread inconsistencies 
with the classification of reported crime in Ireland. 
GISC are identifying many of the incorrect 
decisions, but currently have little or no impact on 
the final decision about what a crime should be. A 
crime that is reported anywhere in Ireland should 
be recorded in the same category, irrespective of 
where it takes place. The current situation across 
the seven divisions is one of different recording 
practices and as a result, crimes of a similar nature 
are categorised in many different ways. 
There are currently 129 call takers at GISC who 
are dealing with thousands of members who 
contact GISC daily to record an incident. GISC call 
takers have developed good knowledge of crime 
classifications and in most cases their decision 
making is good. 
As set out earlier in this part of the report: 
•	 GISC	 call	 takers	 create	 90%	 of	 the	 PULSE	
incident reports; 
•	 Generally,	there	is	a	high	level	of	consistency	
in the creation of PULSE records across the 
call takers at GISC; 
•	 GISC	 have	 developed	 an	 expertise	 in	 the	
components of the main crime categories;
•	 An	 increase	 in	 accuracy	 and	 a	 consequent	
reduction in the 420,000 reviews and review/
clarifications currently pending, would have 
a significant effect on garda member and 
supervisor time. 
It is the Inspectorate’s view that GISC should be 
the final decision maker in respect of the initial 
classification and the detection of incidents on 
PULSE. Changing the decision making role will 
result in greater accuracy in initial classification 
of a crime. It will also significantly reduce the 
enormous number of reviews that are currently 
sent out by GISC to members asking for more 
detailed information about a crime. This change 
in the decision making role will place an onus on 
GISC to extract the information required to make 
an informed decision about what crime has actually 
occurred. 
the inspectorate believes that there must be a real 
focus on getting the classification right at the time 
that it is first recorded.
There are a number of recommendations that will 
impact on GISC, which include completing a far 
more	detailed	PULSE	record.	With	 the	changes	 in	
this part of the report and Part 5, the Inspectorate 
believes that there will be a significant reduction 
in wasted time that GISC currently spend sending 
review/clarifications that are not answered. Also, if 
gardaí ring a call taker at the time of dealing with a 
call, rather than at the end of their duty the pressure 
points on GISC should be reduced. 
 recommendation 4.19
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána designates gisC to be the final 
decision maker in the classification of a crime 
or an incident. (short term). 
the garda inspectorate report on 
‘responding to Child sexual abuse’ 
november 2010
The Garda Inspectorate completed a report in 
November	2010	titled	‘Responding	to	Child	Sexual	
Abuse’. This report produced a total of twenty-
nine recommendations. This report and the 
recommendations arising from it, will be the subject 
of a separate review by the Garda Inspectorate in 
the	coming	months.	Whilst	this	inspection	focuses	
on different types of crimes, the recording and 
investigation of crime provides a clear link to the 
report completed in 2010. 
The following points are key recommendations and 
concerns identified in the 2010 report:
•	 Immediately	create	a	PULSE	record	for	each	
complaint received; 
•	 Ensure	 adherence	 to	 crime	 counting	 rules	
and to other garda directives on crime 
recording; 
•	 That	only	specially	trained	front	line	gardaí	
take reports alleging child sexual abuse;
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•	 That	 the	Garda	 Síochána	move	 away	 from	
the practice of allocating investigations to 
the garda that completed the initial report;
•	 Improve	the	timeliness	of	investigations.	
Concerns about the failure to record child sexual 
abuse crimes and the inordinate delays in creating 
crime records were identified as major concerns in 
the 2010 report. 
essentially the inspectorate found the same issues 
arising in relation to volume crimes, as were 
found in 2010 in relation to child sexual abuse 
crimes. it is clear from the findings highlighted in 
this part of the report that had the lessons learnt 
from that previous inspection been applied across 
other crime categories, the current situation could 
be quite different. 
The Inspectorate has identified a number of 
different operating practices that are taking place 
on the PULSE system that call into question the 
integrity and the accuracy of reported crime data.
Key concerns for the inspectorate:
•	 Burglaries,	 attempted	 burglaries,	 robberies	
and other crimes are sometimes incorrectly 
classified as less serious offences;
•	 Crimes	 are	 placed	 in	 Attention	 and	
Complaints and other non-crime categories;
•	 PULSE	operating	system	allows	individuals	
to make decisions about crimes and 
classifications without any apparent 
supervision and in the absence of external 
oversight; 
•	 Investigating	 members	 regularly	 fail	 to	
respond to GISC concerns about incorrect 
classifications;
•	 Narratives	are	generally	completed	to	a	poor	
standard, lacking detail and in many cases 
there are no specific details about how the 
crime actually happened. 
the inspectorate believes that there are systemic 
failures in garda síochána recording practices 
and non-compliance with the Crime Counting 
rules.
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5.2 Crime Management
Once a crime is recorded and classified by the 
Garda Information Services Centre (GISC), 
the responsibility for the management and 
investigation of that crime transfers from GISC to 
the district where the crime occurred. Currently, 
the full responsibility for the management of that 
crime rests firmly with the district officer; but 
with oversight from Garda Headquarters, regional 
assistant commissioners and the divisional chief 
superintendent. 
the role of assistant Commissioner, Crime 
and security
The Inspectorate met with the Assistant 
Commissioner, Crime and Security, who has overall 
responsibility for crime counting rules in Ireland. 
This includes the Crime Policy and Administration 
Unit, who over time have become a reference point 
for districts to take advice on crime counting 
rules and crime classification disputes with GISC. 
The assistant commissioner made it clear to the 
Inspectorate that responsibility for crime counting 
rules compliance rests with local senior managers 
and particularly at district superintendent level. The 
Crime Policy Unit or Professional Standards Unit 
are not tasked to routinely conduct national audits 
or quality assure crime counting rules compliance 
and only intervene in cases of serious concern.
the role of regional assistant 
Commissioners
All six regional Assistant Commissioners met with 
the Inspectorate to discuss their role in managing 
crime in their regions. It is clear that they regularly 
meet with their divisional chief superintendents 
and certainly had a good grasp of the progress of 
serious crimes that are being investigated in their 
regions and are in turn held to account at monthly 
performance meetings with the Commissioner.
With regard to serious and volume crime 
investigations, it was apparent to the Inspectorate 
that the role of the assistant commissioner involves 
holding divisions to account for fluctuations in 
crime, detection rates and general performance 
5.1 Introduction
This part of the report tracks the next steps of a crime investigation after an 
incident is recorded on PULSE as a crime. Crime management is a separate 
and distinct discipline from crime and incident recording. 
Once a crime is recorded, the management of that crime is a crucial part of the 
whole process of crime investigation. In effect, it is the process for reviewing 
a crime category, deciding whether a crime is going to be investigated or not, 
allocating the crime to a named investigator and ensuring that it is investigated 
thoroughly and expeditiously. This part will explore the roles of senior gardaí 
in crime management and how a crime is currently managed in Ireland. 
Crime management is an internationally recognised term and this part will 
show how the Garda Síochána manages crime and the approach taken in other 
comparable policing jurisdictions. 
This part also examines a process called reclassification of crime. Simply, this 
means the changing of an initial classification of a crime into another category. 
The moving of a crime to another category is an accepted practice in policing, 
but it should always be accompanied with a clear rationale explaining why it 
was necessary. 
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issues. It was however, unclear to the Inspectorate 
what their role was in respect of ensuring that 
districts complied with crime counting rules. 
the role of the Divisional Chief 
superintendent
Divisional chief superintendents have a long list 
of roles and responsibilities, which include many 
leadership and management functions. Chief 
Superintendents are responsible for producing 
an annual policing plan that describes what 
the divisional crime priorities will be for the 
forthcoming year and how the division will 
address them. At present, there are no explicit 
references to crime recording and crime counting 
rule compliance in their policing plans.
During the inspection, the Inspectorate found that 
chief superintendents operated in very different 
ways. In some divisions, chief superintendents 
were clearly very engaged with day to day 
crime investigations and in other divisions, 
such crime management rested with the district 
superintendents and the chief superintendent 
performed a more strategic role. In all divisions, 
chief superintendents hold meetings with their 
district officers and meetings are used to monitor 
crime levels across the division. The frequency of 
these meetings ranged from weekly to bi-weekly to 
monthly.
With the proposed change in the structure of 
divisions recommended in Part 2, the Inspectorate 
believes that the lead for ensuring accurate 
recording of crime and compliance with crime 
counting rules should be at divisional level. 
the role of the District officer 
The district officer is currently the lead for all 
matters concerning crime recording, crime 
counting rules and the investigation and 
management of crime within their areas. This 
includes the management of crimes ranging 
from low level offences through to a murder 
investigation. A number of inspectors and 
sergeants assist them. As previously mentioned, 
the new pilot roster is impacting on the availability 
of that supervisory support, particularly with 
detectives. 
The Inspectorate found that the crime skills 
and investigation experience of superintendents 
currently managing crime varied significantly. 
This included some very experienced officers 
with detective experience, to district officers with 
limited experience of investigating crime and who 
were promoted into these posts having spent many 
years in administrative roles. 
new garda síochána inspections and 
reviews
A recent Garda HQ Directive introduced a new 
approach to internal and external controls. The 
primary function of the inspection and review 
process is to measure and evaluate the effectiveness 
of current systems and procedures. During a 
meeting with senior gardaí, it was explained that 
this process will also examine the management 
of crime investigation. This new inspection and 
review process will operate at three levels:
1. District officer;
2. Divisional chief superintendent;
3. Regional assistant commissioner.
The Garda Professional Standards Unit and Garda 
Internal Audit Section will provide independent 
oversight across all the regions. 
District Daily accountability meeting
The Garda Síochána expects each district officer 
to hold a daily accountability meeting, which is 
often referred to as a Performance Accountability 
Framework (PAF) meeting. This meeting brings 
together key personnel, such as the district officer, 
inspectors, sergeants and detectives to discuss all 
incidents that have taken place in the last twenty-
four hours or over a weekend period. 
The meeting provides a good opportunity for a 
senior officer to review the circumstances of a 
crime, to decide how it will be managed and who 
will investigate it. The Inspectorate believes actions 
arising from meetings should be recorded and 
these should be tracked through future meetings. 
During the inspection process, the Inspectorate 
attended at least one and usually two meetings in 
each division. The following are key observations 
from those meetings:
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•	 Meetings	are	not	held	daily	in	most	districts	
and a variety of systems operated e.g. every 
Monday, every second day, bi-weekly or at 
times when people are available; 
•	 Frequency	of	meetings	was	affected	by	 the	
availability of supervisors, particularly 
detectives. In one district, the superintendent 
held a meeting with their administration 
sergeant; 
•	 Where	 a	 division	 had	 one	 detective	
superintendent or one detective inspector, 
there is difficulty in attending all the 
meetings occurring across the various 
districts;
•	 Most	of	the	meetings	did	not	appear	to	have	
a written agenda, although a similar format 
was followed; PULSE incidents that occurred 
since the last meeting were generally the 
main focus of meetings;
•	 Discussions	 about	 crime	 varied	 greatly.	
At some meetings all incidents were fully 
discussed and at others only serious crimes; 
•	 There	was	very	 little	discussion	about	who	
should investigate crimes, although at one 
meeting a crime was reallocated due to 
roster difficulties;
•	 There	 was	 limited	 discussion	 about	 the	
correct classification of crimes; 
•	 At	 most	 meetings,	 details	 of	 crimes	 were	
recorded in registers and this is used to 
track investigations. It was clear that in the 
busier districts, only the more serious cases 
are tracked and monitored; 
•	 There	 was	 an	 inconsistent	 approach	 to	
reviewing actions and crimes from previous 
meetings. At some meetings, crimes dating 
back many years were discussed and at 
other meetings previous crimes were not 
discussed. 
The Inspectorate is aware that the Garda Síochána 
are currently creating a standard PULSE enquiry 
that would be run locally each morning to 
standardise the information that is discussed at 
these meetings. 
The Interim Commissioner has advised the 
Inspectorate that, following a review, a revised 
format for PAF meetings, which takes account of 
the recommendations in the Guerin Report, has 
been drafted and is ready for implementation. The 
Garda Síochána envisages that this will provide 
consistency and standardisation of approach to 
daily briefings and tasking. 
The Garda Síochána would describe the PAF 
meeting as the crime management process where 
decisions are made about who will investigate 
crime. The Inspectorate supports the holding of a 
daily meeting, but it is not a comprehensive process 
for crime management. Crime management is 
more about a dedicated unit with responsibility for 
monitoring the investigation of crime. 
Other policing jurisdictions also operate a daily 
meeting, as it provides an early opportunity 
to review all incidents and to ensure that any 
necessary or remedial action is taken. These 
meetings should have a clear agenda and previous 
actions closely monitored. Other policing 
jurisdictions use telephone or video conferencing 
to conduct such meetings and therefore reduce the 
need for attendees to make unnecessary journeys. 
Outstanding actions from previous meetings should 
always be a standing agenda item at all meetings. 
Other jurisdictions have also extended the daily 
meetings to include Saturdays and Sundays. In 
West Yorkshire and other police services a second 
and much shorter meeting is convened on the same 
day, but later in the afternoon. This further meeting 
checks to see what has happened during the early 
part of that day and to review the deployment of 
resources. 
To complement the recommendation in Part 2 
on divisional structure, the Inspectorate believes 
that the current system of individual district 
meetings should be replaced by one divisional 
daily accountability meeting. This meeting should 
be chaired by the chief superintendent and all the 
superintendents should attend. As in other police 
services, the meetings could be held through video-
link, conference call or other suitable technology to 
reduce the need for travel.
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 recommendation 5.1
 the inspectorate recommends that divisions 
hold a daily accountability meeting that is 
structured and reviews incidents and crimes 
on a divisional basis to ensure appropriate 
action and tasking. (short term). 
Case management system
There is no dedicated electronic crime management 
system in the Garda Síochána. The PULSE 
system is a very basic register of information. The 
Inspectorate found that management of crime 
investigations across the seven divisions operated 
in many different ways. Some divisions manage 
crime through the daily PAF meeting and issue case 
tracking or monitoring proformas for investigating 
gardaí to provide updates. In other divisions, 
senior detectives play an active role in monitoring 
investigations and use PULSE or other tracking 
systems to monitor cases. With the new roster, the 
monitoring of cases has become more difficult, as 
investigators and supervisors of investigations 
have extended periods of leave from work and are 
often on different schedules. 
In the absence of a crime investigation system or 
a computerised case management system, there is 
no standardised approach to tracking cases and 
making sure that investigations are completed 
diligently and expeditiously. The current process of 
case file management is fully explored in Part 6 of 
this report.
Crime management in other policing 
Jurisdictions
Crime management is a function that needs to 
be operated through a dedicated unit, by trained 
individuals with responsibility for allocating 
and managing crime investigations. Other 
policing jurisdictions have well established 
crime management or crime evaluation units at 
divisional, regional or service-wide level that 
perform a whole host of functions in respect 
of managing crime. These units usually have a 
combination of police officers and police support 
staff. At divisional level, crime management units 
are usually part of a detective unit and managed 
by a detective supervisor. 
Internationally, other police services often refer 
to the initial investigation at a crime scene as the 
primary investigation,1 and further investigation is 
referred to as secondary investigation. Other police 
services focus on achieving a high level of primary 
investigation, as this may well negate the need for a 
secondary investigation to take place. 
Perhaps the most important function of any crime 
management unit is the initial review of a crime 
that is recorded on the system. Crime management 
units play a key role in quality assuring the initial 
investigation that has already taken place and 
making sure that the classification is correct.
It is usual for crime management units to be 
managed by a detective sergeant working to the 
detective inspector. 
Crime screening
Crime screening is a formal process of reviewing a 
crime to decide if it will be further investigated. An 
initial assessment should include whether or not the 
crime is likely to be solved, which in turn should 
determine investigation plans or other actions. 
Crimes that will be investigated are assigned for 
secondary investigation. If no further investigation 
leads are present and the primary investigation was 
thoroughly completed, further investigation will 
commence on receipt of new information on the 
case. The victim will be advised and given contact 
information should they receive new information 
or have questions.
The Garda Síochána does not use a formal process 
of crime screening and keeps undetected (unsolved) 
cases open indefinitely, with the ultimate goal of 
solving the crime. Locally, it is for the district officer 
to decide whether a crime will be investigated and 
who will investigate it. There is some merit to the 
approach taken by the Garda Síochána in dealing 
with crime and the victims of those offences. In 
principle, all crime is investigated in Ireland and 
the Garda Síochána set out with the intention of 
investigating most of those offences to the same 
level, regardless of their solvability or likelihood to 
1 Primary investigation is the initial investigation and the first 
actions by the first officer that attend a crime scene. This is 
an important stage as the investigation starts at this point. 
Secondary investigation is the follow up investigation that is 
usually conducted by a more experienced investigator.
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reach prosecution stage. In reality, the attempt to do 
this wastes valuable time and resources and leaves 
large numbers of historical undetected crimes that 
are still under investigation. 
For many years, other policing jurisdictions 
have moved from investigating all crimes, to 
concentrating resources on those crimes with a 
likelihood of a successful outcome. While there are 
variations in approach, the basic model used is a 
three stage process of:
•	 Early	investigation	with	thorough		primary	
investigation of all possible leads;
•	 Crime	screening;	
•	 Case	 assignment	 or	 early	 closure	 pending	
further investigative leads. 
There are many crimes in Ireland that currently 
receive primary and secondary investigations, 
which are highly unlikely to ever be solved. For 
example, in cases of low value theft or minor 
damage to property, the crime should be fully 
investigated at the time it is reported, but in the 
absence of CCTV, forensic evidence or a witness, a 
secondary investigation should not routinely take 
place. 
During one of a number of focus groups with 
gardaí, it was estimated that some gardaí were 
currently investigating over 250 crimes each and in 
their opinion, over 200 of those crimes would never 
be solved. Developing crime screening processes for 
crime investigations provides real opportunities to 
release investigators to concentrate on more serious 
crimes and minor crimes that can be solved.
the aim of Crime screening 
Whilst the model may vary across police services, 
the crime screening process is about prioritising 
what will and will not be further investigated. 
Post holders should have expertise in crime 
investigation. 
Key crime screening functions include: 
•	 Assessing	the	quality	of	initial	investigations	
and instigating any remedial action;
•	 Ensuring	that	all	evidence	is	gathered;	
•	 Evaluating	 the	 potential	 for	 detecting	 the	
crime; 
•	 Reviewing	 other	 issues	 such	 as	 victim	
profiles; 
•	 Allocating	crimes	when	there	are	clear	lines	
of secondary investigation; 
•	 Closing	 investigations	 when	 there	 are	 no	
clear lines of further investigation. 
The Inspectorate believes that the absence of an 
effective crime screening process is a weakness in 
the management of crime investigation. Too much 
time is spent investigating crimes that will never 
be solved and that reduces the amount of time that 
could be used to investigate crimes where there 
is a realistic opportunity to bring an offender to 
justice. This continued approach of investigating all 
crimes to the same level is impacting on members’ 
workloads and is slowing down the whole 
investigation process.
Crime screening in other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions operate screening processes in 
very different ways, but all have a system in place. 
For example, the Danish police have evaluation 
units that operate this screening process. The 
Danish police service is particularly robust in 
crime screening decision-making and effectively 
only do secondary investigation in 20% of all crime 
reported. The other 80% of crime is dealt with 
immediately after the primary investigation  by 
making a decision to close the investigation, unless 
more information or forensic evidence provides 
an additional lead. If this happens the case is 
immediately reactivated for investigation and it 
will be allocated to an investigator. Danish police 
send a letter to victims of crime explaining what 
will happen to their case. 
In contrast, Denver, Colorado, assigns 77% of crime 
for secondary investigation and the Metropolitan 
Police Service (UK) are moving towards a 50% 
secondary investigation rate. In West Yorkshire 
Police, individual divisions screen-in crimes for 
secondary investigation at very different rates, 
which range from 45% to 60%. For example, Leeds 
City Centre allocates much higher levels of car 
crime offences for investigation than neighbouring 
divisions. 
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Police services that  close large numbers of crimes 
from secondary investigations tend to do so in 
crimes with low solvability, such as car crime 
and criminal damage. Conversely, crimes that are 
usually screen-in for further investigation include 
burglaries in homes, sexual crimes, robberies, and 
other violent crimes.
All screening processes allow police services to 
specify types of crimes that will always be allocated 
for secondary investigation. Examples include:
•	 Mandatory	investigations	such	as	burglaries	
in home;
•	 Crimes	 that	 are	 priorities	 for	 the	 police	
service;
•	 Assaults;	
•	 Crimes	involving	vulnerable	victims.
It is worth noting that the success of any system 
depends on the quality of the initial primary 
investigation carried by the first officer. A 
thorough initial investigation allows a more 
informed allocation for secondary investigation 
decision to be made.
In comparison to other policing jurisdictions, even 
if a low rate of 20% of crime was screened out by 
the Garda Síochána, it could reduce the number 
of secondary investigations that are currently 
conducted by 50,000 crimes per year. This would 
release a significant amount of time and resources to 
progress cases with higher solvability opportunities. 
the garda síochána must adopt a review 
process to determine which crimes will receive 
a secondary investigation after completion of a 
thorough primary one. 
 recommendation 5.2 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a crime screening process 
with established solvability factors. (short 
term).
allocation of Crime for investigation 
Another function of a crime management or 
evaluation unit is to determine who is going to be 
allocated a crime for investigation. To allow this 
to operate effectively, crime management units 
must be aware of what resources are available to 
investigate crime and the types of crimes that will 
be dealt with. For example, other jurisdictions 
have clear protocols on what offences a detective 
will investigate. In Ireland, this is more complex, 
as there are no set protocols for who investigates 
specific crime types. As explained previously, 
crime investigations in the Garda Síochána are 
usually investigated by the first garda that deals 
with a victim. This is further explored in the next 
part of this report. A crime management unit has 
a responsibility to ensure that crimes are allocated 
on a fair and equitable basis and also to the most 
appropriate person or unit. 
monitoring Crime investigations
The key responsibilities of a crime management 
unit are to ensure that investigations are progressed 
expeditiously and to monitor the progress of 
cases. At present in Ireland, there are a large 
number of different systems at each district and 
each division for monitoring crime investigations. 
Some divisions with lower crime levels monitor 
all crime investigations and some of the divisions 
with higher levels of crime only monitor serious 
cases. The Inspectorate found that some gardaí 
had supervisors in charge of their units who 
checked to make sure that crime investigations 
were progressed and other gardaí did not have a 
unit supervisor who performed this function. It 
was clear during the inspection process that many 
investigations are not monitored and are left to 
individual gardaí to progress. 
In some police services, crime management units 
make sure that members who initially attended the 
crime scene collected all available evidence such as 
fingerprints and CCTV footage.
During this inspection, the Inspectorate found 
many cases where an investigator was off work 
on extended leave or had transferred or left the 
police service and their investigations were not 
reallocated. A crime management unit would have 
responsibility to monitor such cases and where 
necessary reallocate the crime to a new investigator. 
Closing Cases 
Before any case is brought to a conclusion and 
closed,2 a crime management unit quality assures 
the investigation that has taken place to make sure 
2 In other policing jurisdictions, a ‘closed’ case can be re-
opened if further information arises. Closed therefore simply 
removes the file from ‘live’ and active investigations.
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that all opportunities to identify a suspect are 
explored. For example, a case would not be closed if 
there was still a named suspect for a crime or other 
outstanding investigative leads. 
The Inspectorate believes that the introduction of 
crime management units by the Garda Síochána will 
professionalise processes for allocation of crimes 
for investigation and enhance the supervision of 
those cases. 
 recommendation 5.3 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána establishes a crime management unit 
model on a divisional basis. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Development	 of	 operating	 protocols	 for	 all	
crime management units. 
5.3 Reclassification of Crime 
Part 4 of this report dealt with the initial recording 
and classification of a crime into an appropriate 
category and highlighted the need to get it right the 
first time. There will be occasions where that initial 
classification is found to be incorrect, such as when 
additional information is received from the victim 
or a witness, which changes the circumstances of 
the case. 
The process which changes a crime from one 
category to another is called reclassification. While 
the Inspectorate acknowledges that reclassifying 
a crime is sometimes necessary, it must always 
be accompanied by a clear rationale as to why a 
crime is changing from one category to another. It 
is especially important to always record a rationale 
in cases where a crime is changed to a non-crime 
category. 
As with the examination of initial classifications, 
the Inspectorate carried out extensive sampling 
of PULSE records to establish the scale of 
reclassification and to confirm if any such changes 
to crime classifications were correct and fully 
justified. 
gardaí Changing Crime Classifications
As mentioned previously, other police services 
try to make sure that the classification of a crime 
is right in the first place to avoid the need to later 
change a crime to another category. This allows far 
better decisions to be made at the time of creating 
the incident report in respect of the next steps 
in an investigation process. To ensure accurate 
compliance with crime counting rules and integrity 
of crime data, other police services restrict to 
certain positions and individuals, the authority to 
reclassify a crime. 
During sampling of PULSE records, the 
Inspectorate found a large number of individuals 
who are reclassifying crimes. These included 
sergeants, inspectors, detective sergeants, detective 
inspectors and district officers. Of particular 
concern was the finding that the following 
individual groups were also reclassifying crimes:
•	 Investigating	gardaí;	
•	 Gardaí	 not	 recorded	 as	 the	 investigating	
member or assisting with an investigation;
•	 Members	 attached	 to	 specialist	 units	
with no obvious connection to the crime 
that was being investigated. Examples of 
these members included local criminal 
intelligence officers and staff in training 
roles.
international Best practice – persons 
authorised to Change Crimes 
In some other policing jurisdictions, nominated 
supervisors are the only people who can reclassify 
a crime. These individuals are often referred to as 
Dedicated Decision Makers (DDMs). The officers 
are invariably detective inspectors and would have 
the remit to authorise or to recommend a change 
in classification with a valid justification. Limiting 
the authority to a few supervisors results in a more 
consistent approach to the management of crime 
and particularly the reclassification of crime. This 
is further explored in Part 11 of this report. 
garda síochána views on Crime 
reclassification
During focus groups with members in all seven 
divisions, it was highlighted that crimes were 
regularly reclassified incorrectly to a different 
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crime category. This often occurred in cases where 
a garda had conducted the initial investigation 
at a crime scene and classified the crime and at a 
later date that crime was reclassified by some other 
person.
The following are examples of the types of 
reclassifications of crime provided to the 
Inspectorate during meetings with members:
•	 Attempted	 burglaries,	 where	 doors	 and	
windows are forced, are moved to offences 
of criminal damage or trespass;
•	 Letter	 box	 burglaries,	 where	 car	 keys	 and	
cars are stolen, are sometimes recorded as 
car thefts or thefts of keys;
•	 Robberies	are	changed	to	a	theft	offence;
•	 Threats	to	life	crimes	have	been	downgraded	
to malicious communications;
•	 Burglaries	 at	 holiday	 homes,	 garages	 and	
in permanent structures are shown as theft 
offences;
•	 Credit	 card	 offences	 and	 minor	 assaults	
are sometimes recorded as Attention and 
Complaints incidents.
During focus groups, the following examples 
of cases were provided to the inspectorate:
•	 A	 garda	 who	 attended	 a	 crime	 scene	
recorded the crime as an attempted burglary. 
As the first responder, the garda took on the 
role of investigator. On returning to work a 
few days later, the member found that the 
crime had been reclassified to a criminal 
damage incident. Even though the garda 
did not agree with the change in the crime 
category, they did not see that it was their 
role to challenge such decision-making. 
•	 Another	 garda	 explained	 that	 their	mother	
was the victim of a burglary, where entry 
was made to her house. This was originally 
recorded as a burglary by the first garda 
that investigated the crime, but was later 
incorrectly changed to criminal damage. 
Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) are experts in 
forensic examination and are usually sent to the 
scenes of serious crimes and in most divisions 
to all burglaries. During focus groups, CSEs 
provided many examples of attending houses to 
complete forensic examinations for crimes that 
were initially recorded by the first garda on the 
scene as a burglary or an attempted burglary. 
While the forensic examination of crime scenes 
indicated clear evidence of an entry by a burglar or 
an attempt to enter, the CSEs noted that the crimes 
were incorrectly reclassified to theft, criminal 
damage or trespass. 
The perception and view consistently put forward 
to the Inspectorate by members in all divisions 
visited, is that crimes were sometimes changed 
to incorrect or non-crime categories. Gardaí 
also felt that some district officers do not always 
want a crime recorded on PULSE without an 
associated detection. During meetings and focus 
groups, members highlighted that sometimes they 
perceived they were under pressure to change 
the classification of a crime. The Inspectorate was 
informed by some members that they were advised 
by staff association representatives or front-line 
supervisors to record on PULSE if they were 
instructed to change a classification. During PULSE 
sampling of reclassified crimes, the Inspectorate 
found nine examples on PULSE where members 
recorded that they were instructed to reclassify a 
crime as a result of directions from a supervisor. In 
eight of those cases, the Inspectorate did not agree 
with the decision to change the classification and 
in the other case there was insufficient information 
recorded to make an assessment. 
The Inspectorate believes that most gardaí know the 
difference between crime categories, particularly 
those that are dealt with on a daily basis. There 
are clearly some crime types that are regularly 
changed from one category to another and there 
is a perception amongst gardaí that some crime 
classification changes are incorrect. In Denmark, 
crime reclassification is virtually unheard of and 
most crimes remain in the same crime category 
from the date first recorded. 
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pULse Data analysis and sampling
The Inspectorate carried out two separate pieces 
of analysis on the reclassification of PULSE 
incidents. The first analysis process focused 
on a desktop examination of data provided 
by the Garda Síochána following a request for 
reclassification information. The second involved 
direct sampling of PULSE crime incident records 
by the Inspectorate. The sampling resulted in the 
collection of PULSE incident record information 
which became the basis of an Inspectorate created 
database on reclassification that was then analysed. 
When examining the PULSE data requested, the 
Inspectorate’s analysis focused on the following 
issues around reclassification: 
•	 Crimes	that	moved	from	one	crime	category	
to another; 
•	 Crimes	that	moved	to	a	non-crime	category;
•	 Non-crime	categories	 that	were	reclassified	
to a crime category.
The analysis process of PULSE incident records was 
carried out to establish the following: 
•	 The	level	of	reclassification	taking	place;
•	 To	 determine	 if	 the	 decision	 to	 change	 a	
crime classification was correct;
•	 To	 establish	 authorisation	 of	 are	
classification; 
•	 To	determine	if	a	rationale	was	recorded	on	
PULSE for any reclassification decisions.
Desktop analysis
The information provided by the Garda Síochána 
related to the reclassification of crimes that occurred 
during a seventeen month period from January 
2011 to May 2012. 
Chart 5.1 shows that during 2011, nearly one million 
PULSE records were created. It also shows that 
there were 298,635 crimes recorded and of those 
crimes, 25,588 were reclassified to another PULSE 
incident category. 
Chart 5.1
pULse incident records Created
Source: Data supplied by Garda Síochána.
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reclassification of Crime - international 
Context
The figure of 25,588 crimes identified as 
reclassified, amounts to 8.5% of total crime recorded 
on PULSE during the twelve month period. 
Compared to evidence from other jurisdictions, 
this is significantly higher, based on an audit of 
Kent Constabulary by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabularies (HMIC) and from other sources 
and police services, such as the Victoria Police 
by the Australian Institute of Criminology and 
FBI reporting procedures. A common figure of 
approximately 4% is the average percentage of total 
crimes that are reclassified. This figure varies up or 
down depending on specific crime types. 
Crime Categories
For the purposes of this examination, the 
Inspectorate selected eight specific crime 
groups,3 which included the crime categories that 
are the five main crimes examined throughout 
this inspection. The total number of crimes 
reclassified  in the eight categories selected in the 
seven divisions in a seventeen month period was 
2,372 crimes. This data set was subsequently used 
for the reclassification analysis. It should be noted 
that all traffic offences were excluded from this 
examination data set.
Chart 5.2 shows the breakdown of the numbers 
reclassified in each crime type selected.
3 The eight crime groups include two assault categories, 
burglary, domestic violence, robbery, (theft person is a less 
serious crime category for this offence) and two vehicle crime 
categories.
Chart 5.2
reclassified pULse Crime incident types in the selected Divisions for  
the period January 2011 – may 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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The top three categories (by volume) outlined in the 
chart for reclassification in that time period were 
burglary, assault minor and theft from a person.
As explained in Part 4 of the report on classification, 
crime categories usually have a higher and a more 
serious incident type as well as a lower and a 
less serious one. With burglary offences, a more 
serious type of offence would be an aggravated 
burglary and a less serious crime type would be 
theft other, criminal damage or trespass. With 
some crimes such as assaults, there are usually 
differences in court jurisdictions, powers of arrest 
and sentences. There are some crimes, where such 
penalty differences do not exist, but historically 
police service successes have been judged against 
performance in these crime areas. Crimes such 
as burglary, robbery, vehicle crime, assaults and 
domestic violence crimes are those that usually 
feature in policing plans and are designated as 
priorities. Offences that attract less scrutiny often 
include crimes such as theft, trespass and criminal 
damage. In other policing services, the movement 
of crimes such as burglary are monitored closely to 
make sure that crimes are not incorrectly classified 
or reclassified into lower crime categories. 
In the case of domestic violence calls, a movement 
to a less serious offence is usually to a non-crime 
category such as a domestic dispute. A less serious 
category for assault harm would be assault minor 
and a less serious category for assault minor could 
be a public order offence or a non-crime Attention 
and Complaints incident.
reclassification trends 
To establish the trends in movement to different 
crime types, the Inspectorate examined the 
12,506 crimes that were reclassified on PULSE 
in the crime types selected, across all divisions, 
during the period January 2011 to May 2012.4 The 
analysis enabled the Inspectorate to ascertain if the 
reclassified crime moved to a more serious category, 
a less serious category or a similar offence type. 
Chart 5.3 shows the movement of the 12,506 crimes 
into one of those three categories.
In 83% of cases, the chart shows a reclassification 
resulted in a crime moving to a less serious offence 
and in 13% of cases, the crime went to a more 
serious crime type. 
4 The Garda Síochána supplied a database of 65,511 PULSE 
records that were re-classified in a seventeen month period 
January 2011 to May 2012.
Chart 5.3
overall movement of reclassified pULse incidents of selected Crime types 
in the period January 2011 – may 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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reclassification trend pattern for Crime 
types 
The next trend that the Inspectorate analysed was 
the movement within the selected crime types, 
to see if there were any variations compared 
to the overall trend. Chart 5.4 breaks down the 
reclassification of crime to a more or less serious 
level by the selected crime types. 
Findings
•	 Six	 of	 the	 eight	 categories	 significantly	
moved to a lesser crime type;
•	 The	 greatest	 percentage	 movement	 to	 a	
lesser crime took place in the categories of 
burglary, robbery and assault harm; 
•	 Domestic	 disputes	 showed	 the	 highest	
percentage change to a more serious offence; 
•	 Assault	minor	was	another	category	with	a	
significant percentage that moved to a more 
serious offence. 
Chart 5.4
movement of reclassified pULse incidents by selected Crime type in  
the period January 2011 – may 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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most Common reclassifications trends
The Inspectorate further examined the selected 
crime types to ascertain the most common incident 
categories the crime moved to. Chart 5.5 shows the 
initial crime that was recorded on PULSE and the 
most common place that the crime type moved 
to for both a less serious and also a more serious 
incident category.
Findings on movements of Crimes
The findings in Charts 5.4 and 5.5 raise a number of 
issues about the movement of crimes:
•	 A	 significant	 percentage	 of	 assault	 harm	
cases moved to a lesser crime;
•	 35%	 of	 the	 assault	 minor	 crimes	 moved	
to a non-crime category in Attention and 
Complaints. Also, a significant percentage 
moved up to assault harm; 
•	 37%	 of	 domestic	 disputes	 cases	 moved	 to	
a crime of assault minor; and 30% were 
reclassified to Attention and Complaints;
•	 Burglary	 again	 features	 as	 a	 crime	 type	
that is often moved and in this sample most 
frequently to criminal damage.
reclassification patterns across the selected 
Divisions
The Inspectorate examined the reclassification of 
crime types across the seven divisions visited, to 
assess any variations to the patterns of movements 
of crime types.
Findings
•	 The	 patterns	 found	 were	 very	 consistent	
in terms of robbery, burglary and assault 
harm as displayed in the chart showing the 
movement of reclassification by crime type; 
•	 There	were	however,	noticeable	differences	
in reclassification practices in respect of 
domestic violence and assault minor. Some 
divisions were more likely to reclassify 
domestic violence and assaults to a less 
serious category, but some divisions had 
the opposite scenario and were more likely 
to reclassify the crime to a more serious 
offence.
reclassification patterns in attention and 
Complaints pULse Category
The Attention and Complaints PULSE incident 
category has featured in several parts of this report 
already. As previously described, it is a non-crime 
PULSE category often used as a catch-all for many 
incidents. This is a category that should not be 
used for an incident where there is evidence that 
a crime occurred. As part of the reclassification 
examination, the Inspectorate looked at incidents 
initially classified as a crime that were later 
reclassified into Attention and Complaints and the 
reverse scenario where incidents initially classified 
as Attention and Complaints were later reclassified 
into a crime or a domestic dispute category.
Chart 5.5
movement of selected Crime types – most Common results following reclassification in the 
period January 2011 – may 2012
initial Classification to a Less Serious 
Crime type following 
reclassification
Proportion of all 
reclassified Cases
to a more Serious 
Crime type following 
reclassification
Proportion of all 
reclassified Cases
assault Harm assault minor 69% robbery 3%
assault minor attention and 
Complaints
35% assault Harm 44%
Burglary Criminal Damage 39% aggravated Burglary 1%
Domestic attention and 
Complaints
30% assault minor 37%
robbery person theft person 53% no Crime type 0%
theft person theft other 52% robbery 10%
theft from mPV theft other 27% Criminal Damage by 
Fire
1%
Unauthorised taking of 
a vehicle
attention and 
Complaints
22% theft of mPV 8%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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To analyse these trends, the Inspectorate examined 
the original database of 65,511 incidents that were 
reclassified during the period of seventeen months 
between January 2011 and May 2012 and found 
that 6,095 crime incidents were reclassified into the 
Attention and Complaints category.
Chart 5.6 shows the movement of a selected 
number of crime categories that went to Attention 
and Complaints.
Chart 5.6
selected Crime incident types that moved 
to attention and Complaints following 
reclassification during the period 
January 2011 – may 2012
initial PULSe incident 
Classification
number of incidents 
reclassified to attention and 
Complaints
Criminal Damage 
(not by fire)
854
assault minor 676
theft (Other) 654
Burglary 377
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
Clearly there are a large number of crimes moving 
into Attention and Complaints and assault minor 
crime incidents again feature highly in these 
findings.
attention and Complaints reclassified 
Conversely, there were also a large number of 
crime incidents that were initially classified in 
the non-crime Attention and Complaints category 
and were subsequently reclassified into a crime 
incident type. The Inspectorate analysed the same 
data set of 65,511 and found 13,465 incidents 
that were initially classified into Attention and 
Complaints and then moved to a crime category 
after reclassification. Chart 5.7 shows a selection of 
the largest volume crime incident types that were 
reclassified from the Attention and Complaints 
category in the period January 2011 to May 2012. 
Chart 5.7
selected Crime incident types that moved 
from attention and Complaints following 
reclassification in the period  
January 2011 – may 2012
PULSe incident 
type following 
reclassification
number of incidents 
reclassified from attention 
and Complaints
Domestic Dispute 1,433
assault minor 1,222
Criminal Damage 855
Public Order 552
theft Other 445
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
As outlined in this chart, a significant number of 
incidents initially categorised as Attention and 
Complaints were at some later date reclassified 
and moved to other categories such as domestic 
disputes, assault minor and criminal damage. 
Attention and Complaints should not be used 
in cases where there is evidence that a crime or a 
domestic dispute took place. In these cases a crime 
should have been recorded in an appropriate crime 
category where there is reasonable probability that 
a crime had taken place. 
attention and Complaints reclassification 
trends in the Divisions visited
The Inspectorate also examined the data set of 
12,506 of reclassified incidents in all divisions, 
to ascertain the trends in movement into and out 
of the Attention and Complaints category. Chart 
5.8 outlines the proportion of each of the eight 
selected crime types moving to the Attention and 
Complaints category following reclassification.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 5: Crime Management
Part 5  |  15
Findings
•	 30%	 of	 all	 domestic	 disputes	 were 
reclassified into Attention and Complaints;
•	 Crime	 categories,	 such	 as	 robbery	 of	 the	
person and burglary, moved to Attention 
and Complaints;
•	 35%	of	all	assault	minor	offences	reclassified	
moved into this category.
Comment on reclassification trends 
Following analysis of the Desktop 
examination of pULse Data
The desktop analysis revealed that the Garda 
Síochána reclassified 8.5% of the total amount of 
recorded crime. In the period under review, 83% of 
the reclassified crime went to a less serious category.
There is a clear link with incident recording as 
outlined in Part 4 that further emphasises the need 
to make sure that the Garda Síochána get that first 
classification right to avoid the need to reclassify 
the numbers of crimes that are currently moving 
from one category to another. 
5.4 PULSE Incident Sampling 
Following on from the desktop review of PULSE 
data, the Inspectorate examined the reclassification 
of PULSE incidents in more depth. The Inspectorate 
directly accessed the PULSE system on visits to 
Garda Headquarters and sampled data from live 
PULSE incident records. Information that was 
not available from the original data request was 
viewed and the details collected were compiled 
into a database and was subsequently analysed 
by the Inspectorate. The additional data collected 
allowed the Inspectorate to make an assessment 
about whether the decision to reclassify a crime 
was correct.
During this sampling, the Inspectorate looked at a 
number of different aspects of reclassified PULSE 
incidents which are outlined below: 
•	 Analysis	 of	 where	 crime	 incidents	 are	
reclassified; 
•	 Reclassification	of	 ten	 crime	 incident	 types	
across the seven divisions;
•	 Examples	of	crimes	that	were	reclassified;	
•	 Robberies	that	were	reclassified;	
Chart 5.8
selected Crime types moving to 
attention and Complaints on reclassification
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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•	 Invalid	crimes	(these	are	crimes	or	incidents	
that were recorded, but are later found not to 
have taken place); 
•	 ‘Operation	 Look-Back’	 –	 (Garda	 Síochána	
initiative to review crime that took place 
three months earlier for detections).
reclassification of Crime – overall Findings 
When sampling reclassified PULSE incident 
records, the Inspectorate selected incidents 
that were initially reported during the period 
May to July 2012, in the seven divisions under 
review. The Inspectorate examined a total of 
393 PULSE incidents from ten selected incident 
types that had been reclassified at some point 
prior to the Inspectorate’s visits in June and 
July 2013. A database was created that provided 
detailed information obtained from each PULSE 
record under a variety of headings. After a 
detailed analysis of the database, and taking 
all the available information into account, the 
Inspectorate separated the crime incidents into the 
following categories:
•	 The	 percentage	 of	 crimes	 that	 the 
Inspectorate viewed to be correctly 
reclassified;
•	 The	 percentage	 of	 crimes	 that	 the	
Inspectorate viewed to be incorrectly 
reclassified; 
•	 The	 percentage	 of	 crimes	where	 there	was	
insufficient detail on PULSE to determine if 
the reclassification was justified;
•	 The	 percentage	 of	 crimes	 that	 were	
reclassified more than once. 
Chart 5.9 shows the number of PULSE records 
examined and the Inspectorate’s view on the 
reclassification of those incidents. 
Chart 5.9
inspectorate’s analysis of pULse incidents reclassified in the selected Divisions during the 
period may – June 2012
number of incidents 
Sampled
incorrectly 
reclassified
Correctly 
reclassified 
insufficient detail to 
Determine if reclassification 
is Correct 
reclassified more 
than once
393 71% 13% 11% 5%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 393 PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate. 
Findings
•	 The	Inspectorate	found	that	only	13%	of	the	
reclassifications were correct;
•	 In	 many	 cases	 the	 Inspectorate	 found	
there was no rationale to explain the 
reclassification; 
•	 Many	crimes	were	incorrectly	moved	from	a	
crime category to a non-crime category; 
•	 In	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 cases,	 a	
crime that was reclassified moved to a less 
serious crime, to a non-crime incident or was 
invalidated. There were a number of cases 
where the crime was reclassified and then 
reclassified for a second time and usually 
back to the original crime type. 
In the majority of cases where the Inspectorate did 
not agree with a reclassification decision, it was 
found that the initial classification of the PULSE 
incident appeared to be the most appropriate 
category.
reclassification by Divisions
While the overall reclassification figures, as 
presented in Chart 5.9, are the combined results 
of all the data examined, it is important to 
acknowledge that the levels of reclassification 
varied between the seven divisions reviewed. 
Chart 5.10 shows the range of differences that 
were found within the Inspectorate’s analysis of 
categories.
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Across the seven divisions the chart shows there 
was a 20% difference in the divisions between 
the lowest and highest rates for incorrect 
reclassifications. 
reclassification of Crime incident types 
Destinations across the seven Divisions
The Inspectorate used the database of 393 incidents, 
created from sampling PULSE records, to analyse 
the most common incident type to which these 
incidents were reclassified. 
Chart 5.11 highlights the most common 
destinations of each of the ten crime types examined 
after reclassification. 
Findings
•	 Similar	to	the	trends	found	in	the	PULSE	data	
analysis, a large percentage of burglaries 
were reclassified to criminal damage;
•	 A	 large	 percentage	 of	 assaults,	 criminal	
damage and theft other crime incidents 
moved to the non-crime category of 
Attention and Complaints;
•	 31%	 of	 the	 Attention	 and	 Complaints	
incidents moved to sexual assaults.
Chart 5.10
inspectorate’s analysis of pULse incidents reclassified - Difference in ranges between the 
selected Divisions during the period may – June 2012
Division incorrect 
reclassification 
ranges 
Correct 
reclassification 
ranges 
insufficient Details to 
Determine reclassification 
Decision ranges 
reclassified more 
than once ranges
Seven Divisions 59% to 79% 9% to 21% 8% to 19% 2% to 10%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate. 
Chart 5.11
reclassified incident types Destinations in selected Divisions in the 
period may to July 2012
initial incident type most Common incident type to which 
these incidents were reclassified
% of the most Common incident 
type
assault Harm assault minor 76%
assault minor attention and Complaints 59%
attention and Complaints Sexual assault 31%
Burglary Criminal Damage 43%
Criminal Damage
interfering with the mechanism of an mPV 41%
attention and Complaints 41%
robbery theft Other 38%
theft from mPV Criminal Damage 38%
theft Person theft Other 76%
theft Other attention and Complaints 42%
 Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate. 
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Detailed analysis of reclassified Crime types
As the crime types examined had a variety of 
reclassification destinations, it is appropriate to 
comment on each one separately. The following are 
some examples from the individual crime types 
and issues that were found during the examination 
of the database of PULSE records.
Burglary 
This was a crime type that saw many crimes 
moving from the original classification to a lesser 
crime. Only one crime moved to a higher category 
of aggravated burglary. There are several examples 
where burglary offences were reclassified to a less 
serious crime and at a later date reclassified back to 
a burglary. There are also several examples where 
the identification of a suspect and the ensuing 
detection were noted in the change back to a 
burglary offence. 
examples of pULse reclassifications for a 
crime that was initially classified as burglary. 
the commentary on the incident is taken from 
pULse incident record details included on the 
inspectorate’s database. 
•	 Front	window	opened	and	entry	gained.	This	
was reclassified to Attention and Complaints. 
GISC recommended that it was a burglary 
and if no intent, to reclassify to a trespass. 
This enquiry from GISC was not answered. 
•	 Suspects	entered	a	house	with	weapons.	This	
was correctly reclassified to an aggravated 
burglary.
•	 Break-in	 to	a	home	and	 items	stolen.	PULSE	
shows victim as unwilling to be a witness. 
This was reclassified twelve months later 
to a non-crime Attention and Complaints 
incident. GISC questioned the reclassification 
from burglary, but it was not answered. 
•	 Door	 kicked	 in	 and	 occupier	 disturbed	 two	
suspects in the hallway, who ran away. This 
was reclassified to criminal damage without 
any explanation.
•	 Rear	door	damaged.	Occupier	heard	suspects	
in hallway and one suspect was wearing a 
balaclava. Suspects fled when challenged. 
This was reclassified by a sergeant to criminal 
damage “pending a witness statement”. There 
was no further entry on PULSE some twelve 
months later. 
•	 Victim	saw	suspects	levering	open	a	window,	
suspects entered and caused damage to the 
property. The crime was reclassified two 
months later to a criminal damage with the 
words “no evidence of entry gained”.
attempted Burglary
Attempted burglary is a specific crime that is 
generally classified correctly at the initial reporting 
stage, but regularly ends up in other categories and 
usually as a criminal damage or a trespass. In other 
police services, an attempt to gain entry at a door or 
window (points of entry) would be recorded as an 
attempted burglary. 
examples of pULse reclassifications for a 
crime that was initially classified as burglary 
(attempt). the commentary on the incident 
is taken from pULse incident record details 
included on the inspectorate’s database. 
•	 The	 following	narrative	was	 removed	 from	
the original PULSE entry “Back door of 
house forced, no entry gained”. This was 
reclassified to a criminal damage and the 
district officer closed the crime.
•	 Male	 trying	 to	 force	 window,	 no	 entry	
gained. This was reclassified to an Attention 
and Complaints incident. GISC challenged 
this reclassification on two occasions but no 
response was received.
•	 Two	males	 knocked	 on	 the	 front	 door	 and	
then attempted to prise open the back 
door, when they were disturbed. This was 
reclassified to a criminal damage.
•	 Victim’s	 door	 bell	 rang,	 followed	 by	 two	
males trying to break into the rear of a house. 
The reporting garda recorded this as an 
attempted break-in. This was reclassified to 
a criminal damage. 
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Garda Síochána supervisors informed the 
Inspectorate that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) will not always give directions 
to charge a person with attempted burglary unless 
the suspect for the offence makes an admission 
of intent to enter. As a result, attempted burglary 
crimes are regularly incorrectly classified to 
criminal damage or trespass. The threshold for 
charging a suspect is a completely separate issue 
to the definition of an attempted burglary. The 
Inspectorate found compelling evidence from the 
data set examined, that the crime of attempted 
burglary is not recorded correctly and as a result, 
there is significant under recording in the crime 
category of burglary.
assault minor
The following are examples where assault minor 
cases were reclassified. In many cases assault 
minor was reclassified to Attention and Complaints 
for several reasons; but mainly the reluctance of 
a victim to assist with a prosecution and provide 
a statement of complaint. A reluctance to make a 
statement should not impact on the category of 
the crime that is recorded. The following are some 
examples of cases found on PULSE. 
examples of pULse reclassifications for a crime 
that was initially classified as assault minor. 
the commentary on the incident is taken from 
pULse incident record details included on the 
inspectorate’s database. 
•	 Victim struck a number of times and, 
although would not make a statement, the 
victim wanted the crime noted. Shown 
as discussed at a district meeting and 
reclassified to Attention and Complaints. 
•	 Victim	 hit	 on	 head	 with	 glass	 bottle.	
Reclassified to Attention and Complaints 
on the authority of a detective sergeant 
“pending further investigation this may be 
reclassified”.	 No	 record	 of	 an	 investigation	
was found by the Inspectorate. 
•	 In	a	domestic	violence	assault	case,	the	victim	
did not want to prosecute, but wanted the case 
noted for any future application to a court. It 
was initially reclassified to an Attention and 
Complaints and then to a domestic dispute 
some four months later. GISC challenged the 
change in classification from an assault to an 
Attention and Complaints. 
assault Harm 
These are more serious assaults. In some cases, 
assault harm crimes were reclassified to Attention 
and Complaints and also appeared to follow the 
reluctance of a victim to assist with a prosecution 
and provide a statement of complaint. A reluctance 
to make a statement of complaint should not impact 
on the category of crime that is recorded. There 
were several cases where the crime was reclassified 
to a lesser assault, even though the injuries recorded 
appeared to be more serious. The following are 
some examples of cases found on PULSE. 
examples of pULse reclassifications for a 
crime that was initially classified as assault 
harm. the commentary on the incident is 
taken from pULse incident record details 
included on the inspectorate’s database. 
•	 Victim	 stabbed	 with	 a	 broken	 bottle.	
This was initially dealt with as a critical 
incident. PULSE noted that the victim did 
not want the crime investigated and it was 
reclassified to an Attention and Complaints 
incident.
•	 Victim	 with	 a	 possible	 broken	 nose,	 but	
was unwilling to make a statement. A 
supervisor directed a reclassification to 
assault minor as the victim would not 
provide a statement.
•	 Victim	 hit	 on	 head	 several	 times	 and	
taken to hospital. Reclassified one month 
later to an assault minor by a member 
from a training unit. GISC challenged the 
reclassification due to the serious nature 
of the assault and the evidence of injuries. 
This crime remained in the new category. 
•	 Victim	punched	 in	 the	 face	and	had	three	
teeth broken. An inspector stated that if the 
victim declined to provide a statement, the 
crime should be moved to a public order 
incident. The crime was reclassified twice, 
initially to a public order incident and 
then to an assault minor on the directions 
of the district officer. GISC questioned 
the reclassification of this crime, but it 
remained in the new category.
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robbery
Robbery is another serious crime, where most 
reclassifications went to a less serious crime type, 
such as a theft person or theft. It should be noted 
that robbery is defined as a theft from a person 
where force or the threat of force is used or a person 
is put in fear of such force. Robbery is still a crime 
with relatively low levels of offending, however due 
to the low levels of recorded robbery offences, any 
change in the classification of robbery to a lesser 
offence, is likely to have a significant impact on the 
percentage changes in these offences. Due to the 
low volume of recorded crimes in this category the 
Inspectorate extended the search parameters in the 
seven divisions to all such crime in 2012.
Chart 5.12 shows analysis of fifty robbery offences 
reported in 2012 in the seven divisions visited that 
were reclassified.
Findings
The Inspectorate did not agree with 76% of the 
reclassification decisions made and found that 12% 
of the cases had insufficient details to determine if 
the decision making was correct or not. 
The following are some examples of the cases 
sampled. 
examples of pULse reclassifications for a 
crime that was initially classified as robbery. 
the commentary on the incident is taken from 
pULse incident record details included on the 
inspectorate’s database. 
•	 Victim	pushed	to	ground	and	phone	grabbed	
from hand. Three months later a sergeant 
reclassified it to a theft. 
•	 Suspect	 grabbed	 bag	 from	 shoulder	 and	
pulled victim to the ground before stealing 
bag and contents. Reclassified to theft one 
day later by a sergeant as no evidence of 
threat or violence. 
•	 Victim	grabbed	by	throat,	pushed	to	ground	
and banged head. Pockets searched by 
suspect described as looking for money. This 
was reclassified to a theft from person.
•	 Suspect	 said	 that	 they	 had	 a	 knife	 in	 their	
pocket and the victim believed this. Suspect 
took the victim’s bicycle and phone. This was 
reclassified to a theft. 
Chart 5.12
inspectorate analysis of pULse robbery incident type reclassified During 2012 in the 
selected Divisions
number Sampled incorrectly 
reclassified
Correctly 
reclassified
insufficient Details to 
determine Classification
reclassified more 
than once
50 76% 10% 12% 2%
 Source: Data obtained from sampling 50 PULSE Robbery type incident records by the Garda Inspectorate. 
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theft person and theft
Theft is a large category for crimes covering a wide 
range of offences. In this category, the Inspectorate 
did find some reclassifications that were 
immediately carried out at the time of creating the 
PULSE record at GISC and appeared to be linked to 
the wrong classification being selected. There were 
also crimes where a PULSE incident was created 
for the category of theft person, but the person was 
not in possession of the property at the time of the 
crime and the crimes were correctly reclassified to 
theft other.
examples of pULse reclassifications for a crime 
that was initially classified as theft person and 
theft. the commentary on the incident is taken 
from pULse incident record details included 
on the inspectorate’s database. 
•	 A	victim	gave	 their	phone	 to	someone	who	
ran off with it. It was correctly reclassified 
from theft person to theft.
•	 Two	 purses	 taken	 from	 a	 buggy	 in	 a	 shop.	
Correctly reclassified from theft person to 
theft.
•	 Money	 taken	 from	 handbag.	 Crime	
reclassified from theft to property lost. GISC 
questioned the reclassification, but it was 
unanswered. The PULSE record suggested 
that theft was the right classification. 
•	 Details	 from	 a	 person’s	 credit	 card	 were	
used and the bank was unsure about the 
jurisdiction for the crime. The crime was 
reclassified into Attention and Complaints 
without any explanation. GISC questioned 
the reclassification in 2010 and two years 
later it remained unanswered. 
sexual assaults and Changes to 
Classifications
During the sampling of PULSE, the Inspectorate 
noted a number of historical sexual offences that 
were reclassified in 2012. These crimes dated back 
over fourteen years and included offences such as 
rape and other sexual assaults. These crimes were 
all reclassified to less serious offences by the same 
detective sergeant on the same date. There was no 
narrative on PULSE to explain why these changes 
were made. The Inspectorate did not have access to 
any cases files, but it was hard to understand why 
historical crimes were being reclassified.
an example of pULse reclassification for a 
crime that was initially classified as sexual 
assault. the commentary on the incident is 
taken from pULse incident record details 
included on the inspectorate’s database. 
•	 A	 sexual	 assault	 PULSE	 record	 created	 in	
2008 had narrative removed to take out 
the description of the assault and it was 
reclassified to the non-crime Attention 
and Complaints category in 2012. There is 
no rationale on PULSE as to why this was 
reclassified some four years later.
The Garda Síochána has developed Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) for all crimes that 
involve child sex abuse and sexual assault. When 
a case is recorded in these categories, and in the 
absence of a detection, it continues to feature on the 
KPIs and remains as a monitored case. If a crime is 
reclassified and the narrative is changed, a crime of 
this nature will no longer feature on the KPIs. 
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theft from motor vehicle
There were a number of crimes in this category, 
where a theft had taken place but were classified 
as other crimes; such as criminal damage and in 
some cases, the non-crime category of Attention 
and Complaints.
examples of pULse reclassifications for a 
crime that was initially classified as theft from 
motor vehicle. the commentary on the incident 
is taken from pULse incident record details 
included on the inspectorate’s database. 
•	 Two	wind	deflectors	were	taken	from	a	car.	
There is also mention of criminal damage. 
This was reclassified six months later to an 
Attention and Complaints incident. GISC 
questioned this change but it was never 
answered.
•	 €150	 was	 stolen	 from	 the	 door	 of	 coach.	
This was reclassified to an Attention and 
Complaints incident. There are no details on 
PULSE about who reclassified this crime and 
when this took place. 
•	 Window	 of	 car	 smashed	 and	 handbag	
contents stolen. On directions of the district 
officer, this was reclassified by a garda three 
months later to property lost.
Criminal Damage
Criminal damage is a crime type that moved to 
several different categories. Some criminal damage 
crimes moved to traffic offences such as interfering 
with the mechanism of a vehicle and some moved 
into the non-crime categories of lost property and 
Attention and Complaints. 
examples of pULse reclassifications for a 
crime that was initially classified as criminal 
damage. the commentary on the incident is 
taken from pULse incident record details 
included on the inspectorate’s database. 
•	 A	driver’s	 door	wing	mirror	was	 damaged	
on a tourist’s car. This was reclassified to 
Attention and Complaints. 
•	 Damage	 to	 the	 window	 of	 a	 cafe;	 the	
victim stated that they just wanted it noted 
for insurance purposes. This was later 
reclassified to Attention and Complaints.
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operation Look-Back 
This was an operation conducted by the Garda 
Síochána in some of the divisions visited which 
reviewed crimes recorded in the previous three 
months to look for detection opportunities. The 
Inspectorate decided to look at this process as a part 
of the detection sampling analysis, but found that 
crimes were also reclassified. Crimes recorded in 
January 2013 were selected to be reviewed and the 
reclassifications were selected from that database. 
As with previous examinations of this variety, 
the Inspectorate used the available information to 
determine if the reclassification was correct. Chart 
5.13 shows the results for that sample.
Chart 5.13 
inspectorate analysis of pULse Crime 
incidents reclassified During operation 
Look-Back of incidents recorded in 
January 2013
incorrectly 
reclassified
Correctly 
reclassified
reclassified 
more than once
71% 0% 29%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records 
by the Garda Inspectorate.
Findings
•	 The	 incorrect	 reclassification	 rate	 is	
consistent with the other analysis conducted 
by the Inspectorate; 
•	 29%	 were	 reclassified	 on	 more	 than	 one	
occasion. 
5.5 Other Crime Counting Rules 
Issues 
reclassification – Crime Counting rules
The Inspectorate found that the current Garda 
Síochána Crime Counting Rules state that 
reclassification is only required within or to 
homicide offences. The Inspectorate recognises 
that there are other occasions when reclassification 
is appropriate. The Crime Counting Rules need to 
be refreshed. The development of any new rules 
requires careful consideration, as it will impact on 
recording practices and it can make comparison 
between crime years more difficult. 
recommendation 5.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality initiate 
a process, in which the Cso should have a 
central role, towards the development of new 
Crime Counting rules. (medium term). 
multiple offences – Under Counting and 
over Counting
With crime counting rules, it is important to ensure 
that each and every crime is correctly recorded, 
and for some offences there may be more than one 
victim and as such, each crime against a person and 
property should be counted as separate offences. In 
simple terms, the Crime Counting Rules say ‘one 
victim one crime’. The Inspectorate found many 
examples where multiple crimes had occurred and 
were correctly recorded and linked on the PULSE 
system. The process of linking PULSE incidents 
is referred to as ‘cased crimes’. The Inspectorate 
identified a number of multiple crimes where 
additional PULSE records existed, but were not 
always ‘cased’ on PULSE. This made auditing 
difficult, as further searches had to be completed to 
check that the other crimes were recorded. 
The Inspectorate found cases where multiple 
offences were committed, but only one crime 
was actually recorded on PULSE. An example of 
this was found during the sampling of letter box 
burglaries; where the keys for a car and the car was 
stolen as a result of a burglary. In these cases both 
the burglary and the taking of the car should be 
recorded as separate crimes. 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 5: Crime Management
Part 5  |  24
Continuous series
In certain circumstances, crime counting rules 
allow multiple offences by the same suspect on 
the same victim to be recorded as one offence and 
treated as a continuous series. This recording rule 
is sometimes used in cases of harassment, where 
there are a number of separate incidents that took 
place over an extended period of time. It can also 
apply in cases where an employee steals on two or 
more occasions from an employer and the crime 
can be counted as one theft. It is important that this 
rule is applied properly to ensure that the correct 
numbers of crimes are recorded. 
During the inspection process, the Inspectorate 
attended a daily accountability meeting where six 
crimes were discussed that involved the theft of 
farm machinery. These crimes were committed 
in different locations, with different victims, but 
it was believed that one suspect was responsible. 
The district officer intimated that in the absence 
of a suspect being charged with these offences, it 
may be recorded under this continuous series rule, 
thus counting it as one offence. The Inspectorate 
pointed out at the time that this rule would not 
apply in these circumstances. During the sampling 
of PULSE incidents, the Inspectorate checked the 
progress of the above case and found that only one 
crime was recorded. This one example resulted in 
the under recording of a number of crimes. 
5.6 Invalidating a Crime 
There will always be occasions where a crime that 
is reported, is later found not to have taken place. 
Examples include, where a person has made a 
false report of a crime or has mislaid property that 
is later found. The Garda Síochána’s process for 
dealing with such cases is to reclassify the initial 
crime to ‘Invalid’. Where this occurs, there should 
always be a clear rationale on the original PULSE 
record, explaining why this is marked as invalid. 
The use of this category is a very small proportion 
of the overall number of crimes.
In order to analyse the invalidation of PULSE 
incidents, the Inspectorate sampled a number of 
incident records that were shown as invalid in 
June 2012. The sample looked at crimes across all 
seven divisions and there were a varied number 
of crime types. Chart 5.14 shows a breakdown of 
the incident types for the largest categories and a 
catch all category for the rest. 
Chart 5.14
inspectorate analysis of pULse incidents invalidated during June 2012 in selected Divisions 
incident type number 
Sampled
incorrectly 
Classified
Correctly Classified insufficient details to 
determine Classification
assault minor 6 83% 17% 0%
Burglary 6 50% 33% 17%
Criminal Damage 13 38% 62% 0%
theft from mPV 4 50% 50% 0%
theft Other 10 10% 90% 0%
theft Shop 4 25% 50% 25%
Unauthorised taking of a 
mPV
6 0% 100% 0%
Others 27 33% 63% 4%
average for all incidents 76 34% 62% 4%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 76 PULSE invalidated incident records by the Garda Inspectorate.
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general Findings
•	 62%	were	correctly	invalidated;	
•	 Further	examination	of	 the	sample	showed	
that in 19% of the cases, crime incidents were 
being incorrectly invalidated when a victim 
would not provide a statement of complaint. 
In these examples, there was credible evidence that 
a crime had occurred and the crime should have 
remained classified as such. 
examples of pULse records that were recorded 
as a crime, but were later shown as invalid. 
the commentary on the incident is taken from 
pULse incident record details included on the 
inspectorate’s database. 
Correctly invalidated:
•	 Report	 received	 that	 a	 car	 was	 stolen	 that	
was later found; 
•	 Robbery	that	was	reported	and	found	to	be	a	
duplicate report; 
•	 Theft	 of	 petrol	 where	 the	 driver	 of	 the	 car	
later returned and paid for the fuel.
Incorrectly	 invalidated	 (No	 rationale	 for	 an	
invalid crime):
•	 Victim	 pushed	 to	 the	 ground	 and	 phone	
stolen	 –	 this	 was	 reclassified	 from	 robbery	
to invalid. There was no rationale to explain 
why it was invalidated;
•	 Victim	hit	in	face	and	received	cut	to	eye.	On	
instructions of an inspector this was shown 
as invalid. There was no rationale to explain 
why;
•	 A	 rape	 offence	 reported	 in	 2012,	 but	 not	
invalidated until May 2013. There is no 
rationale on PULSE to explain why it took 
eleven months to establish that a crime did 
not occur.
With regard to GISC supervision of an incident, 
there is an anomaly with the PULSE system. When 
a crime is shown as invalid by a member, it closes 
that case and the PULSE record becomes invisible 
to GISC. This also includes a crime where GISC 
have generated a review/clarification. 
During sampling, the Inspectorate also found 
a number of examples where there was a clear 
justification to invalidate a crime, but this action 
was never completed. As a result, a crime statistic 
was retained for an incident that was never a crime 
(called over-counting). In some other cases, a crime 
that should be invalidated was incorrectly changed 
to a non-crime category, such as Attention and 
Complaints. 
There are occasions when a crime should be 
invalidated and the Inspectorate believes that any 
such invalidation should always be referred back to 
a GISC reviewer to ensure that this is the correct 
course of action. 
Changes to pULse 
There are a number of features on PULSE that 
should be restricted or removed, such as the ability 
to reclassify or invalidate a crime and any feature 
that allows a PULSE record to be removed from the 
view or supervision of GISC.
Unlike any other comparable police jurisdiction 
visited by the inspectorate, any member of the 
garda síochána can effectively change a crime 
classification, without having to go through gisC 
to register the change, without any permission 
and without any supervision. 
 recommendation 5.5 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána publishes policy establishing 
the roles and responsibilities of all staff 
in regard to the reclassification and 
invalidation of pULse incident records, with 
gisC having the final decision authority. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Allow	 GISC	 full	 PULSE	 incident	 access,	
including the ability to view records that are 
reclassified or invalidated.
In the interim, the Garda Síochána should 
develop guidelines to be issued to all staff clearly 
articulating what is and is not permitted on PULSE. 
These changes should be addressed in conjunction 
with other recommendations made in this report 
relating to PULSE.
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importance of Crime Classification for 
victims of Crime
The importance of getting a classification right 
is also important for a victim of any crime. A 
wrongly classified crime may well stop a victim 
from receiving appropriate referral to a specific 
victim support agency, crime prevention advice or 
a follow-up visit from a community officer.
reclassifying Crime without supervision or 
oversight
GISC have clear responsibilities for ensuring that 
crime classifications are correct and that crime 
counting rules are complied with. Any change 
to a crime classification without having to use 
GISC, effectively removes any oversight of crime 
reclassifications outside of the operational unit that 
has changed the crime. While a reclassification can 
generate a review/clarification, this is not a strong 
enough mechanism to ensure the accuracy of any 
change to the classification of crime.
5.7 Crime Management Units 
and Reclassification of Crime 
the Future
In this report, the Inspectorate has highlighted 
many areas where there are deficiencies in 
the application of crime counting rules and 
particularly in respect of reclassification of crime. 
The Inspectorate believes that there must be 
procedural and structural changes to the way that 
the Garda Síochána manages crime investigation. 
A significant change is the recommendation 
to implement crime management units. Other 
jurisdictions operate crime management units 
in different ways. In Denmark, Denver and West 
Yorkshire the crime management units operate at a 
service level and in Scotland operate on a divisional 
level. The Inspectorate recommends the creation of 
crime management units at a divisional level. 
Clearly, the introduction of crime management 
units will require suitable staffing levels to ensure 
that such units operate effectively. The benefits of 
effective crime management units should include 
a significant reduction in the number of new and 
dated investigations that are currently conducted 
and will release a considerable amount of time for 
gardaí in all investigative roles. 
As recommended in Part 2, a move from multiple 
district administration units to one divisional 
administration unit could release a number of staff 
that could be used to create the new units. Crime 
management units could also provide a meaningful 
role for those gardaí on restricted duties, who are 
currently unable to go out on patrol. 
Crime Classification and reclassification 
District Decision makers 
The ultimate decision maker in respect of crime 
classification in Ireland is the local district officer. 
When crime counting rules were discussed at all 
levels of the Garda Síochána during this inspection, 
the district officer is described as the person who 
has responsibility for checking compliance with 
such matters. 
Across Ireland, there are currently ninety-six 
district officers, who on a daily basis are making 
independent decisions about crime classification 
and reclassification. This practice does not promote 
consistency of decision-making and a crime with 
similar circumstances can be placed in several 
different crime categories, depending on the area 
it occurs in. The Inspectorate also found a wide 
variance in the approach to detecting crimes and 
an absence of central guidance and monitoring as 
to how those detections are achieved, thus echoing 
the Inspectorate’s findings in the report on fixed 
charge processing.5
The Inspectorate recognises that district officers 
are under pressure to address crime and to catch 
offenders. There is certainly a belief amongst district 
officers that if crime increases or detections are low, 
then they will be viewed by their organisation as 
unsuccessful. 
Most other policing jurisdictions have a small 
number of Dedicated Decision Makers (DDMs), 
usually at inspector rank, operating at a divisional 
or a regional level. DDMs are the only persons with 
authority to authorise a reclassification of a crime 
5 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, The Fixed Charge 
Processing System, A 21st Century Strategy, February 2014
Crime Investigation Report       Part 5: Crime Management
Part 5  |  27
or to show a crime as detected. The Inspectorate 
believes that the Garda Síochána should implement 
a system of DDMs who should be the first point of 
contact for a member to go to for a reclassification 
or a detection decision. The DDM should make 
sure it is the right decision and once approved, the 
member should contact GISC or generate a review 
to reclassify the crime.  
 recommendation 5.6 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduces a system of Dedicated 
Decision makers on a divisional basis. 
(short term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken: 
•	 Develop	 policy	 that	 requires	 members	 to	
obtain Dedicated Decision Maker approval 
prior to any request for reclassification or 
invalidation of a PULSE incident record. 
reclassification of Crime 
A new instruction was issued in July 2013 by the 
Garda Síochána, which contained an instruction 
to GISC staff and sergeants about reviewing 
PULSE incidents. It specifically highlights that the 
narrative should contain sufficient information to 
justify a reclassification of a crime. The Inspectorate 
welcomes this instruction, but it needs to be 
accompanied by significant changes in the authority 
levels for making such changes and audits to ensure 
compliance. 
Many international police services have had 
similar systemic issues around change to crime 
classifications. Inconsistency has been overcome 
by strict supervision and adherence to the crime 
counting rules. Concern about the integrity of crime 
recording is a risk for any police service in terms of 
public confidence in policing. 
new role for gisC 
At present there are far too many gardaí with 
the ability to change a crime classification and 
this practice must be stopped immediately. The 
Inspectorate believes that GISC should play a more 
enhanced central role in crime reclassification and 
that divisions should not be allowed to reclassify 
a crime without the authority of GISC. This would 
provide a far more consistent approach to the 
process and it would also reduce the wasteful 
practice of GISC having to generate thousands of 
reviews/clarifications that are never answered. 
In the future, if a member wants to reclassify 
a crime or an incident, the member must first 
contact the local dedicated decision maker (DDM) 
to make sure that the decision is correct and there 
is a rationale as to why it should be changed. 
At this point, the member can contact GISC 
through a call taker or request a review through 
the PULSE system. The Inspectorate accepts that 
reclassifications will often be required, but this 
new system would dramatically reduce the number 
of crimes that are currently incorrectly changed. 
Any future changes must also be accompanied by 
a clear rationale in the narrative to explain why it 
was reclassified. Such an approach would ensure 
that a crime committed anywhere in Ireland is 
far more likely to be classified in the same way. 
There is no cost implication or technology solution 
required to allow this change to take place. 
Where the GISC call taker and the members are in 
disagreement, the case should be referred to a GISC 
Reviewer and if there is still a disagreement, then 
the case should be referred to the proposed Garda 
Crime Registrar (outlined in Recommendation 5.8 
later in this part), who will be the final decision 
maker. In the short term GISC should be the final 
authority. 
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training for Crime managers in Crime 
Counting rules 
During this inspection, the Inspectorate found that 
many people with responsibility for crime counting 
rules had received no formal training and certainly 
no refresher trainer. The Inspectorate believes that 
this should form part of all promotion training 
courses and once developed, that the Garda Crime 
Register should take responsibility for developing 
training for those involved in the management of 
crime investigation. 
integrity of Crime recording - national 
Crime recording standards (nCrs)
From an initial call from the public, through to 
crime and incident recording, the Inspectorate 
has indentified issues that question the accuracy 
of crime and incident recording. The Inspectorate 
believes that Ireland must move towards a national 
system of crime recording that protects the integrity 
of crime data and ensures that there is a consistent 
and transparent approach to the application of 
crime counting rules.
National	 Crime	 Recording	 Standards	 (NCRS)	 is	
a well established process that was introduced 
in England and Wales in 2002 and in Scotland 
in	 2004.	 Prior	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 NCRS,	 the	
decision whether to record an incident as a crime 
or not appeared to be influenced by an individual 
officer’s discretion and there was evidence of under 
recording of crime and crimes consistently being 
downgraded.	 The	 aims	 of	 NCRS	 are	 to	 promote	
greater consistency in the recording of crime and to 
provide a more victim orientated approach to crime 
recording. Ethical recording of crime is integral to 
modern policing and it is vitally important that 
police services’ recording and disposal practices 
are capable of withstanding rigorous scrutiny. 
All reports of incidents, whether from victims, 
witnesses or third parties and whether crime 
related or not, must result in the registration of an 
incident report by the police.
Following the initial registration of the incident 
on the crime recording system, it will be recorded 
as a crime if, on the balance of probability, a crime 
took place. In most cases the belief by the victim 
that a crime has taken place is sufficient to justify 
recording it as a crime. An unwillingness to 
support an investigation or prosecution should not 
be allowed to negatively influence the recording 
process.	“No	victim,	no	crime”	is	a	general	concept	
that is applied to crime. In some cases and generally 
serious cases, a police service may decide to record 
a crime even though the victim cannot be found or 
has declined to confirm if a crime has taken place. 
In Denmark, all complaints of serious sexual assault 
are recorded as a crime. 
Once recorded, a crime remains unless there is 
additional and verifiable information to disprove 
that a crime has occurred. The fact that a person 
is drunk or otherwise impaired might have a 
bearing on the balance of probability, but if at the 
time of reporting, supporting evidence exists, a 
crime should be recorded regardless of the person’s 
condition. The recording of all crimes also provides 
a far greater intelligence picture of offending.
A modern crime recording system is essential to 
the	 proper	 implementation	 of	 NCRS	 and	 ideally	
one that is user friendly, easily auditable and has 
links to incident recording systems. Police Scotland 
became one national service in April 2013 and is in 
the process of developing an IT solution that will 
link eight previous IT systems to one single system. 
Other US and UK services have developed systems 
that link incident recording, custody detention and 
crime recording.
 recommendation 5.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána introduces national Crime 
recording standards. (medium term).
Force Crime registrars (FCr)
To	 ensure	 that	 NCRS	 is	 maintained	 within	 a	
police service and to provide greater consistency, 
other police services have appointed Force Crime 
Registrars (FCRs). The FCR acts as a final arbiter in 
the interpretation of the crime counting rules and 
detections. In any crime counting rules process, 
there will always need to have an appeal system to 
deal with disputes about a classification between 
GISC and the division holding the crime. 
The FCR could be a member of the Garda Síochána, 
but must be outside operational line command and 
answerable to a person with overall responsibility 
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for the accuracy and integrity of crime recording 
processes. In some countries this role is performed 
by a senior police officer and in Scotland by senior 
police staff. In South Wales, the FCR is a senior 
member of police staff, but reports directly to 
an independent Director in the Criminal Justice 
Partnership. 
Key responsibilities of the FCR would include:
•	 Developing	 and	 implementing	 monitoring	
systems of crime recording and detection 
policies;
•	 Creating	an	audit	programme	to	ensure	the	
highest standards of data integrity;
•	 Achieving	 more	 consistent	 and	 accurate	
crime recording;
•	 Ensuring	 prompt	 and	 adequate	 circulation	
of changes to counting rules;
•	 Acting	 as	 the	 force	 representative	 on	 the	
subject of crime recording.
In other jurisdictions, the FCR also leads on incident 
recording standards (see recommendation in Part 
3) and has responsibility for all the processes that 
follow. 
 recommendation 5.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduce a Force Crime registar 
(FCr) with responsibility for the accuracy and 
integrity of the recording of incidents, crimes 
and detections. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 The	FCR	needs	to	be	outside	of	operational	
line command; 
•	 Subject	to	any	selection	process,	an	interim	
FCR should be immediately appointed. 
5.8	Reclassifying	Crime	–	What	
Does this Mean in Practice?
While the Inspectorate found many examples of 
crimes being reclassified to less serious offences, it 
was also found that some crimes were elevated to a 
more serious offence. 
The Inspectorate did find reclassifications 
where, based on the available information, the 
reclassification decision on PULSE was correct. In 
most cases where crimes were reclassified, there was 
no rationale to explain why a crime was changed. 
The Inspectorate again found many reviews/
clarifications generated by GISC questioning the 
appropriateness of a reclassification and many 
of these enquiries remained outstanding twelve 
months later. 
Changing a crime from one crime category to 
another crime category does not impact on the 
overall number of crimes in Ireland, but it does 
significantly alter the balance of crime in certain 
categories. For example, moving a burglary offence 
to a less serious category presents a distorted 
picture of burglary crime levels. Conversely, 
changing a crime into a non-crime category can 
make a significant difference to the volume of that 
particular crime category. The failure to record 
crimes or to put a crime into a non-crime category 
will impact on overall crime numbers.
incident and Crime recording 
The analysis in Part 4, ‘Incident Recording’ and the 
analysis in this part on reclassification of crime, 
raises a number of serious issues about the accuracy 
of the Garda Síochána crime data.
Concerns include:
•	 Crimes	 that	 are	 reported	 to	 the	 Garda	
Síochána, but are not recorded on PULSE; 
•	 Crimes	that	are	reported,	but	are	recorded	in	
a non-crime category;
•	 Crimes	that	are	reported,	but	are	recorded	in	
the wrong crime category;
•	 Crimes	that	are	initially	recorded	in	the	right	
category, but are subsequently incorrectly 
reclassified to either a non-crime or an 
incorrect crime category.
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gap between a report and pULse
The gap between a crime reported to the gardaí, but 
not recorded on PULSE is very difficult to measure, 
but the Inspectorate has spoken to victims and 
witnesses that have reported crimes to the Garda 
Síochána that were never recorded on PULSE. Other 
police services that have addressed poor recording 
practices, found that recording levels in years that 
followed actions to address this issue saw reported 
crime levels in some places rise by as much as 24%.
The 158 Volume Crime Case Reviews were a 
random sample of every day cases, and it identified 
that 9% of the cases did not have a PULSE record 
created at the time of the incident, but were created 
twelve months later. Also, out of the forty-four cases 
that never resulted in a PULSE record, 92% did not 
have a clear rationale for not recording a crime.
Classification on pULse
The Inspectorate has found that many crimes and 
other incidents are not always placed into the right 
category at the point of first classification. Analysis 
of specific crime classifications recorded at first 
instance showed that the Inspectorate did not agree 
with 30% of the classification decisions made and 
in a further 16% of incidents, the Inspectorate was 
unable to determine if the classification decision was 
correct or not. It was also the case that the category 
of classification that was found to be incorrect is, 
in the majority of cases, in a less serious crime 
category or in some cases a non-crime category. 
The Volume Crime Case Reviews also examined 
the PULSE incident records of the classification 
created at first instance and did not agree with 36% 
of the classifications with a further 7% that could 
not be determined.
reclassification
In the view of the Inspectorate, the Garda Síochána 
is reclassifying far too many crimes with analysis 
showing that over 70% of the decisions made to 
reclassify a crime incident are incorrect. In the 
seventeen month sample of 12,506 crimes the 
Inspectorate found that in 83% of those cases, a 
crime that was reclassified moved to a less serious 
crime category. Whilst these are samples of crime, 
they provide an indication of reclassification 
practices.
Links to Detection rates 
Part 11 looks at crimes that are shown on PULSE 
as detected. There is a clear correlation between 
crime recording and detection rates. Poor recording 
practices that under count crimes will result in 
higher detection rates overall.
Decision making 
At present, far too many people are allowed to make 
decisions on classifications and reclassifications 
and far too few people are checking to make sure 
that those decisions are correct. With large numbers 
of people involved in this process, there are always 
going to be inconsistencies with decision-making. 
The Inspectorate has also found an almost complete 
absence of the recording of rationales on PULSE for 
the decisions made. 
Some members of the Garda Síochána are making 
poor decisions about crime classifications and 
reclassifications. The Garda Síochána needs to 
restrict those who can make decisions on crime 
classifications to a few highly trained individuals. 
In many cases, it is clear from reading PULSE 
incident records, that a far more serious offence 
has taken place than the classification suggests. 
The level of incorrect decisions that are being 
made on PULSE are damaging the data integrity of 
PULSE.
At present, there is no independent auditing or 
oversight of crime decisions that are made. The 
integrity of data on PULSE requires systems in 
place to ensure that crime and decisions about 
crime are accurately recorded. 
the inspectorate has identified deficiencies with 
the recording of crimes and incidents reported 
to the garda síochána and with crime recording 
practices.
Baseline Year for Crime
Any new practices for recording and classifying 
crimes are likely to lead to significant fluctuation 
across many crime categories. Therefore, this will 
require the introduction of a baseline year against 
which to measure results accurately.
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There are options for a baseline year. 2015 
could be used, as this would provide time for 
the Garda Síochána to implement some of the 
recommendations contained in this report. From 
January 2015 and throughout the first year, it is 
likely that some crime categories will see increases 
in recorded offences such as burglary, robbery, 
domestic violence and sexual assaults. Recorded 
offences for other crimes such as criminal damage 
and trespass may decrease. In the years that follow 
2015, there will gradually be a far more accurate 
picture of performance, as crime levels can be 
compared against the baseline year. Year two will 
provide an even better intelligence picture of true 
crime levels across Ireland. 
Another option is to go back to January 2014 
and audit the crime records, including PULSE 
classification and reclassification for inaccuracies. 
This process would also have to include checking 
CAD and station paper records, to see how many 
calls received from the public reporting a crime, 
should have been recorded on PULSE. This would 
be a challenging task and would require significant 
assignment of Garda resources and independent 
oversight of the process. The checking of calls 
received versus PULSE records would allow the 
Garda Síochána to recover some cases where crimes 
were reported but not recorded. Due to the poor 
recording of calls received, the Garda Síochána may 
never be able to identify and retrieve unrecorded 
crimes. There is insufficient information in the 
current data sets available to show that the review 
of 2014 would reflect an accurate baseline year. 
 recommendation 5.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality initiate 
a process, in which the Cso should have 
a central role, towards the designation of 
a baseline year for crime recording. (short 
term).
annual inspection of Crime recording 
In	 the	 UK,	 compliance	 with	 NCRS	 and	 the	
maintenance of data quality is subject to 
external review by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission 
as part of their statutory powers. However, primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of crime data 
quality rests with the nominated chief officer with 
responsibility for accuracy and integrity of crime 
recording practices. The Inspectorate believes that 
there should be an independent and annual audit of 
incident and crime recording standards.
 recommendation 5.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality consider 
appointing an independent body to conduct 
annual audits of incident and crime recording 
standards. (medium term). 
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6.1 Introduction
Part 6 looks at the whole process of crime investigation and in particular the 
choices that are made by the Garda Síochána about who will investigate a 
particular type of crime, the training received, the support provided by 
national and specialist units, the timeliness and the quality of the investigation 
conducted.
This part also looks at the investigation of murder, rape and other serious 
crimes. When such a crime occurs, victims rightly expect that an experienced 
investigator will take on their case and bring it an effective conclusion.
Chart 6.1
total recorded Crime in ireland 2006 to 2013
Source: CSO crime data, aggregated by Garda Inspectorate.
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Chart 6.1 shows the total recorded crime incidents 
between 2006 and 2013. This includes the majority 
of crimes but excludes traffic offences and some 
miscellaneous categories as the volume of these 
incidents distorts the crime picture. The trend line 
shows a peak of total recorded crime of 296,705 
in 2008, and a consistent year on year reduction 
in crime to 229,579 in 2013. Total recorded crime 
in most jurisdictions can be affected by police 
generated activity. Comparing the recorded crime 
in 2008 with 2013 shows a reduction of recorded 
offences of over 67,000. The following figures show 
the difference in specific crime categories between 
2008 and 2013:  
•	 11,025	less	offences	of	intoxicated	driving;
•	 Nine	fewer	homicides;
•	 8,000	fewer	drug	offences;
•	 More	than	25,000	fewer	public	order	offences;
•	 Just	over	1,400	more	burglary	offences;
•	 Criminal	 damage reduced by over 15,000 
offences.
Appendix 3 shows the trend in all recorded 
burglary offences from 2006 to 2013. The lowest 
recorded levels for burglary were in 2007 rising to 
a peak in 2012.
As explained in the introduction to this report, the 
Garda Inspectorate wanted to compare recorded 
and detected crime in Ireland with other similar 
jurisdictions. Internationally, this is not a practice 
that is generally used due to differences in crime 
definitions, legislation, accounting periods and 
the crime recording categories. Comparing crime 
between jurisdictions in this way can misrepresent 
the actual incidence of crime.  
Chart 6.2 shows the average number of crimes per 
member per year over a seven year period. This 
peaked in 2006 at just under 21 crimes per member, 
and has shown a steady decline to just over 17 
crimes per member in 2013.
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6.2 Levels of Serious and 
Complex Crime – Current 
Position in Ireland 
The Inspectorate grouped crime into serious and 
volume categories. The purpose of this exercise was 
(i) to establish the levels of the two broad categories 
across the seven garda divisions visited and (ii) 
to ascertain the methodologies in investigating 
these crimes. This distinction between serious and 
volume crime is important, as it should inform 
strategic planning and allocation of resources. 
The general position of the Garda Síochána is 
that detectives investigate serious crime and 
uniformed gardaí investigate volume crime. As the 
organisation has no set definition of ‘serious crime’, 
the Inspectorate sought the views of senior gardaí 
in the divisions visited, as to what is generally 
considered to be within that category. For the 
purposes of this report the Inspectorate included 
the following crimes as serious:
•	 Rape	 and	 other	 sexual	 assaults	 that	 are	
clearly serious crimes, however, in the 
Garda Síochána these crimes are not always 
investigated	by	detectives;	and	
•	 Fraud,	which	is	not	serious	crime	per	se,	but	
can be complex and time consuming and is 
often investigated by detective gardaí. 
Whilst every crime committed is serious to a victim, 
there are some crime types that are defined as 
serious crime, such as serious incidents of violence 
and the death of a person through a criminal or a 
negligent act. Other offences, including kidnapping 
and rape, would be regarded as serious. Volume 
crime includes those crimes that most police 
services deal with on a daily basis such as burglary, 
theft and assaults. The Inspectorate acknowledges 
that robbery and assaults can be serious crimes 
but due to high levels they are usually included in 
the volume crime category. 
For the purpose of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
separated crime into serious and volume crime 
offences. In defining the offences for each category, 
the Inspectorate used international definitions, but 
importantly, the crimes that senior gardaí viewed 
Chart 6.2
average Crimes per member per Year 2006-2013
Source:	CSO	crime	data;	Strength	data	supplied	by	the	Garda	Síochána	aggregated	by	Garda	Inspectorate.	
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as serious. The table above shows the breakdown of 
offences by category. Some fraud cases are complex 
and	 may	 require	 major	 enquiries.	 Most	 fraud	
offences are investigated by the Garda Bureau of 
Fraud Investigation or by district detective units. 
As a result, the Inspectorate included fraud as a 
serious crime for the purposes of determining who 
investigates particular crimes. Fraud accounts for a 
high number of crimes and in 2012 there were 5,736 
fraud offences. The Inspectorate removed traffic 
offences from overall crime figures as the numbers 
often distort statistical analysis.
serious Crime investigation – 
internationally 
Most	 international	 police	 services	 look	 at	 serious	
crime in two distinct areas. Firstly, murder, 
kidnapping and serious firearms offences, that may 
require specialist investigation or technical skills, 
are usually investigated by dedicated centrally 
or regionally based units. When such a crime 
takes place, those units respond and take control 
over the crime scene and the investigation. These 
teams have the skills and people in place and the 
investigation is effectively progressed from the 
arrival of that first unit. Secondly, there are serious 
crimes such as aggravated burglaries, robberies 
and sexual assaults, where divisions have the skills 
in place and can effectively investigate those crimes 
from within their resources. Divisions manage 
both of these areas with assistance from specialist 
units, but divisions retain responsibility for the 
investigation. 
serious Crime – selected Divisions
Chart 6.3 shows the percentage of serious crimes 
across the seven divisions as a percentage of the 
total recorded crime. As outlined, the level of 
serious crime is reasonably consistent across the 
selected divisions and is only a small percentage of 
all recorded crime.
serious Crime volume Crime
•	 Murder,	including	attempts	
•	 Rape	
•	 Aggravated	sexual	assault
•	 Kidnapping	and	related	offences	
•	 Poisoning
•	 Robbery	of	an	establishment	and	cash	or	goods	in	transit
•	 Blackmail	and	Extortion	
•	 Carjacking	
•	 Aggravated	burglary	
•	 Explosive	offences
•	 Firearms	offences
•	 Arson
•	 Affray/riot	and	violent	disorder
•	 Offences	against	the	State	
•	 Perverting	the	course	of	justice
Miscellaneous offences including 
•	 Human	Trafficking
Fraud and associated offences
•	 Burglary	-	Dwelling	
•	 Burglary	Non-Dwelling
•	 Domestic	Violence	
•	 Assaults	
•	 Theft	(including	shoplifting)
•	 Vehicle	Crime	-	Theft	of	and	unauthorised	taking
•	 Vehicle	Crime	-	Theft	from
•	 Criminal	Damage	(not	by	fire)
•	 Drugs	(link	with	acquisitive	crime)
•	 Robbery	of	the	person
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In cases where a detective is not appointed to 
investigate a serious crime, they may be tasked 
to assist the investigating garda. Whilst this 
system provides detective assistance in more 
serious cases, ultimately the accountability for 
a successful outcome lies with the investigating 
member, regardless of the level of training received, 
experience and expertise. 
Many	regular	unit	gardaí	investigate	serious	crimes	
and expressed concern that limited detective 
support is provided in more serious cases and that 
they are professionally and personally vulnerable 
if	errors	are	made	in	an	investigation.	Most	senior	
gardaí and unit gardaí expressed a view to the 
Inspectorate that gardaí need to be exposed to more 
serious crime investigation to gain experience, and 
supervisors view it as an opportunity to observe an 
individual investigating a more serious or complex 
crime. 
Chart	 6.4	 shows	 the	 number	 of	 serious	 crimes	
across the seven divisions in 2012, against the 
number of detectives and detective aides1 assigned 
to detective units to assist with investigations. The 
national figure is the average of all serious crimes 
against the total number of garda detectives and 
detective aides. For the purposes of this analysis, all 
those with detective or detective aide status were 
included.
1 Detective Aide - a garda who, while not formally appointed 
as a detective, works on a temporary basis with a detective 
unit.
The actual number of serious crimes per detective 
nationally is low as outlined in this chart. It 
shows a significant variance in the numbers of 
serious crimes per detective per year across the 
seven divisions, ranging from six crimes per year 
per detective and detective aide in Limerick, to 
fifteen	crimes	per	detective	in	Kildare.	Nationally,	
the average figure is five crimes per detective per 
year. Clearly, the average number of serious crimes 
per detective is affected by the number of gardaí 
assigned to detective duties. 
It is also important to bear in mind that caseloads are 
a helpful indicator, but do not take into account the 
complexity of each individual case. A robbery case 
may involve multiple witnesses and complex forensic 
evidence, or it may be reasonably straightforward. 
Chart 6.3
Levels of Crime Classified as serious Crime 
in selected garda Divisions 2012 
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána, assessment by the Garda Inspectorate 
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Levels of volume Crime and other offences 
As mentioned in other parts of this report, PULSE 
is the Garda Síochána system for incident and 
crime recording. On a daily basis, gardaí deal with 
a variety of incidents that include both crime and 
non-crime incidents. This inspection has focused 
on volume crimes as this category accounts for the 
vast majority of crimes that require investigation. 
Quality of life issues, such as anti-social behaviour 
and public order crimes, are very important crimes 
to local communities. However, there are also other 
non-crime activities that require garda action and 
sometimes an investigation. 
pULse activity Categories 
Chart 6.5 shows three distinct PULSE recorded 
activities that may need investigation or action 
by gardaí. To establish workloads, the number of 
crimes and incidents were compared against the 
number of members at each division visited and 
also on a national basis. For the purposes of this 
exercise, all members were included. 
1. Crime:	 Number	 of	 crimes	 recorded	 on	
the PULSE system in 2012 divided by the 
number	of	members	per	division;	
2. non-crime: Number	of	non-crime	incidents	
recorded on the PULSE system in 2012 
divided by the number of members per 
division. This category includes incidents 
such	as	lost	property	and	civil	disputes;	
3. other offences:	 Number	 of	 other	 offences	
recorded on PULSE in 2012 divided by the 
number of members per division. Offences 
in this category include incidents such as no 
insurance, no vehicle tax or failing to control 
animals. 
Chart 6.4
number of serious Crime incidents per Detective garda per year  
selected garda Divisions 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána, assessment by the Garda Inspectorate.
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There is a wide variation in PULSE workloads 
across the seven divisions outlined in the chart. 
The analysis shows that in some of the more 
rural	areas	 such	as	Donegal	and	Mayo,	 there	are	
far less crimes per member per year to investigate 
and therefore, crime investigation is a much lower 
percentage of their overall PULSE workload. 
To put this chart into context, in 2012, a member 
in	 the	 DMR	 North	 dealt	 with	 approximately	 one	
crime investigation every two weeks, one non-crime 
incident every week and one other offence every four 
weeks. In contrast, in Donegal a member dealt with 
one crime investigation every four weeks, a non-
crime incident every week and one other offence 
every seven weeks. It is noted that the calculation of 
PULSE workloads is only as reliable as the number 
and category of incidents entered on PULSE. 
Crime investigation pULse activity 
With regards to crime investigations, Kildare 
and Waterford managed more recorded crimes 
per member than the other five divisions. Crime 
investigation workloads ranged from fourteen 
crimes per member per year in Donegal to thirty-
one crimes per member in Kildare. The Inspectorate 
recognises that not all members are available for 
operational duties or used to investigate crime and 
deal with incidents, but the data shows that the 
numbers of crime investigations that need to be 
conducted are relatively low. 
There are crimes included in this data, which 
are generated by garda activity, rather than by 
a victim reporting a crime. Examples would 
include gardaí conducting a search of a person and 
finding drugs or an offensive weapon. With these 
types of crimes, there is often very little further 
investigation required and the case can usually be 
progressed quickly. In chart 6.5, the percentage of 
these types of crimes included in a crime category 
ranged from 13% of all crime in Kildare, to 25% in 
Donegal,	 Limerick	 and	 Mayo.	 If	 this	 figure	 was	
subtracted from the crime investigation workload, 
it would significantly reduce the number of more 
time consuming or complex investigations that are 
required to be completed by each member.
non-crime investigation pULse activity
The non-crime incident categories account for the 
largest volume of member activity across all seven 
divisions.	Most	 of	 the	 non-crime	 incidents	 in	 the	
chart are a once-off event, effectively dealt with 
on the day and would not always require further 
investigation. Examples include the conducting of a 
garda road check point or the referral of a child to 
the HSE. Whilst the numbers across the divisions 
equated to approximately one incident per member 
per week, the actual investigative work required 
is generally far less than required with a crime 
investigation.
Chart 6.5
total pULse Crimes, non-crimes and other offences 
per member in 2012
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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other offences investigation pULse 
activity
The category marked as ‘other offences’ in the 
Chart 6.5 is a much smaller proportion of overall 
workload. Examples of investigations in this 
category include dealing with traffic offences, 
which may require some additional activity, such 
as the issuing of a summons. These types of offences 
are generally more straight forward activity than 
a crime investigation and do not always require 
further activity. 
total pULse activity 
The total PULSE workloads across the seven 
divisions show that the numbers of recorded PULSE 
crimes, non-crime incidents and other offences per 
member per year are low. If resources are efficiently 
allocated, there would be sufficient members to 
investigate the current crime and other incidents 
reported. Where significant numbers of members 
are removed from operational duties into roles 
where investigation is not part of their daily duties, 
this will put pressure on the remaining members 
left to deal with investigations. 
6.3	Divisional	Resources	
to Investigate Crime and 
the Allocation of Crime for 
Investigation 
As previously explained, each division has a number 
of gardaí who are not available to investigate crime. 
This includes gardaí in administrative posts, those 
restricted from operational duties and those in 
specialist roles such as crime scene examiners. 
Each time a district places a garda in such a role, it 
effectively removes them from crime investigation 
and increases the workload of other gardaí.
Based on information acquired on field visits, the 
table below shows the various divisional units that 
are available to investigate crime, how those crimes 
are usually allocated and what role the member 
will perform.
Unit Crimes	Investigated	 
(by	volume	order)
How	Allocated role
Regular	Units •	 Volume	Crime
•	 Traffic	offences	
•	 Serious	crime
•	 Assigned	by	999	or	other	
non-emergency	calls
•	 Patrol
•	 Public	Office
•	 Daily	meeting
•	 Investigating	Officer
•	 Assisting	Officer
Detectives	and	Detective	
Aides
•	 Serious	crime
•	 Volume	crime
•	 Fraud
•	 District	supervisor	
•	 Daily	meeting	
•	 Patrol
•	 Investigating	Officer
•	 Assisting	Officer
Community	Policing •	 Volume	crime •	 Assigned	to	non-
emergency	calls
•	 Assisting	regular	units
•	 Patrol
•	 Community	Policing	
internal	message	books
•	 Investigating	Officer
Traffic	 •	 Traffic	
•	 Volume	crime
•	 Assigned	by	999	or	other	
non-	emergency	calls
•	 Patrol
•	 Investigating	Officer
Specialist	Units	 •	 Drugs
•	 Burglary	
•	 Robbery	
•	 Policing	operations
•	 Patrol
•	 Investigating	Officer
National	Units	 •	 Serious	crime •	 Policing	operations
•	 HQ	directions
•	 Patrol
•	 Investigating	Officer	
•	 Assisting	Officer
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Chart 6.6 shows the allocation of resources to the 
various units in the seven divisions visited. Across 
all divisions, regular units account for 56% of all 
gardaí, but investigate the vast majority of crimes 
that take place in a division. An average of 12% of 
members are assigned to detective duties and a 
further 5% to drugs units and taskforces, but these 
units are not investigating an equal proportion of 
crime, whereas the norm in other police services is 
for detectives to investigate an equal or even higher 
proportion. Other specialist units such as traffic 
and	community	members	have	14%	of	staff,	but	are	
not investigating that same percentage of crime. 
Who is investigating Crime?
A key question asked during all inspection field 
visits was “who investigates crime?” As mentioned 
earlier, both detectives and uniform gardaí 
investigate crime, but there is no clear distinction 
or written guidelines outlining who investigates 
different types of crime. Without exception in all the 
divisions visited, gardaí at all levels were unable to 
identify the crime type investigated by a particular 
unit. The Inspectorate did not find any written 
protocol explaining what crimes are investigated 
by individual units or posts. The absence of such 
protocols can create confusion and inconsistency in 
the approach to crime investigation. 
regular Units
As previously identified, the majority of crime 
investigations are assigned to gardaí attached to 
regular units or to gardaí from other units who 
assist regular units on particular days and who are 
first on the scene of an incident. In effect, a crime is 
not formally allocated to a regular unit garda for 
investigation;	 it	 is	 assigned	 by	 default	 as	 a	 result	
of attendance at an incident where they recorded a 
crime. 
other policing jurisdictions deploy regular units 
as first responders to calls, but the secondary 
investigation of the crime is often passed to a 
dedicated investigation unit. 
The Inspectorate found limited evidence of the 
reallocation of a volume crime from a regular unit 
garda to a detective garda. Contrary to assurances 
by senior gardaí that only detectives investigate 
serious crime, the Inspectorate found many 
examples of regular unit gardaí investigating 
rape, threats to life, aggravated burglary and child 
sexual abuse. This is not good practice. In other 
policing jurisdictions visited by the Inspectorate, 
these types of crimes are usually investigated by 
trained detectives or officers assigned to specialist 
investigative units. This issue was raised in a 
previous Inspectorate report on child sexual abuse, 
where the Inspectorate highlighted concerns about 
Chart 6.6
Deployment in the selected Divisions
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána February 2013
Administration / Non  Operational
Community Policing
Crime Task Force / Crime Unit
Detective Duty
Drugs Duty
Operational Support
Traffic Policing
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non-detective and non-specialist gardaí dealing 
with victims of child sexual abuse.2 The approach 
found in most divisions inspected is to leave the 
responsibility for the investigation of serious crime 
to	a	regular	unit	officer;	but	to	allocate	a	detective	
garda to assist with the investigation. A senior 
garda explained to the Inspectorate that sometimes 
in more rural areas, the allocation of a serious 
crime might be determined by who is available, 
rather than who has the skills and experience to 
investigate a particular crime. 
Towards the end of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
was asked to review the issues identified in the 
Guerin	 Report.	 The	 Inspectorate	 looked	 at	 the	
resources in place in the Bailieboro district during 
the period, which was the focus of that report. At 
that time and over an extended period, no detectives 
were	assigned	to	that	district.	The	Guerin	Report	is	
considered fully in the Addendum to this report. 
traffic officers
The	Garda	National	Traffic	Bureau	has	a	remit	that	
includes prioritised traffic enforcement and traffic 
management;	but	does	not	include	the	investigation	
of serious fatal road collisions. This responsibility 
falls to the first garda who first attends the scene. 
In the event of a fatal road collision, a trained 
accident investigator will attend the scene, complete 
a scene examination report and forward the report 
to the garda with responsibility for investigating 
the collision. Divisional Traffic units are assigned 
mainly to deal with traffic enforcement. They only 
investigate a small number of volume crimes and 
generally these are offences encountered while 
out on patrol. During focus groups, traffic officers 
expressed a view that they were underutilised in 
respect of crime investigation. The Inspectorate 
believes that roads policing is not just about traffic 
enforcement, but is about denying criminals the 
use of the roads. This view formed the basis of a 
previous Inspectorate recommendation in the 2008 
“Roads	Policing	Review”.3 The Inspectorate believes 
that responsibilities of traffic units must include 
traffic enforcement, investigating collisions, crime 
prevention and crime investigation. 
2	 Report	 of	 the	Garda	 Síochána	 Inspectorate,	 Responding	 to	
Child	Sexual	Abuse,	November,	2010.
3	 	Report	of	the	Garda	Síochána	Inspectorate,	Roads	Policing	
Review	and	Recommendations,	November,	2008.
Community policing gardaí
The Garda Síochána’s mission statement is 
“working with communities to protect and serve” 
and places community policing as the bedrock of 
community interaction. With the closure of garda 
stations, the dormitory nature of many rural 
communities and the change of lifestyle across the 
nation, it is important to review and adapt how 
the police work with communities to deliver an 
effective operational response. 
Across the seven divisions visited, the Inspectorate 
found large variations in both the numbers of gardaí 
assigned to community policing and their role in 
the investigation of crime. With the introduction of 
the new roster in April 2012, many divisions moved 
members from community policing units to create 
the required extra regular unit. Donegal, Kildare 
and	Mayo	effectively	have	no	full-time	community	
gardaí. Larger divisions have retained gardaí in this 
role, although the numbers are reduced. In these 
divisions, the number of gardaí in community roles 
ranged from eight in Waterford to seventy-nine in 
DMR	North.	While	 the	Garda	 Síochána’s	mission	
statement values working with communities, there 
is no clear role or job description for community 
police officers. The Inspectorate found that some 
members see their role as community engagement, 
not enforcement, whilst other community gardaí 
are investigating the full range of criminal offences. 
Generally, the Inspectorate found an inconsistent 
approach to community policing and to the role 
of community gardaí in crime investigation. The 
Inspectorate	 interviewed	 two	 community	 gardaí;	
one posted to a town centre who dealt with in 
excess of 250 crime investigations in a year and the 
other in a different division who did not investigate 
any crimes in a year. 
Community officers working in units in some 
policing jurisdictions are usually referred to as 
neighbourhood policing teams and are allocated 
crimes	 relevant	 to	 their	 role;	 such	 as	 anti-social	
behaviour, criminal damage and race crime. 
Indeed, many police services are increasing the 
number of officers in neighbourhood teams and 
assigning detectives to those teams. In effect, 
they are becoming investigation units and taking 
a substantial amount of crime away from officers 
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responding to emergency calls (regular units). The 
Inspectorate believes that the role of community 
gardaí must be defined and members should be 
allocated far greater number of crimes to investigate. 
The	Inspectorate	is	aware	that	DMR	North	Central	
has reconfigured the functions of first response and 
community policing units. This division has started 
to take crime investigations from first responders 
and to allocate those crimes to other units including 
community policing. This provides a good pilot to 
assess the effectiveness of this model. It may be that 
different service delivery models will be required, 
depending on the policing needs of a rural or urban 
area. 
Local specialist Units 
A number of local specialist units operate in 
the divisions visited. All divisions outside of 
the	 DMR	 and	 all	 districts	 within	 the	 DMR	 have	
dedicated drugs units. These units conduct pro-
active operations based on local intelligence and 
investigate crimes that arise from their activity. 
The main focus of drugs units is on more serious 
drug offences and they have a clear remit to 
reduce drugs possession and the supply of drugs.4 
In	 some	 divisions,	 principally	 in	 the	 DMR,	 drug	
units are also used on intelligence led operations 
aimed at targeting prolific burglary offenders who 
commit crime to sustain their drug addiction. 
The Inspectorate viewed these deployments as 
good use of resources to tackle associated crimes. 
Investigations by drugs units are not usually 
allocated to them but are self generated, arising 
from operations and arrests for drug offences. 
Some	divisions	in	the	DMR	also	operate	task	forces	
to tackle street offending such as burglary and 
robbery. These units are used to prevent crime 
and to arrest offenders encountered whilst on 
patrol. Primarily these units investigate crimes 
arising from their pro-activity and are not routinely 
allocated crimes. 
The Inspectorate found that with the reduction 
of garda resources across the five units arising 
from the pilot roster and retirements, all units, 
including specialist units, have reduced in 
4	 National	Drugs	Strategy	(interim)	2009-2016,	Department	of	
Community,	Rural	and	Gaeltacht	Affairs.
numbers and some units have been disbanded. In 
some divisions, the Inspectorate found that pro-
active specialist units were disbanded or reduced 
in numbers, whilst administration units retained 
many gardaí that could have been redeployed to 
operational duties. The Inspectorate believes that 
administrative posts should always be reduced 
first to maintain patrol numbers delivering policing 
services. The current model of local specialist 
units has reached the stage that they may be 
unsustainable in their current format and these 
resources may need to be re-focused towards 
crime prevention, public safety, roads policing and 
crime investigation. At the end of this part of the 
report, the Inspectorate makes a recommendation 
on the way forward for this particular issue. 
The Garda Síochána is currently developing a 
revised approach and policing model that will 
include the deployment of community policing 
resources.
garda síochána review of specialist Units
The Garda Síochána has been conducting an 
extensive review of the operation of all 106 national 
and local specialist units. The review is almost 
completed and the Inspectorate has received copies 
of those reviews completed so far, including the 
findings and recommendations. The Inspectorate 
will look at the role of all specialist units as part of 
the	Haddington	Road	Review.	
Crime Investigation Report       Part 6: Investigating Crime 
Part 6  |  11
6.4	Detective	Resources	and	
the	Role	of	Detectives	in	Crime	
Investigation 
The allocation and deployment of detective 
resources is a major component of the terms of 
reference for this inspection. By definition, a 
detective is an investigator and a specialist in terms 
of crime investigation. Detectives in divisions are 
primarily used in a reactive capacity to investigate 
a crime that has occurred, rather than in a proactive 
capacity to prevent crimes. Detectives are most 
efficient when they are fully trained in crime 
scene investigation, case progression, forensics 
and offender management. A successful detective 
should be judged on their ability to detect crimes 
and complete an investigation, which can be 
prosecuted successfully.
In other police services, there is clarity about the 
roles of uniformed officers and detective officers. 
Uniformed officers play a key role by arresting 
offenders and handing over the investigation 
of the crime to detectives. During field visits to 
divisions, the Inspectorate identified some tension 
between unformed gardaí investigating crime and 
detectives who may take over an investigation once 
a person is arrested. The credit for making arrests 
and gaining detections is an issue at the core of this 
tension and many uniformed gardaí who spoke to 
the Inspectorate have a perception that detectives 
only get involved in investigations after a regular 
unit officer has identified a suspect. This is an 
unhelpful situation that affects the relationship 
between the two units. The Inspectorate believes 
that these units should be working collaboratively 
to bring offenders to justice and individual credit 
for the detection should be irrelevant. In Ireland, 
credit is given to the individual officer who is shown 
on PULSE for the detection, which in practice can 
influence promotion and appointment decisions. 
Internationally, credit is often apportioned to 
regular units for making arrests and detectives for 
securing a detection.
Detectives and Detective aides 
Within the Garda Síochána, persons carrying out 
detective	duties	can	be	divided	into	two	categories;	
those who are appointed detectives and uniformed 
gardaí selected as detective aides to assist in 
detective units
Aides are not trained detectives and do not complete 
any formal development process towards becoming 
a detective. Aides usually apply for advertised 
posts in detective units and performing the role of 
an aide is seen as a major advantage when applying 
to become a detective. To secure appointment to 
detective, a garda is expected to have displayed a 
good ability to investigate crime.
selection of Detective resources 
The selection process for detectives differs from 
appointments to national units and appointments to 
district detective units. Applications and processes 
for all promotions and the selection of detectives 
for national units are managed centrally by Garda 
Human	 Resource	 Division	 (HR).	 At	 district	 level,	
the appointment process for detectives is monitored 
centrally	 by	 HR,	 but	 managed	 locally	 where	 the	
vacancies exist. Where a process is managed at 
district level, successful applicants effectively 
remain within that policing area. 
In other policing jurisdictions, selections for 
detectives are held centrally to ensure that the most 
suitable officers are selected for detective posts, 
irrespective of where they are based. It is also usual 
for newly appointed detectives to move to a new 
division, rather than to remain in the same post. 
The Inspectorate considers that it is good practice 
to move people to a new working environment 
when selected for promotion or on appointment to 
detective.
assignment of Detectives
Chart 6.7 shows the overall picture of the 
assignment of detectives throughout the country. 
Detective resources in regions, divisions and 
districts are shown under operational divisions. 
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There are a significant proportion of detectives 
in national units, as outlined in the chart, which 
investigate a very small percentage of the overall 
crime. Of particular note is the deployment of 6% 
of detectives to policy and administration units in 
Garda Headquarters. The Inspectorate questions 
whether this deployment of detectives is best use 
of scarce resources.
Detectives not investigating Crime
Following visits to national specialist units, such 
as	 Crime	 and	 Security,	 and	 National	 Support	
Services (e.g. Technical Bureau), the Inspectorate 
identified many appointed detectives who are 
not investigating crime. This includes detectives 
in administrative roles and those on protection 
duties. The Inspectorate does not view this as best 
use of trained detectives. The majority of crime 
investigations are conducted in divisions, and 
the absence of sufficient detectives is resulting in 
inexperienced and untrained detectives or aides 
investigating serious crime. 
Divisional and District Detective resources 
Chart 6.8 shows the numbers of detectives and 
detective aides allocated across the seven divisions 
visited, and also the percentage of total garda 
numbers allocated to detective duties. 
Chart 6.7
Deployment of garda Detective resources (including aides)
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána as February 2013.
Chart 6.8
Deployment of Detectives and Detective aides in selected Divisions
Division Detectives Detective	Aides Total	Numbers Breakdown	of	
Divisional	Resources	
on	Detective	Duties
D.M.R.	North 56 51 107 14%
D.M.R.	South 50 36 86 15%
Donegal 33 0 33 8%
Kildare 21 8 29 9%
Limerick 46 33 79 13%
Mayo 20 2 22 7%
Waterford 25 0 25 9%
total 251 130 381 12%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána February 2013.
National & Specialist Units
Headquarters Admin & Policy Units
Operational Divisions
56%
38%
6%
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The allocation to detective duties varied greatly 
between the divisions from 7% to 15% of overall 
members, with the more rural divisions investing 
significantly less in detective resources. It is also 
worth noting that the numbers of detective aides 
in some divisions are moving towards 50% of the 
total detective resources. Some divisions have 
not received authority to hold competitions for 
detectives and as a result, detective aides are 
replacing detective vacancies. 
What Crimes do Detectives investigate?
Throughout the inspection, one of the first 
questions posed to senior gardaí was “what types 
of crime do detectives investigate”? Generally the 
answer was “serious crime”. The follow up question 
that caused the most difficulty was “what serious 
crimes do detectives investigate”? The answer to 
that question varied greatly across the divisions. In 
some divisions this included the death of a person, 
serious assaults, aggravated burglaries and armed 
robberies. Other divisions allocated volume crimes 
to detectives such as burglaries and street robberies. 
In one district, the superintendent stated that 
detectives investigate all burglaries and in another 
district within the same division, the detectives did 
not investigate all burglaries. 
protocols for Crime investigations
The Inspectorate could not find any clear written 
protocol about what crime a detective should and 
should not investigate. What was found, was a 
disconnect between what senior gardaí thought 
detectives investigate and what they do in practice. 
For example, a senior garda stated that divisional 
detectives visited every burglary crime scene and 
assisted with most burglary investigations. During 
visits to that division, it was clear to the Inspectorate 
that this was not happening. 
Most	 police	 services	 provide	 clarity	 as	 to	 what	
detectives will investigate. The Inspectorate 
appreciates that on occasions, a crime may not 
neatly	 fit	 into	 a	 strict	 definition;	 but	 a	 guidance	
document provides a good basis for discussion on 
the allocation of a crime. In other police services, 
detective units may deal with all offences in certain 
categories such as rape, sexual assault, burglary and 
robbery. In these types of cases, the first responder 
to an incident is expected to carry out a thorough 
investigation at the crime scene and the case is then 
assigned to a detective to take on the role as the 
responsible investigator. 
Detectives and volume Crime investigations 
While volume crime accounts for the majority of 
crime investigated in divisions, the Inspectorate 
found limited evidence of detectives routinely 
investigating these offences. The Inspectorate 
believes that detectives should have responsibility 
in the investigation of volume crime. 
District Detective Units – Case Loads
As part of the inspection, the Inspectorate analysed 
the caseloads of three district detective units 
from the seven divisions visited, to examine the 
workloads and the types of crimes that were 
investigated. The Inspectorate selected 2013 as a 
base year and requested details of the numbers 
of detectives and the numbers of PULSE records 
where those members were shown as the 
investigating officers. This included all detectives 
of all ranks and detective aides. 
Data supplied
The data supplied did not include information in 
relation to a number of members selected by the 
Inspectorate, or an explanation as to why they were 
not included. Detective aides were assigned in two 
districts but not in the third. There were a number 
of extremes in terms of the large numbers of crimes 
investigated by a small number of detectives. These 
were discounted from the calculations of average 
caseloads per detectives. Some members were 
attached to murder investigations and therefore 
understandably, the numbers of crimes that 
they investigated were low. Some detectives had 
very high levels of crime such as a detective that 
investigated 555 incidents of social welfare fraud 
that were linked to one investigation.  
Some detectives had investigated over 100 
crimes and four were described by senior gardaí 
as excellent and hard working detectives. In 
comparison, eight out of fifty-three of the detectives 
sampled had investigated less than ten crimes in a 
year. 
The Inspectorate’s intention was to compare the 
numbers of crimes investigated by detectives and 
detective aides by the district crime levels. Due to 
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a shortage of crime analysts, two of the divisions 
did not have crime data broken down by district. 
Consequently it was not possible to complete this 
analysis.
Crime types investigated
Chart 6.9 shows the main crime types investigated 
by detectives and detective aides across the three 
districts
Findings
•	 There	 was	 a	 number	 of	 fraud	 cases	 with	
high	rates	of	incidents	attached;
•	 3%	 of	 all	 crimes	 investigated	 were	 public	
order	related;	
•	 16%	of	all	crimes	investigated	were	burglary	
offences;
•	 4%	 of	 all	 crimes	 investigated	 were	 sexual	
offences.
The Inspectorate acknowledges that some crimes 
are very complex to investigate and a single crime 
might require a significant amount of work. 
individual investigators
The Inspectorate examined the numbers of cases 
investigated across the three districts. Chart 6.10 
shows the average number of crimes investigated 
per detective.
Findings 
•	 There	 were	 significant	 differences	 in	
workloads ranging from an average of nine 
investigations per detective and detective 
aide in one district, to a district with an 
average	of	fifty-five	crimes	per	investigator;	
•	 Most	detective	sergeants	investigated	small	
numbers of crimes, although one detective 
sergeant	investigated	twenty-three	crimes;
•	 Detective	 inspectors	 investigated	 a	 small	
number of crimes, but these were serious 
offences. 
Chart	6.9
Crime types investigated by Detective and Detective aides 
in selected Districts – 2013
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
Chart 6.10
average number of Crimes investigated per Detective and Detective aide across the  
three selected Districts 2013
Rank District	A	Average	Number	
of	Crimes	Investigated
District	B	Average	Number	
of	Crimes	Investigated
District	C	Average	Number	 
of	Crimes	Investigated
Average	for	
Three	Districts
All	Detectives 55 9 38 32
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
38%
16%
10%
10%
Crime Type
Fraud 
Burglary
Traffic
Theft
Drugs 
Sexual Offences
Criminal Damage
Public Order
Others
5%
4%
4%
3%
10%
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Data for one District
The Inspectorate was able to examine one district 
detective unit against the yearly crime figures. The 
following are the key findings:
Findings 
•	 Detectives	 and	detective	 aides	 investigated	
62% of all crime categories and 
predominately investigated the same types 
of	crimes;
•	 They	 all	 investigated	 serious	 crimes	 and	 a	
number	of	volume	crimes;	
•	 The	 Inspectorate	 found	 that	 detectives	
in this district appeared to investigate 
more volume crime offences than serious 
offences. Examples include investigating 
approximately 30% of all burglaries and 
only 13% of all rape cases, 15% of robberies 
against the person, 16% of assault harms and 
16%	of	all	arson	offences;	
•	 In	 this	 district,	 appointed	 detectives	 on	
average investigated thirty-six crimes per 
year and aides investigated an average of 
forty-one crimes. 
Detectives assisting and monitoring Cases
Detectives can play a supporting role in criminal 
investigations and can be shown on PULSE as an 
assisting garda. In some divisions, the Inspectorate 
found that whilst a detective may not be allocated to 
investigate a particular crime, they are sometimes 
asked to assist with cases investigated by regular 
unit gardaí. Where this occurred, the Inspectorate 
identified some resentment amongst regular unit 
gardaí that detectives are not accountable for that 
crime investigation. Gardaí provided examples of 
detectives assigned to assist with a case who were 
working on a different roster to the investigator, 
making it very difficult for the garda to meet with 
them to discuss the case. On checking PULSE crime 
investigations, the Inspectorate found limited 
examples where detectives were shown as assisting 
with an investigation.
In some divisions, there was excellent feedback 
on the assistance offered by individual detectives, 
but this was not replicated in respect of all 
detective	 units.	Many	 examples	were	 provided	 to	
the Inspectorate where gardaí had initially dealt 
with a serious or complex case and an attempt to 
seek advice or to hand over a case was not always 
received in a professional manner. 
volume Crime Case reviews
As explained in previous Parts, the Inspectorate 
tracked 158 randomly selected volume crime calls 
from the first contact with the Garda Síochána 
through the various processes of recording an 
incident to allocating a crime for investigation. 
Of	 those	 158	 calls	 for	 service,	 114	 were	 recorded	
on PULSE and ninety of those calls became cases 
after being recorded as crimes. The findings in 
respect of the ninety crimes designated for crime 
investigation are provided in the relevant sections 
of this part of the report.
volume Crime Case reviews 
investigation of Cases by Detectives
Of the 158 incidents first reported to the Garda 
Síochána, only ninety of those incidents resulted 
in an investigation. Unfortunately, the PULSE 
system does not distinguish between uniformed 
gardaí and detective gardaí, which made it 
difficult for the Inspectorate to determine who 
was actually assigned as the main investigator 
of a crime. This was further complicated as 
most of the PULSE paper copies and case papers 
supplied to the Inspectorate were heavily 
redacted to remove the names of any person, 
including gardaí. 
However, by individually checking PULSE 
records on the system and through analysis of 
those incidents with case papers, it appears that 
only 6% of the ninety crimes were investigated 
by detectives and a detective assisted in a further 
4%	of	those	cases.	In	all	other	cases,	it	appeared	
that uniformed gardaí were investigating those 
crimes. In some serious crimes, including a 
robbery with a handgun, a uniformed garda 
was shown as the main investigator.
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District Detective Units 
Each division has a number of separate detective 
units based at the various districts under the control 
of the district officer. These units effectively 
operate independently from other detective units 
within the same division. Often the detective units 
are small in numbers and there was only one 
detective assigned to some districts visited. In 
one such district, the Inspectorate met a detective 
garda who worked alone on a district, in isolation 
from a detective sergeant, who worked at the same 
station, but on a different shift roster. As a result, 
the detective had to plan well in advance to obtain 
assistance from a colleague to make an arrest or to 
interview a suspect. 
All field visits included interviews with detectives, 
detective aides and their supervisors. In terms of 
the deployment of detectives, a number of issues 
were common to all the divisions:
•	 Supervision	of	detectives	was	variable,	with	
many detectives having no daily interaction 
with	a	detective	supervisor;
•	 The	roster	does	not	align	detective	resources	
to	the	times	of	greatest	demand;
•	 There	was	a	lack	of	consistency	and	clarity	
about what crimes they investigate. Some 
were tasked to investigate all crimes and 
others	only	more	serious	cases;
•	 Small	numbers	of	detectives	in	district	units	
make routine activities difficult.
In other policing jurisdictions, detective units 
operate on a centralised or divisional basis and are 
often co-located. This provides greater resilience 
of detective resources and more flexibility in their 
deployment. The Inspectorate believes that all 
detective units in a division should be co-located 
and ideally situated at the main site for processing 
prisoners. A move to divisional detective 
deployment supports the recommendation in Part 2 
about moving to a divisional policing model. 
 recommendation 6.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána aligns all district detective units 
into a divisional model. (medium term).
abstractions for Detectives
Throughout the Inspection, the Inspectorate 
identified a number of other roles performed by 
detectives. These include:
•	 Armed	patrols;
•	 Armed	check	points;
•	 Escorts;	
•	 Checking	vulnerable	premises;
•	 Static	and	mobile	protection	duties.
Detectives provide an armed presence and an 
armed response to incidents where gardaí are 
confronted with people who present a significant 
risk	 to	 the	 public.	 Many	 of	 these	 duties,	 such	 as	
escorting may require an armed presence, but the 
gardaí do not need to be trained detectives to carry 
out these roles. 
These type of duties take detectives away from 
their main role as investigators. Across the seven 
divisions, there was a variance in these abstraction 
rates. Whilst the Inspectorate understands the 
need for these functions to be carried out, using 
detectives is not the best use of resources. 
 recommendation 6.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reduces the current abstractions that 
take detectives away from crime investigation. 
(medium term).
Detectives in non-investigative roles 
During field visits, the Inspectorate found a large 
number of trained detectives or gardaí appointed 
as detectives in non-investigative roles. Sometimes 
this was in posts where detective status was 
allowed, but it was not always in a role where 
investigation skills were necessary. The Technical 
Bureau provides expert skills in a number of 
disciplines such as photography and fingerprints 
and are available to attend serious crimes. In other 
police services, many of the functions of Technical 
Bureau are performed by police support staff. 
The Inspectorate also found detectives in other 
roles such as computer crime investigation. In some 
roles, there may be a need to retain some detectives, 
but there are many opportunities to use non-
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detectives or police support staff. The Inspectorate 
also found detectives in roles that had no connection 
with crime investigation and this included two 
detectives posted in the Garda Legal Section, 
as they have legal qualifications and are filling 
current	 vacancies.	 The	 Haddington	 Road	 Review	
will further examine this issue, but the Inspectorate 
believes that the Garda Síochána must review 
all non-investigative posts to which detectives 
are posted and any retention in post should be 
accompanied by a business case, explaining why a 
detective needs to fulfil that role. The Inspectorate 
believes that a review would identify many posts 
where detective status is not required in order to 
release detectives to investigation roles.
 recommendation 6.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána identifies the unnecessary deployment 
of all detectives in non-investigative roles and 
assigns them into criminal investigation posts. 
(medium term).
arming of Detectives 
Most	 district	 detectives	 and	 some	 detective	 aides	
are armed. In more rural areas they are available 
to provide an immediate response to an incident 
that	 requires	 armed	 support.	New	detectives	 and	
some detective aides are required to complete a full 
firearms course and all detectives and aides that 
are trained are expected to complete three day’s 
refresher training per year. Across Ireland, this is 
a significant abstraction that takes detectives away 
from their primary role of crime investigation. 
During the inspection, some detectives expressed 
concern that they were often deployed on armed 
patrols with unarmed colleagues. This is in 
contravention of current policy and accepted good 
practice in relation to utilising firearms officers. 
The Garda Síochána has successfully developed 
uniformed	 Regional	 Support	 Units	 (RSUs)	 that	
operate	outside	of	the	DMR.	These	units	are	highly	
trained and the provision of armed support is 
their	main	 role.	Within	 the	DMR,	 armed	 support	
is provided by detective gardaí who are part of 
the Special Detective Unit (SDU) and Emergency 
Response	 Unit	 (ERU)	within	 Crime	 and	 Security.	
The	functions	of	the	SDU	and	ERU	include	armed	
daily patrolling and mobile and static protection 
duties. The Inspectorate does not believe that 
the routine patrolling duties performed by these 
units requires the use of trained detectives. The 
Inspectorate	believes	 that	 the	RSU	scheme	should	
be	extended	 to	cover	 the	DMR,	 removing	 the	 role	
from trained detectives. This change would require 
additional	set	up	costs	for	the	RSUs,	but	it	would:	
•	 Achieve	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 the 
number of armed detectives and 
subsequently a significant reduction in the 
abstraction	rates	for	firearms	training;
•	 Release	 detective	 hours	 for	 their	 primary	
role	of	crime	investigation;	
•	 Reduce	 the	 costs	 involved	 in	 training	 and	
issuing detectives with firearms equipment. 
The Inspectorate is aware that the Garda Síochána 
is currently conducting a review of this issue.
 recommendation 6.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána extends the regional support Units 
across all regions. (Long term).
training of Detectives and Detective aides
The Garda College has developed a comprehensive 
training and development programme for newly 
appointed detectives, detective supervisors 
and other specialist investigators. For detective 
training, the process has three elements: course 
assessment, a multiple choice examination and a 
final presentation. The Inspectorate identified the 
following issues in respect of detective training:
•	 Untrained	 Detectives	 without	 formal	
training have been in post for two to three 
years and in some cases longer than ten 
years;	
•	 There	 is	 no	 formal	 process	 or	 specific	
training and development programme to 
develop	aides	towards	becoming	detectives;	
•	 There	 is	 limited	 continued	 professional	
development	for	detectives;
•	 Detectives	are	investigating	complex	crimes	
without any specific training e.g. fraud 
investigation.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 6: Investigating Crime 
Part 6  |  18
There is a back log in detective training and a 
decision was made to focus on those who were 
appointed from 2009 onwards. This means that a 
significant number of detectives appointed before 
that time remain without any formal training. 
Several questions arise as to the value of the current 
detective training programme: 
•	 The	 three	 elements	 of	 the	 course	 may	 not	
be necessary as the majority of participants 
have been appointed for more than two years 
and therefore have by default completed 
their probationary period. A probationary 
period is usually applied to ensure that the 
person is suitable for a post. 
•	 A	 knowledge	 examination	 is	 taken	 many	
years after assignment as detective and 
at the end of the two week course. Other 
policing jurisdictions have pre-selection 
examinations so that those attending 
such courses begin with a certain level 
of knowledge. In addition, in other 
jurisdictions, detectives are not posted until 
after completing a detective training course. 
The Inspectorate noted that the current selection 
process for aides and subsequently detectives was 
perceived by many gardaí as unfairly managed and 
not transparent. The Inspectorate believes that the 
Garda Síochána should introduce a formal trainee 
detective programme that is fair and transparent 
and focuses on developing and selecting future 
detectives. 
Detective training Course
During a visit to the Garda College at Templemore, 
the Inspectorate spoke to course participants and 
to those responsible for creating and delivering 
detective training. Course participants had been 
appointed between six months and seven years 
before this training. The Inspectorate was informed 
that there are approximately 700 untrained 
detectives. The new detective course is two weeks 
in duration and the Garda College planned to 
run a one week course for those who have been 
appointed for some time. Some of those detectives 
on the course had investigated serious crimes such 
as rape and complex crimes such as fraud, without 
any formal training. 
In general, participants felt that the course content 
was good, but in some cases delivered too late in 
their detective careers. The highlight of the course 
appeared to be a session on disclosure of evidence 
(for court cases and interviewing suspects), which 
was provided in a half-day of a two week course. 
This is a crucial skill required by all gardaí that are 
interviewing suspects and preparing prosecution 
files. Throughout the inspection the absence of 
disclosure training was evident. The inclusion of a 
day or a half day for all gardaí involved in crime 
investigation would be worthwhile.
The College has the capacity to train approximately 
sixty detectives a year. The Garda College trained 
eleven detectives in 2010, nineteen in 2011, twenty-
five in 2012 and thirty-three in 2013. This is unlikely 
to keep pace with newly appointed detectives and 
will not clear the back log of untrained detectives.
Following a comprehensive review of training in 
2010, the Crime Training Faculty Unit at the Garda 
College has created and delivered a diverse range 
of specialist training in areas such as: 
•	 Interviewing	of	witnesses;
•	 Detective	 Garda	 and	 Detective	 Sergeant	
training;
•	 Incident	Room	Co-ordinators;
•	 Canvas	Co-ordinators.
Detective status
When a detective leaves a national unit to go to a 
division or where a detective on a division wants to 
move to another division, they effectively have to 
relinquish their detective status. This also applies 
to detectives who move on promotion. In these 
cases they revert to uniform duties for a period of 
time, until a detective post becomes available in 
their new rank. On arrival at their new division, 
there may or may not be a vacancy, but often that 
detective must revert to a uniformed post. This is 
in contrast to other policing jurisdictions, where an 
appointed detective has skills and status that can 
be transferred from one part of an organisation to 
another. Usually in other jurisdictions, detective 
status is retained, subject to good performance. 
Training a detective is an investment in an 
individual and is time consuming and expensive. 
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 recommendation 6.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the selection, training, 
appointment and transfers of detectives. 
(Long term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Create	 a	 structured	 selection	 and	 training	
programme	for	future	detectives;
•	 Develop	a	selection	process	that	is	perceived	
as fair and selects the best possible 
candidates	for	the	role	of	detective;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 current	 detectives	 are	
sufficiently skilled, including additional 
detective	training	as	required;
•	 Ensure	 new	detectives	 are	 trained	 prior	 to	
appointment;
•	 Review	 the	 process	 of	 detective	 transfers	
and the loss of detective status. 
 recommendation 6.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a training package on crime 
investigation that includes disclosure training 
for all gardaí involved in crime investigation. 
(Long term).
Dealing with Underperforming Detectives 
The issue of dealing with unsatisfactory performance 
was discussed in Part 2. Currently, once appointed 
as a detective, very few people are removed from 
their post. During all visits, the Inspectorate met 
detective supervisors who were frustrated by at 
least one individual at detective level that was 
underperforming. As detective units are comprised 
of small numbers of people, one underperforming 
person greatly impacts on the performance of the 
whole unit. Supervisors currently use a variety 
of approaches to dealing with this problem such 
as tasking the person to view CCTV, rather than 
investigating crime. This has an unfair impact 
on colleagues who are required to investigate 
additional	 crimes.	 Many	 gardaí	 have	 aspirations	
to become detectives and the retention of a non-
performing detective blocks their opportunity 
to progress. The Inspectorate believes that poor 
performance of detectives must be addressed, 
rather than accommodated. Part 2 included 
a specific recommendation about the Garda 
Síochána developing a performance management 
system that deals with underperformance. 
Detective roster 
The concerns of the Inspectorate about the new 
roster are articulated in Part 2 and other parts of this 
report. During meetings with detective supervisors 
in national and district units, the general view 
expressed was that the roster is not fit for the 
purpose of criminal investigation. Particularly 
with national units, there is often no need to have 
an additional fifth unit and many national units 
have	returned	 to	 four.	Most	national	units	 should	
function	 on	 Monday	 to	 Friday	 office	 hours	 and	
not work on a roster which has people working at 
weekends	 and	 late	 at	 night.	 Most	 national	 units	
require members to work more days than the 
current pilot roster, where people work longer hours, 
but fifty fewer days each year. Some of the national 
units have sections with small numbers of staff 
that are struggling to provide an effective service 
whilst working the roster. The negative impact on 
efficiency is greater with the current separation 
of detective units into small district units. Often 
detectives are working a shift on their own or with 
a detective aide. The service to victims of crime is 
reduced as many investigators are away from work 
for extended periods. The Inspectorate does not 
view the current detective roster as effective and 
efficient for crime investigation or good victim care. 
The roster will be one of the issues covered in the 
Inspectorate’s	Haddington	Road	Review.	
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6.5 Foundation Training for 
Gardaí
Foundation training is the term given to training 
provided to new entrants to the Garda Síochána. 
On completion of training at the Garda College, 
new entrants are subject to a probationary 
period. Due to the public service moratorium, the 
Garda Síochána stopped recruitment, and due to 
budgetary constraints foundation training ceased 
in 2009. 
training Delivered post - 1989
Following a major review of foundation training 
in 1989, the course moved from sixteen weeks 
residential training at the Garda College in a 
non-academic based course, to a new forty week 
residential course that was academic based and 
accredited (third level status). In the new course, 
student gardaí completed a number of phases 
including residential training weeks at the Garda 
College interspersed with operational assignments 
to districts. 
issues raised about the Course Content and 
Delivery
In most of the interviews with senior gardaí and 
training staff at the Garda College the following 
issues were raised about the course contents and 
course delivery:
•	 Too	academic	based;
•	 Lecture	style	delivery	to	large	numbers;	
•	 Limited	 practical	 training	 at	 the	 Garda	
College;
•	 Some	 wasted	 time	 during	 operational	
assignments to districts. Students watched 
other gardaí dealing with incidents, but did 
not	play	an	active	part;	
•	 Many	 weaker	 students	 were	 attested	 after	
thirty-six weeks training and were sent out 
to	districts;
•	 The	 last	 phase	 of	 four	weeks	 at	 the	Garda	
College was wasted time and was later 
reduced to two weeks. 
Course Content 
Chart 6.11 shows the foundation training delivered 
to new entrants from 2000 up to the cessation of 
recruitment in 2009. The chart breaks down the 
hours spent in the phases and as a percentage of the 
available training hours.
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Findings
•	 A	 lot	 of	 course	 time	 was	 spent	 on	 non-
operational policing activities such 
as language skills (12%), study (6%), 
assessments (9%) and research and 
preparation	(4%);
•	 3%	of	training	time	was	spent	learning	about	
the	PULSE	system;
•	 There	 was	 no	 practical	 training	 in	
interviewing	suspects;	
•	 While	 it	 is	 important	 to	have	physically	fit	
gardaí, a disproportionate amount of time 
(17%) was spent on general fitness.
Criminal investigation elements
Chart 6.12 highlights those parts of the course 
where crime elements were delivered.
Chart 6.11
inspectorate analysis of the Foundation training Course syllabus 2000 to 2009
Study	Module Phase I 
Hours
Phase III 
Hours
total Phase  
I	&	III	Hours
Phase I  
Breakdown
Phase III  
Breakdown
total Phase I & 
III	Breakdown
Management	and	
Organisational	Studies	
60 24 84 10% 7% 9%
PULSE	Training 14 12 26 3% 3% 3%
European	Languages 22 16 38 4% 4% 4%
Irish	Studies 50 20 70 9% 6% 8%
Social	and	Psychological	
Studies
20 13 33 3% 4% 4%
Physical	Education,	Health	
and	Fitness	Studies
80 80 160 14% 23% 17%
Legal	Studies, 60 37 97 10% 11% 10%
Garda	Practices	and	
Procedures	Studies,
72 39 111 12% 11% 12%
Contextual	Policing	
Studies
13 13 26 2% 4% 3%
Total	Contact	Hours 391 254 645    
Assessments 50 30 80 9% 8% 9%
Week	1	Phase	1	
Commitments
30 0 30 5% 0% 3%
New	Intakes	and	
Graduation	Studies
20 0 20 4% 0% 2%
Attestation	preparation	
and	ceremony
0 20 20 0% 6% 2%
Phase	II	&	IV	research	and	
preparation
30 10 40 5% 3% 4%
Study		 35 21 56 6% 6% 6%
Public	Holidays 24 13 37 4% 4% 4%
Total	Other	Hours 189 94 283    
Total	Training	Hours* 580 348 928 100% 100% 100%
* Total Training Hours estimate is 20 weeks X 29 hours for Phase 1 and 12 weeks x 29 hours for Phase 3
Source: Data supplied by the Garda College. 
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in total, the inspectorate estimated that 25% of the 
available time was spent on operational policing 
and criminal investigation. in total this was less 
than the time spent on language skills, physical 
exercise and studying.5
post 2005 and increased recruitment
From 2005 there was a large recruitment drive and 
the numbers in training increased from seventy 
new entrants every quarter to 275 new entrants 
in the same time period. Almost all persons 
that met with the Inspectorate considered that 
the accelerated recruitment programme was a 
significant contributor to some of the poor quality 
investigations that are conducted today.
Key issues raised with the inspectorate arising 
from accelerated recruitment:
•	 The	requirement	 to	manage	 large	numbers	
meant that the style of training moved from 
smaller classes with individual training staff 
to lecture theatre presentations to audiences 
of	190	students	at	a	time;	
•	 Districts	 struggled	 to	 cope	 with	 the	
numbers arriving from Templemore on 
placements and many had insufficient 
5 Breakdown of Contextual Policing, Garda Practices and 
Procedures and Legal Study Courses
staff or inadequate systems in place to 
supply experienced tutor gardaí and good 
supervision. In some cases, student gardaí 
in districts who were on later phases of 
training, were allocated newer recruits to 
supervise	and	instruct;
•	 There	 was	 a	 very	 low	 attrition	 rate	 and	
training staff informed the Inspectorate 
that there were minimal assessment and 
screening processes in place before students 
were confirmed as gardaí.
The course content from 2000 onwards was very 
academic with limited practical training for gardaí. 
From 2005, the increase in numbers of student 
gardaí put the Garda College under immense 
pressure to train greatly increased numbers. 
The Inspectorate readily acknowledges that there 
are many excellent gardaí that have come through 
that experience, who are effective and deliver a 
good service. However, the system did not provide 
the practical training and guidance to ensure that 
the Garda Síochána produced a garda prepared for 
the demands of a modern police service. 
Foundation training is exactly as the name suggests: 
it provides student gardaí with knowledge of 
powers and procedures. The second most important 
element in developing an effective recruit is the 
Chart 6.12
inspectorate analysis of the Crime elements5 in the Foundation training syllabus 2000-2009
Module	Description Phase I 
Hours
Phase III 
Hours
total Phase I 
&	III	Hours
total Phase 
I	Training	
Breakdown
total Phase 
III	Training	
Breakdown
Total	Training	
Breakdown
Management	
of	a	Criminal	
Investigation
16 5 21 3% 1% 2%
Management	of	
Prisoners
27 17 44 5% 5% 5%
Compilation	of	an	
Investigation	File
9 2 11 1% 1% 1%
Legal	Studies	(Crime) 37 20 57 6% 6% 6%
Legal	Studies	
(Traffic)
23 6 29 4% 2% 3%
Legal	Studies	
(General)
0 11 11 0% 3% 1%
Contextual	Policing	
Studies
23 13 36 4% 4% 4%
Garda	Practices	&	
Procedures	Studies	
(General)
10 15 25 2% 4% 3%
total 145 89 234 25% 26% 25%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda College  
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guidance delivered by experienced tutor gardaí 
to put the foundation training into an operational 
context. Clearly, in many cases this did not take 
place and student gardaí did not always receive this 
sort of instruction when they arrived at their new 
district.
The style of training delivered post 2005 at the 
Garda College and the absence of consistent 
and effective work-placed training has led to 
difficulties for many new student gardaí. This 
report highlights some key training needs for 
gardaí, such as statement taking, disclosure and 
interview training. The Inspectorate believes that 
the Garda Síochána needs to conduct a Training 
Need	 Analysis	 (TNA)	 for	 gardaí	 that	 completed	
foundation	training	post	2005.	Following	the	TNA,	
the Garda Síochána needs to develop a specific 
training programme or awareness training that 
addresses any gaps in garda investigation skills.
 recommendation 6.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a training needs analysis 
for members that completed foundation 
training post 2005, and develops a training 
programme that addresses any identified gaps 
in garda investigation skills. (Long term). 
new Foundation training Course
The Inspectorate has examined the new course 
that was recently launched and it has changed 
immeasurably from the previous course. The new 
foundation course is focused on a Garda decision 
making model and students will be required to 
complete modules that are scenario based. In 
September	2014,	the	first	new	intake	of	100	student	
gardaí commenced the new training programme. 
The Inspectorate will include observations about 
the new course in the forthcoming Haddington 
Road	Review.	
6.6 Investigation of Crime 
As mentioned previously, the Garda Síochána 
does not have a formal or agreed protocol for 
deciding who will investigate particular crimes. 
Other policing jurisdictions have clear criteria 
determining how crimes are assigned. This part 
of the report will examine how investigations take 
place, depending on the crime that is committed. 
serious Crime investigation
As noted earlier, serious crime accounts for 
approximately	 4.5%	 of	 all	 crime	 committed.	
While this is a low proportion of overall crime, 
investigations are often complex and can be 
protracted. The majority of serious crimes are 
currently investigated by districts and the 
district officer retains overall responsibility for 
the investigation of that crime. In some high 
profile cases, or where there is a linked series 
of	 offences	 the	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Criminal	
Investigation	(NBCI)	based	in	Dublin	may	take	on	
the responsibility for investigating those crimes. 
murder investigation
Not	all	serious	crimes	require	a	large	investigation	
team and in some cases, such as a serious assault, the 
crime may be investigated by one garda. However, 
for the purposes of explaining how a serious crime 
investigation is managed, this part of the report 
will concentrate on what currently happens when 
a murder has been committed.
A district retains responsibility for the 
investigation of a murder and a local detective 
inspector is usually appointed as the Senior 
Investigating	Officer	 (SIO).	Within	 the	DMR,	 this	
will usually be the detective inspector based within 
the district where the crime occurred. Outside of the 
DMR,	detective	 inspectors	operate	on	a	divisional	
level and lead any such investigations. The first few 
hours and days are critical in the investigation of a 
murder. The crime scene needs to be preserved and 
examined, the family of the victim and witnesses 
need to be interviewed and enquiries need to be 
carried out to ensure that an early arrest is made. 
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staffing and skill requirements for a 
murder incident team 
Staffing of investigation teams with the right 
numbers of people with the necessary skills is a 
challenge for most police services. For murder 
investigations, enquires can require large numbers 
of staff in the early stages, although in many cases 
those numbers can be reduced within a relatively 
short period of time. To conduct an effective 
murder investigation, key personnel are required 
for various functions from managing the original 
crime scene through to preparing for a court case. 
Key roles include:
•	 Crime	Scene	Co-ordinator;
•	 Incident	Room	Co-ordinator;
•	 Specialist	Suspect	Interviewers;
•	 Exhibits	Officer;
•	 Canvass	Co-ordinator;	
•	 Family	Liaison	Officer.	
A district officer in charge of the overall 
investigation or the SIO can, if required, obtain 
assistance from:
•	 Local	divisional	 resources	or	neighbouring	
divisions;
•	 Regional	resources;
•	 National	Units	such	as	the	NBCI	or	Technical	
Bureau.
In garda districts, the main cohort of trained 
investigators are working within detective units. 
When a serious crime takes place, all available 
detectives are usually placed on the investigation 
team. With any major enquiry, not all tasks need 
highly skilled investigators and often teams include 
non-detectives to assist with high volume enquiries 
that	need	to	be	actioned.	Outside	of	the	DMR,	the	
staffing of teams becomes more problematic, as 
numbers of available detectives and other staff are 
generally lower. The new roster has exacerbated 
matters, as detectives are away from work for 
extended periods of time and are not always 
available for duty during the days following a 
serious crime. 
During the inspection process, district officers 
and SIOs informed the Inspectorate that it can be 
challenging to find people with the right skills 
quickly. A superintendent interviewed by the 
Inspectorate who dealt with a murder, stated 
that in the early stages of the investigation it was 
difficult to find members with the necessary skills 
and experience. The Garda Síochána used to have 
a dedicated murder investigation team, but that 
team was disbanded in the late 1980s, and since that 
time the investigations have very much remained 
the responsibility of the district where the crime is 
committed. 
impact on other Crime investigations
The current system of creating a murder 
investigation team can have a negative impact on 
district investigations that are already allocated 
to gardaí who are seconded to an investigation 
team. In addition, the SIO’s appointment to lead 
the murder enquiry significantly reduces that 
individual’s time to cover other district or divisional 
responsibilities. 
Critical incident team
During a murder investigation, the local 
divisional chief superintendent will convene a 
Critical Incident Team to review progress and 
agree investigative strategies. Other members 
of this team would include the relevant district 
officer, as well as a divisional or region detective 
superintendent. The incident team has a role to 
allocate an SIO and to ensure that appropriate 
resources are assigned for the proper investigation 
of serious crime and critical incidents. 
skills of District officers 
As mentioned in Part 2, the skills and experience 
of district officers varies greatly across divisions 
and there are some district officers managing the 
investigation of serious crimes without any formal 
SIO training or detective experience. It is also the 
case that whilst detective superintendents cover the 
same geographical area, they only act as advisors 
in serious crimes and do not investigate them. 
The Inspectorate believes that under the current 
structure those detective superintendents should 
lead such investigations.
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 recommendation 6.8
 the inspectorate recommends, in the interim 
period of any operational or structural 
changes, that the garda síochana ensures 
that a divisional or regional detective 
superintendent take responsibility from 
district officers for the investigation of a 
murder or other major enquiry. (short term).
6.7	National	Support	Services
As part of the inspection, the Inspectorate met with 
the	 Assistant	 Commissioner,	 National	 Support	
Services	(NSS).	Of	the	total	number	of	members	in	
the	Garda	Síochána,	 5%	are	 assigned	 to	NSS,	 and	
just over one quarter of those members work in the 
National	Bureau	of	Criminal	Investigation.
Key	areas	of	responsibilities	in	NSS:
•	 National	Bureau	of	Criminal	Investigation;
•	 National	 Units	 such	 as	 Criminal	 Assets	
Bureau,	Drugs,	Immigration,	and	Fraud;	
•	 Operational	 Support	 Services	 and	 units 
such	 as	 Dogs,	 Mounted,	 Water	 and	 Air	
Support;	
•	 Technical	 Bureau	 and	 liaison	 with	 the	
Forensic	Laboratory;
•	 Professional	 and	 policy	 lead	 for	 Domestic	
Violence and Sexual Assault. 
national Bureau of Criminal investigation
The	 NBCI	 was	 established	 in	 1997	 and	 has	
responsibility for investigating serious and major 
crimes such as murders, organised crime, domestic 
violence and serious sexual assaults against adults 
and children. The Inspectorate was informed that 
in	the	case	of	a	murder,	a	senior	NBCI	detective	will	
attend for the first twenty-four to forty-eight hours 
or until satisfied that the investigation is progressing 
well. In the case of many murders and particularly 
with	gang	related	crimes,	the	NBCI	may	well	have	
intelligence that can greatly assist an investigation. 
The responsibility for the investigation of a murder 
will still remain with the division and the district 
officer.
investigation section
As	part	of	the	NBCI,	the	Investigation	Section	has	
a remit for providing assistance with murders, 
internal garda criminality and crimes that 
include arts and antiques, stolen motor vehicles, 
environmental crime, An Post offences and 
other specialist crime. The Investigation Section 
operates four units of investigation teams with 
two units aligned to each of the two detective 
superintendents. This section has particular 
expertise in murder investigation and can also 
provide assistance with finding and interviewing 
suspects.
The	 Inspectorate	 noted	 that	 the	 NBCI	 does	 not	
often actually lead a murder investigations and 
their role is to provide short term assistance with 
particular investigative skills. There were fifty-
three murders in 2012 and fifty-one in 2013, and 
the	NBCI	did	not	appoint	any	SIOs	in	those	cases.	
Indeed,	the	NBCI	does	not	always	attend	a	murder	
scene to provide assistance and generally assists 
with less than half of all the murders committed in 
the State.
During meetings with Investigation Section 
members,	it	became	clear	that	the	role	of	NBCI	has	
changed and the economic situation has certainly 
contributed to the way that they now operate. 
In	 some	 cases	 the	NBCI	will	 attend	 to	 assist,	 but	
after a few days they will leave the investigation 
to the divisions. The division can retain the use 
of	 the	NBCI,	 but	 the	division	may	be	 expected	 to	
cover travel and subsistence costs associated with 
their assignment. In many cases, particularly 
with murders committed outside of Dublin, the 
NBCI	may	not	 send	any	members	 to	 assist	 or	 the	
division	may	decide	not	to	request	NBCI	assistance.	
Previously,	the	NBCI	would	always	attend	murder	
investigations with a team consisting of a detective 
superintendent, a sergeant and four gardaí, who 
would stay with the investigation for at least a 
month.	Now	the	NBCI	assign	a	similar	sized	team,	
but without the detective superintendent and they 
generally only stay for a few days.
The	support	of	NBCI	to	a	murder	investigation	can	
be	 affected	 by	 the	 new	garda	 roster,	 as	 the	NBCI	
unit that initially attends may have to be replaced 
part way through the investigation by a different 
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NBCI	 unit.	 This	 change	 in	 team	 impacts	 on	 the	
continuity of an investigation and if the length 
of enquiry is extended, the team is constantly 
changing. An example was given of a murder on 
a	Sunday	attended	by	an	NBCI	team	that	had	to	be	
replaced on the following day, as the first team was 
on a day off. This also impacts on the local district 
investigation team as members will be off duty for 
up to four days. It is also increasingly rare that a 
senior	garda	 from	the	NBCI	will	attend	a	murder	
investigation and any contact between senior 
gardaí	 in	 NBCI	 and	 the	 district	 where	 the	 crime	
occurred	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 by	 telephone.	 The	 NBCI	
have currently committed long term resources to 
one investigation from 2013. 
NBCI	 detectives	 perceive	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
their attendance, there may be gaps in murder 
investigation.	 To	 support	 this	 view,	 the	 NBCI	
provided examples where they have attended 
murder scenes or other major enquiries and have 
found that crime scenes were not always well 
managed, that investigations were not always well 
led and that investigative leads were not always 
progressed effectively. 
Investigation Section also has a number of other 
investigative responsibilities. This includes internal 
garda investigations into criminal behaviour of 
gardaí, including recent cases of property missing 
from garda stations. Investigating criminality 
by gardaí is a major part of the Investigation 
Section’s crime workload and greatly reduces their 
availability to assist with murder and other serious 
crime investigations. The two superintendents in 
Investigation Section each manage about seven 
Garda Síochána internal investigations at any one 
time, taking up to nine months to complete each 
one. This dual role can sometimes cause conflict 
for the section. Examples were provided where 
Investigation Section were engaged with a district 
investigation of garda criminality, when a serious 
crime occurred and the section was back in the 
same district but dealing with a different type of 
investigation. It was clear that if a murder takes 
place, then the internal investigations are set aside. In 
effect, Investigation Section spends approximately 
50% of their time on internal investigations and 
only about 30% of their time on murder enquiries. 
The other 20% is spent on investigating specialist 
offences such as environmental crime. While 
the investigation of garda criminality requires 
specialist skills, the Inspectorate believes that 
this function should rest with a separate unit that 
investigates allegations of garda corruption. 
In other policing jurisdictions, such investigations 
are managed by Internal Affairs or Professional 
Standards Units. The Inspectorate does not view 
this current use of Investigation Section as best 
use of their skills and expertise and they should 
be focused on murder and other serious crime 
investigations. 
 recommendation 6.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops an internal affairs 
investigation unit and removes garda internal 
investigations from the remit of investigation 
section. (medium term).
Approximately 20% of Investigation Section time 
is spent on specialist crimes such as intellectual 
property crime, arts and antiques, sea fisheries, 
environmental crime, stolen vehicles and An Post 
offences.	 Most	 of	 the	 staff	 investigating	 these	
offences are not specially trained, but have become 
experts through their own personal experience of 
the types of offences or a strong interest in that 
field. Some of the An Post offences are for small 
value offences and the Inspectorate do not view the 
use of these detectives to investigate such crimes 
as best practice. The Inspectorate believes that 
the	 NBCI	 has	 become	 a	 repository	 for	 sensitive	
enquiries and crimes that do not fit into other units 
responsibilities. The Inspectorate believes that the 
NBCI	 needs	 to	 free	 up	 Investigation	 Section	 to	
investigate murders on a full time basis. 
 recommendation 6.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána removes the specialist crime 
investigations from investigation section and 
reallocates those crimes to other investigation 
units. (medium term).
As	 part	 of	 the	 Haddington	 Road	 Review,	 the	
Inspectorate will look at the structure of the 
national units and make recommendations about 
restructuring options.
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NBCI	 contains	 an	 Organised	 Crime	 Unit	 (OCU)	
that focuses on organised criminality, racketeering, 
stolen motor vehicles and plant machinery. In 
2012, fourteen murders committed were linked 
to	 organised	 crime.	 The	 NBCI	 did	 not	 take	
responsibility for those investigations. 
technical Bureau 
Technical Bureau has approximately 20% of 
National	Support	Service	resources,	comprised	of	a	
combination of garda members and police support 
staff. Teams from the Bureau comprise experts 
in photography, documents and handwriting, 
ballistics, fingerprints and mapping. The process of 
becoming an expert takes approximately five years 
and gardaí and police staff are trained in crime 
scene examination, crime scene management and 
their specific field of expertise. When a murder 
occurs, Technical Bureau usually appoints a crime 
scene manager to attend with a specialist team to 
provide advice about what forensic retrievals are 
possible at a crime scene and to advise on what the 
laboratory can offer. If Technical Bureau attends a 
scene, they usually send a team of five experts in 
the following fields:
•	 Crime	Scene	management;
•	 Ballistics;
•	 Mapping;
•	 Fingerprints;
•	 Photography.
There are occasions where not all disciplines are 
required and they may send a partial team to a 
crime scene. 
Forensic examination of a murder crime scene 
can be conducted by local divisional crime scene 
examiners, but Technical Bureau is available 
for advice and can provide more sophisticated 
equipment if required. There are a large number 
of gardaí in these posts and as mentioned earlier, 
this is in contrast to other police services, where 
most of the functions are performed by police staff, 
rather than by police officers. The issue of members 
in	such	roles	is	considered	in	the	Haddington	Road	
Review.	
Crime scene management
The management of a crime scene from the arrival 
of the first gardaí to the forensic examination of 
the scene is a crucial aspect of any investigation. 
Technical Bureau is not always called and in some 
cases is not always told that a murder has taken 
place. There are some regions that have developed 
their own local skills and now consider themselves 
as self sufficient. In domestic related murders, 
Technical Bureau may not always need to attend 
and they may not attend a suspicious death that is 
not yet determined as a murder.
Sometimes the local Crime Scene Examiners 
(CSEs) attend the scene and conduct the forensic 
examination. As previously highlighted in Part 3, 
CSEs have five week’s training across all disciplines 
of forensics and while this prepares them to deal 
effectively with volume crime examinations, it 
does not necessarily provide them with the skills 
to manage a complex murder crime scene. On a 
number of occasions, local CSEs have commenced 
a forensic examination that they are unable 
to complete and Technical Bureau were asked 
to attend to finish it. The Inspectorate was also 
informed about two occasions where CSEs managed 
crime scenes and later submitted fingerprints 
from the crime scene to Technical Bureau for 
searching. Unfortunately, the fingerprints of the 
deceased persons were not taken for elimination 
purposes. There is also a trend of appointing a 
recently trained local crime scene manager and 
the experience of those individuals varies greatly. 
The crime scene manager’s role is critical to a good 
scene examination.
The examination of a crime scene needs to be 
methodical and certain disciplines are sequenced 
to obtain best evidence. By sending a full team, 
Technical Bureau will usually complete their 
examination with a few days, but CSEs might take 
five days and in one case it took ten days. The use 
of local CSEs also takes them away from their main 
role in respect of attending volume crime scenes.
With the introduction of SIO training, Technical 
Bureau has noticed a great improvement in the 
management of crime scenes. On arrival, areas 
are usually cordoned off and crime scene logs are 
commenced to record people who have entered a 
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crime scene. However, on occasions it is clear to 
Technical Bureau that people have unnecessarily 
entered a crime scene and this may contaminate 
potential exhibits.
Technical Bureau also analyse many exhibits 
recovered by CSEs and the quality of the 
submissions varies greatly. This includes CSEs 
submitting fingerprint lifts on cards that are 
unusable or submitting photographs that are 
blurred and of a poor quality. Photographing 
of murder scenes and in particular fibres found 
at scenes requires a good level of photographic 
expertise. This is not a criticism of CSEs, as they 
only receive five week’s training in all elements, 
compared to the extensive training provided to 
Technical Bureau photographers. 
The issue of poor fingerprint recovery is a key 
concern for the Inspectorate and as previously 
highlighted in this report, there is no performance 
data available on the quality of crime scene 
examinations by CSEs. 
In terms of technology, the Inspectorate believes that 
there are opportunities to provide enhanced IT that 
allows the electronic transmission of fingerprints 
directly from crime scenes to Fingerprint Section. 
On a few occasions, Technical Bureau has used 
this technique, but with inadequate IT, it takes a 
disproportionate amount of time to complete it.
The decision not to use Technical Bureau appears 
to be linked to the proximity of a division to Dublin 
and the regions that are further away are often using 
their own examiners. The Inspectorate believes that 
because of the skills they have developed, Technical 
Bureau should attend all murder enquiries and 
other serious crimes that require their expertise. 
The issue of the location of all Technical Bureau 
staff in Dublin may be an issue that needs to 
be considered in respect of providing better 
coverage across Ireland. There are functions such 
as the examination of exhibits that should remain 
centrally based, but there are clear opportunities to 
regionalise the crime scene elements of Technical 
Bureau. This is an area that will be covered in the 
Haddington	Road	Review.	
other operational support 
National	Support	Services	can	also	assist	with	other	
specialist units at murder and serious incidents, 
such	as	Air	Support,	Mounted,	Dog	and	Water	Unit	
assistance. For example, the Water Unit assists with 
body recovery and retrieving weapons and other 
evidence.	Dog,	Air	and	Mounted	units	are	able	 to	
cover search areas more quickly and areas where 
vehicle units are unable to reach. These are national 
units and they do not charge divisions for their 
services. These units will be examined as part of 
the	Haddington	Road	Review.
incident rooms
When a murder takes place, an incident room is 
usually established in the local district station 
and is used by the investigation team as a base 
for their activity. Some districts have a dedicated 
room that is always available and at others a 
specific room is allocated. The management of 
an incident room remains with the district and a 
member of district staff is normally designated as 
the	Incident	Room	Co-ordinator	(IRC).	The	role	of	
the	IRC	is	to	record	all	actions	(jobs)	undertaken	by	
the investigation team and to analyse, evaluate and 
categorise	all	 information	received.	The	IRC	has	a	
pivotal role to ensure that jobs are tasked and the 
results of these tasks are brought to the attention 
of the SIO. For example, witness statements should 
be	 read	 by	 the	 IRC	 and	 cross-checked.	 In	 a	 non-
complex investigation, thirty to forty actions can 
be generated, but in a more complicated case the 
number of actions can run to several thousand 
enquiries.	NBCI	do	not	 perform	 the	 IRC	 role	 and	
the Inspectorate was informed that there are some 
inconsistencies	in	the	way	that	IRCs	operate	across	
Ireland. The Inspectorate was informed that in 
some	cases	 the	 IRC	appointed	 is	 inexperienced	 in	
the role and may not always know how to make 
best use of specialist resources. 
recording actions and results – Jobs Book
To	 record	 IRC	 actions	 and	 ensure	 that	 they	 are	
completed,	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 operates	 a	 ‘Jobs	
Book’ system, which is a written register where 
investigative actions are recorded. In other police 
services, this process is electronically recorded in 
a major incident investigation system. Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) uses a Detective 
Case	 Tracking	 System	 and	 The	 Royal	 Canadian	
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Mounted	 Police	 (RCMP)	 use	 a	 Police	 Recording	
and Occurrence System. UK police services use a 
system	called	the	Home	Office	Large	Major	Enquiry	
System	(HOLMES).	This	system	is	used	in	all	major	
incidents and captures all documents and actions 
concerning an investigation. This system provides 
a search facility to identify linked crimes or key 
words that may be contained in witness statements 
or other documents. It also has the technology to 
sequence events to assist an investigator to piece 
together large amounts of information about 
a	 crime.	 HOLMES	 was	 introduced	 in	 1986	 and	
upgraded	to	HOLMES	2	in	2001.	The	Home	Office	
are	in	the	process	of	developing	HOLMES	3.	With	
this upgrade, the intention is to link hand held 
devices at crime scenes to download data directly 
onto	HOLMES.
The Garda Síochána had plans to introduce 
a	 system	 called	 MIMS	 (Major	 Investigation	
Management	 System),	 which	 would	 provide	
similar	technology	to	HOLMES.	Unfortunately,	the	
current financial situation led to the cancellation 
of this system. The Inspectorate believes that this 
was a lost opportunity to introduce technology 
operating successfully in other jurisdictions. The 
Garda	Síochána	should	move	from	Job	Books	 to	a	
computerised major investigation system. 
 recommendation 6.11
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána replaces “Job Books” with a 
major investigation management system to 
electronically record all actions in connection 
with a major incident. (Long term).
Decision making Logs
All serious offences should have an SIO appointed 
with responsibility for making key decisions 
in respect of the investigation. Currently, those 
decisions are recorded by SIOs in diaries or 
journals. A key component of any decision made 
is the rationale or thought process behind that 
decision. It is equally important for an SIO to 
explain why they took an investigation in a certain 
direction. In other policing jurisdictions, SIOs 
use a structured decision making log designed 
specifically for use in serious incidents and logs 
remain with a case at the conclusion and not with 
the SIO. 
 recommendation 6.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána replaces the use of diaries and 
other ledgers with a national standard garda 
decision making log. (medium term). 
Cold Case murder review 
NBCI	 has	 a	 Serious	 Crime	 Review	 Team	 (SCRT)	
that is primarily focused on unsolved crimes that 
took place after 1980. This team does not investigate 
crimes, but co-ordinates reviews of crimes that 
remain unsolved. At present their activity is 
restricted to murders, but the Inspectorate was told 
that the team would like to review other serious 
crimes such as unsolved rapes. With most crimes, 
a full review is not conducted as this would be 
an enormous task. Instead the team conducts 
preliminary reviews that are focused on key 
aspects of a crime such as suspects or exhibits. They 
are currently managing thirteen reviews with the 
majority	conducted	by	district	gardaí.	Reviews	are	
intended to help an SIO and may generate up to 200 
recommendations.
Findings, exhibits and paper work often causes 
difficulties for the team and in some serious cases 
they have found that retired detectives have 
retained possession of case papers and that papers 
are also kept in members’ lockers. In some cases, 
SCRT	has	to	review	up	to	thirty	boxes	of	statements	
and exhibits. The absence of a computerised case 
management system seriously impacts on murder 
review.
All members of the team were trained by officers 
from South Wales Police. In other police services, a 
murder review usually remains within a homicide 
team and murder investigations and reviews are 
shared amongst the investigation teams. South 
Wales has a full time murder review team fully 
staffed by civilians, many of whom are retired 
homicide detectives. 
The	SCRT	completes	reports	with	recommendations	
to help an SIO and on occasions this can run to 
several	hundred.	In	most	cases,	 the	SCRT	receives	
no feedback on their recommendations.
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The Inspectorate believes that there are 
opportunities	 to	 combine	 the	 SCRT	 and	 the	
Investigation Section and use investigators in a 
more effective way. 
 recommendation 6.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána includes the serious Crime 
review team (sCrt) as part of a new major 
investigation team. (medium term). (see also 
recommendation 6.16)
 recommendation 6.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána ensures that cold case 
review recommendations provided to senior 
investigating officers (sios) are reviewed and 
progress monitored. (short term).
Family Liaison officers
A murder has a devastating impact on families 
and the broader community. An effective 
police response to such incidents is critical in 
maintaining confidence and managing the fear 
of crime. Involving family at a very early stage 
in an investigation and maintaining contact is a 
really important part of a criminal investigation. 
A Family Liaison Officer (FLO) maintains links 
with and ensures that families are kept up to date 
with developments in cases. The Garda Síochána 
has 360 trained that are used during serious crime 
investigations as the point of contact for families 
and work directly to the SIO. The Garda Victims 
Liaison Office (GVLO) provides support to the 
FLOs. 
independent advisory groups
Many	 UK	 police	 services	 have	 developed	
Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) that consist 
of key community leaders and representatives 
of all communities. IAGs are used by police 
services to provide advice following a murder, 
a terrorist incident or other serious crime. They 
are often referred to as ‘critical friends’ and 
provide a community perspective to an incident 
and practical advice about how to engage and 
reassure	 communities.	 Many	 police	 services	
also use such groups to discuss new policies or 
policing operations and use those groups to advise 
them on the likely impact to local communities. 
IAGs operate on different levels and usually at 
Divisional and Headquarters level. These groups 
are particularly useful in murder investigations 
and provide excellent assistance in managing local 
community issues. 
 recommendation 6.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops independent advisory 
groups. (medium term).
6.8	Current	System	of	Murder	
Investigation 
Members	 involved	 in	 investigating	 murders	 and	
other serious crimes have mixed views regarding 
the current system of investigation. Some senior 
gardaí see value in the current system of districts 
managing investigations and others believe that 
there should be dedicated units with responsibility 
for investigating murders and other serious crimes. 
Divisions that have managed a number of murder 
enquiries consider that their teams have acquired 
the necessary skills to effectively manage a major 
investigation, without the need for support from 
the	 NBCI.	 However,	 other	 divisions	 have	 less	
confidence in their ability to manage a major 
investigation.	 Most	 divisions	 were	 positive	 about	
the	assistance	offered	by	the	NBCI,	but	this	support	
is only available on a short term basis and divisions 
have noticed a considerable reduction in the time 
that	 the	 NBCI	 now	 spends	 with	 an	 investigation	
team. 
Locations of murders in 2012 and 2013 
The data in Chart 6.13 shows the numbers of 
murders in 2012 and 2013 by garda regions, which 
shows that a significant number of murders are 
committed in Dublin and more than half are 
committed	 within	 the	 DMR	 and	 the	 adjoining	
Eastern	Region.
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Chart 6.13
murder offences by garda region 2012 
and 2013
Region 2012 2013
DMR	 21 19
Eastern	 5 8
Northern	 8 6
Southern	 6 7
South	Eastern 10 3
Western	 3 8
total 53 51
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
As	 previously	 mentioned,	 NBCI	 has	 developed	
an Investigation Section, which has the skills 
and expertise to investigate murder. Currently, 
the section is tasked to investigate far less serious 
crime and crimes of a sensitive nature. These other 
investigations should be allocated to other units and 
the Investigation Section should be investigating 
murders.
murder and other serious Crime 
investigations in other policing Jurisdictions 
At a point in the past, all of the police services 
visited as part of this inspection, operated the 
current Irish system for investigating murders 
and other serious crimes. However, they have all 
now moved on from local investigation teams, 
to full time dedicated teams that deal with the 
majority of murders committed. When asked by 
the Inspectorate, all found a centralised system to 
be more effective. The Inspectorate was informed 
that these dedicated units are appropriately 
resourced and have highly skilled investigators 
with experience of dealing with serious crime 
investigation. When a murder takes place, they 
immediately send officers to the crime scene, who 
take over the investigative role and follow the 
case through to any subsequent court case. The 
Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
should have dedicated investigation teams that 
deal with all murders in Ireland and other specified 
serious crime. 
In the UK, many police services are collaborating 
and introducing major crime investigation units 
that cover more than one service area. In 2007 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire established a joint 
team that deals with the majority of offences that 
would be classified as serious crime including 
homicide, attempted murder, stranger rape, 
kidnapping and extortion. The unit also attends all 
reports of suspicious sudden deaths and work related 
deaths. The unit is divided into three teams and 
manage twelve to fifteen live investigations per team.
Clearly, Ireland has geographical challenges that 
some other police services do not have to contend 
with. As part of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
visited Scotland, South Wales and West Yorkshire 
Police, which are comparable in terms of policing 
both rural and urban areas. Scotland has a 
Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD) with many 
similarities	 to	 the	 NBCI.	 With	 regard	 to	 murder	
investigations, SCD resources are located in three 
geographical areas. SCD major investigation 
teams deal with the majority of homicides, except 
some domestic related murders where the suspect 
is known and already arrested. Teams can be 
redeployed to assist with other investigations such 
as rape offences. SCD teams also conduct cold case 
homicide reviews. In developing teams, Scotland 
looked at both West Yorkshire and South Wales. 
There are other sections of SCD that deal with 
other serious crimes such as organised gangs and 
human trafficking. West Yorkshire, South Wales 
and most US and Canadian cities have dedicated 
homicide investigation teams. 
The	current	 location	of	NBCI	sometimes	prohibits	
more	activity	in	the	far	South,	West	and	Northern	
regions and the Inspectorate believes that there 
are	 opportunities	 to	place	 the	NBCI	 into	 strategic	
locations that provide national coverage.
 recommendation 6.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops major incident 
investigation teams that investigate murders 
and other specified serious crimes. (Long 
term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Remove	 the	 responsibility	 for	 homicide	
investigation from the district 
superintendent to a major incident 
investigation	team;	
•	 Establish	 major	 incident	 teams	 on	 a	
geographical basis that meet the policing 
demands	of	major	incident	investigations;
•	 Utilise	existing	National	Bureau	of	Criminal	
Investigation	 (NBCI),	 Technical	 Bureau,	
regional and divisional resources to create 
the new teams.
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6.9 Cybercrime
Cybercrime covers a whole range of offences and 
advancements in technology are creating new 
opportunities for criminals. It is also an area 
where organised criminal networks are expanding. 
Cybercrime	 affects	 everyone,	 including	 citizens,	
corporations and governments. 
The following are some of the crimes that would 
come into this category:
•	 Targeting	networked	systems;
•	 Money	laundering;
•	 Supply	of	heroin	and	other	drugs;
•	 Credit	card	fraud;
•	 Human	trafficking;	
•	 Account	theft;	
•	 Child	exploitation.	
A major threat to police services is a high volume of 
non-reported cybercrimes. The following are some 
victims who may be less willing to report including: 
•	 Some	victims	of	child	exploitation	or	human	
trafficking may not report the crime for a 
variety	of	reasons;	
•	 Organisations	may	not	want	to	damage	their	
reputation;	
•	 Victims	may	 be	 unaware	 that	 a	 crime	 has	
taken place. 
The threat from cybercrime is impacted by new 
technology, such as smart appliances and social 
network sites. 
During the inspection visits, many senior gardaí 
highlighted cybercrime and the threats posed as 
an	area	requiring	Garda	Síochána	attention.	Many	
other police services are developing cybercrime 
units or including cybercrimes within serious and 
organised crime units. As part of the Haddington 
Road	 Review,	 the	 Inspectorate	 will	 examine	 this	
issue more closely.
6.10	Other	National	Units	with	
Investigative	Responsibilities
Within	 the	 National	 Support	 Services	 and	 Crime	
and Security there are other units with investigative 
roles. Some of the following units do not usually 
investigate crimes generated by victims, but are 
more proactive units that conduct operations. The 
national unit structures are part of the Haddington 
Road	Review.	
organised Crime Unit (oCU)
The Organised Crime Unit was established in 
2005 and focuses on investigations into organised 
criminal networks. Operations are usually based 
on intelligence received and this unit maintains 
the operation through to any prosecution. A 
crime is only usually recorded at the arrest 
phase of an operation. Within this unit, there is 
a	 Stolen	 Motor	 Vehicle	 Investigation	 Unit	 with	
experts in examining and identifying stolen plant 
machinery and stolen vehicles. This unit conducts 
examinations on a country-wide basis. There are 
opportunities to train gardaí on a divisional basis 
to a level that would enable them to identify stolen 
cars and to allow this unit to focus on organised 
criminality. This will be further considered as part 
of	the	Haddington	Road	Review.	
garda national Drugs Unit (gnDU)
This unit operates very similarly to the OCU 
and operations are usually intelligence led. The 
Inspectorate found overlaps between the targets of 
the	GNDU	and	 the	OCU	and	 the	Garda	Síochána	
is currently considering the amalgamation of these 
units.
garda Bureau of Fraud investigation (gBFi) 
The Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation (GBFI) 
was established 1995 to concentrate on complex 
fraud cases. The following are investigation units 
within the GBFI. 
assessment Unit
This unit is the central point for receiving all 
complaints of fraud. The Assessment Unit reviews 
cases to see if there is prima facie evidence and make 
recommendations	 on	 investigations.	 Minor	 fraud	
offences are sent to districts to investigate. There are 
many delays in commencing investigations, such as 
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victims providing additional evidence that a crime 
has taken place and also trying to determine if a 
crime took place and in which jurisdiction. Last 
year,	 the	 unit	 received	 514	 new	 enquiries	 and	
the volume of cases is significantly delaying the 
investigative process. In some cases which date 
back to 2011, investigations have just commenced.
Commercial Fraud
The vast majority of cases received by GBFI are 
commercial fraud cases. 10% of these cases received 
are sent to the Commercial Fraud Unit in GBFI for 
investigation, 20% are sent to districts to investigate 
and the remaining 70% are awaiting more evidence. 
The Anglo-Irish Bank investigation is an example 
of a high profile and resource intensive case. A 
very time consuming part of their role is dealing 
with telephone calls from victims of crime and 
calls from district investigators who need help 
with cases being investigated locally. Some of 
the cases investigated require large numbers of 
statements	 from	 victims	 and	 witnesses;	 in	 one	
case an investigator took 250 witness statements. 
The impact of this sort of crime can be dramatic 
for some victims and can include the loss of life 
savings. Cases involving crime are recorded on 
PULSE, but civil cases are not recorded. There is 
currently no threshold for what the GBFI will and 
will not investigate and it is decided on a case by 
case basis. It was acknowledged that some district 
detectives without any formal training are 
investigating high value and sometimes complex 
investigations. GBFI also highlighted cases where 
district investigators have waited two years before 
asking them for help. 
suspicious transactions Unit 
This unit manages a large number of notifications, 
most of which are received on-line. The majority of 
investigations are conducted by divisions and not 
by this unit. These are not recorded on PULSE, 
until a crime has been established.
other Units
There are a number of other units in the GBFI 
including:
•	 Money	Laundering;
•	 Payment	Card;
•	 Financial	Investigation	unit;
•	 Computer	 Crime	 Investigation	 Unit	 (this	
unit is discussed later in this part of the 
report);
•	 GBFI	members	are	attached	to	the	Office	of	
the Director of Corporate Enforcement.
garda national immigration Bureau (gniB) 
This unit has a wide remit of responsibilities 
including:
•	 The	Registration	Office	 for	 new	 arrivals	 to	
Ireland;
•	 Dublin	Airport	immigration	and	security;
•	 Repatriation;
•	 Human	Trafficking.
There are plans in place to move some of the 
functions	of	GNIB	 to	 the	 Irish	Naturalisation	and	
Immigration Service and this should release gardaí 
for redeployment.6 The Inspectorate believes that 
that the Human Trafficking investigation element 
should move to another part of the Garda Síochána. 
This will be considered further in the Haddington 
Road	Review.
special Detective Unit
As mentioned with regards to firearms, this unit 
provides	a	24/7	armed	response	in	the	DMR.	This	
unit also has an investigative capability. 
summary
At present there is very little clarity about what 
some of the national units do and do not 
investigate. The Inspectorate believes that there are 
opportunities to amalgamate functions and units 
and to create clear protocols about what crimes 
units will investigate. The formation of a Serious 
and Organised Crime Unit would allow several 
current units to come together to reduce overlap and 
to provide more resilience for investigations. The 
Inspectorate will examine the role and function of 
the	national	units	in	the	Haddington	Road	Review.
6 The Inspectorate notes that significant progress was made on 
this issue at the time of completion of this report.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 6: Investigating Crime 
Part 6  |  34
6.11	Rape	and	Serious	Sexual	
Assault Investigations
To conduct an effective investigation of rape and 
serious sexual assault, an investigator needs to 
develop the trust of a victim. This requires good 
investigative skills in respect of gathering evidence, 
dealing with suspects and preparing cases for 
prosecution. In most international policing 
jurisdictions, this role is performed by a trained 
detective.
In every division visited, the Inspectorate found 
regular unit gardaí undertaking the primary 
investigation of these crimes and in many cases 
remaining as the investigating garda. In some 
divisions, a detective may be assigned to assist the 
investigating garda, but the investigator retains 
responsibility for victim care, the investigation 
and the prosecution of any offender. The 
Inspectorate found that this can result in a garda 
with very little experience investigating one of the 
most difficult investigations that an investigator 
will face. A rape investigation is often complex 
and requires good investigative skills to obtain 
independent corroborative and forensic evidence. 
Increasingly, offences involve issues of consent, 
which can negate many forensic opportunities and 
these cases need a skilled investigator to establish 
the facts of the case.
Dealing with a victim of rape is incomparable 
to most other offences. Victims have to provide 
intimate details in an initial version of events as 
well as in a full written statement. Victims are 
asked to agree to a physical examination by a 
medical practitioner to retrieve forensic evidence 
and to record physical evidence of the assault. This 
process requires the highest levels of victim care 
and a good understanding of the investigative 
aspects of the offence. 
The Garda Síochána has a Domestic Violence and 
Sexual	Offences	Unit	 (DVSAIU)	within	 the	NBCI.	
From a field visit, it was clear that the unit is very 
much focused on sexual offences against children 
and particularly victims of clerical abuse. With 
regard to adult rape and other sexual offences, 
the unit does not perform an investigative role 
and does little work in relation to monitoring 
investigations conducted by divisions. At the time 
of the inspection, they were conducting eight 
investigations into offences against children. 
The Inspectorate does not agree with garda 
policy that the investigation of serious sexual 
offences can be performed by all front-line gardaí. 
Other policing jurisdictions, such as the London 
Metropolitan	 Police	 Service	 and	 most	 US	 and	
Canadian police services have full time, dedicated 
officers investigating such crimes. Front-line 
officers may attend a crime scene, but a trained 
investigator is quickly deployed to take over the 
case. Scotland has dedicated rape investigation 
units in all fourteen policing divisions, each 
managed by a detective inspector. The units have 
trained officers who undertake all serious sexual 
assault investigations. Dedicated Sexual Offence 
Liaison Officers (SOLOs) trained in forensic 
retrieval and victim trauma deal with the initial 
investigation of all complaints of rape and serious 
sexual assault. SOLOs accompany victims to sexual 
assault centres, where a full forensic and medical 
examination is undertaken as well as providing 
health support and access to counselling. Where 
the victim has made a complaint to the Garda 
Síochána, gardaí accompany victims taken to 
Sexual Assault Treatment Units. 
Police Scotland is looking to develop a specially 
equipped bus to allow forensic examination 
facilities to move to locations where they are most 
frequently required. Statements are always taken at 
a neutral venue away from police stations and there 
is a high level of victim care from the outset. To 
ensure a high quality of investigation, investigators 
have received additional training in crime scene 
management and rape trauma.
In support of divisional rape investigation units 
in	 Scotland,	 there	 is	 a	 National	 Rape	 Task	 Force	
providing a centre of excellence in terms of rape 
investigation and the monitoring of offences across 
Scotland. The unit also undertakes investigations 
into the majority of stranger rape attacks and 
performs a review function of all undetected rape 
cases twenty-eight days after the commencement 
of the investigation. All undetected cases are 
reviewed by a detective superintendent. Scotland 
has	 a	 National	 Expert	 Advisory	 Group	 that	
develops policy relating to the investigation and 
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prosecution of rape offences. The Crown Policy 
Unit,	 High	 Court	 Unit,	 Head	 of	 the	 National	
Rape	 Task	 Force,	 senior	 representatives	 from	 the	
Procurator	Fiscal’s	Office	and	Scottish	Rape	Crisis	
are amongst the members of this group, which 
is chaired by the Lord Advocate. There are also 
dedicated lawyers dealing with all serious sexual 
assault cases in the Procurator Fiscal’s Office.7 One 
of the outcomes of this approach is that Police 
Scotland can monitor the attrition rate of cases at 
each stage of the investigative and prosecution 
process. There is also a high detection rate for rape. 
In	the	first	ten	weeks	of	2013	(from	1st	April)	1,646	
sexual offences were reported nationally with a 
detection rate of 73.9%. Of these, 327 were offences 
of rape, with a detection rate of 68.5%. In 2012 in 
Ireland, 1,286 sexual assaults (not aggravated) were 
reported	with	a	detection	rate	of	54%	and	a	total	of	
507 offences of rapes were reported with a detection 
rate of 57%.
The Inspectorate received a number of recent 
Garda	 Professional	 Standards	 Unit	 Reports	 from	
divisional examinations. Each examination 
specifically looked at the investigation of crime, 
including the investigation of sexual assaults. 
Each report has contained areas of concern with 
the investigation of sexual assaults. Issues found 
include:
•	 Long	 delays	 in	 conducting	 some	
investigations and examples of cases going 
back	 to	 2002	 and	 2004	 that	 have	 not	 been	
concluded;
•	 Some	cases	that	are	many	years	old,	which	
were never sent to the district officer or the 
DPP	for	directions;
•	 Cases	without	updates	on	PULSE;	
•	 Examples	 where	 crimes	 were	 reclassified	
to invalid (no crime has taken place), 
when there was evidence that a crime had 
occurred.
The Inspectorate believes that rape and serious 
sexual assault cases should always be investigated 
by detectives and supervised by a senior detective. 
This is in keeping with a similar recommendation 
7 Procurator Fiscal is the Scottish equivalent of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions
made in the Inspectorate’s report into the 
investigation of child sexual abuse published in 
2012. At that time, the Inspectorate recommended 
that only a cadre of specially trained gardaí should 
record crimes, take statements and investigate 
crimes. This recommendation was rejected. The 
Inspectorate still believes that the Garda Síochána 
should train gardaí to conduct the primary 
investigation of serious sexual assault allegations. 
In putting together the content of this training, 
the Garda Síochána should engage with external 
professionals such as Cosc, rape crisis groups and 
the Head of the Forensic Science Laboratory.  
 recommendation 6.17
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements victim-centred policy 
and good investigative practices in rape and 
other sexual offences. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Train	 dedicated	 officers	 to	 undertake	 the	
initial investigation of a serious sexual 
assault, including the taking of a victim’s 
statement. The training should include 
forensic retrieval, rape trauma, victim care 
and	statement	taking;
•	 Allocate	 all	 investigations	 to	 trained	
detectives;	
•	 Implement	 a	 formal	 review	 process	 for	
undetected sexual offences.
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6.12 Volume Crime Investigation
As previously highlighted, volume crime accounts 
for a large percentage of criminal offences 
that require investigation. The Inspectorate’s 
examination focused on the quality of volume 
investigations by the Garda Síochána, the length of 
time these investigations took to complete and the 
victim’s experience. 
Barriers to good volume Crime 
investigation 
Police services worldwide experience challenges 
in managing volume crime investigations. The 
following are some of the negative factors that can 
seriously impact on the quality of volume crime 
investigations: 
•	 Inexperienced	investigators;
•	 Unclear	 investigation	 direction	 given	 to	
investigators;
•	 Excessive	workloads;
•	 Lack	of	a	performance	regime;
•	 Poor	supervision;
•	 Limited	or	inadequate	training;
•	 A	lack	of	up-to-date	forensic	capacity.
Where any of these conditions prevail, 
investigations are often of a poor quality, they are 
not progressed quickly and offenders are unlikely 
to be brought to justice. The following part of 
this report will examine how the Garda Síochána 
manages volume crime investigations.
experience and skills of investigators
Ireland, unlike most other policing jurisdictions, 
has no clear policy setting out who will investigate 
volume crime. Effectively, the default position is 
that the first gardaí (usually from a regular unit) 
that deals with an incident will investigate the 
crime. The majority of these investigators are not 
trained detectives, although they will have received 
elements of crime investigation instruction during 
their foundation training at the Garda College. 
Gardaí with detective or enhanced criminal 
investigation training are mainly based in national 
and district detective units. 
investigations by regular Units
There are two very distinct stages in crime 
investigation. The first response to a call is usually 
referred to as the primary investigation. For a 
burglary offence, this is performed by the first 
gardaí to attend and they are expected to conduct 
an investigation at the crime scene and to secure 
any evidence that might identify a suspect. 
The next stage, the secondary investigation, builds 
on the work completed at the crime scene and may 
involve responding to any forensic results found at a 
burglary or conducting more detailed enquiries. The 
majority of gardaí should be capable of conducting 
a good primary investigation of a volume crime and 
many experienced members would also be capable 
of conducting a good secondary investigation. There 
are however, fundamental issues with the current 
system of secondary investigations for volume 
crime. There are many less experienced gardaí that 
do not possess the skills or have sufficient time to do 
a thorough secondary investigation. In cases where 
the crime is less serious or where there are leads 
to a potential suspect, the secondary investigation 
might be straight forward however, in more serious 
or complex cases where a suspect is not known, they 
may be required to conduct significant enquiries. 
The Inspectorate met with regular unit gardaí who 
are investigating serious offences such as sexual 
assaults, robberies, child sexual abuse and other 
serious assaults. These are serious crimes and the 
Inspectorate believes that these types of crimes 
should always be investigated by trained detectives. 
A second major obstacle to good secondary 
investigation is the absence of investigation time for 
gardaí	 on	 regular	 units.	 No	 specific	 investigation	
time is built into their roster and their working day 
is usually spent out on patrol dealing with calls 
received from the public or they are abstracted for 
policing operations or local escort duties. In some 
districts, supervisors allow regular unit gardaí 
to show themselves as unavailable for calls, to 
deal with enquiries such as visiting victims to 
take statements. In other districts, no such time 
is provided and gardaí try to make enquiries in 
between dealing with other calls. On checking 
the CAD system, the Inspectorate regularly found 
patrol units shown as unavailable for calls as they 
were conducting enquiries. Other police services 
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have tried to release regular units from such 
investigations to enable those units to respond to 
999 calls, to patrol hotspots of crime and to prevent 
further offences.
At present, only those gardaí deployed in detective 
units or other investigation teams have any time 
set aside to conduct secondary investigations. 
Victims of volume crime and particularly the more 
serious crimes, deserve the deployment of a trained 
detective and an investigator that has the time 
to conduct a thorough and timely investigation. 
During field visits to divisions, the Inspectorate 
found that detectives are not investigating large 
numbers of volume crimes and the Inspectorate 
believes that this is a lost opportunity to use their 
skills and expertise to tackle key crimes impacting 
on their local communities. Other policing 
jurisdictions use detective units to investigate the 
more serious volume crime cases and a mixture 
of detectives and uniform gardaí in investigation 
units to investigate the less serious cases.8
In Ireland, there are currently insufficient 
allocations of detective numbers based in districts 
to investigate all volume crimes, but they could 
significantly increase the numbers of crimes that 
they are managing. As previously stated, there are 
a number of other specialist units on divisions, such 
as drugs, traffic and community policing units that 
are not investigating large numbers of volume 
crimes and the burden falls very much onto the 
regular units. The Inspectorate believes that these 
specialist units need to be more engaged in the 
investigation process. With the current reduction in 
garda numbers on both regular units and specialist 
units under the new roster, the Garda Síochána may
8 Includes 7 cases of Domestic Dispute - no offences disclosed. 
(This is not a crime and further investigation would not 
usually take place).
have reached a point where these specialist units 
may not be viable in their current format.
volume Crime Case reviews –  
Crime investigation
Running	 throughout	 this	 report	 has	 been	 the	
analysis of 158 calls for service made to the seven 
divisions	visited.	Of	the	total	calls,	114	were	recorded	
on PULSE and forty-four were not recorded. Of 
the	114	on	PULSE,	nine	were	recorded	as	domestic	
disputes, thirteen as Attention and Complaints and 
two as property lost. The other 90 were recorded as 
crimes for investigation.
Chart	 6.14	 shows	 the	 158	 calls	 broken	 down	 by 
crime types, number and percentage of cases in each 
crime type that were designated for investigation.
The overall percentage of cases designated for 
investigation is low with only 59% of the original 
158 cases investigated. Within those figures, there 
are significant variations, such as 80% of calls to 
burglaries were investigated, as opposed to only 
40%	of	assaults	and	24%	of	domestic	violence	calls.	
Failure to record and investigate incidents 
Following the original request for the 158 cases, 
the	 Inspectorate	 identified	 that	 of	 those	 cases,	 114	
cases were recorded on PULSE. On checking those 
incidents on PULSE, the Inspectorate found that 
fourteen late PULSE records were created after the 
request was first made by the Inspectorate and a 
minimum of twelve months after the alleged crime 
was notified to the Garda Síochána. 
Chart 6.15 outlines a breakdown of the incidents by 
crime type and shows the average time it took to 
create the fourteen PULSE records. 
Chart 6.14
volume Crime Case reviews – Crime investigation 
Calls for service investigated 
Crime	Category	of	
Call	for	Service
Number	of	Calls	for	
Service
Calls	for	Service	that	
were	Recorded	on	
PULSE	and	Investigated
Calls	for	Service	that	
were	Recorded	on	PULSE	
and	not	Investigated
Calls	for	Service	that	
were	not	Recorded
assault 30 40% 13% 47%
Burglary 40 80% 10% 10%
Domestic	Violence 33 24% 31%8 45%
Robbery 27 81% 8% 11%
Vehicle	crime 28 68% 4% 28%
totals 158 59% 13% 28%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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Chart 6.15
volume Crime Case reviews Cases from 
2012 not recorded on pULse until 2013
Crime 
Category	
Type
Number	of	Cases	
with	PULSE	
Incidents	Created	
in	2013
Average	Delay	in	
Recording	from	
Original	Reporting	
(by	months)
assault 2 13
Burglary 1 13
Domestic	
Violence
5 14
Robbery 3 14
Vehicle	crime 3 15
totals 14 14
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
Six out of the seven divisions created PULSE 
incidents after the Inspectorate’s request for 
case files. Of the records created, there were five 
domestic incidents that were not recorded until 
2013 and that equates to 15% of the total DV cases 
requested. Other crimes that were not recorded 
included a knife point robbery, a burglary, car 
crimes and assaults. Several of the reports created 
in 2013 were categorised as non-crime incidents 
such as Attention and Complaints9 and property 
lost. In several of those cases, there is unambiguous 
evidence that a victim reported that a crime had 
taken place, but it was not recorded as a crime and 
was not investigated. 
implications for not recording these Cases 
on pULse
There are clear implications for not recording a 
crime at the time that it is reported. With these 
fourteen crimes from the sample, the following 
issues are relevant: 
•	 No	criminal	investigation	has	taken	place	in	
the	proceeding	twelve	months;
•	 Victims	 of	 those	 crimes	 did	 not	 receive	 a	
Garda Síochána victim’s letter with details 
of	support	agencies;
•	 The	victims	of	 those	crimes	were	never	re-
contacted;
•	 Potential	 suspects	 were	 never	 sought	 or	
brought	to	justice	for	these	crimes;
•	 There	was	no	supervision	of	these	incidents;
9 Attention and Complaints is a category on PULSE where 
non-crime incidents are recorded.
•	 In	domestic	violence	cases,	the	safety	of	the	
victim and of gardaí may be compromised 
as other gardaí attending further incidents 
to the same victim or the same address may 
be unaware of the previous call.
The explanations from divisions for not recording 
these incidents included an oversight by the garda 
that attended, or in several cases, an inability to 
identify who actually dealt with the original call to 
determine why it was not recorded.
For the majority of reports created at a later date, no 
reason was offered for failing to record the incident 
at the time of dealing with the original call. 
the random selection of these incidents highlights 
inconsistency in the recording and investigative 
practices of the garda síochána. 
6.13 Domestic Violence 
Investigations 
Domestic violence (DV) was one of five key crimes 
selected by the Inspectorate as part of this inspection 
process. Police services recognise the dangers 
of not dealing with DV incidents and DV often 
accounts for almost half of all murders that are 
committed. It is also well reported that reporting 
of domestic violence is very low and victims suffer 
many incidents before contacting the authorities 
or applying for a protection order.10 In Ireland, the 
National	Study	of	Domestic	Abuse	(NSDA)11 found 
that under a quarter of those severely affected by 
domestic abuse told the gardaí. The study also 
found that where a family or friend discovered that 
a person was suffering domestic abuse, only eight 
percent reported the crime to the gardaí. 
Domestic violence calls demand a high proportion 
of police time. Effective response to such calls 
reduces repeat crimes as well as the effects to the 
immediate and secondary victims. This elevates the 
importance of the first contact between the police 
and a victim of violence or abuse.
Domestic violence first featured as one of the Garda 
Síochána policing priorities in 2008. Currently, 
regions, divisions and districts receive weekly 
10  Felson et al, 2005.
11 Watsons and Parsons, 2005.
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crime reports on the levels of offences across thirty-
five different crime types and the detection rates for 
solving	those	offences.	No	DV	statistics	are	included	
in these reports, and the Garda Síochána is unable 
to accurately identify the number of weekly 999 
calls they receive, the numbers of crimes committed 
involving DV and the related detection rates. As 
DV is a national policing priority, the Inspectorate 
expected to find easily accessible crime data. 
During fieldwork, the Inspectorate looked at the 
strategic management of DV and the operational 
delivery of services to victims. Assistant 
Commissioner	for	National	Support	Services	(NSS)	
is	 the	 lead	 for	DV.	As	 part	 of	NSS,	 the	Domestic	
Violence and Sexual Assault Unit (DVSAIU) 
develops policy and provides an oversight 
function, but does not, as its title suggests, 
actually investigate offences of DV. Indeed, the 
DVSAIU does not include a unit dedicated to DV, 
but responsibility for DV policy is part of the 
functions of a detective inspector and a sergeant. 
The DVSAIU is not a proactive unit and it is not 
currently conducting any DV investigations 
or reviewing the quality of DV investigations 
currently conducted by districts. 
From a strategic perspective, the Inspectorate 
found that whilst there is a policy (2007) in relation 
to the response to DV, there is very little evidence 
that the policy is audited or monitored to ensure 
that it is implemented at an operational level. A 
recurring theme throughout this inspection is the 
gap between the creation and implementation of 
policy and the absence of action and supervision to 
ensure that policy aims are actually delivered. The 
Inspectorate is aware that a new policy on DV is due 
to be published. 
What distinguishes DV from other crimes is the 
nature of the relationship between the victim 
and the offender. There is often a strong element 
of controlling behaviour on the part of the 
offender, which can isolate victims from sources 
of support and regulate everyday behaviour 
through intimidation. The conventional approach 
of a criminal prosecution can sometimes create 
significant difficulties for those experiencing 
abuse, including the potential loss of a victims 
home and further intimidation, once a case is 
concluded.	 Many	 victims	 require	 alternative	
options to a criminal prosecution, whilst still 
knowing that there will be an effective response 
from gardaí should further violence occur. DV 
is most effectively managed by a multi-agency 
response, bringing together statutory agencies 
and voluntary organisations to provide effective 
outcomes for victims. The current garda policy 
does not advocate a joint working approach 
with other relevant agencies, which is a missed 
opportunity and particularly important for the 
complexities involved in DV. The policy only 
stipulates that the investigating gardaí will provide 
victims with the details of local support groups, 
HSE social workers, Family Law Courts and other 
agencies. 
Divisional response to the Dv policy 
The current DV policy provides that each division 
nominate an inspector to oversee the policy and 
evaluate its effectiveness. During field visits, 
the Inspectorate met several inspectors with 
responsibility for DV. In most cases, the high 
volume of incidents reported to those divisions 
diminished the ability of an inspector to check all 
cases for compliance with the policy. For many 
inspectors, the extent of their intervention was 
limited to monitoring the number of offences. Part 
of the inspector’s role is to ensure accurate recording 
of all DV crimes and all domestic dispute incidents. 
On checking PULSE incidents, the Inspectorate 
found no recorded evidence that inspectors 
are checking DV calls or ensuring the accurate 
recording and classification of them on PULSE. An 
exception to this was found in one district where a 
nominated sergeant monitors all DV incidents. 
assessing risk and identifying repeat 
victims
In other policing jurisdictions visited, a formal 
risk assessment process is undertaken at all DV 
incidents to identify those at the highest level of 
risk of abuse and to engage partner organisations 
at an early stage to provide effective interventions 
to reduce that risk. In Ireland, there is no such 
assessment of risk and gardaí are repeatedly dealing 
with the same victims. If a victim is unwilling to 
make a statement of complaint, there is no effective 
police intervention to improve the victim’s safety 
or to provide an alternative way forward. This 
fails to break the cycle of abuse and results in 
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further calls to gardaí for assistance and generates 
a view amongst many gardaí, that these calls are 
problematic. The current policy states that the 
investigating gardaí will call back to see a victim 
of DV within one month to provide an update on 
the investigation or to offer support in cases where 
there is no investigation. During focus groups, the 
Inspectorate identified that follow-up visits do not 
always happen. Follow-up visits can be an effective 
way	 to	 prevent	 further	DV.	 In	New	York,	 officers	
must carry out a set number of follow-up visits 
each month and this policy has contributed to a 
reduction in DV crime with no negative response 
from victims. 
A revised approach, identifying repeat offences and 
working with partner agencies to agree practical 
support would bring a significant improvement 
in the service provided to victims and reduce the 
demands on front-line gardaí. UK police services 
operate a formal risk assessment process, which 
identifies cases as being high, medium or low 
risk. The response to each is directly proportionate 
to the risk of harm faced by the victim and 
takes account of repeat calls for assistance. In 
Hertfordshire, high risk victims are offered the 
services of an Independent DV Advisor (IDVA) 
who in addition to supporting a victim through a 
criminal prosecution also provides information 
and advice about civil court injunctions. 
offender management
Closely linked to the assessment of risk to victims 
is the management of perpetrators of DV. Effective 
management of those committing acts of violence 
will assist to keep victims and their families safe 
from further harm. It also sends a clear message 
that further incidents of abuse will be dealt with 
robustly through the criminal justice process. 
An effective process allows for the collection of 
intelligence about such offenders, which can assist 
in providing accurate information to the courts 
about their behaviour, as well as providing the 
basis for sentencing options. The current DV policy 
outlines the approach to be taken in relation to 
bailing an offender charged with an offence, but it 
is limited to setting out the legal provisions of the 
Bail Act and the response to more serious offences. 
The policy does not set out a robust and proactive 
response to managing perpetrators of DV and 
abuse. (See also Part 10)
arresting offenders
The DV policy clearly sets out the difference 
between DV related crimes and domestic dispute 
incidents and describes how each should be 
recorded and classified. The policy makes it clear 
that:
•	 Where	there	is	visible	evidence	of	an	assault,	
the crime should be addressed by the 
responder rather than placing the onus on a 
victim	to	apply	for	a	civil	court	order;	
•	 Where	 the	 investigating	 member	 has	
reasonable grounds to believe that a 
suspect has committed an offence, then any 
applicable power of arrest that exists should 
be	exercised;
•	 An	 injured	 party’s	 attitude	will	 not	 be	 the	
determining factor in respect of exercising a 
power of arrest.
The making of an arrest in cases where a crime 
has taken place is referred to as ‘positive action’. 
There is a clear expectation from the Garda 
Síochána that where there is evidence that a crime 
took place, gardaí will take such positive action. 
During field visits, the Inspectorate met with 
operational gardaí of all ranks, both uniform and 
detectives and discussed their roles in responding 
to calls of DV and domestic disputes. It was clear 
from those discussions that the response to DV 
incidents rests with regular units. Unless a DV 
crime involves a murder or very serious assault 
there is virtually no detective input into DV cases. 
During meetings with detective supervisors, there 
was an acknowledgement that this is not a crime 
area that they review on a daily basis. In Part 3, the 
Inspectorate identified the high number of calls to 
domestic incidents and the low volume of arrests 
recorded on CAD at the time. 
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volume Crime Case reviews - Domestic 
violence
Chart 6.16 shows the outcomes of the thirty-three 
domestic violence incidents requested as part of the 
Volume	Crime	Case	Reviews	that	were	reported	in	
2012. In many of these cases, the CAD and paper 
messages recorded that a crime was described 
by the caller when they first contacted the Garda 
Síochána. Chart 6.16 shows how many arrests were 
made and for what offences. 
Chart 6.16
Domestic violence Cases 
from 2012 not recorded on 
pULse until 2013
Number	
of	Calls
Number	of	
arrests at the 
Time	of	the	Call
Details	of	Arrests
33 4 •	 1	for	breach	of	
barring	order	
incident
•	 1	for	a	public	order	
offence
•	 2	for	intoxication
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
Court orders and positive action
As part of the Inspection process, the Inspectorate 
sampled a number of DV cases. The Inspectorate 
found that there was a clear difference in the 
service provided to victims where a court order was 
in place to protect the person and where no such 
court order existed. In cases with an order, a garda 
was more likely to arrest for breach of the order. In 
cases where a DV crime had clearly occurred, but 
where there was no court order, there was limited 
evidence of positive action and in most cases, 
victims were given advice about how to obtain 
civil court protection orders. Even when a criminal 
offence was committed, often no arrest is recorded. 
In many cases, gardaí reported that victims are 
often unwilling to make a statement of complaint 
and this clearly impacts on garda action. 
members from all seven divisions stated in focus 
groups that positive action is not always taken 
where crimes were committed and where there 
were opportunities to arrest the offender. these 
members also said that Dv is not always recorded 
in cases were a crime had clearly taken place and 
that injuries sustained by victims are not always 
recorded on pULse.
Dip sampling of Domestic violence on 
pULse
During the course of the inspection, the 
Inspectorate examined a number of PULSE 
records to ascertain the standard of recording of 
domestic violence and domestic dispute incidents. 
Domestic violence is not in itself a PULSE crime 
category and accurate recording requires a garda to 
flag the association of DV on the PULSE record of 
a crime. 
The following are two examples of domestic 
violence incidents examined during that 
sampling and highlight key issues regarding the 
categorisation of DV incidents.
Case 1 – assault with injuries classified as a 
domestic dispute - no offences disclosed
A victim’s injuries were noted on a PULSE 
incident as significant bruising. This incident 
was not shown as a crime, but was recorded 
as an Attention and Complaint incident. The 
Garda Information Services Centre (GISC) 
questioned this classification and highlighted 
the injuries sustained by the victim. The 
investigating garda changed the category from 
Attention and Complaint to a ‘domestic dispute 
no offences disclosed’. This was clearly a crime 
and should have been recorded as an assault and 
flagged as domestic violence.
Case 2 – serious assault reclassified to an 
attention and Complaints (non-crime)
A victim of domestic violence was stabbed by 
an ex-partner. The victim would not provide a 
statement of complaint to the gardaí, but when 
questioned, the suspect admitted the crime. This 
was initially categorised as an assault, but was 
later reclassified to a category of Attention and 
Complaints and effectively not a crime.
supervision of incidents
During this inspection, the Inspectorate found an 
absence of supervision of calls to DV incidents by 
control rooms. Supervisors do not always check 
the actions of gardaí dealing with DV cases and 
are particularly not asking why an offender was 
not arrested. One division attended five domestic 
violence calls and on finishing the call, CAD results 
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for all calls were shown as a ‘report to station’. In 
fact only one call was recorded on PULSE at the 
time and one was created thirteen months later. 
victim service and victim Care 
The failure to record an assault or other crime has 
wide ranging implications. DV is often a recurring 
crime and one where the violence against a victim 
continues and often escalates. A lack of action in 
these cases can expose victims to potentially life 
threatening violence. There is also ample evidence 
of the impact caused to secondary victims such 
as children and other extended family members. 
Victims of DV and other abuse are some of the most 
vulnerable and intimidated victims of crime and 
for this reason, need a higher level of support and 
protection.
When a person is recorded on PULSE as a victim 
of crime, they should receive a letter from the 
district superintendent, which includes contact 
details for victim support groups. During this 
inspection, the Inspectorate identified many cases 
of domestic violence where a crime had occurred, 
but it was wrongly recorded as an ‘Attention and 
Complaint’ or a case of ‘domestic dispute – no 
offence	disclosed’.	Neither	of	these	circumstances	is	
recorded as a crime and a victim would not receive 
an information letter. This is a serious flaw, as all 
victims of DV and domestic abuse should receive 
information making them aware of agencies that 
can provide support and advice. Gardaí explained 
that sending letters in DV cases can sometimes 
cause difficulties in the event a perpetrator opens 
the victim’s post. There are other options which can 
be applied to DV. First responders in other police 
services carry a small card with information on 
DV services. Alternatively, the garda dealing with 
the initial incident could provide the victim with 
a copy of a victim’s letter containing details of the 
various support agencies that are available.
The Inspectorate found an inconsistent approach 
to dealing with victims of DV who initially make 
a statement of complaint, but later decide that 
they do not want to go to court. In some divisions 
the victim is told to go to court to withdraw their 
complaint in front of a judge. The Inspectorate does 
not view this as a victim-centred approach and in 
many respects it further empowers the perpetrator 
who is able to see the victim publicly withdrawing 
the complaint. 
Throughout this inspection, the Inspectorate 
encountered many different garda attitudes towards 
DV. While the Inspectorate met some members 
who demonstrated an understanding of DV, others 
were unaware of the complex reasons why many 
DV victims return to their abusive partners and 
the broader challenges faced by DV victims. The 
Inspectorate met some gardaí who are providing a 
very good level of service to victims and help them 
to obtain the relevant protection or barring orders 
at court. These gardaí also visited victims after the 
initial call. The Inspectorate also encountered many 
negative attitudes from gardaí towards DV by 
referring to calls as problematic, time consuming 
and a waste of resources, because victims are not 
prepared to make a statement. Providing a better 
response to DV victims will necessitate a general 
cultural change in the attitudes of some gardaí. 
training
Culture can be changed and skills can be 
improved through awareness and training. The 
Garda Síochána developed a corporate training 
programme, which is being rolled out across all 
divisions, to update members on the relevant 
legislation and their responsibilities in relation to 
DV. Unfortunately, the Inspectorate noted that not 
all divisions had delivered this training package 
and there does not appear to be any central direction 
to ensure that this training is delivered. While 
waiting for the roll out of this national programme, 
one division developed a training course and the 
Inspectorate viewed this as a good initiative. 
Best practice in other Jurisdictions
In every UK police service visited, the Inspectorate 
found a clear recognition that those experiencing 
domestic abuse, whether physical, sexual or of a 
verbal nature, are amongst the most vulnerable 
victims of crime that police services deal with. 
Other policing jurisdictions have experienced the 
same issues with DV and particularly a failure 
by officers to always take “positive action”. These 
services all have a positive action policy, which is 
generally interpreted as a positive arrest policy, 
where on the balance of probabilities an offence 
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has occurred. The decision to make an arrest is 
one for the officer at the time and victims are not 
asked if they wish to have the perpetrator arrested. 
For example, in Denver, Colorado, an arrest should 
still take place if probable cause exists, irrespective 
of the wishes of the victim. In the UK, the Human 
Rights	Act	1998	places	a	positive	obligation	on	police	
officers to take reasonable action to safeguard the 
rights of victims and children. In 1995, a mandatory 
arrest	 law	was	enacted	 in	New	York	State.	Where	
the victim does not want the arrest, the officer has 
discretion to arrest. In cases of breach of protection 
orders,	a	mandatory	arrest	applies.	The	New	York	
Police Department’s view is that mandatory arrest 
works. 
Police services with evidence of improved 
outcomes for DV have significantly changed the 
approach to investigating this type of crime. 
Regular	 unit	 officers	 are	 expected	 to	 attend	 the	
scene, to make an arrest and then dedicated units 
(mixture of detectives and non-detectives) take on 
the investigative role and deal with the offender. 
This approach has professionalised the response 
to dealing with such violence and has resulted in a 
significant increase in arrest levels at the time that 
a victim calls the police. The investigation units 
have also developed excellent relationships with 
statutory and voluntary groups, resulting in better 
victim care.
A considerable amount of work has taken place 
between other police services, prosecuting 
authorities and the courts to improve the 
approach to dealing with DV. In certain 
circumstances, a prosecution may proceed without 
a victim’s statement of complaint in cases where 
the victim has previously called the police and 
where the levels of violence are escalating. This 
can, in certain cases, take the pressure away from a 
victim, as the police and the prosecutors take on the 
role of deciding whether or not to prosecute. The 
Inspectorate believes that the arrest of an offender 
at the time of dealing with a crime or breach of an 
order sends an important message to all parties 
that this crime will not be tolerated and that this 
sort of behaviour has consequences for an offender. 
In Denmark, the police can formally expel an 
offender from the home for periods ranging from 
six hours to twenty-eight days on the authority of a 
superintendent. 
Police Scotland uses an analysis tool, which 
records the recency, frequency and gravity of 
DV offences to identify vulnerable persons and 
repeat perpetrators. Divisions receive regular 
information on high risk perpetrators, and victims 
who are potentially at risk. A scoring mechanism 
allows managers to assess risk and take informed 
preventative action. At a divisional level, Domestic 
Abuse Investigation Units operate with an emphasis 
on proactive investigations against perpetrators. 
These units provide some investigative capacity 
as well as support and advice on the investigation 
of DV. This response is further supported by a 
Domestic Abuse Task Force, which provides a 
national, proactive, intelligence-led investigative 
response to high risk perpetrators. Staffed by a 
mixture of uniform and detective officers, the 
unit investigates historic and protracted domestic 
abuse inquiries. The Task Force targets the most 
dangerous and prolific perpetrators. 
Other jurisdictions have reviewed domestic related 
murders to look for lessons that could be learnt in 
respect of reducing the instances of future crimes. 
The DVSAIU was keen to conduct this analysis 
and the Inspectorate would encourage that piece of 
work to be completed. 
multi-agency arrangements
Operating	in	a	similar	way	to	the	Sex	Offender	Risk	
Assessment	and	Management	model	(SORAM),	DV	
Multi-Agency	 Tasking	 and	 Co-ordinating	 Groups	
(MATAC)	operate	in	Scotland	and	a	Multi-Agency	
Risk	Assessment	Conference	(MARAC)	in	the	rest	
of the UK. These groups bring together statutory 
and non-statutory partners to assess and agree 
a course of action for high risk perpetrators and 
victims at greatest risk of harm. The Inspectorate 
views this approach as good practice. 
supervision of Dv
The need to deal positively and appropriately with 
calls to DV must be supported by robust checking 
by supervisors. This includes ensuring that the 
initial investigation is thorough and that where 
possible, positive action is taken. In all of the UK 
services visited by the Inspectorate, there is a daily 
review of all DV cases by senior managers. 
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prosecutions
In South Wales, Scotland and Hertfordshire, 
cases that proceed to a prosecution are heard at 
dedicated DV courts where magistrates (judges 
in the case of Scotland) are trained in the specific 
issues that impact on DV. England and Wales are 
moving towards dedicated courts, which aim to be 
‘centres of excellence’ and provide a high degree 
of support and care for victims. The intention is 
to deal with cases in a timely manner, reducing 
unnecessary delays, and in particular the number 
of adjournments.
Future approach to Domestic violence
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
needs to urgently re-appraise both the strategic 
and operational response to DV. According to 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights	 (FRA)	 pan-European	 study	 on	 Violence	
Against	 Women	 (2014)	 15%	 of	 Irish	 women	 have	
experienced	 physical	 and/or	 sexual	 violence	 by	 a	
partner since the age of fifteen. This situation shows 
no	improvement	since	the	National	Crime	Council	
report on Domestic Abuse was published in 2005. 
Domestic abuse is a real and continuing problem 
and the negative impact is felt by the whole family 
circle and particularly by children in households 
where violence is a regular occurrence. 
The Inspectorate understands that the Garda 
Síochána is conducting a review of the policy in 
relation to the response to domestic violence. A 
revised approach needs to be significantly more 
comprehensive and robust than the existing 2007 
policy document. The Garda Síochána is urged to 
look at the services provided in other jurisdictions 
where innovative policies have been introduced 
and evaluated as successful.
 recommendation 6.18
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána, working with Cosc and key strategic 
partners, implements victim-centered policy 
and good investigative practices in Domestic 
violence (Dv). (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 The	Domestic	Violence	 and	Sexual	Assault	
Investigation Unit (DVSAIU) must perform 
a national monitoring function to ensure 
compliance with the Garda Síochána DV 
Policy;	
•	 Assign	 secondary	 investigation	
responsibility for DV crimes to dedicated 
investigation	teams;
•	 Conduct	 analysis	 of	 domestic	 related	
murders to inform garda policy on harm 
reduction;
•	 Engage	 victims	 of	 DV	 and	 support	
agencies to improve garda awareness of 
the particular needs of DV victims. This 
should form part of a garda training and 
awareness	programme;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 calls	 for	 DV	 are	 properly	
supervised from the receipt of the call to the 
recording	of	the	crime	or	incident;
•	 Ensure	that	all	crime	of	DV	and	incidents	of	
domestic dispute are recorded on PULSE, 
irrespective of the willingness of a victim to 
make	a	statement	of	complaint;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 positive	 action	 is	 taken	where	
there	are	clear	opportunities	to	arrest;
•	 Implement	a	risk	assessment	process	that	is	
completed	at	all	DV	incidents;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	corporate	 training	package	
on	DV	is	delivered	to	all	front-line	officers;	
•	 Update	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 website	 with	
information that is easy to find and provides 
clarity on the service that a victim of DV can 
expect;	
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 requirement	 for	 follow	 up	
visits	is	recorded	and	supervised;	
•	 Ensure	that	all	DV	incidents	are	reviewed	at	
Daily	Accountability	Meetings;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 victims	 of	 DV	 and	 parties	
involved in domestic disputes receive details 
of DV support organisations.
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6.14	Racist	and	Homophobic	
Incidents
The levels of race and homophobic crimes recorded 
in Ireland are very low. This was highlighted again 
recently in a report by the University of Limerick.12 
Whilst the legislation varies in other jurisdictions, 
the definition and requirement to record a racist 
or homophobic incident by the Garda Síochána 
is the same as the one used in the UK: namely 
“any incident which is perceived to be racist or 
homophobic by the victim or any other person”. 
During inspection visits, the Inspectorate asked 
gardaí of all ranks about investigating racist and 
homophobic crimes and not one garda reported that 
they had ever recorded such a crime or investigated 
an offence. 
In most of Europe and the USA, police services refer 
to particular crimes that are bias motivated in the 
collective term of ‘Hate Crime’. These are usually 
violent, prejudice-motivated crimes that occur 
when a perpetrator targets a victim because of their 
perceived membership in a certain group. Examples 
would include ethnicity, gender identity, religious 
and sexual orientation. The term hate crime is not 
used by the Garda Síochána.
12	 Schweppe,	 J.,	 A.	 Haynes	 and	 J.	 Carr	 (2014)	 A	 Life	 Free	
from	 Fear.	 Legislating	 for	 hate	 crime	 in	 Ireland:	 an	 NGO	
perspective. Limerick: University of Limerick.
Chart 6.17 shows racially motivated crime 
committed in Ireland between 2006 and 2013 in 
these areas.
The number of race crimes recorded in the last eight 
years in Ireland is low and varied from ninety-four 
crimes in 2013 to a peak of 217 in 2007. 
In the UK, there is a specific offence of racially 
aggravated crimes. For example, where a person 
assaults a victim and is racially abusive, they can 
be prosecuted for a racially aggravated assault, 
which carries a higher sentence. In Scottish 
common law, the courts can take any aggravating 
factor into account when sentencing someone 
guilty of an offence. 
UK police services record racist incidents, 
regardless of whether a crime took place, but in 
Ireland, unless a crime of incitement has taken 
place, it is not recorded as a racist incident. The 
Garda	 Síochána	 has	 a	 Racial	 Intercultural	 and	
Diversity	 Office	 (GRIDO)	 that	 is	 available	 to	 the	
public and to gardaí for advice and provides a 
monitoring role in respect of incidents that are 
reported. 
Chart 6.17
racially motivated Crime in ireland 2006 - 2013
Source: CSO data.
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Divisions have access to local Ethnic Liaison 
Officers, who are usually gardaí, and they 
perform many functions, such as a liaison role 
with communities and they can assist with the 
investigation of racist and homophobic crimes. 
The Garda Síochána also has Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
Transgender Officers (LGBT) who provide an 
excellent link with established and emerging 
communities. The Garda Síochána has linked both 
roles	and	gardaí	are	now	designated	as	ELO/LGBT.	
In many ways the roles are similar, but they are 
dealing with very different communities and both 
require very different training to understand the 
complexities of the communities with whom they 
are engaging. The Inspectorate would recommend 
a review of the decision to merge the two roles. 
Internationally, police services have tried various 
initiatives to encourage the reporting of hate crime, 
including: 
•	 Third	 party	 reporting	 sites:	 designated	
places where trained non-police personnel 
record	crimes	and	pass	them	to	the	police;
•	 Telephone	 reporting	 and	 on-line	 reporting	
of crime to the police or other organisations. 
(These are further explored later in this 
Part).
Racial	 and	 homophobic	 crime	 is	 an	 area	 that	 is	
under-reported in many jurisdictions and the 
Garda Síochána needs to review its approach to 
encourage victims to come forward and ensure that 
gardaí are aware of the importance of accurately 
recording such crimes.
 recommendation 6.19
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a victim-centered policy 
and good investigative practices in racial, 
homophobic and other similar crimes to 
encourage victims to report offences. (medium 
term).
 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 crimes	 containing	 elements	
of hate or discrimination are flagged on 
PULSE;
•	 Create	 clear	 modus	 operandi	 features	 on	
PULSE that allow the accurate recording of 
the	nine	strands	of	the	Diversity	Strategy;13 
•	 Develop	 third	 party	 reporting	 sites	 to	
accommodate	victim	reporting;	
•	 Review	 the	 decision	 to	 merge	 the	 role	 of	
ELO/LGBT	officers.	
6.15 Investigation Plans
With regards to secondary investigation of crime, 
it is good practice for a supervisor to agree and 
record an investigation plan with an investigating 
garda. The benefits of an investigation plan 
include clear direction from a supervisor about 
what action a garda is expected to take and 
agreeing timescales to ensure that cases are 
progressed diligently and expeditiously. Across 
the seven divisions visited, the Inspectorate found 
limited evidence of investigation plans and no 
plans were found on PULSE. One division uses 
PULSE to send messages or actions to officers, 
but these tended to be one-off tasks, rather than 
a detailed investigation plan. Across all divisions 
the Inspectorate found a significant number of 
different paper pro-formas that are used as check 
lists for gardaí who are dealing with crimes. These 
pro-formas are generally retained by the garda 
and updated at various time periods. There was 
an inconsistent approach as to the type of cases 
that generated a form and in some divisions they 
were only used in more serious crimes. This system 
generates huge volumes of paper and a supervisor 
needs to speak to the investigating garda to find 
out what is happening in a case. The Inspectorate 
believes that all cases should have an investigation 
plan and plans should be recorded on PULSE. 
13 The Garda Síochána Diversity Strategy covers nine strands 
of	diversity	but	PULSE	does	not	have	MO	features	that	allow	
the accurate recording of crimes under each strand.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 6: Investigating Crime 
Part 6  |  47
 recommendation 6.20
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops investigation plans for 
crimes that are recorded on pULse. (short 
term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Investigation	 plans	 must	 be	 approved	 by	
supervisors and recorded on PULSE.
recording of Crime investigation
As	highlighted	 in	Part	4,	 the	quality	of	narratives	
entered on PULSE incident records is generally 
poor and very little investigation detail is 
recorded. The Inspectorate was informed by senior 
gardaí that the details of secondary investigations 
are recorded on the PULSE system and particularly 
the results of forensic examinations and updates to 
victims of crime. From checking large numbers of 
PULSE records, the Inspectorate found very little 
evidence to support that assertion. Indeed, in many 
cases there was no additional information added to 
the PULSE incident from the time that the report 
was first created. 
In all other police jurisdictions visited, the 
Inspectorate found that an electronic crime 
recording system was used to record all details 
of a crime investigation. For example, in the case 
of a rape investigation in Ireland, the narrative 
on PULSE may only contain ten lines, whilst in 
another police service the narrative could run to 
ten pages. In these police services, all entries are 
timed and dated with the details of the officer 
that updated the record. There was also clear 
evidence of supervisors checking the progress of 
investigations and recording tasks allocated to 
investigators. The recording of this information on 
the PULSE system would make supervision more 
efficient. The Inspectorate acknowledges that the 
PULSE narrative has limited space for recording 
an investigation, but the current available capacity 
is not used effectively. Other police services have 
moved to systems with electronically scanned 
statements and other documents on a case 
management system and very little paperwork is 
retained.
volume Crime Case reviews
pULse investigation and victim Updates
On examination of the ninety cases that were 
assigned for investigation, the Inspectorate 
found	that	in	43%	of	those	cases,	no	update	was	
recorded on PULSE in the preceding twelve 
months and in most of those cases there were no 
updates from the date that the report was first 
created. 
In 13% of the cases investigated, an update was 
only recorded on PULSE after the request by the 
Inspectorate for information on those cases.
Most	 of	 the	 updates	 that	 were	 recorded	 on	
PULSE referred to suspects identified, arrested 
or charged. A few updates recorded that 
actions were taken, such as conducting door to 
door enquiries or obtaining CCTV. There were 
very few victim updates and very few entries 
from crime scene examiners. Six out of the 
seven divisions visited demonstrated similar 
issues in not updating PULSE incidents, with 
only one division having a high rate of PULSE 
updates. Some of the cases not updated were 
serious crimes such as a violent robbery, where 
no information was recorded in the previous 
twelve months.
Within these cases, the Inspectorate identified 
crimes where the investigating garda was on 
extended leave, including sick leave, or had 
retired and their cases were not reallocated. In 
one case, a garda retired and a new investigating 
garda was appointed some eighteen months later 
(after the Inspectorate’s request for these cases). 
Before a garda transfers out of an area, leaves the 
police service or in the case of a garda who are 
absent on extended leave, it is good practice to 
ensure that any crime investigations assigned 
are reallocated to another member.
The paper system of recording crime investigation 
in the Garda Síochána is costly, relies heavily on 
the investigating garda to provide updates on cases 
and often results in paper files being misplaced. The 
use of PULSE must be expanded to ensure those 
who support a crime investigation, such as crime 
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scene examiners, juvenile liaison officers, and those 
examining exhibits, directly record the results of 
their contribution onto the PULSE report. 
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána, 
in the short term, must greatly increase the 
narrative space available on PULSE to ensure that 
investigation details are recorded and in the long 
term to develop a new system that provides for the 
more detailed recording of a criminal investigation.
 recommendation 6.21
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that all investigation 
updates are recorded on pULse e.g. Cse 
examinations. (short term).
Case Loads and allocation of Crime for 
investigation 
A garda’s crime investigation case load is effectively 
the number of crimes that an individual garda is 
currently responsible for that have not been closed. 
There is a tipping point, where high case loads 
begin to impact on the quality of investigations. 
An experienced investigator is often more likely 
to manage a higher workload than an untrained 
and inexperienced garda. Allocations are also 
influenced by decisions made by supervisors to 
assign the most active and committed gardaí to 
ensure that crimes are investigated thoroughly. The 
net result is an unfair allocation of crime and the 
best gardaí often end up with significantly higher 
case loads.
Garda focus groups were asked how many cases 
each member was currently investigating. During 
the visits to the seven divisions, there was no 
garda that could precisely answer this question. 
One regular unit garda did say that they may 
have upwards of 250 current investigations and a 
detective garda estimated a case load as high as 
3,000 crimes spanning over a number of years. In 
Ireland, unsolved cases are often not closed and 
once allocated to a garda, it remains with them 
until a suspect is identified and the case is solved. 
There comes a point where a high number of cases 
is unmanageable and gardaí admitted that after 
about a month, they stop looking at the cases that 
they are unlikely to solve without new information.
During focus groups with supervisors, the 
Inspectorate asked how many crimes were being 
investigated by gardaí reporting to them. Again 
not one supervisor across seven divisions was 
able to say how many crimes individual gardaí 
were investigating. A supervisor should know the 
answer to this question. During visits to other police 
services, the Inspectorate tested the same question 
about case loads and without fail, both investigators 
and supervisors were able to precisely state the 
number of crimes they were investigating. In these 
policing jurisdictions, case loads ranged from eight 
to sixteen crimes for each investigator, depending 
on the seriousness of the cases. The main difference 
in the crimes that these officers were investigating 
is the fact that a crime screening process had taken 
place and they were investigating cases with a 
higher probability of solution. 
proportionality with Crime investigation
The current Garda Síochána approach noted 
during this inspection is to investigate all crimes to 
the same level. An investigator assigned to a case 
will be expected to fully investigate that crime, 
regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the 
chances of solving it. For example, gardaí reported 
to the Inspectorate that if they recorded a low level 
incident, the district officer would expect a full 
investigation and possibly a case file. Clearly, some 
crimes are more serious than others and require 
full investigations, but there are other less serious 
crimes that do not always require the same level 
of investigation. The Inspectorate believes that an 
effective crime management system (as highlighted 
in Part 5) would apply proportionality to criminal 
investigations.
timeliness of investigations
With more serious criminal offences (indictable 
offences14) there are no time limits on commencing 
a	 prosecution.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	
policy is to initiate proceedings as soon as possible 
after the commission of the offence and without 
any avoidable delay in accordance with the 
principle that justice delayed is justice denied. For 
14 Some volume crimes are indictable offences. Summary 
and indictable offences indicate the manner in which these 
offences are tried or dealt with in the courts. A summary 
offence is one which can only be dealt with by a judge sitting 
without a jury (the District Court), while an indictable offence 
is one which may be or must be tried before a judge and jury.
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victims of crime, the speedy arrest and prosecution 
of an offender often alleviates concerns that the 
perpetrator is still at large. 
With less serious offences (summary only) 
proceedings must be taken within six months 
after the date of the commission of an offence. Less 
serious cases with time limits include offences such 
as minor assaults and possession of a small amount 
of cannabis. The important time in this process is 
the date that the offence was committed and not the 
date that the victim reports the offence. 
During field visits, the Inspectorate established that 
regardless of the seriousness of the crime, gardaí 
are normally given three months to complete an 
investigation and this often stretches towards the 
six month time limit for summary offences. 
arresting suspects 
In Ireland, there are many different laws in respect 
of the arrest and detention of identified suspects 
and although gardaí may have reasonable grounds 
to suspect that a person has committed an offence, 
they are not always arrested immediately. In many 
cases, the investigating garda will attempt to gather 
all available evidence prior to speaking to a suspect 
and then will decide whether to arrest a suspect(s) 
or invite them to a garda station to be interviewed 
under caution, but not detained in custody. In these 
circumstances, case files are often prepared and 
sent to the district officer. If the case is a serious 
one, the file may well be forwarded to the DPP for a 
decision on whether to prosecute or not. 
In many of these cases, prosecutions may proceed 
by	summons,	rather	than	by	charging.	Many	gardaí	
said that they prefer this system, as they have more 
time to prepare case files for court, but cases dealt 
with by summons take a minimum of three months 
longer to go to court. From examination of case 
files and PULSE records, the Inspectorate is aware 
that many less serious crime investigation cases go 
right to the six month time limit and gardaí are then 
placing themselves and the courts under pressure 
to commence proceedings before the case becomes 
statute barred. 
In meetings with court personnel, the Inspectorate 
noted concerns expressed at late applications (close 
to the six month date) by gardaí for summonses to be 
issued. In one court visited, 20% of the summonses 
issued are late submissions. Once the summons is 
issued, a court date is set for at least three months 
ahead. In many cases, by the time the first court 
date is arranged, a case is already ten months old. 
Where there is no time limit for proceedings, cases 
can extend even further. Examples were provided 
where assault and drug cases are taking up to 
two years to get to court. With more serious cases, 
there are even further delays and examples were 
provided of cases that took three years to reach the 
courts. The issue of summonses is further discussed 
in Part 11.
named suspects on pULse
Crime recording systems in other police services 
usually have an application that provides the details 
of any named suspects recorded in a crime report 
who have not yet been arrested for that crime. This 
is particularly useful information for supervisors 
who can monitor investigations and ensure that 
where suspects are identified that they are arrested 
at the earliest opportunity. Clearly, suspects 
may re-offend and it is important to ensure that 
opportunities to arrest are taken, particularly if an 
arrest may prevent another crime from occurring. 
Unfortunately, there is no PULSE search facility 
that provides this important piece of information. 
During inspection visits, the Inspectorate did not 
find any supervisor who was able to provide details 
about how many people were shown on PULSE as a 
suspect, who had not yet been arrested. 
not recording a named suspect on pULse 
A practice brought to the attention of the 
Inspectorate was the decision of some investigating 
gardaí not to record a known suspect’s details 
on the PULSE record right away. In essence, 
this information is not recorded in case another 
member might arrest that person and take credit 
for that detection. Senior gardaí indicated to the 
Inspectorate that they are aware of this issue. This 
is a serious matter, particularly if an early arrest 
could have prevented that suspect from committing 
another offence. In contrast, in other police services, 
it is viewed as helpful when an officer locates and 
arrests a suspect that is wanted by another officer. 
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timeliness of prosecuting or 
progressing Cases 
During visits to the seven divisions, the Inspectorate 
discovered lapsed criminal cases where there was 
an identified suspect for a crime, but the six month 
time limit for proceedings had passed. These 
cases are effectively lost. In two of the divisions 
visited, a large number of drug possession cases 
were identified where a person was found with 
an illegal substance, but no proceedings were ever 
commenced. This will be further explored in Part 
11. In fact, these crimes are shown as detected, but 
the suspect was never brought to court. Another 
reason for lapsed cases takes place in circumstances 
where there are both serious and minor offences 
in connection with a particular individual. As the 
more serious offences often take longer than six 
months to fully investigate, the minor offences 
have, by that time lapsed and they cannot be dealt 
with.	Most	 divisions	 visited	 do	 not	 have	 systems	
in place to track such cases, particularly the less 
serious ones. At present, the system relies heavily 
on individual gardaí ensuring that summonses are 
issued or directions to charge are obtained before 
the case becomes statute barred. The Inspectorate 
is aware that this problem is not confined to these 
two divisions and such cases occur across Ireland. 
Failure to progress a prosecution may be a neglect 
of duty issue.
 recommendation 6.22
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a national audit of lapsed 
criminal cases and introduce a system to 
ensure that investigations are progressed in a 
timely manner. (short term). 
 This is linked to a recommendation in Part 11, 
with regard to lapsed cases that are recorded as 
detected.
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Address	the	causes	for	lapsed	cases;
•	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 electronic	 case	
management system, develop a filing and 
tracking system to significantly reduce the 
number of cases which are not progressed 
in a timely manner.
Child interviews 
Garda policy directs that only specialist 
interviewers will take statements from child 
victims of sexual abuse. The policy also directs 
that specialist interviewers should interview adult 
victims of sexual offences, but interviews with 
children should take priority. The Garda Síochána 
has trained specialist child interviewers who 
conduct interviews in cases where a child or young 
person may have been the victim or witness of 
sexual or physical abuse or serious neglect. 
During meetings with investigators, concerns 
were raised in some divisions about time delays 
in completing interviews. Gardaí stated that it 
can take up to six months before a child interview 
is conducted. In divisions where the specialist 
interviewers were dedicated to that role, the 
interviews appeared to be conducted much sooner 
than in places where the interviewers had to be 
released from other posts. The transcription of 
those tapes also adds to delays and responsibility 
for this function appears to have fallen to the gardaí. 
 recommendation 6.23
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána conducts a review of the 
availability and deployment of child specialist 
interviewers and with the Hse, to review the 
process of creating interview transcripts. 
(medium term).
Computer examination 
The forensic analysis of a personal computer 
or	 a	 lap	 top	 seized	 as	 an	 exhibit	 is	 taking	 an	
unreasonable amount of time. Investigating 
gardaí at every district highlighted long delays, 
ranging from two to four years for completion 
of computer examination. The Computer Crime 
Investigation Unit (CCIU) which analyses 
computers	is	centrally	based	and	part	of	National	
Support	Services	(NSS).	This	unit	is	struggling	to	
deal with the volume of work and has a significant 
backlog. A substantial part of this backlog relates 
to	 the	 examination	 of	 computers	 seized	 from	
those suspected of possessing indecent images 
of children. The delays are impacting on the 
progress of investigations and the management 
of potentially high risk offenders. The Garda 
Síochána is aware of the risks arising from this 
situation and is taking steps to reduce the delays 
in examination. 
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The use of technology has resulted in an increase in 
the	amount	of	IT	equipment	seized.	The	CCIU	has	
received an increase in staffing levels, but the unit is 
still struggling to clear the long back log. The CCIU 
conducts a risk assessment for cases and prioritises 
the more serious crimes. At present, there is a four 
year back log and the unit is receiving more cases 
each day. 
The CCIU would like investigating gardaí to 
conduct a preliminary check (triage) at the point of 
a	search	or	before	seizure,	to	assess	if	there	is	any	
evidence to be retrieved. Time invested in deciding 
on what evidence can be obtained would reduce 
the amount of time that is later spent examining 
equipment without evidence. The CCIU believe 
that this would reduce workload by approximately 
40%.	At	 the	time	of	finalising	this	report,	 the	unit	
is drafting an instruction to investigators. The 
Inspectorate believes that there is an opportunity 
to regionalise the unit to reduce the amount of 
travelling required and also to develop closer links 
with local investigators. 
Other policing jurisdictions also face problems 
with delays in computer analysis, but not to 
the extent of the delays experienced in Ireland. 
Solutions used in other services have included 
taking computer analysts out on searches and 
providing hand held technology that allows 
cursory examinations to be conducted at the time of 
a policing operation, in order to determine if there 
is evidence on a computer or other device. 
The Inspectorate believes that the back log needs 
to be addressed and there appears to be a good 
business case for examinations to be conducted on 
a regional rather than a central basis. 
 recommendation 6.24
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an urgent review of the 
approach taken to computer examination and 
significantly reduces the time taken to provide 
evidence to investigators. this should include 
the resources required to provide an effective 
service and to explore options for creating 
units in key geographic locations. (short 
term). 
telephone analysis 
Detectives and investigating gardaí also 
highlighted to the Inspectorate significant delays 
in obtaining mobile phone subscriber information 
and details of calls made by suspects using mobile 
phones. Some of the mobile phone companies 
are not providing a timely service to the gardaí 
and delays of nine to twelve months are not 
unusual. These delays are severely impacting on 
the timeliness of investigations. This is further 
discussed in Part 8. The Inspectorate believes 
that the Garda Síochána should engage with 
the telephone service providers to agree a more 
effective and efficient way of obtaining this sort of 
information. 
 recommendation 6.25
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality and the 
garda síochána engage telephone service 
providers to reduce the current delays in 
providing call data. (medium term).
impact of Delays on victims and Witnesses 
The timeliness of an investigation is very 
important to victims of crime and particularly in 
cases involving violence and entries to peoples’ 
homes. A long delay in arresting suspects and 
completing investigations is not good victim 
service. Delays in getting cases to court also impact 
on the availability of witnesses and victims and 
long delays may make it more difficult for them 
to provide clear and accurate accounts of what 
happened in their case. 
impact of Delays on suspected offenders
Whilst a victim of crime is a key priority in any 
crime investigation, there also needs to be 
cognisance about the impact of a delayed 
investigation	on	a	suspected	offender;	particularly	
on a person who may not have committed that 
crime. Delays in completing crime investigations 
can make it more difficult to locate transient 
offenders and a delay also increases the risk of 
that suspect re-offending. There is also the issue 
of fairness to a person in terms of their right to a 
fair trial. Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human	Rights	outlines	the	right	to	a	fair	trial	and	
also the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. 
In Ireland, judges have dismissed court cases for 
abuse of process due to excessive and avoidable 
delays. 
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Part	 9	 of	 this	 Crime	 Investigation	 Report	 fully	
discusses the findings of the volume crime cases 
and the issues around timeliness and investigating 
known suspects. It highlights a number of concerns 
in respect of gathering evidence and dealing with 
suspects. 
The following are some of the key findings 
contained in Part 9:
•	 Delays	or	failures	to	gather	and	view	CCTV	
evidence;
•	 Delays	 in	 obtaining	 victim	 and	 witness	
statements;
•	 Some	poor	quality	statements	from	victims	
and	witnesses	taken	by	the	gardaí;
•	 In	some	cases,	action	only	taken	following	the	
information	request	from	the	Inspectorate;
•	 Delays	in	dealing	with	known	suspects.	
overall timeliness
The issue of timeliness in crime investigation is 
important in respect of speedy summary justice. 
In Ireland, the process of crime investigation 
is considerably slower than in other policing 
jurisdictions visited, with less serious crime 
investigations taking up to six months to 
investigate and commence proceedings. With 
more serious offences, this stretches to over a year. 
This is particularly worrying in a case where there 
is a named suspect at large who may well re-offend 
during this period. Other policing services have a 
starting point of making an early arrest and where 
possible charge a person on the day that the crime 
was first reported. In Ireland, the Inspectorate 
found cases where there were unnecessary delays. 
international Comparisons 
Other policing jurisdictions generally operate 
two systems for progressing crime investigations. 
Where a suspect is identified, an arrest is usually 
made at the earliest opportunity and a quick 
decision is made whether to prosecute or not. 
In cases where there is sufficient evidence to 
prosecute, authority to charge can be obtained 
immediately and the person can be charged whilst 
still in police custody. This effectively brings an 
investigation to a quick conclusion and all case 
papers are completed at that time.
Where a crime is committed without an identified 
suspect, investigating officers are usually given 
between two and four weeks (depending on 
the complexity of the crime) to complete their 
investigations. In these policing jurisdictions, 
summonses are used far less in criminal cases 
and more for traffic matters or for offences where 
a power of arrest is conditional. It is clear to the 
Inspectorate that other policing jurisdictions 
make far quicker decisions about the outcome of a 
criminal investigation. 
The	Greater	Manchester	Police	(GMP)	conducted	an	
informative piece of analysis of the time actually 
taken to bring a case to conclusion and the actual 
time it takes to complete an investigation. They 
found that investigations were taking fifty-five 
days, but the actual investigation time involved 
was	only	4.5	hours.	As	a	result,	they	have	changed	
the approach to crime investigation, moving 
investigations from first responders to dedicated 
neighbourhood teams, who now conduct the 
investigations. The change in crime investigation 
practices has reduced the time to conclude a case 
by 50%. 
Combined with other recommendations in this 
report, the Inspectorate believes that the majority of 
crime investigations should be concluded within a 
maximum of twenty-eight days.
 recommendation 6.26
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána reduces the time scales for 
crime investigation from three months to a 
maximum of twenty-eight days. (medium 
term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Record	 all	 suspected	 offenders’	 details	 on	
PULSE;
•	 Develop	 a	 search	 facility	 on	 PULSE	 to	
identify	named	suspects	not	yet	arrested;	
•	 Take	 witness	 and	 victim	 statements	 at	 the	
time of dealing with a crime where there is a 
likelihood	that	a	suspect	will	be	arrested;
•	 Re-allocate	 crime	 investigations	 for	 any	
garda who is transferring, retiring or is on 
extended absence from work. 
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6.16 Other Investigative 
Opportunities
CCtv Database
The use of CCTV in criminal investigations has 
become prominent in terms of gathering and 
viewing CCTV footage to see if the crime was 
captured or the suspect entering or leaving the 
vicinity. In serious crimes, CCTV is often the first 
focus of an investigation team. 
At present there is no national CCTV database that 
contains the details of all CCTV systems (public 
and private) that are in operation. Other police 
services have developed a database of all systems 
and whilst the initial identification and recording 
of systems was time consuming, it provides full 
details of where systems are and what areas they 
cover. The Inspectorate believes that it would be 
a good initiative to develop and maintain a garda 
national CCTV database to assist investigators in 
crime investigation. It may be possible to link with 
CCTV location information gathered by the Private 
Security Authority. 
 recommendation 6.27
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a national CCtv database 
that contains details of all systems that are 
operating. (Long term).
Use of automatic number plate recognition
Automatic	 Number	 Plate	 Recognition	 (ANPR)	
provides technology that scans vehicle number 
plates, checks these against vehicle and police 
databases and identifies vehicles of interest. Other 
police services use this information to prevent and 
detect crime. In Ireland, 112 garda vehicles are 
equipped with mobile technology and there are 
limited	ANPR	systems	on	static	cameras.	Between	
1st	January	and	30th	September	2012,	mobile	ANPR	
read	 8,484,112	 number	 plates	 and	 this	 activated	
592,864	matches	 to	vehicles	 on	 the	ANPR	 system.	
The majority of activations were for uninsured 
or untaxed vehicles. In most cases, systems fitted 
to police cars allow checks to be made on the car 
directly in front and directly behind the garda 
equipped vehicle. 
Most	 UK	 police	 services	 have	 the	 same	 mobile	
technology, but are moving more towards static 
ANPR	 systems	 and	 linking	 them	 into	 existing	
camera systems, such as those operated by local 
authorities. The advantages to this are significant in 
terms of the volume of vehicle checks processed at 
any one time and one camera can effectively cover 
many motorway lanes. With these systems, police 
services need to be able to react to activations and 
often assign police vehicles to key locations to stop 
vehicles of interest. In serious crime investigations, 
the	static	ANPR	systems	have	proved	beneficial	in	
tracking the movements of vehicles before and after 
crimes were committed. The Inspectorate believes 
that the Garda Síochána should with its partner 
agencies	explore	 the	options	 to	develop	ANPR	on	
existing camera networks. 
 recommendation 6.28
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána should, with its partner agencies, 
explore the option of developing automatic 
number plate recognition system (anpr) on 
existing camera networks. (Long term).
Case Files and investigation Files 
As previously highlighted, PULSE is not a crime 
investigation system and following the creation 
of an incident on PULSE, there is often very little 
added to the record. In practice, the record of 
an investigation reverts to paper based systems. 
Such paper work is often referred to as a case file. 
‘Case file’ is a loose term and often a case file only 
consists of a copy of the PULSE record or a victim’s 
statement of complaint. In cases where directions 
for prosecution are sought from a district officer 
or the DPP, the file is usually referred to as an 
‘investigation file’ and these paper files generally 
contain far more information.
The numbers of case files created for crime 
investigations varied greatly across the seven 
divisions visited, depending on the type of crime 
that was committed and where that crime took 
place. Generally, the Inspectorate found that in 
more rural districts the local superintendent had a 
much higher expectation that a case file would be 
created for all incidents. In some of the more urban 
districts, superintendents would still like a case 
file for most crimes, but accept that in reality this 
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is not always going to happen. In one of the urban 
districts visited, an audit of 300 burglary offences 
produced only fifty case files. 
Most	 garda	 districts	 use	 a	 variety	 of	 paper	 pro	
formas for monitoring crime investigations and the 
investigating garda uses the pro forma to record the 
actions they have taken, e.g. obtaining and viewing 
CCTV. With paper based case files, it is difficult 
to supervise the progress of a case without access 
to the investigating garda or to the case file. If the 
garda is off-duty on leave or on other absence such 
as sick leave, the file is often unavailable and no one 
else will be able to say what is happening with that 
crime. If a victim wants an update on their crime, 
only the investigating garda can provide it. 
Many	 national	 units	 do	 not	 routinely	 investigate	
crime and often a PULSE record is only created 
once	 an	 arrest	 is	 made.	 National	 units	 do	 not	
usually	 create	 a	 case	 file,	 but	 will	 create	 a	 ‘Jobs	
Book’ for serious cases and an investigation file 
for less serious cases that need to go to the DPP for 
directions. 
There is no national standard operating practice 
for when a case file should be created and what it 
will look like. All seven divisions visited operated 
different processes and pro formas and within 
some divisions, districts were found to be operating 
different case file systems. 
Examples include:
•	 One	division	uses	a	case	management	form,	
but it is only used for more serious cases 
such	as	robbery;	
•	 Some	divisions	expect	case	files	 for	certain	
crime types such as burglary, but in reality 
this	is	not	always	happening;	
•	 Some	 divisions	 expect	 case	 files	 for	 all	
crimes	and	all	incidents;
•	 One	 division	 has	 a	 stand	 alone	 software	
package that monitored the progression of 
cases that were nearing the six month statute 
limit.
the garda síochána is in the process of designing 
a case file that will provide a national standard 
file that all units will use. in the absence of 
an electronic case management system, the 
inspectorate believes a standard national case file 
protocol would ensure consistency in application 
and approach across all divisions and specialist 
units.
 recommendation 6.29
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a standard national case 
file. (short term).
Case File requests
The Inspectorate made two separate requests to the 
Garda Síochána for case files in order to assess the 
quality of this work. Firstly, the Inspectorate asked 
for thirteen case files for a variety of different crime 
types that resulted in a successful prosecution. The 
files received were cases where a suspect had been 
identified and had proceeded through the courts 
with successful outcomes. The files received were 
very comprehensive and completed to an excellent 
standard. 
Following that request, the Inspectorate made 
a second application for a much larger number 
of case files that were randomly selected by the 
Inspectorate. In general, unless the case was going 
to court, the quality of the case files was of a much 
lower standard. Analysis of the second set of case 
files is highlighted in this Part in the Volume Crime 
Case	Review	section.
other policing Jurisdictions
Most	other	policing	 jurisdictions	do	not	operate	a	
similar system of case files unless a case is likely to 
go to court, at which stage case papers are prepared 
for a prospective court case. In all cases, details of 
investigations are recorded directly onto their crime 
recording systems and the only other documents 
created might be exhibits or a victim or witness 
statement. Files are not generally completed for 
cases that are likely to remain unsolved.
In the Garda Síochána there is a clear difference 
in the quality of a case file for a routine criminal 
investigation and a file that is submitted to a district 
officer or the DPP for directions on charging. The 
files going to the district officer for directions 
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generally followed a similar and structured format. 
These files had the appearance of a prosecution file 
and were completed to a much better standard.
Case File Locations, storage and movements
During field visits, gardaí were asked where case 
files are kept and the consistent response was 
“everywhere”. The majority of gardaí stated that 
files are kept in their lockers. In extreme cases, 
locations for keeping files included members taking 
them home. The retention of files by individual 
gardaí removes the ability of supervisors to check 
the progression of cases and if officers are away 
from work for extended periods, then files are 
not readily available. The Inspectorate found one 
district that retained all case files in a cabinet in 
the Public Office, so that they were available for 
supervision and for enquiries made by victims of 
those crimes. 
There are often several copies of case files. 
Producing numerous copies is costly both in terms 
of personnel time and wasted resources, such as 
paper and photocopying. It is also producing a 
significant problem in terms of storage and the 
secure management of case files, all of which 
contain personal and sensitive information. Each 
fieldwork visit included a tour of the relevant 
storage areas for case files and in many cases, stores 
were generally full to overflowing with files and the 
ability to retrieve files was not always adequate. 
Across the divisions visited, the Inspectorate found 
a large variation in the time taken for a file to travel 
from one person to another and to be returned. For 
example, a garda investigating a case may need to 
seek directions from a district officer about whether 
to charge a person for an offence. In most cases, this 
file will travel from the investigating garda to a 
sergeant or an inspector before it goes to the district 
officer. The Inspectorate was informed that there 
are large variations in the time it takes for files to 
be returned with decisions. Examples included two 
days to several months, and it appeared to be wholly 
dependent on the individual that received the file. 
Where a file was sent to the DPP, there was similar 
feedback about cases that were returned in two 
weeks, to a national unit case that took two years to 
obtain a response setting out directions and advice 
concerning a prosecution. A national unit also gave 
an example of an internal garda investigation that 
was completed in three weeks, but it took twelve 
months to obtain directions.
Cases	 in	 district	 courts	 outside	 of	 the	 DMR	 are	
currently prosecuted by superintendents and 
inspectors.	 More	 serious	 cases	 are	 dealt	 with	 at	
circuit courts and these cases are prosecuted by state 
solicitors on behalf of the DPP. During field visits 
the Inspectorate met with several state solicitors 
who are prosecuting cases in those divisions. In 
general, they have a good relationship with district 
officers. With regard to crime investigations and 
case files the following points were raised:
•	 Files	are	often	sent	that	are	incomplete	and	
require additional statements. In some cases 
the missing statements are required from 
the	district	officer	that	sent	the	file;
•	 Files	with	no	likelihood	of	a	prosecution	are	
submitted;
•	 The	quality	of	case	files	varies	greatly;
•	 Case	files	can	take	a	long	time	to	reach	the	
state solicitor and some statute time limited 
cases are arriving with only a few weeks 
to go before the six months prosecution 
deadline. 
With regard to submitting files to the DPP, the Garda 
Síochána has a duty to submit all files relating 
to certain offences, such as sexual assaults. In 
addition, the Inspectorate was informed that in 
national units, many cases are submitted to the 
DPP, even where there is insufficient evidence 
to proceed with a court case. This involves the 
completion of a full file to the DPP in a case where 
the facts of the case indicate that a prosecution will 
not take place, including production of up to three 
additional copies of the case file. In a complex case, 
this is a significant undertaking and an unnecessary 
cost. 
In other policing jurisdictions, investigators of 
all crime types (serious and volume) have formal 
processes to access pre-charge advice on a case. This 
allows an investigator and a prosecutor to discuss 
the merits of a case and identify any additional 
investigation leads that need to be taken. This has 
two distinct benefits. Firstly, fewer cases are sent to 
prosecutors where there is insufficient evidence to 
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proceed and secondly, fewer cases are returned for 
additional enquiries. The Inspectorate supports the 
concept of obtaining pre-charge advice and believes 
that it should be available to all investigators.
The manual photocopying of case and investigation 
files was a common topic across all seven divisions 
visited. A file may be copied on several occasions 
and examples include:
•	 A	district	administration	unit	may	retain	a	
copy;
•	 A	divisional	administration	unit	may	retain	
a	copy;
•	 The	investigating	gardaí	often	keeps	a	spare	
copy of the file in case it gets lost when the 
original	 is	 sent	 to	a	 supervisor	or	 the	DPP;	
and 
•	 Copies	 are	 prepared	 for	 submission	 to	 the	
DPP: three copies are made for summary 
cases and four for indictable cases.
There is a significant time and cost implication 
for this. The Inspectorate is not aware of any 
analysis conducted by the Garda Síochána to cost 
the process of copying case files, but it is likely 
to be a significant issue and one where there are 
clear opportunities to save time and resources. 
Other policing jurisdictions have moved to the 
production of one file to avoid unnecessary costs 
or have encouraged prosecutors to accept files 
electronically. With electronic file systems, cases 
can move much quicker and progress can be easily 
tracked and monitored.
Volume	Crime	Case	Reviews	
Case Files and Investigation Files
Case Files
Of the ninety cases investigated, the divisions 
indicated that fifty-two (58%) had associated 
papers and, where possible, those papers were 
supplied to the Inspectorate. In some instances, 
divisions were unable to locate case files. The 
creation of case files varied greatly between 
divisions, with the highest completion rate of 85% 
of cases with a file to the lowest at 27%. 
The quality of case files was generally of a low 
standard and usually consisted of a victim’s 
statement, a copy of a PULSE record and in some 
cases an investigation pro forma. The Inspectorate 
did not see any added value in the paper file above 
the PULSE record. 
investigation/prosecution Files
Of the fifty-two cases with associated files, twenty-
three had more comprehensive case files that were 
sent to the district officer or the DPP. These were 
completed to a much higher standard than the 
other twenty-nine case files. Of the twenty-three 
files, two were completed to an excellent standard, 
one in connection with a serious aggravated 
burglary completed by a detective and the other by 
a uniformed garda investigating a linked series of 
burglaries. Of the other twenty-one files, nineteen 
were completed to an acceptable standard and two 
were very short on information and content. 
File supervision 
On checking the files, the Inspectorate found 
limited evidence of supervision by sergeants and 
inspectors before a file was sent to a district officer. 
For example, there were no notes on files showing 
that investigating garda were tasked to complete 
certain actions. There were also basic errors in 
cases, such as the wrong date for crimes recorded 
on witness statements or garda statements where 
the date of the statement was not shown. Case files 
also included victim and witness statements that 
clearly showed that a more serious crime took 
place than the crime that was recorded on PULSE. 
In one particular case, every mention of the crime 
in the case file refers to an assault with harm and 
yet the crime was classified as a minor assault. 
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victim and Witness statements
The quality of victim and witness statements 
varied greatly from well completed and detailed 
statements, to very short statements that were 
missing basic details, such as how the crime 
happened and good descriptions of suspects. 
In a case of assault with harm, the victim’s 
statement was only eleven lines long and the 
associated witness statements were equally 
short. The taking of a witness statement is a core 
function for any police officer and it is critical to 
obtain best evidence to support a potential court 
case. The issue of gardaí taking poor witness 
statements was raised during this inspection by 
training staff at the Garda College and by senior 
gardaí in divisions.
outstanding actions from the 
inspectorate’s request for Case Files
There were significant delays in providing the 
requested case files from all divisions and at 
the time of completing this report, there are 
still some cases that are awaiting satisfactory 
responses. In one individual case, it took 
eleven months to respond to the request for 
information. 
Following the supply of case files and 
information on cases, the Inspectorate sent a 
list of follow up questions in response to the 
paper work supplied. Again, there were delays 
in receiving this additional information and at 
the time of completing this report, there are still 
five outstanding actions.
the inability to respond in a timely manner 
to what in most police organisations would 
be a simple request for files highlights the 
deficiencies identified by the inspectorate in 
crime case file management.
Case management
There is no electronic or national standardised 
system for case management in the Garda Síochána. 
All divisions and national units visited operate 
different systems for monitoring cases. Six out of 
the seven divisions visited operate a paper based 
case management system. The decision to create 
a case file is often made at district accountability 
meetings and cases are logged in registers. At these 
meetings the Inspectorate found that not all crimes 
are monitored in respect of case progression and 
the focus tends to be on the more serious crimes 
that have taken place. This approach results in an 
absence of oversight for the cases that are deemed 
less serious.
Some districts send a paper reminder to gardaí 
requesting updates on crimes and investigating 
members complained that they are regularly asked 
for the same update for an action that is complete. 
If this was all recorded on PULSE, then it would 
remove the need for such paper updates to be 
generated. Often the reminders are sent to establish 
if the garda has conducted routine enquiries, such 
as house to house enquiries. This is all relevant 
information that should be recorded directly onto 
PULSE and should not result in a garda having 
to spend time writing paper reports to update 
managers.
good practice
one division secured funding for a piece of 
software that operates on pULse and uses 
a traffic light system to flag up cases that 
are moving towards the six month limit for 
prosecutions. the use of this system appeared 
to be a better way of ensuring supervision 
of cases as sergeants did not want to receive 
a message highlighting that one of their 
members’ cases was flagged as red.
Other policing jurisdictions have moved towards 
electronic systems for case file management. 
West	 Yorkshire,	 Denmark	 and	 the	 PSNI	 use	 the	
same record management system that tracks case 
progression. Demonstrations of this system showed 
that supervisors can track individual cases and case 
loads of individual officers. It also allows for the 
scanning of all documents, such as statements and 
the direct transfer of a case from the police to the 
prosecutor. 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 6: Investigating Crime 
Part 6  |  58
Two changes would significantly improve case file 
management: 
1. A national standard that is consistent across 
the	Garda	Síochána;	and	
2. A move away from paper files and paper 
based management systems to electronic IT 
solutions. 
The Garda Síochána must have a computerised 
case investigation and case management system 
that ensures that investigations are completed 
diligently and expeditiously. In the interim, the 
Inspectorate believes that an enormous amount of 
time and money could be saved by using PULSE 
to the full extent of its capacity.
 recommendation 6.30
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a national electronic case 
file management system. (Long term). 
 in the absence of an electronic case file 
management system, the following actions 
need to be taken: 
•	 Reduce	the	number	of	unnecessary	case	files	
that	are	created;	
•	 Keep	 original	 or	 primary	 case	 files	 in	 a	
secure place and ensure that access is tracked 
and that they are available if required for 
investigative	purposes;	
•	 Ensure	that	case	files	are	not	taken	outside	of	
a garda station without the permission of a 
supervisor;	
•	 Develop	 an	 electronic	 process	 for	 passing	
cases files from one unit to another and 
particularly to the DPP. 
supervision of Crime investigation
Consistent and robust front-line supervision is 
necessary to ensure effective crime investigation. 
During the course of inspection visits, the 
Inspectorate met many committed and professional 
supervisors at both sergeant and inspector 
ranks. A common concern raised by these ranks 
was the amount of time available to supervise 
their teams, particularly in relation to crime 
investigation. Supervisors regularly complained 
about administrative processes assigned to them 
that restrict the time available for supervision 
and patrol. In order to ensure a high standard of 
investigation and a good service to victims of crime, 
there must be a presence of effective supervision. 
The Inspectorate noted an absence of effective 
supervision at all stages of crime investigation. 
Supervision at a local level should be timely and 
appropriate to the case being investigated. There 
should be clear guidance to all supervisors about 
their role in supervising crime investigations 
and the standards of investigation expected. As 
individual district officers are responsible for crime 
investigations in their own area, the Inspectorate 
also discovered that within the same division there 
are variances in the way that districts operate. 
Supervisors should ensure the timeliness of 
investigations and make sure that steps are 
taken to arrest offenders as soon as possible 
and particularly in cases of prolific or high risk 
suspects. There also needs to be better supervision 
of more minor crimes, ensuring that these are 
investigated not only efficiently but effectively. 
During the sampling of PULSE incident records, 
the Inspectorate noted one division using the 
review facility on PULSE to task investigating 
gardaí with actions. In other policing jurisdictions 
this is common practice and supervisors send 
messages to officers on crime investigation systems, 
instructing them to take certain action. On PULSE 
there was a general absence of recorded entries 
showing supervisors had checked the progress of 
investigations. The role of supervisors should also 
include checking that all appropriate support has 
been given to a victim of crime. This is especially 
relevant for those who are vulnerable in some way, 
such as the elderly, those with disabilities or victims 
of sexual assault. Good supervision will also 
identify gardaí with good investigation skills and 
those with development needs. The Inspectorate 
was informed by the Garda Síochána that they have 
recently developed a PULSE tab for supervisors to 
monitor investigations.
With reducing availability of sergeants and inspectors 
on front-line duties across the five units, many are 
often left without a dedicated supervisor or may be 
working without a supervisor on duty at that time. 
In these cases, front-line supervisors need to operate 
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across portfolios and teams and not just supervise 
the officers that work directly to them. In order to 
improve the standards of investigation, supervisors 
must be intrusive and need to be supported by 
senior gardaí when they tackle poor performance. 
Good supervision does not always come with a cost. 
Supervision is about not making assumptions about 
what may have happened, but checking what you 
are told and making sure that gardaí do what they 
were asked to do. It is clear from discussions with 
gardaí, that they are more likely to carry through a 
task when they know that a supervisor will check to 
see that it was completed. Clearly, fully functioning 
CAD, crime investigation and case management 
systems would enhance the supervision of crime 
investigation, from dealing with the initial incident 
through to preparing a case file for a prosecution. 
However, in the absence of these systems, the Garda 
Síochána can still improve the supervision of crime 
investigation, if the recommendations in this report 
are implemented.
Following the Inspectorate’s visits to divisions 
and after access to PULSE was provided to the 
Inspectorate, the Garda Síochána published two 
new HQ Directives, addressing many of the areas 
of concern identified by the Inspectorate during 
this inspection. These directives articulate the 
responsibilities of sergeants, GISC and district 
officers in respect of reviewing PULSE incidents 
and directing that they are completed to the 
highest standard. The Inspectorate welcomes the 
contents of the directives, but the Garda Síochána 
must ensure that the instructions are turned into 
daily practice. To record supervisory activity, the 
Inspectorate believes that a PULSE record should 
have a supervision tab to be completed for all crime 
investigations.  
 recommendation 6.31
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements systems to improve the 
quality of supervision of crime investigation, 
including the development of a tab on pULse 
to record all supervision of an investigation. 
(short term).
Bringing an investigation to a Conclusion 
The Garda Síochána does not have a policy for 
closing a crime investigation. In most garda 
divisions, a case is never formally closed. As 
mentioned previously in this part, the non-closure 
of investigations results in gardaí attempting to 
manage enormous numbers of crimes, some of 
which are patently unsolvable. This problem is 
exacerbated by the approach that all crimes remain 
‘open’ until such time as an offender is identified. 
In interviews with both senior officers and rank 
and file gardaí, there was a general view that crime 
investigations are never closed. 
There comes a time in a crime investigation, where 
it is obvious that a case cannot be progressed 
any further. Often this can be after the primary 
investigation by a garda. If this part of the 
investigation is completed to a good standard, 
then a decision can be made at that point if 
further investigation will take place. For other 
investigations, that decision might come after a 
secondary investigation is completed, which should 
be within a few weeks of the crime taking place. 
Clearly this approach is targeted at less serious 
crimes and particularly those volume crimes that 
are the focus of this report. From dip sampling 
PULSE	 incidents	 between	 April	 and	 June	 2012,	
the Inspectorate found that many crimes without 
any obvious lines of enquiry are still technically 
under investigation. From checking PULSE and 
case files, it is clear that in many cases, no further 
investigation ever takes place.
A closed case can always be re-opened if further 
information or evidence becomes available. The 
process of closing a case is to remove it from a 
garda’s case load. This simple process would allow 
the investigating garda to concentrate on solvable 
cases, where there are leads that need to be followed 
up. It is also easier for supervisors to allocate new 
investigations based on a current case load, rather 
than on a historical one. Supervisors will find it more 
straightforward to check the progress of twenty 
cases, rather than 200 or in extreme cases 2,000.
For victims of crime, the conclusion of an 
investigation can also be a form of closure for them. 
Often victims appreciate that an investigation can 
only go so far and unnecessarily prolonging an 
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investigation has no obvious benefits to a victim. 
With some low level property crimes, a victim may 
only be reporting a crime for insurance purposes 
and are realistic about what action can be taken. 
All crimes are always investigated at the outset, but 
decisions need to be made about how much further 
investigation should take place. The Inspectorate 
did find two district stations where superintendents 
are making the decision to close investigations. 
For example, a case is closed in one district after 
six months, if there are no further leads and in the 
other district, cases are closed after twelve months. 
Whilst the Inspectorate welcomes the approach, 
there is no crime screening to determine if the cases 
are actually solvable in the first place and even the 
timescales for closure are still far too long. There is 
also an issue in respect of a crime where a person 
is named as a possible suspect. Continuing an 
investigation that will never result in a prosecution, 
leaves a person listed as a suspect in a difficult and 
unnecessary	position;	particularly	when	they	may	
not have committed the alleged crime. Bringing 
a case to a conclusion should be accompanied by 
supplying information to a suspected offender that 
the case is now closed, but may be re-opened if 
further evidence comes to light.
Effective supervision and professional judgement 
should be applied by supervisors to bring 
investigations to a conclusion at a reasonable 
point. The victims and witnesses to crimes should 
be provided with an update on the outcome of 
the investigation at that time and provided with 
reassurance that the investigation of their case will 
be resumed, if further evidence comes to light. All 
other police services visited have a formal process 
for closing cases at particular intervals in crime 
investigations and the Inspectorate believes that the 
Garda Síochána needs to introduce a process that 
brings a crime investigation to a conclusion. 
 recommendation 6.32
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduces a national policy and 
procedure for bringing an investigation to a 
conclusion. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 process	 includes	 formal	
updates to victims, witnesses and suspects.
6.17 Crime Investigation – 
Developing	New	Ways	to	
Investigate Crime 
telephone investigation 
Unlike other policing jurisdictions, the Garda 
Síochána does not conduct telephone recording or 
telephone investigation of crime. There are strict 
criteria for deciding the types of offences that 
are recorded in this way and it would clearly not 
include crimes where the victim is vulnerable or 
where there are opportunities to arrest an offender. 
Offences that can be recorded in this way include 
criminal damage, theft or vehicle crime offences. 
Offences such as some burglary, domestic violence 
and robbery are usually excluded from this process. 
In Hertfordshire, crimes are recorded by telephone 
by trained civilian police staff in a centralised 
contact centre. A further dedicated team of 
predominantly police staff undertake the telephone 
investigation of these crimes. The agreement of 
the victim to telephone investigation is obtained 
in all cases and, if necessary, an officer is sent 
to see a victim. Telephone reporting of crime in 
Hertfordshire	 is	 available	 24/7	 and	 the	 telephone	
investigation team operate from 0800-2100, seven 
days a week. In other services, brief details are 
taken from a victim and the telephone investigation 
units contact the victim to record and investigate 
the crime over the telephone. In these units, there 
is usually a mix of police officers and police staff. 
Such units would provide an excellent opportunity 
for utilising gardaí who are on restricted duties and 
are unable to work outside of a garda station.
West Yorkshire Police use telephone investigation 
units that manage a large proportion of low level 
offences. If a suspect is identified, the case is sent 
to an officer to carry out a full investigation. The 
Metropolitan	 Police	 Service	 investigates	 12%	 of	
their crime in this way. In many cases, telephone 
reporting may suit a victim of crime as they do not 
have to wait for an officer to call to their house. In 
remote areas, it can remove the need for an officer 
to travel great distances to take a report of minor 
crime. Once a crime is investigated on the telephone 
it may be closed pending any further information 
becoming available.
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The Garda Síochána still provide face-to-face 
contact, but it is becoming increasingly more 
difficult to do this and there is a need to consider 
other ways of dealing with crime victims. A different 
approach may provide a better and more flexible 
service to victims of crime that wish to report their 
crimes	 in	 this	 way.	 The	 24/7	 Garda	 Information	
Services Centre (GISC) could be utilised to perform 
a telephone reporting and investigation system. 
Applying this process to Ireland at a low level of 
between 5% and 10% of all crime could create an 
opportunity	to	deal	with	between	12,000	and	24,000	
crimes a year in a different way.
on-line reporting of Crime
good practice
the garda síochána’s on-line pilot that allows 
victims to report a crime on the internet is a 
good example of how police services can be 
delivered in a different way. in considering a 
more efficient use of current garda resources, 
it is clear that there is a case for increasing 
the use of on-line reporting. this offers the 
public an effective way of reporting crime 
at a time convenient to them and it reduces 
demand on front-line services. Currently, the 
garda síochána offers this facility for those 
who are victims of theft, where the monetary 
value does not exceed €500. this system is 
only recording approximately thirty crimes 
per month, but Denver records 6% of the total 
crime via the internet. the current on-line 
process operated by the garda síochána is 
easier for the victim to initially report a crime, 
but once received it generates a number of 
activities that do not save any garda time. For 
example, a garda has to call on the victim to 
verify that a crime has taken place and then it 
is allocated for investigation. the inspectorate 
believes that on-line reporting of crime should 
be extended to include other less serious 
crimes, but the process should be streamlined. 
Crimes without any investigative leads could 
be dealt with by telephone investigation units.
Hampshire Police Service operates an initiative 
which allows businesses to report crime on-line. 
This application is designed to tackle low level 
crime in shops, licensed premises, hotels and 
other businesses. It enables businesses not only 
to report crimes on-line, but also to upload CCTV 
or photographs of offenders, complete witness 
statements and even arrange to have customers’ 
credit cards cancelled if necessary. Participants 
of the system can share images of suspects with 
other businesses to prevent further crimes. A 
smart phone application allows the public to view 
images of individuals that the police would like to 
identify. When a member of the public recognises a 
‘subject of interest’ they can respond confidentially 
or openly to their local police. Eight further UK 
police	 services,	 including	 Northamptonshire,	
Humberside and Cheshire, are now using this 
facility.
 recommendation 6.33
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops new systems for recording 
and investigating crime. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	telephone	reporting	and	telephone	
investigation	of	crime;
•	 Further	develop	opportunities	for	extending	
on-line reporting of crime and reduce the 
bureaucracy of the current process.
Crime investigation Units
During this inspection, the Inspectorate visited 
or made contact with a number of other police 
services to examine how they manage the 
investigation of crime.
The following table contains details of particular 
crime types and the various units that conduct 
investigations.
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In these police services, the equivalent of regular 
units play a vital role in attending crime scenes 
and completing the primary investigation, but the 
next part of the investigation process is passed to 
dedicated units, releasing regular units to focus on 
other policing activities. Creating the right balance 
of numbers between investigation units and regular 
units is crucial to the whole crime investigation 
process.  
The advantages of using dedicated units include:
•	 Clarity	 about	 who	 investigates	 particular	
crime	types;
•	 More	 serious	 or	 complex	 crimes	 are	
investigated	by	detectives;
•	 In	 most	 cases	 the	 burden	 of	 secondary	
investigation is removed from the uniformed 
officers	that	recorded	the	initial	crime;
•	 Victims	can	contact	an	investigation	unit	for	
an update, rather than trying to contact an 
individual investigating officer. 
It is important to ensure that dedicated 
investigation units have sufficient numbers of staff 
with	 the	 right	 skills.	 Many	 police	 services	 have	
investigation units with a mix of detectives, trainee 
detectives and police staff assistant investigators. 
Assistant investigators are now used in many 
police	services,	such	as	the	PSNI	and	Surrey	where	
they are used for all functions except the arrest of 
suspects. 
Police	Service Crime	Type Investigation	Unit
Denmark	 Murder	 •	 National	investigation	units	
Volume	crime •	 Solvable	cases	go	to	investigation	units	with	a	mix	of	
detectives	and	uniformed	officers	
Burglary •	 Dedicated	detective	units
Denver	 Murder,	Robbery,	Sexual	Crimes,	Missing	
and	Exploited	Persons,	Domestic	Violence	
and	Fraud
•	 Dedicated	detective	units
PsnI Murder	 •	 Murder	Investigations	Teams
Rape	 •	 Regionally	based	Rape	Crime	Units	
Serious	crime	 •	 Detective	units	
Domestic	Abuse •	 Dedicated	DV	units
Child	Abuse	 •	 Child	Abuse	Investigation	Teams	
volume Crime •	 Regular	units	conduct	the	primary	investigation	and	
Neighbourhood	Policing	Teams	conduct	the	secondary	
investigation
Scotland	 Murder	and	murder	case	reviews	 •	 Specialist	crimes	units	based	in	three	regional	centres.	
Domestic	related	murders	may	be	dealt	with	by	divisional	
detective	units
Robbery	and	serious	assaults •	 Detective	units
Rape •	 Divisional	rape	investigation	units
Domestic	Violence •	 Divisional	DV	Abuse	Teams
south Wales Murder,	Kidnap	and	Extortion	 •	 Major	incident	investigation	teams	deal	with	all	murders.		
There	is	a	separate	murder	review	team	that	is	fully	
civilianised	
Other	serious	crime	such	as	sexual	assault,	
burglary	and	robbery
•	 Divisional	detective	units
Volume	crime •	 Regular	units	investigate	most	volume	crimes,	but	any	
prisoners	are	handed	over	to	Divisional	Hub	Teams.	Hub	
teams	manage	83%	of	prisoners,	including	all	DV	prisoners
West	Yorkshire Murder •	 Homicide	investigation	teams	
Serious	crime	–	a	total	of	11	offences	
including;	commercial	robbery,	burglary,	
vehicle	crime	by	prolific	offender,	serious	
assaults,	fraud	and	arson
•	 Detective	Units
Serious	sexual	assault •	 Rape	investigation	unit
Volume	Crime	-	A	total	of	16	offences	
including:	robbery,	burglary,	theft,	less	
serious	assaults,	DV,	non-complex	sexual	
assaults
•	 Crime	Management	Units/Evaluation	Units
Race	and	hate	crime,	criminal	damage,	car	
crime,	assaults	in	schools	and	anti	social	
behaviour
•	 Neighbourhood	teams
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model for Crime in ireland 
Earlier in this Part, the Inspectorate recommended 
that murder and other serious crime should be 
investigated by dedicated units. This will release 
divisional units from the investigation of murder 
and other similar offences.  
serious and volume Crime Divisional 
investigation Units 
The Inspectorate believes that with the creation of 
a new divisional model, the Garda Síochána must 
ensure that detective resources are fully utilised in 
the investigation of both serious (non-homicides) 
and volume crime.  
In other policing jurisdictions, only detectives 
investigate rape and other sexual offences. 
With volume crimes, many police services use 
dedicated units with detectives and non-detectives 
to investigate crimes such as assaults, burglary, 
domestic violence, robbery, and vehicle crime. The 
Inspectorate believes that detectives should also be 
fully utilised to investigate these types of offences. 
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
must develop a model of dedicated investigation 
teams that deal with all serious crimes and 
a significant percentage of volume crime 
investigations.	 Regular	 units	 need	 to	 be	 released	
from the routine investigation of volume crime 
to allow them to respond to emergency calls, to 
conduct high quality investigations at crime scenes 
and then hand over secondary investigations to 
dedicated units.  
 recommendation 6.34 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates divisional investigation 
units to investigate designated volume crimes. 
(medium term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Release	 regular	 units	 from	 investigating	
high	volumes	of	crime;
•	 Create	volume	crime	investigation	units	that	
utilise	detective	resources;
•	 Publish	 clear	 protocols	 about	 the	 type	 of	
crimes units will investigate.
 recommendation 6.35
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána provides clarity about the crime 
investigation role of divisional specialist 
units, such as drugs and other tasking units, 
traffic units and community policing units. 
(medium term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Publish	 clear	 protocols	 about	 the	 type	 of	
crimes specialist units will investigate.
Draft model 
The following table is a draft model of how units 
could be configured into the investigation of crime. 
Any model will need to take into account the needs 
of both rural and urban divisions. 
With any model, there needs to be clarity and 
written protocols about which units investigate 
certain crimes.  
Crime management
As outlined in Part 5, the Inspectorate believes that 
there should be a crime management process for 
allocating crimes based on agreed protocols.   
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Crime	Type	 Examples	 Investigation	Units
serious Crime 
including	other	
Designated	Offences
Examples	include	
•	 Murder
•	 Kidnapping	
•	 Offences	Against	the	State
•	 Other	Designated	Crimes	
•	 Murder	Review
•	 Regionalised	Investigation	Units
Other	National	
Units	Criminal	
Investigation
Examples	include
•	 Internal	Garda	Investigation	
•	 Serious	Organised	Crime	
•	 Armed	Robbery
•	 Serious	Firearms	Offences	
•	 Serious	Drug	Offences
•	 Human	Trafficking
•	 Cybercrime	
•	 Criminal	Finance	
•	 Intellectual	Property	Crime
•	 Environmental	Crime
The role and investigative functions of other national 
units will be part of the Haddington Road Review.  
•	 Internal	Affairs	
•	 Serious	Organised	Crime	Unit	
serious Crime 
excluding	Murder	
and	Other	
Designated	Offences
Examples	include	
•	 Serious	Assaults
•	 Serious	Sexual	Assaults
•	 Aggravated	Burglary	
•	 Criminal	Damage	(by	fire)
•	 Divisional	Detective	Units	
volume Crime Examples	include	
•	 Assaults
•	 Burglary
•	 Domestic	Violence
•	 Robbery
•	 Vehicle	Crime
•	 Divisional	Investigation	Units
Crime	Prevention	
Quality	of	Life	
Crimes 
Roads	Policing
Examples	include	
•	 Public	Order
•	 Anti	Social	Behaviour		
•	 Drugs	
•	 Traffic	Enforcement	
•	 Race	Crime	
•	 Criminal	Damage	(not	by	fire)
•	 Theft
•	 Regular	Units
•	 Traffic	
•	 Community	Policing	
•	 Drugs	Units	and	Taskforces	
•	 Case	Progression	Units	(to	deal	with	any	
prisoners	for	these	crimes)
Garda
Inspectorate
Promoting Excellence & Accountability
Crime investigation report
Part 7
The
Victims
Experience
VICTIM
INVESTIGATION
CONTACT
PROCESS
D
o
m
es
ti
c Interview
Violence
IN
SP
EC
TO
R
Lo
ca
l
SY
ST
EM
Response
Abuse
Experience
Id
en
ti
fyGarda
TR
A
IN
IN
G
C
as
e
Statement
Search
Quality
OFFENCE
Garda Síochána
Phone
DelaysSe
rg
ea
n
t D
iv
is
io
n
s Incident
File
Justice C
ri
m
e
C
u
lt
u
re
Se
ri
o
u
s
Evidence
Resources
D
ru
g
s
Unit
SECURITYIreland
Detective
Suspect
National
Policy
Offender
D
ru
g
s
SE
C
U
R
IT
Y Complaint
A
n
al
ys
is
Detention
the Victims exPerience
Crime Investigation Report       Part 7: The Victims Experience 
Part 7  |  1
7.2 Victims Charter
The Victims Charter is a document issued by 
the Victim’s of Crime Office on behalf of the 
Department of Justice and Equality, as a guide 
for users of the criminal justice system. The latest 
version of the charter was published in June 2010 
and sets out victim rights and entitlements to the 
services provided by the various state agencies and 
one voluntary sector organisation working with 
crime victims. 
The following are key elements of the charter 
standards that a victim can expect from the Garda 
Síochána:
•	 Respond	 quickly	 to	 calls	 and	 investigate	
complaints;
•	 Provide	 contact	details	 of	 the	 investigating	
gardaí	 and	 the	 PULSE	 crime	 reference	
number;
•	 Explain	 what	 will	 happen	 during	 the	
investigation and update victims on the 
investigation;
•	 Provide	 details	 about	 the	 Crime	 Victims	
Helpline and other support services;
•	 When	a	suspect	is	in	court,	to	provide	details	
of the hearing, bail conditions and court 
outcomes.
7.1 Introduction
The way a victim or a witness is dealt with following an incident of crime 
is an important aspect of any crime investigation. All victims should have 
a reasonable expectation that their crime will be accurately recorded and 
that there will be an appropriate level of investigation. Victims will also 
have a reasonable expectation to receive regular updates about significant 
developments in their case, such as the arrest or prosecution of an offender. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the experience of victims, the 
Inspectorate conducted telephone and face-to-face interviews with a cross-
section of victims of crime. The Inspectorate also contacted a number of victim 
support agencies and organisations, and attended the 2013 Garda National 
Crime Victims Forum. 
There are two very important contact stages for victims of crime with the 
gardaí, which are closely related to the recording and subsequent investigation 
of crime. These are the initial contact that a garda has with a victim of crime 
and the subsequent follow-up contacts while a crime is under investigation. 
Keeping a victim up to date with an investigation is a challenge faced by most 
police services. 
Victims experiences have already featured in several parts of this report and 
in	Part	6	in	particular;	the	report	explored	the	service	currently	provided	by	
the Garda Síochána to victims of rape and domestic violence. 
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There are a number of other commitments in the 
charter, such as actions to support victims of elder 
abuse, domestic violence, race crime or sexual 
assault. This support also extends to families of 
murder	victims	and	other	serious	crimes.	Where	a	
crime is committed by a young person, the victim 
will be informed of this and the victim’s views 
will be taken into account. The victim may also be 
invited to participate in various processes, such as 
a family conference.1
7.3	The	Victims	Rights	Directive
In	 2015,	 the	 E.U.	 Victims	 Rights	Directive	will	 be	
transposed into Irish law, providing minimum 
rights, support and protection for all victims of 
crime regardless of where the crime was committed 
in	the	E.U.,	the	residential	status	of	the	victim	or	the	
victim’s nationality or citizenship. The Directive 
defines a victim as a natural person who has 
suffered some type of harm, which was directly 
caused by a criminal offence. The Garda Síochána 
will play an important role in ensuring that the 
Directive is implemented within the timeframe. 
Once the Directive is transposed, the key 
responsibilities of the gardaí will include:
•	 To	 ensure	 that	 information	 is	 consistently	
provided to all victims throughout the 
criminal process;
•	 To	 provide	 information	 to	 victims	
on how to access support, such as 
medical, psychological and alternative 
accommodation; 
•	 To	 provide	 contact	 details	 so	 that	 a	 victim	
can communicate with a garda about their 
case;
•	 To	 provide	 information	 on	 access	 to	 legal	
advice and the procedures available, if a 
victim wants to make a complaint in relation 
to their case.
Providing	 information	 to	 a	 victim	 about	 their	
case is an important aspect of the Directive and 
is particularly important at key points in an 
investigation when for example, the victim can 
1	 Under	Part	8	of	the	Children	Act,	2001,	the	Probation	Service	
can convene a family conference for young offenders who 
come before the courts.
be given details about a trial. Other important 
information might relate to an offender being 
released from prison, particularly in cases where 
there is a risk of harm to the victim. An important 
change to procedures is the requirement to 
provide a victim with brief details of the reason 
why a decision is made not to prosecute or to end 
proceedings.	 The	 Victims	 Rights	 Directive	 will	
ensure that all victims of crime will have a right to 
information, support and protection. 
7.4	Garda	Síochána	Website	–	
Victim Information
The Garda Síochána website provides information 
for victims, including a page with answers to 
frequently asked questions by victims of crime. 
Some of the information provided is sourced from 
the Crime Victims Helpline (see below) and covers 
questions and answers, such as:
•	 What	happens	when	I	report	a	crime?
•	 What	is	a	PULSE	number?
•	 Who	investigates	a	crime?
•	 What	are	the	steps	in	investigating	a	crime?
•	 How	long	will	it	take?
Easily accessible online information is an essential 
element of care to victims of crime. In light of the 
upcoming	 transposition	 of	 the	 Victims	 Rights	
Directive, the Inspectorate would recommend 
this material be updated. This helps victims to 
be informed and prepared on what to expect and 
experience during this difficult time. 
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7.5 National Support Agencies 
and	Processes	
national Crime victims Helpline
The Crime Victims Helpline is a national 
confidential helpline run by a team of experienced 
volunteers trained in counselling and listening 
skills. The helpline provides a single point of 
contact for victims of crime and provides services, 
mainly to victims of burglary, theft, anti-social 
behaviour, assault and harassment. The helpline 
receives approximately 3,000 calls and e-mails per 
year, one third of which are from victims of assault. 
Due to data protection restrictions, the Garda 
Síochána does not provide the victim’s details 
to the helpline, but provides the helpline contact 
details in a letter sent to all victims of crime. In all 
police	services	in	the	UK,	victims	are	asked	at	the	
time of recording a crime if they would like to be 
referred to the Victim Support Scheme and if they 
agree, the request is automatically sent by the police. 
the victims of Crime office
The Victims of Crime Office within the 
Department of Justice and Equality was set up 
to encourage state and voluntary organisations 
to provide a better service to victims. The core 
mandate of the Victims of Crime Office is to improve 
the continuity and quality of services to victims 
of crime by state agencies and non-governmental 
organisations throughout the country. It works to 
support the development of competent, caring and 
efficient services to victims of crime by: 
•	 Using	 the	 Victims	 Charter	 to	 achieve	
improved standards of treatment of victims 
by relevant State and voluntary sector 
organisations;
•	 Promoting	 awareness	 concerning	 victims	
needs and services available to victims of 
crime;
•	 Advising	 the	 Minister	 for	 Justice	 and	
Equality on victims issues in Ireland and 
on international developments pertinent to 
victims;
•	 Working	in	co-operation	with	Cosc,	the	Anti-
Human	Trafficking	Unit,	 the	Criminal	Law	
Reform	Division	and	other	relevant	sections	
of the Department of Justice and Equality 
to ensure a co-ordinated policy response to 
issues in relation to victims of crime by the 
Department.
The Director of the Victims of Crime Office is a 
member of the independent Commission for the 
Support of Victims; whose Office provides the 
secretariat to the Commission. The Commission 
funds voluntary sector organisations to provide 
support to victims of crime.
support agencies across ireland
There are a large number of well established 
agencies and organisations across Ireland 
providing a range of support services to victims 
of crime. The vast majority of these organisations 
are engaged with victims of domestic violence and 
sexual	assault.	Most	of	these	organisations	operate	
independently of each other in respect of provision 
of services, funding and training. 
irish tourist assistance service
The Irish Tourist Assistance Service provides help 
to visitors to Ireland who have become victims of 
crime.	Whilst	the	service	offers	emotional	support,	
the emphasis is on the practical needs of the victim, 
such as replacement of travel tickets or passports. 
7.6	Garda	Support	Services
garda Family Liaison officers 
As	previously	highlighted	in	Part	6,	Family	Liaison	
Officers	 (FLOs)	 are	 appointed	 in	 serious	 cases	 to	
keep victims families informed about the progress 
of an investigation.
garda victims Liaison Unit
The	Garda	 Síochána	has	 a	Garda	Victims	Liaison	
Unit	(GVLO)	that	is	responsible	for:
•	 Formulating	strategy	and	developing	policy;	
•	 Supporting	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
Victims Charter;
•	 Liaison	with	stakeholders,	including	victim	
support agencies;
•	 Supporting	Family	Liaison	Officers.
The	 GVLO	 works	 with	 forty-nine	 Non-
Governmental Organisations and arranges an 
annual Crime Victims Forum. The unit does not 
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have direct contact with victims, but receives 
feedback from victims of crime through regular 
reports from the Crime Victims Helpline.
The	 GVLO	 monitors	 the	 compliance	 of	 garda	
divisions with the policy to issue letters to victims 
of crime at the time that the crime is first reported 
and at key stages of an investigation. 
garda Divisional victims offices 
A small number of garda divisions are operating 
Victims Offices with dedicated staff that provide a 
single point of contact for victims of crime. In the 
divisions	visited,	Waterford	was	operating	a	unit	at	
the	time	of	the	inspection	and	DMR	North	has	now	
introduced	a	similar	unit.	DMR	North	Central	has	
operated a victims office for a considerable period 
of	time.	In	Waterford,	the	unit	has	taken	on	the	role	
of sending garda letters to victims and contacting 
them by telephone to provide an update on crime 
investigations and to inform victims of the various 
support agencies which can provide support. 
Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	unit	updates	victims	
with developments in cases. 
From September of this year (2014), the Garda 
Síochána intends to establish a victims office 
in each garda division by the end of the year. 
The Inspectorate welcomes the introduction of 
dedicated victim units which provide a good 
opportunity for the Garda Síochána to ensure a 
more consistent approach to the service provided to 
victims of crime. 
victim Letters 
To meet some of the commitments made in the 
Victims Charter, the Garda Síochána developed 
two standard victim letters that are generated by 
the	PULSE	system	and	are	signed	by	or	on	behalf	of	
the district officer (Templates of these letters can be 
found	at	Appendix	4.).	Letter	1	is	sent	empathising	
with a victim that a crime has taken place and 
providing	details	of	 the	PULSE	reference	number,	
the investigating garda’s name and the garda station 
contact	 number.	 Whilst	 this	 letter	 also	 provides	
contact details for the Crime Victims Helpline, it 
needs to be updated to reflect a new free phone 
number that is now available to victims. In some 
of the divisions visited, a separate leaflet is also 
sent with this letter that contains contact details for 
other support agencies. The Inspectorate would like 
this practice to be followed in all divisions. 
 recommendation 7.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána updates pULse letters to reflect the 
free phone number for the Crime victims 
Helpline. (short term). 
During contact with victims of crime the following 
matters	were	raised	about	Letter	1:
	•	 Although	most	victims	received	Letter	1,	not	
all victims received one;
•	 Some	 victims	 felt	 that	 it	 was	 a	 standard	
computer generated letter and viewed the 
letter as impersonal;
•	 Many	victims	did	not	understand	the	reason	
for receipt of a long list of support agencies 
for crimes that had no connection to the 
crime they reported.
Whilst	 the	 principle	 of	 victims	 Letter	 1	 is	 good,	
the content is the same for every victim, whether 
the crime committed is one of low value damage 
to property or a serious assault. The Inspectorate 
believes that the wording of the letter needs to 
be reviewed to make it more empathetic and to 
include both national support services as well as 
details of locally based support groups. Currently, 
letters are not sent to victims of sexual violence 
and not always to victims of domestic violence 
or in cases where the victim is vulnerable for any 
other reasons. The Inspectorate recognises that in 
domestic violence cases, a letter from the Garda 
Síochána to a household where the perpetrator is 
still living may create further risk for the victim. 
The Garda Síochána should consider providing a 
specific card with support and contact details that 
could be carried by gardaí and given to a victim at 
the time of recording the crime. 
 recommendation 7.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána improves the information provided 
to victims and particularly to victims of sexual 
assaults, domestic violence or those who are 
vulnerable for any other reason. (short term).
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 in support of the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 card	 or	 information	 leaflet	with	
support agency and other contact details, 
particularly for domestic violence and 
sexual assault to provide to victims at the 
time of recording the crime.
Letter	 2	 is	 sent	 once	 an	offender	 is	 identified	and	
the case has progressed. The wording of this letter 
describes the fact that progress has been made 
in the investigation and that ‘a person has been 
made	 amenable’.	 Most	 victims	 spoken	 to	 did	 not	
understand what this term actually meant and 
had to contact the investigating garda to establish 
what had actually happened. The Inspectorate 
believes that updating victims is an important 
aspect	of	investigating	a	crime	and	Letter	2	should	
be reworded to clearly explain what has happened 
in their case and to remove the need for a victim to 
contact an investigating garda for clarification. 
Chart 7.1 shows the latest results for quarter three 
of 2013 for the selected seven divisions in respect of 
compliance	rates	for	sending	Letters	1	and	2.
chart 7.1
Letters to victims of Crime 3rd  
Quarter 2013
Division Letter 1 Letter 2
Dmr north 100% 98%
Dmr south 89% 79%
Donegal 90% 88%
Kildare 59% 42%
Limerick 92% 86%
mayo 81% 54%
Waterford 92% 77%
national totals 89% 74%
Source:	Garda	Victims	Liaison	Office
The results show the current performance across 
the seven divisions with one division achieving 
100%	compliance	with	Letter	1	and	98%	with	Letter	
2. In this quarter, just over 3,000 victims nationally 
did	not	receive	Letter	1	and	just	over	1,500	victims	
did	not	receive	Letter	2.	The	national	performance	
shows a 5% increase in both letters in comparison 
with the same period in 2012. The Inspectorate 
believes	that	Letter	1	should	be	sent	in	100%	of	cases	
and	that	a	minimum	target	of	90%	should	be	set	for	
the	sending	of	Letter	2.	
 recommendation 7.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduces compliance rates for 
divisions of 100% for sending Letter 1 and 
a minimum of 90% for sending Letter 2. 
(short term).
The Inspectorate believes that victims should 
always be updated at key points in an investigation 
of their crime, such as the arrest, charge, or bail of a 
suspect and any court appearance or other judicial 
disposal. In many cases, a telephone call will often 
be more welcome, as it provides a victim with an 
opportunity	to	ask	questions	about	their	case.	Many	
gardaí fully understand the importance of updating 
victims, but the update is often a task that is not 
completed. Other policing services have developed 
software programmes aligned to crime recording 
systems that remind officers to contact victims of 
crime at certain intervals. The Inspectorate believes 
that the Garda Síochána should develop an IT 
solution that acts as a reminder to contact victims 
and that captures all contact with victims of crime. 
A	new	initiative	in	the	UK	allows	victims	to	check	
progress of their crime on-line with automatic 
updates to the victim.
 recommendation 7.4 
 the inspectorate recommends in the absence 
of a case management system, that the garda 
síochána explores software options that 
would provide a reminder that a victim needs 
to be updated. (short term).
initial garda Contact with victims
The first interaction between a garda and a victim 
is most important and can ultimately determine 
whether the victim will assist with an investigation. 
During meetings and conversations with victims, 
the Inspectorate found two distinct levels of victim 
satisfaction, depending very much on the type of 
crime	 that	was	 committed.	With	 property	 crimes	
such as burglary, the feedback from victims was 
far more positive than if the crime was an assault 
or	a	domestic	violence	case.	With	property	crimes,	
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the victims generally found gardaí to be empathetic 
and helpful with practical advice on issues such as 
crime	prevention.	When	 the	 incident	was	 a	 crime	
of violence, some victims reported not perceiving 
the attending garda to be empathetic and in other 
cases, disinterested in dealing with their crime.
This same view was also expressed by many 
organisations representing the interests of such 
victims. Staff at a women’s refuge explained 
that the service provided to victims of domestic 
violence varied according to the attitude of the 
attending garda and frequently the approach 
was one of disinterest or aimed at limiting garda 
involvement in investigating further. Inappropriate 
comments made by gardaí were reported by some 
victims of domestic violence, including:
•	 “there’s	two	of	them	in	it”;	
•	 “just	 don’t	 annoy	 him	 and	 he	 won’t	 come	
back”;
•	 “let	him	sleep	it	off”.
The Inspectorate learned that in one particularly 
serious case, gardaí attended an emergency call 
to a home where a wife was being threatened by 
her husband. The support group reported that one 
of	 the	 gardaí	 commented	 to	 the	 victim	 “we	 have	
enough	to	be	doing,	next	time	we	won’t	call	back”.	
Later	 that	 same	day,	 the	husband	 returned	 to	 the	
home and stabbed his wife in front of their child; 
who was also injured in the process of protecting 
his mother. Both victims were taken to hospital 
and it took three days to take a statement from the 
victim and to arrest the suspect. A more positive 
attitude at the first time of contact with a victim 
may prevent or minimise further incidents. 
At the Annual National Garda Crime Victims 
Forum, the Inspectorate met many representatives 
from victim support agencies, including domestic 
violence support agencies. Key issues raised with 
the Inspectorate on behalf of victims included:
•	 Victims	that	are	“failed	by”	criminal	justice	
services in relation to their expectation of 
achieving justice;
•	 Cases	where	statements	of	complaint	are	not	
taken from victims. One victim recounted 
trying eighteen times to get a garda to take a 
statement of complaint from them;
•	 Cases	where	victims	 felt	discouraged	 from	
providing a statement of complaint;
•	 Unless	a	barring	order	is	in	force,	an	arrest	is	
unlikely for domestic violence;
•	 An	 offender	 who	 breached	 a	 court	 order	
nine times without any custodial sentence; 
•	 Criminal	 cases	 that	 are	 adjourned	 on	
numerous occasions.
Most	 police	 services	 find	 that	 their	 officers	 have	
varied levels of communication skills and that 
young and inexperienced officers often find it very 
challenging to deal with victims and suspects in 
emotionally	charged	situations.	Most	officers	always	
provide an excellent service to victims, but a small 
minority of officers consistently provide a poor level 
of	service.	Many	police	services	have	taken	action	
to identify the level of services provided by their 
officers and to use the information to acknowledge 
those who provide a good service and to tackle 
those who consistently deliver a poor service. 
Throughout the visits to divisions, the Inspectorate 
found little or no evidence of supervisors contacting 
victims of crime to determine the levels of service 
provided.
Other policing jurisdictions check the levels of 
service provided by officers by contacting victims 
directly and establishing their views. These contacts 
allow supervisors to take any remedial action 
necessary and are often well received by victims. 
Usually,	 pre-set	 questions	 are	 used	 to	 ensure	
that all victims are surveyed in the same way. In 
August 2014, the Garda Síochána began a process 
of	procuring	a	Public	Attitudes	Survey,	which	may	
help to gather information from victims of crime 
about the way that their case was managed. 
victim’s statement of Complaint
The barriers identified in this inspection 
surrounding a victims statement of complaint are 
articulated	 in	 Part	 3	 of	 this	 report.	 Many	 gardaí	
expressed their frustration to the Inspectorate 
with victims that refuse to make a statement of 
complaint. In some cases, gardaí took the view that 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 7: The Victims Experience 
Part 7  |  7
if a victim did not make a statement of complaint 
then perhaps it was the case that the offence did not 
happen. This often resulted in recording the crime 
on	PULSE	or	the	incident	was	recorded	on	PULSE	
under the category ‘Attention and Complaints’; 
which is not a crime category. Detective gardaí 
and other investigating members informed the 
Inspectorate that in serious crimes, such as unsolved 
sexual assaults, sometimes victims of these assaults 
are subjected to unnecessary pressure to either 
make a statement of complaint or to withdraw 
their complaint completely. The Inspectorate 
was provided with several examples where an 
investigating garda was directed by a district 
officer to take such action and in the view of the 
members, it was inappropriate to put a vulnerable 
victim under this kind of pressure.
Common themes raised by victims of 
Crime and by investigating gardaí
The following are key themes identified during the 
Inspectorate’s contacts with victims of crime and 
gardaí:
•	 Without	 a	 statement	 of	 complaint,	 a	 crime	
may not be recorded;
•	 Victims	are	often	unaware	 that	 their	 crime	
has not been recorded; 
•	 Victims	 are	 often	 unaware	 about	 the	
categorisation of their crime; 
•	 Victims	are	sent	away	for	medical	treatment	
or to consider their next course of action. On 
many occasions, no follow-up is ever made 
with the victim;
•	 There	 are	 long	 delays	 in	 taking	 victim	
statements or statements are never taken; 
•	 Victims	sometimes	learn	about	the	outcome	
of their case in the court section of the local 
newspaper.
7.7 Victim Interviews
During this inspection process, the Inspectorate 
met with and spoke to a number of victims of 
crime or their family members. The intention was 
to establish the level of service provided by the 
Garda Síochána or other criminal justice partners to 
victims. For some, this was the first occasion where 
the person was a victim of a crime, but for others, 
it was not their first time to report a crime to the 
gardaí. 
The Inspectorate was directly contacted by a family 
member in relation to the victim of a serious crime. 
This case is currently part of a Department of Justice 
and Equality review process and for this reason, the 
details of this crime are not included in this report. 
The Inspectorate gained access to victims and 
family members through a variety of different 
means such as: 
•	 Referrals	from	the	Crime	Victims	Helpline;
•	 Referrals	from	support	agencies;
•	 Direct	contacts	by	the	victim	or	family	to	the	
Inspectorate;
•	 Victims	 engaging	with	 the	 Inspectorate	 on	
other matters that disclosed details of their 
crimes.
volume Crime Case reviews 
Following	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 158	 Volume	 Crime	
Case	Reviews,	the	Inspectorate	wrote	a	letter	to	all	
of the callers who contacted the gardaí about those 
crimes, asking for an opportunity to discuss the 
level of service provided. Due to data protection 
concerns raised by the Garda Síochána, the 
Inspectorate sent the letter via the Garda Victims 
Liaison	Office,	who	sent	an	accompanying	letter	to	
the victims of those crimes. 
The method of access to victims in these cases was 
probably affected by the following factors:
•	 Only	 ninety	 of	 the	 158	 incidents	 were	
recorded as crimes;
•	 Fourteen	of	the	incidents	were	recorded	on	
PULSE	after	the	request	for	details	of	those	
cases by the Inspectorate;
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•	 Victims	 that	 did	 contact	 the	 Inspectorate,	
expressed their reservations about 
contacting the Inspectorate following the 
receipt of an accompanying letter from the 
Garda Síochána. 
In total, six victims contacted the Inspectorate as a 
result of the letter received. The Inspectorate would 
like to thank those persons that made contact and 
shared their experiences. The Inspectorate viewed 
all	of	the	PULSE	records	for	the	victims	that	were	
part	 of	 the	 case	 reviews,	 and	 also	 some	 PULSE	
records for other victims who were in contact with 
the office. 
victims interviews
The following are extracts taken from interviews 
with eight victims who reported crimes at the 
divisions visited as part of this inspection. These 
interviews include victims from volume crime case 
reviews and referrals from other agencies. 
victim 1 – Burglary victim - excellent 
initial action, but poor follow up
The victim returned home to find their house 
ransacked and a significant amount of jewellery 
and other personal items stolen. The victim 
described an excellent and caring service 
provided by the first garda that attended. This 
garda asked the victim to write a list of the 
stolen items and that the investigating garda 
would collect it at a later stage. Some fourteen 
months later the investigating garda had still 
not contacted the victim. During this time, 
the victim rang the garda station and was 
repeatedly told that the investigating garda 
was off duty. Despite leaving several messages, 
the garda never contacted them. Following an 
intervention by the Garda Inspectorate, the 
property list was eventually collected.
victim 2 – Burglary victim - excellent 
initial action, but poor follow up
The victim returned home to find their front 
door forced open. The initial response was good 
and the victim described the service provided at 
the time as excellent. A few days after reporting 
the crime, an investigator attended and took a 
statement from the victim. The victim remembers 
receiving a letter from the local superintendent. 
Following the initial contact the follow up was 
poor and the victim did not have further contact 
with the gardaí until they were the victim of a 
further crime eleven months later. The victim 
was very understanding that gardaí are busy 
and that updates might be something that are 
not always completed. The victim did not receive 
a letter for the second crime. The Inspectorate 
checked	PULSE	and	the	crime	was	recorded.	
victim 3 – assault victim – poor victim 
care 
The victim was kicked and bitten by a known 
suspect and received several cuts to the face. The 
suspect also threatened to kill the victim’s family. 
The victim attended the local garda station and 
spoke to a group of gardaí. The victim describes 
all the gardaí as uncaring and despite the fact 
that the victim was hysterical and bleeding from 
their injuries, no ambulance was called and no 
first aid was provided. According to the victim, 
one garda told them that they were too busy with 
another case to deal with theirs and another told 
the victim to deal with the matter themselves. No 
photographs were taken of the injuries and the 
victim was told to come back to the station later 
that day and a statement would be taken. The 
victim’s family later called an ambulance and 
the	 victim	went	 to	 a	 hospital.	When	 the	 victim	
returned to the garda station, they were told that 
the gardaí were too busy to take a statement and 
the victim was sent away again. Six months later 
the victim had still not received any contact and 
does not know if the crime was ever recorded.
victim 4 – Burglary victim - good initial 
action and good follow up
The victim returned home and was followed by 
two suspects who entered the victim’s home and 
stole money and a handbag. The victim thought 
they heard the mention of a gun, but did not 
see a weapon. After a short period, a patrol car 
arrived with two gardaí. The victim found the 
gardaí to be helpful and they provided a good 
level of service. The victim received a letter from 
the local station, but commented that they found 
it very impersonal. The victim did receive at 
least one telephone call requesting attendance at 
an identification process.
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victim 5 – robbery victim – poor initial 
action and poor follow up
The victim was violently assaulted and tied 
up by two males whilst making early morning 
deliveries to a business premises. The suspects 
took the keys to the premises and the victim’s 
mobile telephone. The victim described the first 
gardaí who arrived at the scene as unprofessional 
and uncaring towards him. The victim explained 
that he had to ask them to cut his wrists free 
and had to find a knife for them to use. He also 
described them as not knowing what to do. The 
victim explained to the gardaí that there was a 
telephone application on his mobile phone that 
could locate his phone and possibly the suspects 
for this crime. He described a very slow response 
to this suggestion at the scene and again when 
he later raised this at a hospital. Detectives came 
within twenty-four hours and took a victims 
statement from him. After that visit, the victim 
unsuccessfully tried several times to contact 
the investigating garda. One year later a garda 
contacted the victim to talk about the mobile 
application that was on his telephone. 
victims 6 – assault victim – good initial 
action, but poor follow up and a slow 
investigation
Following a party at a neighbour’s house, the 
victim heard a knock on the door. On opening 
the door, the neighbour entered the house with 
a number of persons who assaulted both the 
victim and a friend. The victim was kicked and 
punched and the friend received a serious facial 
wound. The victim described the first garda 
who attended as excellent and that garda was 
assigned to investigate the crime. Statements 
were taken from the victims about a week 
later. At the request of the investigating garda, 
the victim attended a garda station to have 
photographs taken of their injuries, but the 
investigating garda was not there and no one 
else would help. The victim said the garda later 
made lots of appointments to call on the victim, 
but failed to turn up as promised. At some 
later stage, the garda called on the victim and 
apologised for not returning their calls. At that 
time, the garda told the victim that it took eight 
months to arrest the neighbour, but the victim
does not know if they were charged with the 
assaults. Following that visit, the victim tried 
to contact this garda several times without any 
success and does not know what has happened 
to their case. At the time that the victim was 
contacted, the crime had occurred twelve 
months previously.
victim 7 – serious sexual assault – good 
initial action, but poor follow up and a 
slow investigation 
The victim initially reported the serious assault 
in	2008,	but	shortly	afterwards	stated	that	 they	
did not want to proceed with the complaint. In 
November 2010, the victim contacted the same 
garda and re-instated the complaint. The victim 
described the garda as helpful and caring, 
and believes that the investigating garda is a 
regular unit garda. A victim’s letter was never 
received, nor any referral to a victim support 
agency. A short statement was provided by the 
victim at the time of the second report in 2010 
and another more detailed statement was taken 
some eight months later. It took two years to 
take a statement from a key witness and at least 
twelve	 months	 to	 arrest	 the	 suspect.	 Whilst	
permission was granted immediately, the 
victims medical records were only obtained in 
September 2013. The victim has encountered 
many difficulties trying to contact the 
investigating garda. Some calls were replied to 
after two weeks and sometimes no return call 
was ever made. On one occasion the victim was 
told that the garda was on extended leave, but 
the person who took the call did not find out 
what was happening to their case. The victim 
believes that the last contact made was in 
September 2013. Three years after reporting the 
crime, the case is still not completed and the 
victim believes that a case file has gone to the 
DPP.	 Following	 this	 interview,	 the	 victim	 rang	
their garda station to speak to the investigating 
garda and to ask why they did not receive 
a	 victims	 letter	 and	 to	 request	 their	 PULSE	
reference number for their crime. The victim 
said that a sergeant spoke to them and said that 
the investigating garda was on extended sick 
leave and that only victims wanting to make an 
insurance	claim	are	given	a	PULSE	number.	
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victim 8 – assault victim –  
High satisfaction levels with the 
investigating garda, but dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of the case
The victim, a taxi driver, picked up a young 
male who was drunk. At the end of the 
journey, the male announced that he had no 
money, became aggressive and kicked the 
victim in the chest and damaged the victim’s 
car. The victim called for help and gardaí 
attended and arrested the suspect. Gardaí 
told the victim that they were lucky not to be 
more seriously injured. The victim was highly 
satisfied with the first garda that attended the 
incident. The victim provided a statement the 
following day to the same garda and at that 
time was told that the suspected offender was 
apologetic and that he had personal problems. 
Following on from that contact, the victim 
had difficulties in contacting the investigating 
garda. Eventually the garda contacted the 
victim with an offer of compensation from 
the suspect and after consideration, the 
victim agreed to accept this. The victim has 
no idea what happened to the suspect in this 
case. The Inspectorate is concerned that an 
investigating garda appears to have negotiated 
a settlement between the victim and the 
suspected offender. To protect the anonymity 
of the victim, the Inspectorate has not checked 
PULSE	to	 identify	 the	outcome.	 It	 is	clear	 that	
a crime took place and if a charge or summons 
was not proffered, then an adult caution is 
available in appropriate circumstances. Garda 
policy on the Adult Caution Scheme makes it 
very clear that under no circumstances should 
members become involved in the negotiating 
or awarding reparation or compensation. 
These cases confirm many of the positives of 
dealing with gardaí, but also confirm many of 
the concerns raised by other victims of crime 
during interactions with the Inspectorate. 
The Inspectorate believes that the whole 
approach to victim care and contact by the 
Garda Síochána needs to be urgently addressed. 
Follow-up Contact
As previously mentioned, keeping victims up to 
date with crime investigations is an area that most 
police services find challenging. Victims should 
have a reasonable expectation that a garda will 
contact them during the first few days and weeks 
of an investigation and particularly when there is 
a	significant	development	in	the	case.	Poor	follow-
up with victims often impacts negatively on victims 
overall satisfaction level with the service provided 
and can often ruin the good work that took place 
during the initial contact. From contact with victims 
and support agencies, it is clear that many victims 
are not kept up to date with developments in their 
case and find it extremely difficult to contact the 
investigating officer. 
summary of victims views of Follow-up 
Contact:
•	 Across	 most	 crime	 types,	 updates	 on	 the	
progress of investigations are not adequately 
provided to victims;
•	 Victims	often	find	it	very	difficult	to	contact	
the investigating garda due to changing 
shifts; 
•	 When	victims	 ring	a	garda	station	and	 the	
investigating garda is not there, no one else 
helped them; 
•	 Despite	 leaving	 messages	 for	 the	
investigating officer at garda stations, calls 
are not always returned;
•	 Crimes	often	take	a	long	time	to	investigate;	
•	 Investigators	 often	 break	 promises	 to	
update victims or fail to keep pre-arranged 
appointments. 
Front-line gardaí and detectives recognise the 
importance of updating victims, but often struggle 
to find the time to do so. High workloads make it 
more difficult for investigators to keep victims 
updated.	 Many	 gardaí	 reported	 that	 they	 often	
have to cancel appointments with victims as a 
result of duty changes to their working day. The 
current pilot roster further adds to this difficulty, as 
members are away from work for extended periods 
of time. 
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Many	victims	who	tried	to	contact	an	investigating	
garda reported that it was a frustrating process. The 
investigating officer is not always available when 
the victim calls and the default position appears to 
be to tell the victim that the garda is not at work 
and to take a message from them. This is because 
the investigating garda will be the only person with 
intimate knowledge of the case. However, there 
are many occasions when a garda taking a call or 
dealing with a visitor to a garda station could be 
more helpful. The Inspectorate was informed by a 
district officer that a case was identified where a 
victim had to make ten telephone calls to a garda 
station to get their mobile phone returned to them. 
It is even more frustrating for victims when the 
investigating garda does not return their call. 
Victims informed the Inspectorate of leaving two 
or three messages for the investigating officer 
and then giving up trying to make contact. Some 
members receiving calls from victims stated emails 
were routinely sent on the garda system to the 
investigator, advising them of the victim’s call.
There were some good examples of victim 
contact found by the Inspectorate in divisions 
that use community gardaí to visit victims and 
particularly vulnerable victims of crime. Generally, 
the Inspectorate found that victims are very 
understanding that gardaí are busy, but do not 
understand when no one replies to messages left 
or why no one takes any responsibility for helping 
them with the information that is required.
PULSE	 does	 not	 currently	 have	 the	 ability	 to	
generate a reminder to a garda to contact a victim. 
This sort of application would provide a fail safe 
to ensure that regular updates are provided to 
victims. This is an area that needs to be addressed.
By	dip	sampling	PULSE	records,	checking	case	files	
and by contacting victims of crime, the Inspectorate 
was easily able to identify cases where no updates 
were provided or recorded. For many crimes, no 
updates	were	recorded	on	PULSE	since	the	date	that	
the original crime was recorded. In the majority of 
these cases, the crimes were at least twelve months 
old	 when	 the	 Inspectorate	 viewed	 the	 PULSE	
record and the case files. The Inspectorate chose 
this period of time to allow for the proper course of 
action to have occurred. The Inspectorate believes 
that there is an absence of robust supervision of 
victim contact in those divisions without a victims 
office or other means to ensure contact.
The access of gardaí to external e-mail was very 
inconsistent across the seven divisions. Some 
members stated that they had no external e-mail 
access and other gardaí explained that if you apply 
for	 access	 then	 it	 will	 be	 given.	 Many	 victims	
would like the option to use e-mail to communicate 
directly with the garda dealing with their case and 
it would ensure that the member actually received 
their message.
During the examination of the Volume Crime Case 
Reviews,	the	Inspectorate	found	that	in	43%	of	the	
cases that were investigated, there were no updates 
on	PULSE	 in	 the	 twelve	months	 that	 followed	the	
creation	 of	 the	 record.	 In	 the	 PULSE	 records	 that	
were updated, the entries tended to be more about 
the investigation, rather than victim updates on 
the progress of the case. It is important to record 
updates	and	attempts	to	update	a	victim	on	PULSE.	
Senior gardaí believe that contact with victims is 
often made, but is not always recorded. This should 
be immediately addressed and there is no cost or 
technical barriers to this taking place.
Across the seven divisions, the Inspectorate found 
an inconsistent approach to updating victims and 
there was no national standard as to how or when 
this contact should take place other than the two 
required victims letters. In four of the divisions the 
following different approaches are taken:
•	 An	investigating	garda	is	expected	to	update	
a victim within fourteen days;
•	 A	divisional	clerk	updates	all	victims;	
•	 The	 investigating	 garda	 is	 expected	 to	
update a victim within seven days;
•	 A	dedicated	unit	manages	 all	 contact	with	
victims.
The division operating a dedicated victims unit has 
completely removed the responsibility to update 
victims from the investigating garda. This is a 
small unit, but it appears to operate effectively and 
the division has seen a reduction in the number of 
complaints about the service provided to victims.
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PULSE	 has	 a	 programme	with	 an	 update	 facility	
aimed at victims and built around contact in one 
day, one week and one month. The Inspectorate 
found limited use of this facility, but it may provide 
a system to fill the current gap.
Crime recording systems in other policing 
jurisdictions often have associated software 
programmes that remind officers at certain intervals 
to	update	victims.	For	example,	 in	West	Yorkshire	
and	 in	 the	 PSNI,	 the	 crime	 recording	 system	 has	
a diary that prompts investigating officers to 
contact victims. The Inspectorate believes that the 
Garda Síochána should introduce such a system to 
improve the service provided to victims of crime. 
Many	 UK	 police	 services	 operate	 a	 ‘Call	 Back’	
system where victims of crime are contacted by 
telephone to establish the level of service provided 
by the officer that dealt with them. In these services, 
a variety of approaches are used such as police staff 
and volunteers calling victims and using a set of 
specific questions. Feedback from victims about the 
‘Call Back’ system is very positive and generally 
well received. The system very quickly identifies 
those officers that always provide a good service 
to victims and those that do not. For officers that 
are dealing with victims, they will know that a ‘call 
back’ may be made to check what action was taken. 
As mentioned earlier, the Inspectorate welcomes the 
introduction of the Victims Offices by the interim 
Commissioner, and looks forward to seeing the 
establishment of a set of standards to ensure that 
victims receive a consistently high quality service.
repeat victimisation
Currently, there is no garda policy or procedure 
for dealing with people who are repeat victims of 
crime.	Police	services	in	other	jurisdictions	usually	
ask victims if they have been the victim of another 
crime in the last twelve months. Depending on the 
crimes committed, there is a policy that provides 
for an enhanced response to the individuals who 
are repeat victims. The Inspectorate found an 
inconsistent approach across the seven divisions 
inspected, with some divisions clearly identifying 
this vulnerable group and others who do not. The 
Inspectorate	 believes	 that	 PULSE	 should	 have	 a	
mandatory field that records if a person is a repeat 
victim of crime and a policy and procedure that 
ensures an enhanced service is provided, such as 
specialist crime prevention advice.
victim impact statements
Victims may make a victim impact statement in 
certain cases. It is  a victim’s account, in their own 
words, about the effect that the crime has had on 
them. This helps a judge to understand the impact 
of the crime on the victim and a judge can take this 
into account when deciding what sentence to give 
an offender. A victim impact statement can be read 
by, or on behalf of, a victim at the sentencing stage. 
In some circumstances, family members including 
parents and guardians can complete a statement 
on behalf of  a victim. Victim impact statements 
can only be submitted in cases involving sexual 
offences or violent crimes, or in cases where a judge 
thinks that it is appropriate, such as in a fatal road 
traffic collision. Guidelines were developed by the 
Garda	Síochána,	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	
and the Victims of Crime Office. It is important in 
these cases that an investigator informs a victim 
that this option is available to them and provides a 
copy of the guidelines.
Community impact statements
In some policing jurisdictions, senior police officers 
can complete a Community Impact Statement on 
the impact particular crimes are having on the 
local community. Community Impact Statements 
are not currently used in Ireland. The statement is 
provided to inform:
•	 The	 decision	 to	 charge	 a	 suspect	 with	 an	
offence;
•	 Restorative	justice	interventions;
•	 Decisions	on	possible	conditions	of	a	caution;	
•	 Proposals	 for	 sentencing	 in	 pre-sanction	
reports;
•	 Partnership	 activity	 to	 tackle	 issues	 raised	
by the community;
•	 Sentencing.	
It is a multi-functional tool which can be used across 
the justice system to enable decision makers to tailor 
responses to the local issues it describes. It can also 
be used as a means to assess what measures could 
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be taken to deter further issues of local concern. 
The statement may be used in addition to a Victim 
Impact Statement.
 recommendation 7.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána adopts the following practice in its 
policy and approach to dealing with victims 
and witnesses. (short term):
•	 Create	 a	 national	 standard	 for	 victim	 and	
witness contact with set timescales and 
set events that will result in an update to a 
victim or witness;
•	 When	a	victim	of	crime	or	a	witness	contacts	
a garda station for an update to create a 
process where someone takes ownership of 
that enquiry;
•	 Provide	 clear	 guidance	 and,	 where	
necessary, training to all gardaí on their 
roles and responsibilities with regard to 
victims of crime;
•	 Create	 a	 mandatory	 field	 on	 PULSE	 that	
identifies repeat victims of crime; 
•	 Create	a	policy	and	a	process	for	identifying	
and managing repeat victims of crime; 
•	 Create	a	 tab	on	PULSE	to	record	all	victim	
updates or attempts to update a victim;
•	 Provide	 external	 e-mail	 access	 for	 all	
investigating gardaí; 
•	 Review	the	approach	taken	by	gardaí	to	the	
initial contact with victims of assault and 
domestic violence (this complements the 
recommendations	on	DV	in	Part	6);
•	 Ensure	 a	 consistent	 standard	 of	 victim	
referral to support agencies;
•	 Ensure	 that	 in	 appropriate	 cases	 victims	
are provided with the Victim Impact 
Assessment Guidelines; 
•	 In	consultation	with	the	DPP	to	consider	the	
use of Community Impact Assessments.
 recommendation 7.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the approach and quality 
assures the supervision of victim contact. 
(medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 quality	 call	 back system which 
monitors the quality of the service provided 
to victims of crime to ensure that the good 
work of gardaí is acknowledged as well 
as dealing with those who consistently 
provide a poor service;
•	 Provide	 guidance,	 and	 where	 necessary	
training, to existing supervisors and newly 
promoted supervisors on their roles and 
responsibilities for ensuring appropriate 
victim care.
7.8	The	Way	Forward
There are a number of recommendations running 
throughout	 the	 Crime	 Investigation	 Report	 that	
could greatly improve the levels of services given to 
victims. Examples include:
•	 The creation of crime management units 
to monitor cases and oversee contact with 
victims	 of	 crime.	With	 the	 implementation	
of Garda Victims Offices, there may be an 
opportunity to co-locate both units;
•	 Crime	 screening	 to	 focus	 on	 cases	 that	
could be solved and bring more offenders to 
justice;
•	 Better	system	of	allocation	of	crime	to	ensure	
that crimes are allocated based on the skills 
of an investigator; 
•	 Reducing	 the	 time	 it	 takes	 to	 conduct	 an	
investigation; 
•	 Specific	 investigation	 units	 that	 provide	 a	
better service to victims; 
•	 Serious	 crime	 allocated	 to	 trained	
investigators to provide a better service to 
victims;
•	 Enhanced	 supervision	 of	 cases,	 including	
obtaining feedback from victims on the 
service provided.
In terms of providing a better service to victims 
of crime, it would be more appropriate to assign 
investigations of more serious offences such as rape 
and sexual assault cases to those gardaí selected 
and trained to investigate those types of crime.
The creation of investigation units for specific 
crime types and the development of crime 
management units will act as a central point of 
reference for victims to call for updates on their 
crime. In these cases, a victim can contact a specific 
unit and irrespective of whether the investigating 
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garda is on duty, someone from that unit can 
still provide an update on that crime. Crime 
management units would also ensure that victims 
are contacted at certain time periods. 
Witness Care Units
Whilst	 this	 report	 has	 focused	 on	 victim	 contact 
and care, the Inspectorate is very conscious of the 
need to also treat witnesses with respect and to 
provide	updates	on	the	progress	of	a	case.	Witnesses	
are a vital element in evidence gathering and a case 
may well hinge on the testimony of a witness to a 
crime. It is important that an investigating garda 
also updates witnesses on the progression and the 
outcome of a case. A witness that is well managed 
will often come back to help the police in future 
cases.
Some policing jurisdictions have developed victim 
and witness care units. These units are usually 
operated by police support staff responsible for 
managing cases once a person is charged or 
summonsed. In these cases, the responsibility for 
updating victims and witnesses about court cases 
and court outcomes passes from the investigating 
officer to this unit. Such units are operating in many 
services	in	the	UK	and	were	recently	introduced	in	
the	 PSNI.	 The	 primary	 function	 of	 the	 unit	 is	 to 
keep people up to date and to make sure that 
victims and witnesses are notified in good time 
to attend court and also take on the responsibility 
of notifying members for court appearances as 
well. These units provide a single point of contact 
for victims who want an update on their case. 
The introduction of victim and witness care units 
would take away a lot of post-charge work from 
gardaí and release that time for patrol and crime 
investigation. 
The Garda Síochána needs to provide a far more 
consistent level of service for victims of crime 
and regardless of where a crime occurs in Ireland, 
a victim should receive the same high level of 
a	 consistent	 service.	 Witness	 Care	 Units	 are	
discussed	further	in	Part	11	and	are	the	subject	of	
a recommendation.
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8.1 Introduction
Modern police services strive to be ‘intelligence led’. The first step to achieve 
this is to understand what is meant by ‘intelligence led policing’. Intelligence 
is not simply information. Information without analysis is of minimal value. 
While collecting and considering good quality information has always been 
central to good police work, modern police services use sophisticated systems 
to gather useful data, which after a process of evaluation, collation and analysis 
produces intelligence for dissemination to tactical or strategic teams. 
Tactical intelligence assists in operational investigations, whereas strategic 
intelligence is principally used in policing policy and planning. 
Effective use of intelligence led policing informs police decision-making, 
particularly in the efficient allocation of resources; which in turn supports 
successful crime prevention and investigation. 
The Garda Síochána must ensure that information is gathered from all 
available sources and that there is a clear process of evaluation, analysis, cross-
referencing and prioritising in order to task units or individuals to action the 
resulting intelligence. This process is often referred to as ‘the intelligence 
cycle’. The Inspectorate specifically looked at how the Garda Síochána uses 
intelligence to support volume crime prevention and investigation. 
This part examines the creation, assessment, sharing and management of data. 
It looks at:
•	 How	intelligence	 is	managed	and	used	at	all	 levels,	but	particularly	at	
regional, divisional and district levels; 
•	 How	intelligence	is	used	to	task	garda	resources	to	prevent	and	investigate	
crime; 
•	 How	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	 uses	 intelligence	 obtained	 from	 registered	
informants and from confidential lines such as Crimestoppers. 
Part 8 reviews the garda units gathering intelligence, the range of contributors 
of intelligence and the intelligence systems used by the Garda Síochána. For 
security reasons, the Inspectorate has not included information on processes 
and tactics that might compromise national security or intelligence collection 
methods used by garda activity. 
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8.2 Importance of Intelligence 
The primary objective of any police service is to 
prevent crime from occurring. A crime prevented 
means one less victim, one less crime investigation 
and avoids all the expense and activity that is 
required to support an investigation. 
Effective policing, which identifies risk of harm 
to communities, prevents crime and assists in the 
detection of offenders, will always be reliant on 
accurate and timely intelligence. As highlighted in 
Parts 3 and 4, inaccurate and incomplete crime and 
incident recording on PULSE impacts negatively 
on the overall scope and representation of data and 
results in analysis and decision making being made 
on partial and deficient information. 
management and application of 
intelligence 
Professional, effective intelligence management 
involves linking information from a wide range of 
sources to build a composite picture. The collation 
of appropriate information, its accurate assessment 
and timely analysis is vital to effective policing. 
The collation and use of intelligence also needs to 
operate within the existing legislative framework, 
in	this	context:	the	European	Convention	on	Human	
Rights	Act,	 2003	 (ECHR)	 and	 the	Data	 Protection	
Acts of 1998 and 2003. At an operational level, it 
should determine and inform:
•	 The	daily	briefing	of	operational	gardaí	and	
their supervisors;
•	 Identification	 of	 risk	 and	 the	 appropriate	
management of that risk;
•	 Tasking	 of	 gardaí	 and	 other	 resources	 to	
prevent and detect crime;
•	 Effective	 management	 of	 offenders,	
particularly those persistent and prolific 
offenders;
•	 Liaison	with	border	police	 services,	 in	 this	
case, Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI)	on	cross-border	threats;
•	 Liaison	with	statutory	partner	agencies	who	
share a responsibility for crime prevention 
and investigation, e.g. notifications to the 
HSE	of	children	needing	attention.	
Use of intelligence 
Good quality intelligence is the life blood of 
policing operations and is used to inform managers 
of risk issues. The section in the Garda Síochána 
Code on the Criminal Intelligence System provides 
that every member has a role to play in intelligence 
gathering. Unlike other police services, there is no 
clear statement on the need for quality intelligence 
and the role of all operational gardaí in gathering 
intelligence.
state security intelligence
Security	 and	 Intelligence	 Division	 includes	 the	
Intelligence Section, which focuses on intelligence 
relevant to State security and threats arising from 
terrorist activities.
national Criminal intelligence Unit
The	 National	 Criminal	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (NCIU)	
is	part	of	Security	and	Intelligence	Division	in	the	
Garda Síochána. The NCIU focuses on intelligence 
in relation to serious and organised crime. The 
NCIU has daily contact with garda national units, 
Garda Liaison Officers attached to Irish embassies 
and with other police services. 
Key Functions of the nCiU
The NCIU has three key national functions and 
the unit is divided into three sections: Operations, 
Vetting	 and	 Covert	 Human	 Intelligence	 Sources	
(CHIS).	 In	 Operations	 section,	 gardaí	 are	
designated as ‘desk officers’, appointed to manage 
operations and requests for assistance. The NCIU 
provides a service at fixed hours, but will operate 
outside of these hours to support an on-going 
operation. In a serious fast-time case such as a tiger 
kidnap, a desk officer will be assigned to work 
with a senior investigating officer to provide and 
evaluate intelligence. The garda roster has greatly 
impacted on their ability to manage case loads. The 
Inspectorate has been informed of the difficulty in 
managing case loads and apart from serious cases, 
desk officer tasks are not progressed whilst they are 
off-duty. 
The NCIU can task national units to gather 
intelligence or to conduct intelligence led pro-
active operations against known targets. Where 
such an operation has been authorised, the NCIU 
will issue a name for the operation. Currently, 55% 
of the intelligence received by the NCIU is referred 
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to garda national units, and 45% is referred to 
divisions and districts. Of the information sent 
to national units, 65% goes to the Garda National 
Drugs	Unit.
intelligence on threats to Life
The Garda Síochána has a positive obligation to 
take all reasonable steps in respect of individuals 
whose lives are threatened. The policy and 
guidelines	 are	 published	 in	 a	 2011	 Garda	 HQ	
Directive.	Threats	are	graded	in	risk	levels	from	low	
to	critical.	During	2012	(period	01.01.12	to	30.09.12),	
there were a large number of threats, with only one 
threat	 graded	 as	 critical	 (an	 attack	 is	 imminent)	
with the majority graded as substantial (an attack 
is	a	strong	possibility).	Information	provided	to	the	
Inspectorate during this inspection indicated that 
all of those cases still appear as current threats. 
Intended victims often present themselves to 
gardaí to report that a threat has been made against 
them. In cases where an intended victim may not be 
aware of the threat, the district or divisional officer 
can authorise that the person is informed about the 
threat and a formal Garda Information Message 
(GIM)	 is	 served	 on	 the	 person.	 In	 most	 cases,	 a	
district investigator will contact the intended victim 
about a threat that has been received locally, and 
the NCIU will provide any available intelligence to 
assist the senior investigation officer to determine 
the level of risk and any action to minimise the risk. 
The NCIU often receives requests from divisions to 
review threats to life incidents that are still under 
investigation and the Inspectorate was informed of 
one divisional request which required the review 
of forty-seven threat to life cases. The submission 
of this volume of cases placed the NCIU under 
enormous pressure and the Inspectorate noted that 
the division had a very large number of live threats 
to life investigations. 
prioritisation of intelligence 
The Inspectorate was informed that too much 
information is received to be actioned effectively. 
This clearly presents an organisational risk. The 
Inspectorate found that the volume of operations 
is very high and there is an absence of formal 
prioritisation at a corporate level.
 
intelligence system 
Security	 and	 Intelligence	 Division	 operates	 an	
intelligence system which is separate from PULSE. 
This system is a central repository for intelligence 
in relation to State security and serious and 
organised crime for the entire Garda Síochána. 
This system is in serious need of upgrading and the 
intention is to migrate to a new Major Investigation 
Management	 System	 (MIMS)	 intelligence	 system.	
The Inspectorate understands that the testing of this 
new system is at an advanced stage. The migration 
is likely to be a major operation as there are 95,000 
old electronic records and the current data is 
unconstructed and will need cleansing before it is 
placed onto the new system. The new system will 
provide NCIU with access to all of the intelligence 
of the national units, but national units will be 
restricted to viewing only that intelligence relevant 
to their own speciality, i.e. drugs. This system will 
not be viewable to frontline units or used in the day 
to day investigation of crime.
security vetting
The NCIU provides a non-statutory security 
vetting function for a range of internal positions 
and also in response to requests from other police 
services. This includes vetting for new entrants to 
the Garda Síochána, such as recruits and reserves. 
In 2013, 4,700 vetting checks were carried out. The 
Inspectorate believes that this is not best use of 
intelligence resources and there is no good reason 
for gardaí performing this vetting function. 
The Inspectorate noted that people vetted for 
entrance to the Garda Síochána are not subject to 
further vetting, at any later date. In other policing 
jurisdictions, people are subjected to further 
vetting including financial vetting, at key times; 
such as on application to join a national unit or for 
promotion to higher ranks where the post holder 
would need to be included in the distribution of 
more sensitive material. The Inspectorate believes 
that vetting needs to be an on-going process and 
is a good tactic to reduce internal threats to an 
organisation. 
 recommendation 8.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the security vetting process 
to consider a need for additional vetting 
prior to specific appointments or promotions. 
(short term).
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8.3 Surveillance 
Use of surveillance 
The use of surveillance is provided for by the 
Criminal	 Justice	 (Surveillance)	 Act	 2009	 and	 a	
Garda	 HQ	 2012	 Directive.	 Unlike	 legislation	 in	
other policing jurisdictions, e.g. the UK (Regulation 
of	 Investigatory	 Powers	 Act	 2000),	 the	 powers	
used by the Garda Síochána allow more scope for 
gardaí to observe suspects outside of the legislative 
requirements.
national surveillance Unit
The use of a properly trained surveillance officer is 
a crucial resource in safeguarding the security of 
the State and tackling serious criminality. In most 
policing jurisdictions, the demand for surveillance 
units far exceeds their capability. Many organised 
criminals are surveillance conscious and the use of 
untrained officers without the necessary skills and 
equipment often compromises policing operations. 
The Garda Síochána has made a significant 
investment in the skilled resources deployed in the 
National	Surveillance	Units	(NSU).	
The Inspectorate met with members of the NSU, 
who described the garda roster as severely 
impacting on their availability and it has reduced 
capacity by up to 20%. It was explained that 
the unit does not need five teams and they do 
not need to work longer hours; they just need to 
increase the number of days worked. It was further 
explained that the roster reduces individual garda 
availability by forty-two days per person per 
year. In a situation where demand far exceeds the 
capability of the unit, the roster is further seriously 
impacting on this critical work area. A supervising 
officer described the roster as “not made for the 
mission”.
The work of the NSU is targeted towards dissident 
activity and serious and organised criminality. In 
2013, the NSU were involved in operations that led 
to nineteen arrests for cases that appeared before 
the Special Criminal Court. As a national unit, 
they	operate	outside	Dublin	and	try	 to	help	when	
requests are made for their services. With volume 
crime, their involvement is more limited, although 
they have participated in operations to target 
inter-regional travelling burglars. The NSU are 
sometimes tasked to monitor specific individuals.
Due	 to	 the	 inability	 to	 service	all	of	 the	demands	
placed on the NSU, many regions and other national 
units have developed their own small surveillance 
teams. These teams are not trained to the same level 
as the NSU and do not have access to surveillance 
devices. Other national units see merit in having 
their own surveillance equipment, such as tracking 
devices for cars that they could deploy at times 
when the NSU is unavailable. 
 recommendation 8.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána conducts a review of the use 
and prioritisation of surveillance and the 
availability of surveillance equipment and 
training to non-national surveillance units. 
(medium term).
operational Decision making
Several national units, including the NSU, may be 
involved in a single operation. The issue of making 
and recording decisions during the running of 
an operation was raised by a number of national 
units.	 During	 an	 operation,	 events	 invariably	
unfold that require fast-time decision making. With 
surveillance, this could include dangerous driving 
by the persons being followed or the commission of 
a crime that is unconnected to the operation. The 
recording of decisions made and the rationale for 
them in such situations is an important aspect of 
the management of that operation. At present there 
is no garda policy, instructions or training about 
how those decisions should be recorded. In many 
police services, formal operational/decision logs 
are used to record key decisions and the rationale 
for them. In most cases, this only becomes an 
issue when a serious incident occurs and there are 
follow-up enquiries about decisions made. National 
unit supervisors identified a need for training and 
development in decision-making and recording by 
those in command of pre-planned and spontaneous 
operations.
 recommendation 8.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a review of the training 
and development for decision making and 
recording of decisions for those managing 
pre-planned and spontaneous incidents. 
(medium term).
Crime Investigation Report       Part 8: Intelligence Led Policing
Part 8  |  5
The management of spontaneous firearms incidents 
was raised during several focus groups. On a 
regular basis, armed officers are attending incidents 
and	an	on-scene	commander	(usually	an	inspector)	
is not always available. The responsibility on 
these occasions falls to the armed officers who are 
dealing with the incident. It is very important that a 
properly trained supervisor attends the scene of all 
spontaneous and pre-planned firearms operations 
and takes command of the incident.
 recommendation 8.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a review of the training and 
availability of on-scene commanders to take 
command of pre-planned and spontaneous 
armed incidents. (medium term).
telecom Liaison Unit
Within Security and Intelligence, there is a 
section	 called	 the	 Telecom	 Liaison	 Unit	 (TLU),	
which provides a single point of contact with 
communication service providers and also deals 
with telephone interception issues. 
Significant delays in obtaining telephone call 
data from some service providers was raised in a 
previous part of this report. This issue was raised 
by a number of senior investigators, particularly 
in relation to some telephone companies. The 
delay in providing the data is causing delay to the 
investigation of many crimes. In some cases the 
investigating garda may be asking for unnecessary 
call data information, or the time period sought 
is extended beyond what is needed to investigate 
the crime. It is important that a supervisor 
checks the application to ensure that the data is 
required and that the parameters for the call data 
are proportionate and necessary to facilitate the 
investigation of the crime. The TLU explained that 
there are no time limits imposed on telephone 
companies for providing the call data and that 
service providers do not always respond in a timely 
manner. This is the subject of a recommendation 
in Part 6.
The TLU informed the Inspectorate that with the 
advancement of telephone applications, the Garda 
Síochána needs to upgrade their surveillance 
equipment. 
 recommendation 8.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána ensure that technology is 
upgraded before the implementation of 4g. 
(medium term).
garda síochána analysis service
good practice
the garda síochána analysis service (gsas) 
is headed by an intelligence professional 
based at garda HQ. the Head of Unit reports 
directly to the assistant Commissioner for 
Crime and security and has two deputies that 
perform a quality assurance role for all of the 
analytical products produced. the targeted 
recruitment of professional analysts is a real 
success story for the garda síochána and they 
have been very well received. there are a total 
of twenty-eight analyst posts and the original 
intention was to incrementally increase the 
number of analysts. analysts are based at a 
number of locations, including garda HQ and 
across some of the regional offices. 
GSAS produce a variety of reports, including 
monthly crime reports to the respective regional 
and national assistant commissioners. The reports 
provide an overview of crime trends on a month 
by month basis, as well as rolling year averages. 
Analysts based in regions also produce specific 
reports on particular crime trends or profiles on 
known criminals. The Inspectorate found the 
reports produced by GSAS to be of a high quality 
and senior gardaí stated that they use them to better 
inform operational decisions. The unit head attends 
a senior management monthly meeting held by the 
Commissioner and provides the latest picture on 
crime trends.
Researchers and analysts are a key component of 
any good intelligence system and best results are 
usually achieved when intelligence units have a 
good mix of police officers and GSAS analysts and 
researchers.	However,	within	 the	Garda	Síochána,	
the Inspectorate found that analysts are generally 
working separately from gardaí who work in 
intelligence	 units.	 During	 inspection	 visits,	 the	
Inspectorate found many examples at regional 
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and national level where analysts and gardaí are 
analysing similar intelligence in the same buildings, 
but in different offices.
A significant challenge for GSAS is the retention of 
analysts in posts where there is limited opportunity 
for career progression. Analysts are attractive to 
private sector organisations, who offer significantly 
higher levels of remuneration. At the time of writing 
this report, five of the original twenty-eight analyst 
posts are vacant. This is impacting on the service 
that the unit can provide in terms of crime analysis. 
Although GSAS is considered to be the centre of 
excellence in terms of crime intelligence analysis, 
it has no role in overseeing the use of crime 
intelligence outside of its own remit. Currently, 
GSAS does not have a role in setting standards for 
use of intelligence, such as the collation, analysis 
and dissemination of intelligence throughout 
the service. This is a missed opportunity, given 
the experience and expertise of the GSAS senior 
management team. 
 recommendation 8.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána designates gsas as the 
professional lead for developing standards 
for the collating, analysis and evaluation 
of intelligence to ensure that professional 
standards are maintained. (short term). 
availability of intelligence on pULse
The Garda Síochána operates a number of different 
intelligence systems, but PULSE is the main 
repository for crime information1 in respect of the 
majority	 of	 crime	 that	 is	 committed.	 Data	 must	
be exported from PULSE into another database 
for analysis. This was first set up as a temporary 
PULSE solution, but a more long term solution 
has never been addressed. Unfortunately the 
database to which PULSE information is exported 
does not contain critical information such as the 
Modus Operandi2 field. This is information that 
analysts need to use on a daily basis. Extracting 
data from PULSE is challenging and more detailed 
1 This crime information is commonly referred to as “PULSE 
intelligence” or “intelligence on PULSE”.
2 A term used by law enforcement authorities to describe the 
particular manner in which a crime is committed.
searches have to be forwarded to a unit called 
the	 Information	Analysis	 Service	 (IAS).	 This	 unit	
conducts many searches that should be available 
to other intelligence users such as GSAS analysts. 
In the absence of an investment in an IT solution, 
the Inspectorate believes that analysts should 
be trained and provided with access to the data 
available to IAS staff.
 recommendation 8.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána provides gsas analysts with full 
access to pULse data. (short term).
Across all Garda Síochána units, the Inspectorate 
found large numbers of gardaí who are, on a 
daily basis, collecting and storing statistics and 
information. The Inspectorate found duplication in 
activity and the lack of automation often demands 
manual searches. The use of gardaí to conduct such 
searches is not best use of those resources and many 
functions of intelligence gathering and analysis 
should be performed by police staff researchers and 
analysts.
The Inspectorate is aware that the PULSE system 
contains a large number of management and 
information reports that are not used and many 
managers do not know what is available and how to 
extract it. The Inspectorate believes that the Garda 
Síochána must fully exploit the information that 
they have, but at present they are unable to readily 
access or interrogate it. The Garda Professional 
Standards Unit within the Garda Síochána, 
informed the Inspectorate that this is an area under 
examination. One initiative is the introduction of a 
daily search on PULSE that can be run by districts to 
provide standardised information for use as part of 
the district officer’s daily meeting. The Inspectorate 
welcomes this approach. 
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8.4 National Intelligence Model 
The Garda Síochána informed the Inspectorate that 
they work to a national crime model, but there is 
no written document outlining what this model is, 
how the model works and what processes should 
take place to make sure that resources are targeting 
prolific offenders or hot spot locations where crime 
takes place. 
Other police services visited as part of this 
inspection work to a national model of intelligence. 
The Canadian Criminal Intelligence Model links 
up all elements of the criminal intelligence process 
within law enforcement in Canada and has a 
separate CAPRA3 model for officers in deciding how 
to act in an interaction with a suspected offender. UK 
police services use the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM)	created	by	the	National	Criminal	Intelligence	
Service	 (NCIS)	 to	 target	 crime	 and	 disorder	 and	
prolific offenders of crime. The desired outcome is 
to create safer places for those that live, work or visit 
an area. The model looks at three levels of offenders 
ranging from those that commit crime at a divisional 
level	(Level	1),	to	those	that	cross	divisional	borders	
(Level	 2)	 and	 to	 those	operating	at	 a	national	 level	
(Level	3	serious	organised	criminals).	The	intention	
of NIM was to move police services from reacting 
to crimes, to policing on the front foot and trying 
to prevent a crime from taking place. Research, 
design and testing of the model were completed by 
police officers, analysts and intelligence specialists 
from a number of police services and agencies. The 
NIM approach also determines who will target a 
particular criminal. For example, a division manages 
Level 1 offenders, regions co-ordinate activity against 
Level 2 offenders and national units focus on Level 3 
offenders. Australia is the most recent advocate of a 
NIM structure with its Criminal Intelligence Model 
(2012).
From field visits, the Inspectorate found that much 
of the terminology created in the NIM is also used 
by the Garda Síochána; but in practice it operates in 
a very different way and the processes that make it 
work have not been adopted. As the PSNI use NIM, 
the Inspectorate believes that its full use by the Garda 
Síochána would be of benefit in cross border work. 
3 Community Policing Problem Solving Model, CAPRA (C 
=Clients, A =Acquire/Analyse Information, P =Partnerships, 
R	=Response,	A	=Assessment	of	Action	taken)
tasking and Co-ordinating 
The tasking and co-ordinating process is a key 
element in the National Intelligence Model, as it is 
the conduit for actioning intelligence, prioritising 
targets and for ensuring that results from activity 
are fed back through the intelligence process. In 
simplest terms, tasking and co-ordinating is about 
having the right people, in the right place and 
at the right time. At the start of a tour of duty, all 
operational front-line gardaí should be given specific 
tasks to complete, which are focused at preventing 
crime or monitoring offenders in their patrol areas. 
The tasks should be determined beforehand, on the 
basis of intelligence and local knowledge of current 
crime patterns and supported by a supervising 
officer. Gardaí working on regular units should 
have a daily parade and a supervisor should task 
all gardaí such as with a particular patrol in a crime 
hot spot or to conduct an enquiry on a suspect who 
is on bail. At the end of a tour of duty, gardaí should 
provide a result, explaining what action they took 
and feed this back into the intelligence system. For 
national units, activity should be prioritised and 
focused on serious organised criminals identified 
by intelligence. Field visits to divisions and national 
units have shown that there appears to be an absence 
of any such formal tasking and co-ordinating and 
as a result gardaí on patrol or on local specialist or 
national units are self-tasking and generating much 
of their own work. 
Chart 8.1 shows the NIM intelligence process with 
tasking and co-ordinating at the centre of the model. 
tasking and Co-ordinating meetings 
Under the NIM model, priorities and policing 
activity are driven by strategic assessments (six 
monthly reviews of main crime priorities and 
emerging	 issues)	 and	 a	 tactical	 assessment	 (the	
recent	 crime	profile).	A	major	development	 in	 the	
UK was the creation of a joint strategic assessment 
completed by all the main partner agencies. 
At a national, regional and divisional level, many 
police services operate a weekly or bi-weekly 
meeting to prioritise targets and task all available 
resources. With reductions in staff in all major 
police services, there is a real need to ensure that 
priorities are selected and that all available staff 
are appropriately tasked. In the UK, there is a 
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statutory obligation between the police services, 
local authorities and the health service to make 
communities safer. As a result, local authorities, 
fire services and other statutory agencies, such as 
those dealing with young offenders are invited to 
attend tasking meetings to discuss the deployment 
of all agency resources. Most local authorities have 
uniformed patrol staff, such as parking wardens or 
police community support officers and the tasking 
meeting co-ordinates all patrol activity. 
Tasking and co-ordination are core parts of the 
intelligence management process, as they underpin 
the strategic, operational and tactical work arising 
from the production of intelligence. These key 
elements are:
•	 Strategically,	 the	 tasking	and	co-ordinating	
meetings provide an overview of emerging 
challenges to assess and inform preventive 
or mitigating medium term planning;
•	 Operationally,	 such	 meetings	 provide	 an	
opportunity to frame priorities, responses 
and identify resources required; 
•	 Tactically,	 they	 provide	 a	 forum	 to	 inform	
police units about imminent threats and to 
develop preventive or mitigating responses.
 recommendation 8.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a national intelligence 
model/process. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	national	standards	for	the	way	that	
intelligence units operate at national and 
divisional levels; 
•	 Develop	a	corporate	intelligence	tasking	and	
co-ordinating meeting that is chaired by a 
senior officer; 
•	 Develop	 a	 regional	 and	 divisional	
intelligence tasking and co-ordinating 
process; 
•	 Ensure	 that	 every	 operational	 garda	 and	
reserve is assigned a daily intelligence task; 
•	 Conduct	 a	 review	of	 all	national	units	 that	
are operating intelligence units and to 
ensure that GSAS analysts are aligned to 
intelligence units; 
•	 Ensure that check points and other pro 
active initiatives are intelligence led, outputs 
are accurately recorded and evaluations are 
conducted to identify what works well.
chart 8.1
Business planning
NCIS - National Intelligence Model Tasking and Co-ordinating process. 
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8.5 Garda Síochána Internal 
Crime Meetings
The Garda Síochána convenes a number of different 
crime meetings at national, regional, divisional and 
district level. The meetings in general do not follow 
a similar format, and agendas and attendance 
at meetings vary greatly from place to place. The 
Inspectorate found some good examples where 
regular meetings are held to discuss crime trends 
and a broad range of specialist gardaí are invited 
to attend.
operation Fiacla
good practice
operation Fiacla is a national garda síochána 
initiative against individuals and gangs 
committing burglary offences. this is a good 
example of how the garda síochána can 
effectively task resources at a national and 
local level towards a particular crime issue 
and co-ordinate activity across all the regions 
and divisions. the inspectorate believes that 
this approach needs to be adopted in respect of 
other priority crimes.
Checkpoints
The Garda Síochána conducts check points on 
a daily basis for a variety of reasons such as 
Mandatory	Alcohol	Testing	 (MAT)	and	 to	prevent	
or detect criminal or traffic offences. Currently, only 
MAT checkpoints are recorded on PULSE under a 
defined category. Other checkpoints, if recorded, 
are placed into the wide category of Attention and 
Complaints. 
As part of Operation Fiacla and the national 
response to burglary, the Garda Síochána conducts 
daily check points on key locations at certain 
times of the day. The Inspectorate was unable to 
determine the effectiveness of these check points as 
records and results are often not entered on PULSE 
or are difficult to find. The Inspectorate tried to 
identify the outcomes of checkpoints in respect of 
the number of arrests, recovery of property and 
intelligence records. Like any initiative, over time 
gardaí can lose interest unless they are given fresh 
impetus.	During	 field	 visits,	 the	 Inspectorate	was	
informed by gardaí that they did not perceive that 
the check points were always intelligence led and 
in the right place. The success of a good intelligence 
system is the evaluation process of identifying 
effective and ineffective operations and initiatives. 
The Inspectorate considers that the process of using 
checkpoints or other such activity should be part of 
the tasking process, needs to be intelligence led and 
results must be recorded and evaluated. 
garda síochána tasking meetings 
The Garda Síochána does not convene a national 
tasking and co-ordinating meeting to inform 
and direct the activity of national and regional 
units. There is a unit called the Tasking and Co-
ordinating	 Unit	 (TACU)	 within	 the	 National	
Support	 Services	 (NSS).	 TACU	 was	 introduced	
in 2010 primarily to co-ordinate regular tasking 
meetings for the five bureaus in NSS and to manage 
the flow of intelligence between the NCIU and 
NSS	operational	units.	However,	 the	TACU	 is	 not	
actually performing the suggested role of its title 
and a tasking meeting has not been held for almost 
two years. In essence, TACU acts as an intelligence 
hub to receive information from the National Crime 
Intelligence Unit and to send it to the appropriate 
bureau within NSS. The passing of intelligence from 
the NCIU through TACU and onto the national 
units is all managed on paper. 
Development of tasking and Co-ordinating 
meetings 
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
must develop a tasking and co-ordinating process at 
all levels that reviews intelligence and crime trends, 
identifies priorities and allocates appropriate 
resources. The Inspectorate considers that under 
the current structure of the Garda Síochána, tasking 
meetings should be held at three specific levels: 
national, regional and divisional. While a version 
of these meetings already occurs, there is a need for 
strategic linkage between the various levels. 
The Inspectorate believes that it is important to co-
ordinate the activity of national units and to provide 
a structured forum for regions and divisions to 
seek the assistance of units, such as the National 
Surveillance Unit and uniformed operational units, 
such as Air Support, Mounted and other specialist 
units. 
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Linkage is also required at regional and divisional 
level to facilitate co-ordinated requests for assistance 
to deal with cross-border and particularly 
challenging criminals. The Inspectorate believes 
that a senior garda member should chair all tasking 
meetings, particularly at a national level. 
Divisional resources available for tasking
Within divisions, there are a significant number of 
units that should be tasked and directed towards 
policing plan targets and local priorities. The 
following are the various units and examples of 
taskings that should be allocated:
•	 Criminal	 Intelligence	Officers	 and	 analysts	
to produce crime or suspect profiles and to 
support predictive policing by identifying 
locations for future offences; 
•	 Detectives	 to	 conduct	 the	 interviews	 of	
prolific offenders; 
•	 Regular	 unit,	 community	 gardaí	 and	
reserves to patrol hot spots for crime or 
enforce bail conditions;
•	 Crime	Prevention	Officers	to	develop	target	
hardening crime prevention initiatives ;
•	 Traffic	gardaí	to	target	particular	roads	used	
by criminals; 
•	 Taskforces	 and	 Drug	 Units	 to	 target	 those	
offenders committing volume crime; 
•	 Crime	 Scene	 Examiners	 to	 attend	 priority	
crime scenes.
national support services intelligence Units 
Most of the national units have their own separate 
intelligence sections. Within National Support 
Services	(NSS),	the	Inspectorate	found	six	separate	
intelligence units. Some of these units work in 
the same building, but operate in isolation of the 
others. This disconnection risks the occurrence of 
‘blue on blue’ operations where two national units 
independently target the same suspect at the same 
time, compromising an operation, and wasting 
resources. 
In addition, analysts within NSS are not co-located 
with gardaí working in intelligence units. There 
should be one intelligence hub/unit servicing 
NSS, and analysts and gardaí should be working 
together as part of one single team. A single hub 
would remove the risk of two units targeting the 
same person. 
 recommendation 8.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána amalgamates the current 
national support services intelligence 
units into a single intelligence hub. 
(short term).
intelligence role of the regional Detective 
superintendent
The Inspectorate visited all regions and met with 
regional and divisional detective superintendents 
to discuss their role in managing intelligence. 
The role and responsibilities of a detective 
superintendent in a region can vary. Regional 
detective superintendents often perform the role of 
controller	 for	 Covert	 Human	 Intelligence	 Sources	
(CHIS),	 managing	 a	 small	 team	 of	 detectives	
who	 deal	 with	 registered	 informants.	 Detective	
superintendents control other regionally based 
units	 such	 as	 Regional	 Support	Units	 (RSUs)	 that	
provide an armed response to incidents involving 
significant risks and in some regions a small 
surveillance capability. The Inspectorate found a 
considerable variance in the methods employed by 
detective superintendents to ensure that intelligence 
was utilised effectively. 
In one region, a detective superintendent has 
developed a clear process in relation to the use 
of intelligence, including holding bi-monthly 
meetings with all district detective inspectors, 
focussing particularly on cross-border and 
travelling criminals. 
In a different region, a detective superintendent 
described their role as the operational manager 
for the regional assistant commissioner, with 
responsibility for the deployment of a regional 
surveillance	team,	the	RSU	and	CHIS	unit.	Although	
the post has no defined role description, it does by 
its very nature, include many activities which need 
to be intelligence led, such as the effective tasking 
of the regional units. The Inspectorate did not find 
any clear formalised process for determining how 
these units are deployed. In the absence of a formal 
tasking and co-ordinating meeting, resources are 
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deployed by the detective superintendent using 
professional judgement rather than intelligence 
data to determine how best to task them. In this 
region, there was little if any liaison between the 
region	 and	with	 divisions	 on	 the	 use	 of	 CHIS	 or	
monitoring of the value and outcome of intelligence 
obtained from them. 
In another region, the Inspectorate found that a 
detective superintendent had no clear remit in 
respect of intelligence or operations. Their role was 
vague and undefined, described by the post holder 
as ‘a bit muddled’ with no clear responsibility 
for	 intelligence	 or	 tasking.	 Despite	 their	 position	
as senior investigating officers within the 
organisation, most detective superintendents had 
no clear role for ensuring the effective collation, 
analysis, dissemination and use of criminal 
intelligence. Indeed, there is no clear linkage 
from GSAS to regional and divisional detective 
superintendents and then onto the local Criminal 
Intelligence units. Each detective superintendent 
works independently of the other, with no clear 
standards or framework for using intelligence in a 
timely and effective manner. 
As highlighted in Part 2, the Inspectorate is 
advocating a change in the way that detective 
superintendents are currently used. To complement 
their role, the Inspectorate believes that detective 
superintendents should be responsible for all 
aspects of the effective management and use of 
intelligence. This needs to sit alongside a revised 
policy with clear operating standards for the use of 
intelligence. 
intelligence to and from other Countries
Interpol and Europol are units within Crime and 
Security	Division	managing	 enquiries	 from	 other	
international police services and enquiries from 
Ireland to other countries. Enquiries can range 
from a check to make sure that a person is safe and 
well in Ireland or abroad; or to an investigation of 
a crime in another country where the suspect may 
be located in Ireland. Europol is a small unit that 
focuses on criminal and operating intelligence and 
this is passed to the National Criminal Intelligence 
Unit. 
interpol Unit
Interpol covers 190 countries and the Garda 
Síochána Interpol Unit manages 120,000 enquires 
a year, of which 50% require assessment or action 
in Ireland and the rest are in connection with 
enquiries that are sent abroad. Interpol Unit is 
staffed by garda desk officers who manage the 
enquiries and they are supported by police staff 
who enter the information onto a stand alone 
computer system. The Inspectorate was informed 
that the police staff are able to do many of the tasks 
that do not require sworn powers and there are 
opportunities to increase the current roles afforded 
to police staff. General enquiries received by the 
unit include: information on a person wanted in 
and outside of Ireland; serious crimes including 
tiger kidnappings; and a growing number of 
enquiries in relation to cybercrime.
Garda	 Liaison	 Officers	 (GLOs)	 at	 sergeant	
rank are based abroad in the main European 
cities and provide a liaison between the Garda 
Síochána, Interpol and European police services. 
The Inspectorate was informed that GLOs are 
providing an excellent service.
There	 is	 no	 Standard	 Operating	 Procedure	 (SOP)	
for Interpol Unit staff and in particular for the desk 
officer. The Inspectorate believes that a written SOP 
would provide clarity about the role of Interpol 
staff and how they should operate. 
 recommendation 8.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a review of interpol 
Unit and in particular the management of 
enquiries, minimum staffing levels of the unit 
and the it infrastructure. (medium term).
 To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Create	a	Standard	Operating	Procedure	for	
Desk	Officers.
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8.6 Criminal Intelligence Units in 
Garda	Divisions
Criminal intelligence units should be the hub for 
receiving, collating and evaluating intelligence 
received locally and for liaising with the National 
Crime	Intelligence	Unit	(NCIU).	Each	of	the	seven	
divisions visited had a number of intelligence 
units operating from district stations. There 
are approximately 120 designated gardaí called 
Criminal	 Intelligence	 Officers	 (CIOs)	 in	 divisions	
and districts, whose role is to collate, evaluate 
and disseminate intelligence. Within the divisions 
visited, the Inspectorate found that all CIOs are 
gardaí and that they have limited interaction with 
regional	or	HQ	based	analysts.	A	National	Crime	
Intelligence Officer attached to NCIU provides 
policy advice and general guidance to CIOs all over 
the country. In some districts, the CIO had a clear 
line manager, but in other places it was less clear 
who was supervising the unit.
While they are considered to be a divisional 
resource, in many cases a small number of CIOs 
work at different district stations within the same 
division, sometimes on their own. The Inspectorate 
met one group of CIOs in a division who had not 
all previously met. Most of the CIOs had no relief 
officer and this frequently resulted in situations 
where there was limited or no intelligence coverage 
on districts when the CIO is off-duty, whether on 
four rest days or some other absence. One CIO 
returned after sickness absence to find a backlog of 
a month’s work.
A major part of a CIO’s work is the creation and 
circulation to gardaí of bulletins: information 
sheets about a particular crime or an offender. 
In some places CIOs are circulating up to five 
bulletins a day. In general, patrolling gardaí 
were complementary about the bulletins and the 
information supplied by CIOs.
With the move to a divisionally based policing 
model, the Inspectorate believes that there 
are benefits to be gained by creating a single 
divisional intelligence hub that manages all local 
information and intelligence. 
 recommendation 8.11
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops divisional intelligence 
units. (medium term).
role of the Criminal intelligence officer
Whilst the Garda Síochána Code sets out the role 
of the CIO, how they are recruited and their day to 
day remit, it does not describe how the CIO should 
be operating with other individuals or teams who 
contribute towards crime investigation on districts 
and divisions. It also does not explain how CIOs 
should liaise with partner agencies to gather and 
share intelligence or how open source intelligence 
should be used. 
In discussions with the Inspectorate, CIOs outlined 
their main functions as:
•	 Daily	 review	 of	 intelligence	 entered	
onto PULSE and quality assuring that 
intelligence;
•	 Creating	 intelligence	 bulletins	 (internal	
information sheets on crimes or CCTV stills 
of	suspects	that	are	circulated	to	gardaí);
•	 Attending	 case	 conferences	 for	 serious	
crimes such as homicides;
•	 Creating	 and	 monitoring	 of	 warning	
markers on PULSE (such as wanted suspects 
or	vehicles	of	interest);
•	 Uploading	 of	 prisoner	 photographs	 onto	
PULSE.
The Inspectorate found that CIOs spend a 
considerable amount to time undertaking 
administrative tasks, such as the uploading 
of prisoner photographs onto PULSE. Whilst 
there will always be a degree of administration 
associated with this role, it would be a much 
more effective use of resources to allocate these 
administrative tasks to police staff and allow 
a CIO to focus on analysing and evaluating the 
criminal intelligence picture in their area. A 
Standard	 Operating	 Procedure	 (SOP)	 is	 required	
to clarify the functions and operating practices of 
a CIO, to make it more appropriate to both current 
policing demands and international best practice.
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 recommendation 8.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates a standard operating 
procedure clarifying the functions and 
operating practices of a criminal intelligence 
officer. (short term).
Criminal intelligence officer and 
attendance at meetings 
In most divisions, CIOs are included in case 
conferences held following a homicide or other 
major crime and will generally be tasked to 
produce profiles of potential suspects. The creation 
of suspect profiles was described as a very time 
consuming process and in some cases different 
units are creating profiles on the same offenders 
who come to notice at a later date. 
There was limited evidence of CIOs being involved 
in producing offender profiles in districts and 
regions visited where there was a focus on 
managing prolific offenders, e.g. through Operation 
Fiacla	(burglary).	There	was	also	limited	evidence	of	
CIOs producing subject or problem profiles, which 
would inform local officers about a volume crime 
trend and the approach to preventing or detecting 
that offence. 
The Inspectorate found no evidence that CIOs 
regularly attended unit briefings or parades to 
either provide intelligence or to encourage gardaí 
to input actionable intelligence reports. Most 
CIOs recognise that this is a gap and some try to 
visit units resuming duty after a period of rest 
days. Other police services have briefing officers, 
whose role is to prepare an electronic briefing 
with associated tasks. This briefing is used to task 
patrolling officers, but is available to all officers and 
particularly those working at remote locations. 
There was also very little evidence of CIOs being 
used in either the planning or execution of major 
crime operations. The Inspectorate views this as a 
missed opportunity to employ CIOs on the more 
high profile cases where they could support both 
the planning of the operation from an intelligence 
perspective as well as ensuring that all available 
intelligence is captured during and after the 
operation. 
Who Contributes towards Criminal 
intelligence? 
Within divisions and districts there are a number of 
units and individuals that can contribute towards 
the intelligence picture as can be seen in Chart 8.2. 
During	 interviews	 with	 detectives,	 drugs	 units	
and CIOs, it was clear that detectives and specialist 
units do not always input intelligence about 
their operations or investigations onto PULSE. A 
variety of reasons were offered, which included 
seeking to retain information about forthcoming 
arrests, or lack of confidence in the security of the 
PULSE intelligence system. There will always be a 
need to protect certain intelligence for reasons of 
operational confidentiality, but an effective system 
will meet this need without difficulty. Failure 
to share information about known or suspected 
offenders means that vital knowledge about their 
offending habits, or the risk they pose to others, 
may not be actioned. 
Apart from detectives and gardaí who patrol, there 
are other invaluable sources of information, 
such	 as	 Crime	 Scene	 Examiners	 (CSEs)	 who	 are	
visiting the majority of burglary and other serious 
crime scenes to conduct forensic examinations. 
The Inspectorate found limited evidence of CSEs 
routinely supplying information to CIOs about 
particular methods used by suspects at crime scenes 
and recording this on PULSE. The Inspectorate 
considers that there is a gap in linking crime 
scenes and providing information to CIOs and 
analysts to identify trends and suspected offenders. 
This inconsistency was evident in all divisions 
visited. 
District	 intelligence	 units	 described	 to	 the	
Inspectorate what they see as a one-way flow of 
intelligence from local policing units to national 
units with little in return. From visiting national 
garda units, it was apparent to the Inspectorate that 
those units are receiving far more information 
than they can manage. The Inspectorate believes 
that	there	needs	to	be	a	clear	process	(i)	to	decide	
how the high volume of intelligence received 
by	 national	 units	 is	 managed,	 and	 (ii)	 to	 seek	
opportunities to utilise local specialist units to 
action intelligence that is not currently progressed.
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Criminal methods of operation 
An offender’s method of operation is referred to 
as	‘modus	operandi’	(MO).	There	is	an	MO	feature	
on PULSE that allows the recording of specific 
pieces of information that can be used to link crime 
scenes and offenders. Burglary offences are often 
committed by a suspect who may use a particular 
tool or method for entering a property and large 
numbers of burglaries are often committed by a 
small number of prolific offenders. Without this 
level of detail, an analyst or CIO is unable to link 
offenders to multiple crime scenes. When an arrest 
is made, it is vital to be able to link crimes that a 
suspect may have committed and for those crimes 
to be put to the offender during interview. This 
is particularly important in serious crimes such 
as murder or serious assault. The Inspectorate 
identified that MOs are not always entered onto 
PULSE.
 recommendation 8.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that the garda information 
service Centre, investigators and specialist 
staff include modus operandi in all pULse 
incident records. (short term).
access to pULse intelligence
Throughout this inspection, gardaí of all ranks 
expressed concerns about inappropriate viewing 
of PULSE incidents and other data primarily by 
other members who have no professional need to 
access that data. Most national and local specialist 
units and detective gardaí in general, informed 
the Inspectorate that they greatly restrict the level 
of information and intelligence that is placed 
on PULSE. This includes both PULSE crime 
investigations and PULSE intelligence records. The 
main issue is the unrestricted access that every 
garda has to the PULSE crime and intelligence 
systems. Other police services restrict the majority 
of officers from accessing the intelligence records 
of other divisions and national units and regularly 
check to see if officers are viewing intelligence 
records that should not concern them. Most of the 
Garda Síochána national units use stand alone 
databases for intelligence that are not connected 
to PULSE and offer a greater level of internal 
security. The national units are in the process of 
migrating their intelligence to a new MIMS (Major 
Investigation	 Management	 System)	 intelligence	
application that will provide restricted levels of 
access for individual units. 
chart 8.2
Unit and internal sources of intelligence cIos’ perceptions provided during field visits
regular Units •	 Main	contributors;
•	 Quality	is	varied;	
•	 Some	very	poor	and	low	level	intelligence;
•	 Sometimes	create	multiple	and	unnecessary	entries.
detectives •	 Provide	very	little	intelligence;
•	 Do	not	always	enter	information	onto	PULSE;	
•	 Keep	intelligence	to	themselves.
drugs Units and local taskforces •	 Provide	very	little	intelligence;
•	 Do	not	always	put	intelligence	on	PULSE	until	an	arrest	is	made;	
•	 Keep	intelligence	to	themselves.	
traffic •	 Mixed	response	some	traffic	units	provided	good	intelligence	and	
some	very	little.
Community	Policing	 •	 Regular	providers	of	intelligence	on	quality	of	life	issues.
Crime	Investigators	 •	 Provide	very	little	intelligence	about	a	crime	investigation.
Crime	Prevention	Officers •	 Two	divisions	reported	good	contact;	
•	 Five	divisions	had	no	contact.
Crime	Scene	Examiners •	 Two	divisions	had	regular	contact;	
•	 Five	divisions	had	limited	contact.
national Units •	 One	way	flow	upwards;	
•	 Very	little	intelligence	sent	to	divisions.
Garda	Analysts	 •	 Limited	contact;	
•	 One	division	had	good	contact	via	e-mail.
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 recommendation 8.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána implements a system of regular 
intelligence audits and daily spot checks to 
ensure that intelligence on the pULse system 
is only accessed for a legitimate purpose. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Introduce	 a	 process	 to	 ensure	 that	
supervisors check the intelligence that 
their staff are accessing to ensure that the 
searches conducted are linked to a criminal 
investigation, a pro active operation or other 
legitimate purpose;
•	 Explore	IT	security	solutions	that	will	limit	
access to intelligence records based on user 
security levels.
Creation of intelligence records
Most CIOs were unable to say how many 
intelligence reports are created each year in 
their division and to provide a breakdown of the 
numbers of reports created by particular units. 
Those who were able to supply data stated that 
intelligence report numbers in divisions ranged 
from 1,000 records per year to over 50,000. CIOs 
play a role in assessing and evaluating intelligence 
and use a 4 X 44 system to grade intelligence. 
Intelligence was described by CIOs as high 
volume, but low value. Most CIOs reported that 
the numbers of intelligence records created are 
decreasing. In particular, CIOs believe that stop and 
search records are not always entered onto PULSE 
and can remain in garda note books.
There is an anomaly in the PULSE system which 
affects CIO work. Criminal intelligence recorded 
in one division is only accessible and visible 
to the CIO in that division. This means that 
intelligence is recorded in the division where the 
garda is stationed, rather than the area where the 
intelligence is obtained. A national unit or a traffic 
garda working in a different division for the day, can 
create an intelligence record on a person that lives 
in	 that	 locality.	However,	 in	 the	absence	of	 contact	
from the CIO in the specialist unit, the record will 
4 4x4 is a system used to evaluate and grade intelligence to 
establish the reliability of the source of the information.
not be known to the CIO in the district where the 
intelligence is relevant. In these cases, a CIO where 
the garda is based is required to inform the CIO in 
the area where the intelligence is most relevant.
Data Quality of records and the Quality of 
intelligence 
CIOs have responsibility for reviewing and 
validating the information entered on PULSE, 
collating intelligence and correcting or removing 
inaccurate information. Most intelligence reports 
are created by a member contacting GISC. A drop-
down menu for GISC call takers could improve the 
quality of the intelligence provided. 
The PULSE system allows any member to create 
an intelligence record on a person or a location and 
once created, it cannot be deleted or removed; but can 
be altered or explanatory text added. This includes 
records that are later found to be factually incorrect 
and potentially damaging to an individual. 
The following two examples, obtained on field 
visits, show data recorded as intelligence on PULSE; 
but in the first example, the data is inaccurate and 
in the second example it is potentially damaging to 
an innocent individual.
example 1 – inaccurate intelligence
An off duty member’s car was captured on 
CCTV at a garage around the time when a car 
drove away without paying for fuel. Although 
the member was not a suspect, their car details 
were recorded on the PULSE intelligence system 
as being connected to the offence. At a later date, 
a check made on the car owned by the member 
would link the car to this crime. 
example 2 – potentially damaging 
intelligence
A person was stopped by gardaí attached to 
a drugs unit who searched the person under 
the	 powers	 conferred	 by	 the	Misuse	 of	 Drugs	
Act. Although no drugs were found, PULSE 
intelligence records retained information that 
the person was stopped and searched by a 
member from a drugs unit. Because the search 
was drugs related, this has the potential to cast 
doubts on a person’s character if they are subject 
to security vetting, even though no drugs were 
found. 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 8: Intelligence Led Policing
Part 8  |  16
In the case of the car belonging to a member, the 
intelligence record was changed to remove the 
association of the car with the theft of fuel. The 
Inspectorate does not view the current process 
of changing data in this way as an acceptable 
practice and a system should be developed to allow 
inaccurate data to be removed from PULSE.
The second example was raised as an issue by 
a number of gardaí, including senior officers, 
who were concerned that the recording of such 
intelligence on PULSE is almost criminalising a 
person who was not found in possession of any 
drugs. CIOs informed the Inspectorate that the 
system allows for alteration of inaccurate records 
by changing some of the details of the record 
(such	 as	 changing	 a	date	 of	 birth)	 so	 that	 it	will	
not be linked to a person in the future. 
Unlike many international systems for recording 
such data, PULSE contains all crime data, all 
divisional intelligence data and all stop and search 
records. This can be a strength of a system if all the 
data is accurate, but can be a significant weakness 
if the data is incorrect. Systems employed in 
many UK police services have a filter process for 
turning stop and search data into intelligence. A 
negative stop and search in these police services 
is not always considered as intelligence especially 
if the person has no previous involvement in 
criminality.
CIOs informed the Inspectorate that an inordinate 
amount of their time is spent correcting inaccurate 
and poor quality intelligence reports. This includes 
spelling mistakes and inappropriate comments. 
Precise recording of names is important, as 
inaccuracy can lead to the creation of a different 
and unlinked intelligence record for someone who 
is already on the PULSE system. There is a lack of 
corporate guidance to operational members about 
what constitutes quality and useful intelligence. 
In discussions with operational gardaí, examples 
were provided where members created multiple 
intelligence reports because it is a way to provide 
evidence of personal activity for promotion or 
selection purposes. 
An example of high volume and low value 
intelligence was provided where a garda drove 
into a particular area and recorded the registration 
number of ten vehicles parked near an address of 
interest. Those vehicles were entered onto PULSE 
as ten separate intelligence records
 recommendation 8.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána provides a basic training 
programme to members and police staff, 
including gisC, on intelligence led policing, 
to increase awareness of the value of criminal 
intelligence, to provide information on data 
protection issues and to provide clarity on 
the system operating in the garda síochána.
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key action needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 drop-down	 menu	 for	 GISC	 to	
improve the quality of intelligence on 
PULSE. 
The Inspectorate did not find any evidence of 
supervisors checking the quality of PULSE 
intelligence reports. CIOs did not see that it was 
their role and they do not want to discourage 
gardaí from creating records. This creates a high 
volume of worthless information on the PULSE 
system. Gardaí explained that many offenders have 
hundreds of intelligence entries and that important 
intelligence can sometimes be missed. This is 
particularly relevant in fast time situations such as 
when gardaí are dealing with a person on the street 
and have requested that person’s details be checked 
on PULSE. 
 recommendation 8.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that supervisors check the 
quality of intelligence records submitted by 
members. (short term).
recording intelligence on Children
The recording of childrens’ details on PULSE 
intelligence records was raised by a number of 
people as a concern. The Inspectorate was informed 
that there are a significant number of children 
under the age of seven and infants under the age 
of one with intelligence records. The Inspectorate 
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requested statistical information to confirm the 
number and demography in this PULSE category. 
The Garda Síochána has responded that they are 
not yet in a position to give definite figures but are 
dealing with the issue as a matter of urgency.
 recommendation 8.17
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána conducts an urgent review 
of the recording of childrens’ details as an 
intelligence record on pULse. (short term).
Duplicate intelligence records 
Another anomaly in the PULSE intelligence system 
is the creation of a duplicate intelligence record 
(with	 a	 unique	 PULSE	 ID)	 for	 a	 person	 or	 for	 a	
location that is already recorded on the system. 
There are many reasons for this, including the 
facility for any member to create a new intelligence 
record. Where a garda or GISC call taker does not 
search PULSE thoroughly for an existing record, it is 
possible to create another record on PULSE, which 
becomes	a	duplicate.	During	visits,	the	Inspectorate	
saw examples of duplicate records on PULSE and in 
one case there were thirteen duplicate records for 
the same person. A person that has come to notice 
can of course add to this confusion by providing a 
completely different identity or by slightly adjusting 
their name or date of birth. If new reports are vague 
or unspecific about the correct details of a person, 
such as a date and place of birth, or distinguishing 
marks such as a tattoo or a scar, it will be impossible 
to link these to the existing reports for that subject. 
This issue was also raised during an Inspectorate 
visit to the Garda Interpol Unit, which other police 
services regularly contact for enquiries such 
as a fingerprint comparison of a suspect under 
investigation by the requesting police service. In 
some cases, the check of the fingerprints against 
garda records reveals multiple hits against 
suspects with different details and in one case the 
person was linked to seven different identities. 
This is confusing and such records should be 
merged	into	one	PULSE	ID	with	a	note	to	explain	
that the person uses a number of aliases. Part of 
the problem appears to be the issue of matching a 
PULSE incident number (unique reference number 
for	 a	 particular	 crime)	 and	 a	 person’s	 PULSE	
ID	 number	 (unique	 reference	 number	 for	 each	
person	 on	 PULSE).	 One	 solution	which	 has	 been	
identified is for an alert system to be introduced 
at the Fingerprint Section in the Technical Bureau 
to inform an investigating garda immediately that 
the fingerprints of the person that they are dealing 
with match those of another record on PULSE that 
has a different name or date of birth.
The responsibility for merging duplicate reports 
is left to CIOs, but some are untrained and not 
all CIOs are doing merging work. In one district, 
the superintendent deployed two gardaí on a full 
time basis to undertake the merging of thousands 
of intelligence records and said that it would 
take some considerable time to bring order to the 
current situation. CIOs expressed a strong concern 
that the PULSE system is cluttered with duplicate 
intelligence reports, which cannot be verified and 
are not or cannot be linked to existing subject 
records. 
The Inspectorate was informed that gardaí can 
also contribute to duplicates by not thoroughly 
searching PULSE, in order to link a person to 
someone who already has an existing intelligence 
record. In these cases, a second record for the 
same person is created. The Inspectorate was also 
informed of cases where a new PULSE record was 
created as a result of a garda not taking action in 
a case and a second record is created with slightly 
different details about a person. An example of this 
was provided where a garda had not arrested a 
person who was shown on PULSE as wanted. This 
is further covered in Part 10. 
PULSE allows an individual garda to create an 
intelligence record. In other police services, officers 
create an intelligence report, but it is placed into 
a ‘holding or cloud’ file allowing a CIO to check, 
sanitise and grade the intelligence before it is 
entered onto the intelligence system permanently. 
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
should introduce a similar practice to deal with the 
creation of intelligence records.
 recommendation 8.18
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána restricts the creation of pULse 
intelligence records to a Criminal intelligence 
officer. (short term).
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 recommendation 8.19
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána tasks Criminal intelligence officers 
with a review of pULse for duplicate records 
and inaccurate intelligence records. (short 
term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Introduce	 a	 system	 to	 identify	 and	 remove	
intelligence that is inaccurate or misleading;
•	 Allow	 CIOs	 to	 recommend	 removal	 of	
inaccurate information with the approval of 
a supervisor; 
•	 Provide	 clear	 direction	 on	 the	 merging	 of	
duplicate intelligence records. 
open source information
Open source information is publicly available 
material such as that on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube 
and other social media sites. There is currently no 
garda policy on the approach and use of social 
media. Many gardaí in investigative and criminal 
intelligence roles are restricted from access to such 
sites. Other police service intelligence units have 
ready access to sites and regularly use it to check 
for entries by known criminals and particularly 
for street gangs and organised criminal networks. 
Street gangs have used YouTube and other sites to 
post evidence of assaults committed on other gangs 
and also to indicate future criminal activity. 
The consequence of restricting access is that many 
gardaí are visiting these sites at home on their own 
personal equipment and all those interviewed 
felt uncomfortable about doing this. The Garda 
Síochána check some open source sites for 
intelligence about planned demonstrations or other 
protests, but have limited capacity at a national 
level to do this properly. 
The Inspectorate believes that intelligence units at 
local and national levels should have full access to 
interrogate and monitor open source intelligence. 
The Inspectorate was informed that the PSNI use 
this sort of intelligence on a daily basis and have 
deployed dedicated resources to manage this 
process. 
Members of the NCIU also stated that ANPR5 is not 
fully developed as an intelligence tool. This was the 
subject of a recommendation in Part 6 of this report. 
Collators’ Cards 
In both divisional and national units, the 
Inspectorate found that many intelligence units still 
retain paper intelligence records dating back many 
years, which are called collators’ cards. In other 
police services, a move to an electronic intelligence 
system led to the transfer of relevant data from 
collators cards to an electronic intelligence system 
and the destruction of cards where the intelligence 
was out of date or inaccurate. In the units visited, 
there did not appear to be a plan of what to do with 
these cards and many of them are merely filed. The 
Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána must 
provide direction for the migration of intelligence 
from the collators’ cards onto an electronic system 
or the sanction to destroy them.
 recommendation 8.20
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána provides clear guidance 
on the retention and disposal of collators’ 
cards which contain personal identifying 
information. (short term).
intelligence for parades and Briefings 
The Inspectorate attended at least one unit parade 
in every division visited, and observed parades 
at several district stations. The sharing of current 
intelligence about offenders, their associates and 
vehicles and requests to gather intelligence about 
known suspects was rarely covered during a 
parade. As mentioned in Part 2, many districts did 
not conduct a parade. The Inspectorate attended one 
parade where members were shown photographs 
of suspects and given details of vehicles which 
were of interest to investigating officers. In most 
places, members were expected to read CIO 
bulletins and were left to decide where to patrol on 
that particular day. The Inspectorate believes that 
operational gardaí should be briefed daily with the 
latest intelligence on crime and tasked to complete 
actions that will reduce opportunities for crime or 
locate	a	person(s)	suspected	of	crime.	
5	 	Automatic	number	plate	recognition	(ANPR)
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it equipment 
A consistent theme throughout the inspection 
of national and district intelligence units was 
that outdated IT equipment blocked them from 
accessing or viewing evidence about a crime. 
The Inspectorate was informed that the National 
Intelligence Unit is working on outdated software 
and	is	unable	to	load	PDF	documents	and	to	view	
photographs. CIOs in particular experience daily 
challenges in accessing the necessary IT applications 
and equipment to perform their role effectively. 
CIOs often use personal laptops and computers to 
view CCTV footage, to download stills and to turn 
those stills into briefing documents and bulletins. 
This represents a risk of breaching security of 
intelligence data, but their motive is to ensure that 
intelligence is provided to local gardaí. 
Cio training
During	 field	 visits,	 the	 Inspectorate	 identified	
a significant variance in the amount of formal 
training that CIOs had received. Some had 
undergone a CIO course in recent years and others 
had little if any formal training but had learnt ‘on 
the job’ over many years. A common concern was 
the lack of continuous professional development 
to provide CIOs with the skills now required to 
complete their roles effectively. This includes 
merging duplicate intelligence reports and IT 
based training to create PowerPoint presentations 
or Excel spreadsheets. The Inspectorate also 
recommends continual training on data protection 
requirements. 
good practice - garda portal
there is a dedicated site for Cios on the garda 
portal, where difficulties can be discussed and 
good practice shared. there is also an on-line 
computer based training package available 
through the portal on the use of criminal 
intelligence, but this is focussed on the role of 
operational gardaí rather than the Cios role. 
a number of Cios have attended an annual 
intelligence conference organised by Crime 
and security and spoke positively about the 
ability to network with other intelligence 
officers. senior managers from gsas deliver 
presentations at the annual conference, which 
are seen as informative and useful. a recent 
positive development is the introduction of 
a gtube application, which allows Cios to 
upload CCtv footage of suspects onto the 
garda portal.
8.7 Information Sharing
The Inspectorate met with many gardaí in roles 
where they are required to share information and 
intelligence with other police services and other 
agencies. When asked about information sharing 
protocols, no one was able to produce a document 
that showed what data could be exchanged and 
how it will be managed. Gardaí dealing with young 
offenders are sharing information with statutory 
and non-statutory agencies and CIOs are providing 
information to local authority housing managers. 
The lack of understanding about information 
sharing and the absence of protocols were raised as 
major issues during every visit. 
The Garda Síochána is not the only body 
responsible for making communities safer. There 
are a number of statutory and voluntary agencies 
that work closely with the Garda Síochána to help 
to tackle crime and disorder, deal with offenders 
and	support	victims.	During	the	visits	to	the	seven	
divisions, and where possible, the Inspectorate 
met with representatives from the following 
organisations:
•	 HSE;
•	 Probation	Service;
•	 Local	Authority;
•	 District	Courts;
•	 State	Solicitors;
•	 Joint	Policing	Committees;
•	 NGOs	that	work	with	victims	of	crime.	
In	the	UK,	the	1998	Crime	and	Disorder	Act	placed	
a statutory obligation on the police and local 
authorities to work together to make places safer. In 
later times, this obligation was extended to include 
other	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Health	
Service. 
The Inspectorate found that close relationships and 
trust are used by gardaí and partners as the basis for 
sharing information. To enable these organisations 
to work effectively together, there is a need to be 
able	to	share	information.	The	Data	Protection	Acts	
of 1998 and 2003 set out how information should be 
managed and the circumstances under which it can 
be shared. The Garda Síochána worked with the 
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Data	Protection	Commissioner	 to	 develop	 a	Code	
of Practice to assist all garda employees with data 
protection compliance.
Disclosure	 in	 the	 context	 of	 data	 protection	 is	
the provision of personal data to a third party 
by any means whether written, verbally or 
electronically.	 The	 Data	 Protection	 Act	 places	
serious responsibilities on every employee of the 
Garda Síochána not to disclose data in relation to 
any individual to any other individual who is not 
entitled by law to receive it. Personal data is used 
within the Garda Síochána in the normal course of 
operational functions.
The public policy objective being pursued by 
particular data sharing arrangements without 
consent should be explicit. An assessment should 
be made as to whether the likely benefits of the 
sharing justify the overriding of the individual’s 
data protection rights. The assessment should 
represent a careful balancing of these factors. The 
legal basis for data sharing, including the conditions 
under which such sharing is permitted, should be 
set out in primary legislation. Any decision to share 
personal data between public bodies (and thereby 
to	set	aside	a	person’s	right	to	privacy)	must	not	be	
taken lightly. This is especially the case when bulk 
data is shared. Such decisions should only be taken 
following due consideration at senior management 
level.
Information sharing was raised by many gardaí 
and also by many partner organisations as a major 
issue that needs to be addressed. It is clear from 
discussions with a range of gardaí that there is a 
reluctance to seek or share information with other 
organisations on the basis that it will breach 
the	 Data	 Protection	 Act.	 The	 Inspectorate	 found	
confusion and lack of clear guidance on when and 
how	information	can	be	shared.	The	Data	Protection	
Act provides for the disclosure of information 
for the purposes of investigation, prevention and 
detection of criminal offences, but the Inspectorate 
found no clear guidance for members as to how this 
should operate on a day to day basis. 
Police Scotland employs an information sharing 
specialist who provides guidance on the 
development of information sharing protocols, 
training and changes to personal role profiles. 
Legislation provides for the sharing of information 
proportionately with regard to data protection 
regulations. Guidelines set out all the information 
which	 might	 be	 relevant.	 Data	 protection	 takes	
account of the prevention and detection of crime, 
the risk to the individual or to other people. Under 
the	 Schedule	 to	 the	 Scottish	 Data	 Protection	
Act 1998, sharing can be done without consent. 
Partnership working varies from one part of the 
country to another, but the fundamental template 
documents are guided by the specialist. Protocols 
have been prepared between the police and many 
other bodies and agencies for the prevention and 
detection of crime. Records are kept on what is 
shared and why. 
There are Community Planning Partnerships 
which oversee community and safety, which brief 
community officers on registered sex offenders, 
pickpockets etc. in the context of upcoming 
events. There is an agreement with Rape Crisis 
Scotland on information sharing and there are 
local agreements also. The Scottish Intelligence 
Database	 (SID)	 has	 opened	 the	 intelligence	
system for domestic violence and extended it to 
partners such as Women’s Aid and Assist. These 
organisations have been trained in intelligence. A 
multi-agency	taskforce	(MATAC)	based	in	Glasgow,	
meet every fortnight and is composed of police, 
Women’s	 Aid	 and	 Assist	 and	 Housing	 partners,	
with full intelligence sharing. The philosophy is “if 
in doubt, share”. Inappropriate information sharing 
is a crime and there is a significant emphasis on 
training. With the extension of the intelligence 
facility to support bodies, the intelligence log is 
greater in number and quality than previously. 
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Feedback from partner organisations on 
information sharing
The following are some of the observations from 
Irish partner organisations about information 
sharing: 
•	 Guidelines	 are	 needed	 to	 facilitate	
information sharing of data;
•	 Good	sharing	by	front-line	gardaí;
•	 Lots	of	‘off	the	record’	conversations;
•	 Gardaí	 give	 the	 impression	 that	 they	 are	
afraid to disclose data to non-police agencies; 
•	 Sharing	 is	 done	 through	mutual	 trust	 and	
good will; 
•	 There	are	no	written	protocols;
•	 The	Garda	Síochána	are	too	cautious;	
•	 There	is	a	need	to	develop	encrypted	e-mail	
to enable the sharing of more intelligence 
electronically e.g. details of children to be 
discussed at case conferences. 
There are inconsistencies with sharing data and 
in some divisions it came down to the practices of 
individual gardaí. In one division, two members 
dealing with registered sex offenders took very 
different approaches in terms of disclosing 
information.
Local	 Authority	 Housing	 Departments	 regularly	
apply for information about prospective tenants. 
The local CIO usually conducts a search of PULSE 
and provides a summary of known information. 
This is forwarded to the local superintendent for a 
decision as to how much information is supplied to 
the housing team. In the absence of an information 
sharing protocol, this data is disclosed under the 
terms	of	the	Housing	Act.	
Local senior gardaí attend Joint Policing Committee 
meetings and deliver an update on policing issues 
in that area. There is a real reluctance to provide 
any information or statistics in advance of 
meetings. In the majority of cases, no personal data 
is included and the data is subsequently provided 
at the meeting. The reluctance to share this sort of 
information greatly reduces the opportunity for 
members of the committee to digest the data and 
prepare more informed questions.
In disclosure of data regarding the safety of 
children, decisions about disclosure of data often 
fall back on the question “is it in the best interests of 
the child?” In many respects this allows the Garda 
Síochána far greater discretion than if they are 
dealing with adults.
There is a general absence of information sharing 
protocols and without fail, all senior managers 
in partner organisations would like to have 
information sharing protocols as a clear basis for 
the passing of information from one organisation 
to the other. It would be more productive for 
agencies to have a formalised information sharing 
protocol	in	place,	which	is	compliant	with	the	Data	
Protection Act. In the UK, it is a standard operating 
practice to have information sharing protocols with 
other agencies to agree what information will be 
shared, in what form and how it will happen. 
The	 Criminal	 Assets	 Bureau	 (CAB)	 is	 an	 agency 
with representatives from the Garda Síochána, 
Social Welfare and Revenue Commissioners 
working together in a joint enterprise. The 
organisations are co-located and share information 
held by each agency, albeit under strict 
arrangements. The Inspectorate believes that the 
sharing of information by these agencies is a good 
model that could be replicated outside of CAB. The 
Inspectorate believes that the sharing of partner 
data is a key component of victim care, crime 
prevention and crime investigation. This is an issue 
that needs to be resolved at the highest levels of all 
the various organisations to formalise information 
sharing	 protocols,	 in	 consultation	 with	 the	 Data	
Protection Commissioner for Ireland.
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8.8	Covert	Human	Intelligence	
Sources	(CHIS)
The Garda Síochána gathers information and 
generates intelligence about crime and criminals. 
The ability to infiltrate criminal organisations is 
key to understanding the way in which organised 
criminal networks operate and to help to formulate 
strategies to thwart and frustrate them. A well 
tried and tested method of gathering intelligence 
is through the use of informants, who can provide 
specific information about those involved in crime. 
In policing circles, informants are now referred to 
as	Covert	Human	Intelligence	Sources	(CHIS).	The	
Garda	Síochána	revised	its	approach	to	using	CHIS	
in 2006 following the Morris Tribunal Report. The 
CHIS	system	is	subject	to	formal	review	by	a	retired	
judge and this process was described as very robust.
regional CHis Units
The Garda Síochána has invested significant 
resources	 in	 CHIS	 units,	 which	 are	 based	 at	
both regional and national levels. The Assistant 
Commissioner of Crime and Security has corporate 
responsibility	 for	 the	CHIS	 system	and	divisional	
chief superintendents and regional assistant 
commissioners have leadership roles to ensure 
the	integrity	and	effectiveness	of	the	CHIS	system	
within their areas. 
national source management Unit and 
oversight of CHis
Within	Crime	and	Security	Division,	 the	National	
Source	 Management	 Unit	 (NSMU)	 has	 the	
responsibility	 for	 oversight	 of	 all	 CHIS	 activity,	
including processing referrals for registration, 
providing advice to those involved in dealing with 
CHIS	and	training	gardaí	in	source	handling.	The	
NSMU	manages	a	national	register	of	all	CHIS.	The	
Major	 Investigation	 Management	 System	 (MIMS)	
system has provided a more sustainable IT platform 
for	recording	and	monitoring	CHIS.	
There are still outstanding issues with the migration 
of paper records dating back to 2006 when the 
new	 CHIS	 system	was	 first	 introduced	 that	 need	
to be uploaded onto MIMS. The Inspectorate was 
informed that there is a significant piece of work that 
needs to be completed to convert old paper records 
onto the new MIMS system. With new registrations, 
handlers are checking old paper files to see if the 
person was previously considered. Retrospective 
record conversion of these records would reduce 
the time taken to assess new registrations. 
All	 registered	CHIS	 are	 risk	 assessed	 and	 should	
be formally reviewed every three months. This is a 
very labour intensive and time consuming process. 
If	a	CHIS	is	classified	as	a	high	risk,	they	are	referred	
to the NSMU for this risk assessment. 
registration of a source 
If a garda identifies a person that may be 
suitable	 to	be	a	CHIS,	 they	are	 required	 to	refer	
them	 straight	 away	 to	 a	 source	 unit.	 The	 CHIS	
controller6 appoints a handler7 to conduct an 
assessment. The handler enters that person 
onto MIMS, which automatically registers that 
assessment with the NSMU. The NSMU play 
a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 a	 CHIS	 as	 they	
have access to all Garda Síochána intelligence 
systems. The NSMU particularly look at a 
person’s	 motivation	 to	 be	 a	 CHIS.	 At	 present	
there	 are	 between	 ten	 to	 fifteen	 CHIS	 referrals	
entered onto MIMS on a daily basis, of which 
50% are assessed as suitable. The NSMU may 
designate a person as unsuitable before a regional 
assessment is completed. A usual reason for 
unsuitability will be the person’s involvement in 
crime. In these cases, the NSMU place a warning 
marker onto MIMS highlighting that the person 
is	unsuitable	to	be	a	CHIS.	
referrals to source Units 
Success	of	a	CHIS	system	requires	all	gardaí	who	
have contact with the public to encourage people 
to come forward with information and where 
someone is suitable, to refer them to the source unit 
for	assessment.	During	the	 inspection	it	was	clear	
to the Inspectorate that this is an area that needs to 
be developed.
6	 A	CHIS	controller	is	usually	at	superintendent	rank	and	have	
oversight responsibilities.
7	 Handlers	 have	 day	 to	 day	 responsibility	 for	 dealing	 with	
CHIS	and	directing	activity.
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 recommendation 8.21
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána tasks regional Criminal 
Human intelligence sources units to engage 
with divisions to encourage the referral of 
persons who are suitable to be considered for 
registration. (medium term). 
Urgent intelligence
If an urgent piece of intelligence is received from 
a	 registered	 or	 unregistered	 CHIS,	 it	 can	 still	 be	
actioned	and	in	many	cases	the	Detective	Inspector	
in charge of the NSMU will be contacted for advice 
on how to manage that intelligence. 
CHis outcomes
The Inspectorate found limited evidence that any 
actionable or useful intelligence on volume crime 
was being returned to districts and divisions from 
those	 CHIS	 who	 were	 successfully	 registered.	 In	
some cases, when local detectives had engaged a 
person with information, the detective referred 
the	 person	 to	 the	 regional	 CHIS	 unit	 and	 often	
the intelligence that was returned to the local 
area was not the original intelligence and in many 
cases no information was ever received back. The 
Inspectorate found an absence of performance 
management	data	to	show	the	outcomes	from	CHIS	
in respect of the numbers of arrests and seizures 
that	resulted	from	CHIS	intelligence.
The	 current	 approach	 to	 CHIS	 has	 resulted	 in	
gardaí becoming reluctant to engage with people 
who may be able to provide useful intelligence 
for	 fear	of	breaching	garda	policy.	Detectives	and	
other gardaí are not permitted to gather or use 
intelligence from criminals. The Inspectorate 
recognises that criminals have to be managed 
within clear safeguards, but the current approach 
is not encouraging the effective use of a valuable 
source of criminal intelligence.
volume Crime and CHis intelligence 
Very little evidence was provided at divisional level 
about	intelligence	from	a	CHIS	that	led	to	an	arrest	
or provided positive support for an investigation. 
Exceptions to this tended to involve more serious 
crimes, such as murders or drug offences. There 
was very little actionable intelligence coming 
to divisions in relation to volume crime. With 
burglary and car crime offences, it is crucial to be 
able to identify individuals that are committing 
crimes and persons or places that are receiving 
stolen	property.	During	the	visits	 to	divisions,	 the	
Inspectorate found limited evidence that this sort 
of intelligence is provided. The Inspectorate 
believes	 that	 CHIS	 must	 be	 refocused	 towards	
volume crime.
The	 current	 CHIS	 system	 is	 not	 operating	 to 
support volume crime investigation and 
opportunities are being lost to capture and act 
upon valuable intelligence; which would assist in 
bringing offenders to justice. The current system 
has limited if any credibility with the majority 
of detectives and senior gardaí who met with 
the Inspectorate. It is the Inspectorate’s view 
that the safeguards, which were introduced 
after the Morris Tribunal, are inhibiting the 
use	 and	 tasking	 of	 CHIS.	 The	 regular	 three	
monthly review process undertaken for 
every	 CHIS	 is	 heavily	 bureaucratic	 and	 time	
consuming. The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána review the current approach to 
managing	CHIS.
 recommendation 8.22
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána conducts a review of the 
corporate approach to the use of Criminal 
Human intelligence sources to ensure that 
it provides measurable outcomes in relation 
to volume crime. (Long term).
8.9 Crimestoppers and Garda 
Confidential
Crimestoppers and Garda Confidential are two 
systems which provide an opportunity for members 
of the public to provide information directly to 
the Garda Síochána. Tackling crime effectively 
requires the help of communities. International 
police services use similar methods to engage and 
encourage communities to report crime, to provide 
intelligence and to help to find missing or wanted 
persons.
Crimestoppers is a joint initiative between the 
Garda Síochána and the business community, 
which encourages people to report crime by 
calling a free phone number. Calls are taken by 
trained gardaí based in the National Bureau of 
Criminal	 Investigation	 (NBCI)	 operating	 between	
09.00 and 21.00 daily. Members of the public are 
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able to provide information confidentially and 
without giving their personal details if they so 
wish. Crimestoppers is overseen by the Irish 
Crimestoppers Trust which was established in 
1998. Crimestoppers also provide another contact 
point	 for	 a	 Dial	 to	 Stop	 Drugs	 line.	 The	 Garda	
Serious Crime Review Team uses Crimestoppers 
for appeals to assist with cold case reviews for 
serious crimes. 
Not all information received by Crimestoppers will 
provide sufficient detail to be able to be actioned. 
In 2013, Crimestoppers received 1,556 calls, but 
they were unable to say how many reports were 
suitable to be actioned and what the results were. 
Of the total calls received, 33% were misdirected 
calls due to one of the high street banks mistakenly 
putting the Crimestoppers number on ATM 
machines, asking people to report any suspicious 
circumstances	 to	 the	 Garda	 Síochána.	 During	
visits to divisions, the Inspectorate found limited 
evidence of Crimestoppers information being 
received or that the intelligence received was 
actioned. A drugs unit informed the Inspectorate 
that they had received ten reports and that only 
one piece of information was actionable. A senior 
detective stated that the division only receives 
approximately two Crimestoppers reports per 
month and that these were invariably about drug 
related offences. In contrast, a comparable division 
in London receives twelve to fifteen Crimestoppers 
reports per month.
Garda Confidential provides a similar service with 
a different free phone number. Calls to this number 
are	received	in	the	Dublin	Command	and	Control	
Centre under the control of the Garda Síochána. 
The Inspectorate was unable to find any formal 
tracking system that monitors Crimestoppers 
information and what happens when that 
information is sent to a national unit or a local 
division for action. International best practice is 
to have a central tracking system to ensure that 
information is actioned and results monitored. 
Crimestoppers international practice 
Internationally a key marketing point of 
Crimestoppers is the reporting of intelligence to 
an independent and non-police organisation. This 
reduces the fear that a police officer may find 
out the identity of the caller. A major problem in 
the current garda system is the fact that a person 
ringing to provide information speaks to a 
member of the Garda Síochána. In the UK, calls to 
Crimestoppers are received by fully trained non-
police call takers. Crimestoppers UK operates a 
24/7 365 days service and they have now taken 
on the responsibility for Crimestoppers calls in 
Northern Ireland and other international police 
services. In the UK, Crimestoppers records 
100,000 reports a year. This system:
•	 Has	the	capability	and	technology	to	take	all	
Crimestoppers calls currently managed by 
the Garda Síochána;
•	 Offers	 an	 on-line	 reporting	 service	 that	 is	
now accounting for nearly 40% of the reports 
received. This service is not currently offered 
by the Garda Síochána; 
•	 Provides	 performance	 data	 broken	 down	
into the information received for particular 
crime types would also be available. 
The charges for this service are nominal (less than 
half	 the	 current	 cost	 of	 one	 garda	 per	 year).	 This	
would greatly reduce the current cost, provide a 
much better service and one that would be more 
attractive to those wishing to report crimes and 
other information. 
The Inspectorate believes that having two different 
numbers	(Crimestoppers	and	Garda	Confidential)	
is unnecessary and confusing and that there is 
an opportunity to move these functions to one 
system. This would also release gardaí currently 
managing telephone calls made to Crimestoppers 
and Garda Confidential. 
 recommendation 8.23
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a review of the use of 
Crimestoppers and garda Confidential. 
(medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Evaluate	outsourcing	Crimestoppers	so	that	
it is independent of the Garda Síochána;
•	 Provide	one	24/7	365	confidential	line;
•	 Develop	electronic	 reporting	 for	 the	public	
to be easily able to report intelligence 
information; 
•	 Implement	 a	 central	 tracking	 system	 that	
ensures that intelligence is effectively 
actioned.
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open Crime information for Citizens 
Increasingly, citizens and customers expect a 
public service that meets their needs. They expect 
a service that is responsive, flexible, efficient and 
innovative	 (Public	 Service	 Reform	 Plan	 2014-16).	
Other policing jurisdictions have recognised that 
providing on-line crime information and crime 
mapping allows citizens an opportunity to obtain 
up to date crime information for the area in which 
they live. Providing access to crime information 
can also reduce the volume of requests that police 
services receive from a broad range of interested 
stakeholders. It can also lead to an increase in 
reporting of intelligence to the police. 
Alongside statistical releases by government bodies 
such	 as	 the	CSO,	Home	Office,	 or	New	York	City	
Council, many police agencies make crime data 
available in two formats. These are:
1)	 Tables	 set	 out	 on	 internet	web	 pages	 or	 in	
annual reports; and
2)	 Interactive	or	dynamic	crime	maps	that	can	
be altered by the user to reflect a desired 
crime type, date, location, etc. 
Reports are generated for a range of crimes, 
represented by symbols and the generation of 
compact reports for each crime type in a particular 
time period is possible. Good examples can be 
found on: 
›	 www.lapdonline.org/crime-mapping-and-
compstat;
›	 maps.ny.gov/crime/;
›	 www.police.uk;
›	 www.police.qld.gov.au/forms/
crimestatsdesktop.asp/; 
›	 www.crimeinchicago.org/
The Inspectorate believes that there should be 
a system of open crime information to inform 
the public about local crime levels. While this 
could be achieved by the Garda Síochána, other 
organisations, such as CSO may have the expertise 
to do so. In addition to informing the public, it is 
likely to engage the public in relation to suspicious 
activity, crime prevention and investigation.  
 recommendation 8.24 
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána initiates a process with public 
service information bodies, including the 
Central statistics office, to develop on-line 
crime mapping information. (medium term).
8.10 The Way Forward
The impact of limited allocations of resources 
requires the Garda Síochána to be more strategic 
about how it prioritises work and how it deploys 
available resources. At a basic level, all operational 
resources must be tasked daily and the results of 
those tasks fed back into the intelligence system.
A new approach must link the intelligence 
structures found in national units with those in 
regions and divisions to ensure there is not only 
standardisation of approach, but effective sharing 
of all but the most sensitive intelligence. 
The Garda Síochána must recognise that high 
quality intelligence supports and drives the 
operational response to crime investigation, 
prevention and the identification of risk. More 
effective supervision is also required to enhance 
the quality and accuracy of intelligence entered 
into the Garda Síochána intelligence systems. 
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9.2 Investigation of Suspects
authority to arrest
There are a number of laws, rules and garda policies 
in place that govern the questioning and treatment 
of suspects. This includes powers to arrest and to 
conduct investigations. 
national and international articles and 
rules 
The Irish Government is a signatory to 
international conventions on human and civil 
rights. The Garda Síochána has a duty to act in 
accordance with both the Irish Constitution and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
introduction of human rights into the policing 
arena provides many rights for individuals and 
places obligations on police services, such as a duty 
to protect life. The function of the Garda Síochána 
was statutorily defined in the 2005 Garda Síochána 
Act and includes “vindicating the human rights 
of each individual”. This is particularly relevant 
when dealing with persons detained in garda 
stations, who are vulnerable and for whom the 
Garda Síochána have a duty of care to ensure their 
protection and to uphold their human rights. 
Judges’ rules
Judges’ Rules were created in 1912 as a guide to 
police officers dealing with criminal investigations 
and to clarify the circumstances in which officers 
can question people in connection with crimes. In 
essence, when endeavouring to discover who has 
committed a crime, an officer can put questions 
to any person, whether a suspect or not, to obtain 
useful information. A person should be cautioned 
before an allegation is put to them and this applies 
whether the person is in police detention or not.
powers of arrest
Arrests may be made either with a warrant or, if 
there is common law or statutory power to do so, 
without a warrant. Short of an arrest, there are no 
powers to detain a person for the purpose of an 
investigation. Section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 
1977, and Section 30 of the Offences Against the 
State Act 1939, created powers of arrest for a range 
of offences. This report will primarily examine 
arrestable offences, which are punishable on 
indictment by a term of five years imprisonment or 
more. Most powers of arrest that originated under 
common law have been superseded by statutes. 
However, gardaí still use the common law power of 
breach of the peace and particularly when dealing 
with incidents of domestic violence. Other police 
services have discouraged the use of common law 
breach of the peace in such cases. 
Many other statutes provide a power of arrest in 
relation to specific offences, such as the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1977,  and the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences) Act 2006. Some criminal offences, such 
as possession of a small amount of drugs require 
9.1 Introduction
A significant factor in preventing and reducing crime is the ability of a police 
service to effectively identify and manage prolific offenders of crime. Once 
a crime is committed, police services have a duty to bring those responsible 
to justice. Part 9 explores the investigative processes of gathering evidence to 
identify suspects and the decision-making process in relation to how to deal 
with an offender. 
Part 9 also examines what happens when a person is taken to a garda station 
and the issues around their detention in custody. This includes the various 
processes, such as the initial reception, conducting interviews and the taking 
of fingerprints and photographs. 
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an additional level of suspicion to effect an arrest; 
such as a suspicion that a person is providing a false 
name and address. 
In the UK, police services operate under the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and in Scotland, 
under the Criminal Procedures Act 1995, which 
provide all powers for arrest, searching and 
detention in custody. These acts in many ways are 
far more reaching in respect to similar powers to 
those conferred on the Garda Síochána. In the UK, 
police officers can arrest a suspect, interview them 
and release them on police station bail pending 
further investigation. This approach encourages 
an early arrest. In Ireland, whilst under some 
circumstances a person’s detention may be 
suspended, there is no such garda station bail 
and generally, gardaí gather all evidence first and 
arrests tend to come at a later date. 
recording of persons Connected to a Crime 
Whilst investigating a crime, a number of people 
may be identified at a crime scene as persons who 
can assist with an enquiry; such as a suspect or a 
witness to the offence. These persons should be 
recorded on PULSE and placed under one of the 
following categories:
•	 Witness;
•	 Suspect;
•	 Questioned	in	relation	to;	or
•	 Suspected	offender.	
The categorisation process on PULSE is very 
important in linking an individual to a particular 
crime. A person at the scene of a crime who was 
spoken to, but without specific evidence to link 
them to the crime, is shown on PULSE as questioned 
in relation to the crime. Where evidence exists that 
a person may have committed a crime, they can be 
recorded as a suspect on PULSE. Once arrested, a 
person is usually recorded as a suspected offender.
The categorisation of a person as a suspected 
offender is important, as this records a crime 
as detected. Before a person can be charged or 
summonsed for an offence, PULSE must be updated 
with this category. A person can, at any stage in an 
evolving investigation, move from one category to 
another. The use of two status codes with the word 
suspect is confusing. In other policing jurisdictions, 
a single suspect code is usually used and a person 
who is no longer a suspect is shown as eliminated 
from an enquiry. During this inspection, the 
Inspectorate, noted that it is common practice in the 
Garda Síochána to prematurely categorise a person 
linked to a crime as a suspected offender before any 
arrest, charge, summons or other case disposal. The 
implications of this are discussed in Part 11.
 recommendation 9.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the current pULse status 
codes, in conjunction with recommendation 
11.2 to clarify investigation and detection 
status codes. (short term).
invitation to attend a garda station
There are other options available to an investigating 
gardaí apart from an arrest, such as inviting a 
person to attend a garda station to assist with 
enquiries. This is not an arrest, and the person must 
be so informed and that they are free to leave at 
any time. If the person becomes a suspect during 
the interview, they should be arrested so that the 
statutory protections pertaining to the detention 
come into operation, People (DPP) v Conroy.1 
When a person attends a garda station voluntarily, 
a witness statement may be taken, but where an 
allegation is being put to that person, the individual 
should be cautioned and the statement obtained is 
referred to as a “statement under caution”. The use 
of cautioned interviews is a regular occurrence. 
Dealing with a suspect or a suspected 
offender 
Irish law differs from that in some other 
jurisdictions in respect of the arrest and 
detention of suspects. During this inspection, 
the Inspectorate was informed by gardaí of all 
ranks that effectively, there is one opportunity 
to arrest a person and that is a reason for not 
always arresting at the time of first dealing with 
a suspect or an incident. Whilst legally there is 
a power to arrest a person and release them to 
return to a garda station, it is not something that 
is often used.2
1 People (DPP) v Conroy [1986] IR 460, [1988]ILRM 4.
2 Suspension of Custody Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 
2011.
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9.3 Making an Arrest
the garda Crime investigation techniques 
manual 
The Garda Síochána has a well-established Crime 
Investigation Techniques Manual, which is a 
comprehensive reference publication for more 
serious complex crimes. The manual is specifically 
designed to provide guidance and instruction 
to those dealing with serious and complex 
investigations. Volume crime investigations are 
the vast majority of investigations conducted by 
the Garda Síochána. The Inspectorate believes that 
the Garda Síochána should develop a standard 
operating procedure for the investigation of all 
crime, with a focus on volume crime investigation. 
This should cover all aspects of crime investigation 
and dealing with offenders. 
interviewing a suspect 
The Crime Investigation Techniques Manual states 
that in an ideal situation, a suspect should not be 
interviewed until the preliminary investigation 
is complete; i.e. the scene of the crime has been 
examined, evidence of a technical nature collected 
and written statements taken from witnesses. 
However, it states that a suspect should be 
interviewed as quickly as possible after the crime. 
It further highlights that every minute that elapses 
between the commission of the crime and the time 
of interviewing affords the suspect an opportunity 
to compose themselves, to fabricate alibis or to 
communicate with their accomplices. A delay can 
provide an opportunity for a suspect to contact a 
victim or witness to persuade or intimidate them to 
withdraw their allegation. 
timings of arrests 
The Inspectorate found that members make arrests 
only after they are in possession of all of the available 
evidence in the case. The approach usually taken is 
to gather all available evidence before questioning a 
suspect about the crime. In some respects, there are 
merits in this approach in respect of making sure 
that all exhibits and witness evidence is available in 
order to conduct a full interview. However, in many 
cases, an early arrest and interview is viable. When 
key evidence is gathered, such as CCTV footage, 
victim or witness statements, together with any 
other corroborating evidence, the member is in a 
position to put the case to a suspect and ask them for 
an explanation. The Inspectorate found many cases 
where interviews took place many months after the 
crime was committed. In respect of some crimes, 
obtaining technical and forensic evidence is taking 
several years to analyse, which can significantly 
impact on the timing of an arrest. 
In other jurisdictions, an arrest is far more likely 
to take place where a suspect is available to be 
arrested and there is probable cause or reasonable 
grounds to suspect that they have committed an 
offence. There are many cases where the primary 
evidence is available, such as an offensive weapon, 
drugs or a public order offence without the need to 
unnecessarily delay an arrest. 
arrested but not Charged
The Inspectorate found that some offenders are not 
subsequently charged after arrest. In many cases, 
a suspect is arrested, interviewed and released 
without charge, pending the completion of a case 
file to be sent to the district officer or, in more 
serious cases, to the DPP for a decision on whether 
to prosecute or not.
In other jurisdictions, authority to charge for 
most offences can be obtained on the day that the 
person is arrested and without a full file. Where 
directions are obtained, a person is immediately 
charged and the case file is completed at that time. 
The Inspectorate believes that the DPP and Garda 
Síochána should review the current process for 
providing charging advice to investigators.
Gardaí may re-arrest a person in order to charge 
them and this is specifically provided for in Section 
10(2) Criminal Justice Act 1984. With regard to re-
arrest for investigation, Gardaí may only generally 
do so under judicial supervision, such as by warrant 
and where “new information has come to light”. 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 9: Investigation and Detention of Suspects
Part 9  |  4
advantages of an early arrest and early 
interview 
The Inspectorate believes that there are distinct 
advantages to the timely arrest of a suspect, in that 
it:
•	 Creates	an	earlier	opportunity	to	 interview	
the suspects;
•	 Increases	 opportunities	 to	 secure	
corroborating evidence before it can be 
destroyed, such as clothing worn by the 
suspect;
•	 Increases	opportunities	for	securing	forensic	
evidence;
•	 Reduces	 the	 opportunities	 for	 suspects	 to	
re-offend, particularly in cases of assault, 
sexual abuse or cases involving threats and 
intimidation;
•	 Reassures	 a	 victim	 that	 the	 case	 is	 being	
progressed expeditiously;
•	 Reduces	the	time	period	between	the	date	of	
the crime and any judicial outcome;
•	 Reduces	the	time	to	set	up	alibis.
impact on victims
Unnecessary delays in making an arrest can have 
a significant impact on a victim or witness and 
can negatively affect a potential prosecution. 
Avoidable delays can also impact on the confidence 
and increased fear of crime of a victim. Delay in 
arresting and prosecuting a suspect can result in 
a victim or a witness withdrawing their support 
for a prosecution through a variety of different 
pressures, such as intimidation by a suspect. 
9.4 Barriers to Arrest
Throughout this inspection, the Inspectorate 
identified a number of processes and procedures 
that delay the arrest or interview of an offender.
resource and roster issues 
Investigating gardaí explained that arrests have 
to be carefully planned. Detective units often 
have small numbers of gardaí and arrangements 
to execute an arrest need to be planned for when 
colleagues are available to assist with the arrest and 
any subsequent interview. In some more rural areas, 
the numbers of people on units is significantly lower 
and finding available members to make arrests can 
be more challenging. An example was provided in 
a rural area where a garda had to unnecessarily 
wait an additional week to make an arrest, before a 
colleague would be available to assist. 
The new pilot roster has added to the delays, by 
significantly reducing the number of supervisors 
and gardaí that are available on a given day. A 
regular unit sergeant explained that the shift roster 
and availability of members delayed the arrest of a 
suspect for a serious assault. In this case, the arrest 
was delayed for nine days until sufficient gardaí 
were available. The Inspectorate was told this was 
not an isolated case and such delays take place on 
a daily basis. This presents a number of risks; most 
importantly, that a suspect could re-offend or move 
away from the area during the period between the 
commission of the crime and their arrest. The pilot 
roster further exacerbates delays as depending on 
when a garda starts to investigate a crime, it can be 
four days3 before the garda is back on duty and can 
recommence an investigation. 
gathering of evidence 
The gathering of all available evidence can 
take considerable time, particularly when the 
responsibility rests with a single investigating 
garda. As previously highlighted, most crimes are 
investigated by gardaí who are attached to regular 
units. The roster for those working on regular 
units has no specific time built into it for crime 
3 A garda normally has four rest days before going back on a 
tour of duty.
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investigation. Gardaí on these units have to manage 
investigations by conducting enquiries around 
their daily work pattern. 
reasons for Delay in early arrest 
The Inspectorate identified a number of factors 
that influence garda decisions as to whether or not 
to arrest a suspect, who is present on scene when 
gardaí are dealing with an incident.
An arrest effectively removes one or more gardaí 
from patrol duties for an extended period of time, 
particularly where an interview is required. In 
many divisions visited, the Inspectorate was 
informed that at certain times of the day, resources 
are short and an arrest of a suspect might remove 
all available responders in that area. This is further 
complicated in more rural areas, where a garda 
station could be a long distance away from where 
an incident took place. In cases where there is 
no victim, such as minor public order offences, 
this may be an appropriate action to take and the 
garda may decide to warn a person or to deal with 
the matter at another time. In the case of a more 
serious offence and one where there is a victim, this 
approach is far less satisfactory. Many people that 
gardaí deal with (suspects, witnesses and victims) 
may have consumed alcohol or other substances, 
reducing the ability of gardaí to take statements 
and delaying any interview with a suspect. Gardaí 
are confronted by this problem particularly at 
night. The Inspectorate found that in many cases 
of assaults, where persons are intoxicated, gardaí 
often decide not to arrest at the time. As discussed 
in Part 4, some victims of crime who have consumed 
alcohol are sent away, with the onus on the victim 
to contact the gardaí later if they want to report a 
crime. In most cases, no PULSE record is created at 
the time and often no follow-up is conducted with 
the victim. On checking PULSE, CAD and other 
garda systems, the Inspectorate found examples of 
crimes that were notified to the garda, but were not 
recorded as crimes or were recorded as a non-crime 
incident in the Attention and Complaints category. 
statements
The taking of victim and witness statements is an 
important part of a crime investigation and is the 
first formal stage of recording evidence that may be 
used to prosecute an offender.
Dealing with victims and Witnesses
During this inspection, the Inspectorate has 
identified a number of issues with obtaining victim 
and witness statements. These include:
•	 Some	victims	stated	that	they	were	left	with	
a perception that the garda did not want 
to investigate the crime when it was first 
reported ;
•	 Significant	 delays	 in	 obtaining	 victim	 and	
witness statements; 
•	 Broken	 appointments	 to	 gather	 evidence,	
such as taking photographs of victims’ 
injuries;
•	 Obtaining	authority	 from	victims	 to	access	
medical records and then not requesting the 
records; 
•	 The	 taking	 of	withdrawal	 statements	 from	
victims, who don’t want to prosecute;
•	 Victim	 and	 witness	 statements,	 lacking	 in	
detail. 
The Inspectorate found cases where the PULSE 
incident and case file stated that a victim was 
unwilling to make a statement of complaint. In 
most cases, there was no recorded evidence of 
any attempts to persuade a victim to assist with a 
criminal investigation. The Inspectorate examined 
a case involving a burglary at the home of a 
vulnerable and elderly victim. The PULSE incident 
and a case file tracking form record showed that the 
victim was unwilling to make a statement. Since 
the time of the crime, there is nothing to indicate 
that any further investigation took place or that any 
additional steps were taken to try and encourage 
the victim to make a statement. The Inspectorate 
has examined numerous cases where it took several 
months to take a statement from a victim and in one 
very serious assault case, some six months later a 
statement had still not been taken.
The Inspectorate found examples where gardaí 
appeared to make several attempts to obtain 
withdrawal statements. (See also Part 7 and the 
Addendum to this report) This is a practice that 
needs to be examined. The Garda Síochána must 
develop clear guidelines on when it is appropriate 
to take a withdrawal statement and how that 
process should be appropriately supervised.
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identification of suspects 
An option open to an investigator is the use 
of a photo fit or facial recognition systems, a 
service provided by the Technical Bureau. This is 
completed on a laptop and can provide an image 
of a suspect that can be circulated to the public 
and to gardaí to try and identify a suspect. With 
advances in technology the photo fit is now far 
more lifelike than those previously produced. The 
Technical Bureau informed the Inspectorate that 
it used to create around 140 photo fits a year, but 
this has reduced to fifty or sixty a year. This is an 
important investigative tool that should be more 
widely available to help to solve crimes where a 
witness saw a suspect.
investigation Units
As highlighted in Part 6, the absence of dedicated 
garda investigation units to deal with arrested 
persons is a significant factor in whether or not to 
make an arrest. In other jurisdictions, a uniform 
first responder will make an arrest, book in the 
detained person, write their arrest notes and go 
back on patrol. The goal in these services is to get 
responders back out as quickly as possible and 
for investigation units to process those who are 
arrested. As outlined in Part 6, the Garda Síochána 
does not operate the same system of investigation 
units as other police services and the Inspectorate 
believes that this increases the time delays in 
making arrests.
Crime investigation Delays impacting on 
arrests
In Part 6 of this report a number of issues were raised 
about delays in conducting crime investigations and 
those delays have a significant impact on dealing 
with offenders. Examples include: 
•	 A	 general	 slow	 approach	 to	 conducting	
crime investigations;
•	 Not	conducting	all	enquiries	at	 the	 time	of	
first response;
•	 Delays	in	gathering	and	analysing	evidence,	
such as CCTV;
•	 A	preference	for	summonses,	 to	reduce	the	
time pressures on submitting case files;
•	 Delays	 in	 obtaining	 victim,	 witness	 and	
medical statements.
All of these issues further add to the delays in 
making an arrest and the subsequent way that 
offenders are managed. 
In other police jurisdictions visited by the 
Inspectorate, there was a clear understanding of 
the risks of delayed arresting and not progressing 
an investigation into a named suspect. The greatest 
risk to an investigator is the opportunity for that 
suspect to commit a further offence. 
9.5 Supervision and Impact on 
Arrest 
The absence of effective front-line supervision is a 
key theme presented throughout this inspection. 
Across the seven divisions, the Inspectorate found 
a lack of intrusive supervision to ensure that 
crimes are investigated quickly and that identified 
offenders are arrested at the earliest opportunity. 
In every division visited, the Inspectorate spoke to a 
variety of both uniform and detective sergeants and 
inspectors to understand the levels of supervision 
that exists and particularly in relation to the 
determination of how and when to arrest offenders. 
The following issues were raised by those supervisors 
as significant challenges to good supervision:
•	 An	 absence	 of	 a	 detective	 or	 uniform	
sergeant on all operational units; 
•	 Identified	 suspects	 are	 not	 always	 entered	
onto PULSE for a variety of reasons. In these 
cases, a supervisor checking a PULSE record 
could be unaware that there is an identified 
suspect;
•	 The	 approach	 to	 supervision	 of	 crime	
investigation is focused on paper reporting. 
In many cases, investigating garda are 
required to provide unnecessary written 
reports on crimes to their sergeants, 
inspector and district officer on the progress 
of an investigation. The material for these 
reports is usually contained on PULSE;
•	 PULSE	 does	 not	 allow	 supervisors	 to	
search for the details or numbers of 
outstanding suspects for their unit or in 
their geographical area; 
•	 There	 are	 no	 clear	 national	 standards	 or	
policies about crime investigation.
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The absence of a front-line supervisor on every 
operational unit is a real issue for the Garda 
Síochána. The Inspectorate believes that face to 
face daily contact with a supervisor is essential to 
ensure that investigations are progressed and that 
front-line supervisors should be dealing with any 
blockages that are preventing an early intervention, 
such as an arrest.
From sampling PULSE records, the Inspectorate is 
aware that there are large numbers of crimes with 
suspects details recorded on PULSE, where there 
is no recorded of action being taken to find them 
and bring them to justice. This includes serious 
crimes, such as rape and other violent assaults. 
Other policing jurisdictions have an IT facility to 
identify cases where a suspect is recorded, but not 
yet arrested, including time frames for how long 
the suspect has been entered onto the system and 
the relevant crime types. This is extremely useful 
management data that can be used to check the 
overall numbers and prioritise those offenders who 
should be arrested as a matter of urgency. (See Part 
6). 
In summary, supervision of crime investigation 
should be far more intrusive, but also supportive, 
particularly in cases where inexperienced gardaí 
are investigating serious crime. Supervisors should 
set clear timescales for arresting suspects and 
prioritise cases where prolific or high risk suspects 
need to be arrested. 
9.6 Investigation and 
Interviewing of Suspects
volume Crime Case reviews
As explained in previous parts, the Inspectorate 
has tracked 158 volume crime cases from the first 
contact made to the garda through the various 
processes of recording an incident to allocating a 
crime for investigation. In this part of the report, 
the Inspectorate examined how the seven divisions 
visited sought and gathered evidence, and how 
crime investigations were dealt with, particularly in 
cases where suspects were identified. It is important 
to restate that this was a random selection of 
incidents dealt with by the gardaí. The following 
examples are taken from those cases. 
The analysis of the findings are separated into five 
areas:
1. Prompt and effective investigations of 
crimes;
2. Incidents that were not recorded and not 
investigated;
3. Delays in cases where there were 
opportunities to deal with a suspect;
4. Investigations that were not progressed 
effectively; 
5. Delays and lost opportunities to gather best 
evidence 
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1. prompt and effective investigations 
The following cases show prompt and effective 
investigations that resulted in the arrest and 
prosecutions of named suspects. 
Volume Crime Case Reviews 
Prompt and Effective 
Investigations of Incidents
Case 1 
During the months of June and July 2012, two 
vacant premises were targeted by a group 
of young offenders and a significant amount 
of damage was caused. The investigating 
garda took witness statements and identified 
and interviewed twelve young suspects in 
the presence of their parents and guardians. 
The PULSE record contains updates on the 
investigation activity and at the conclusion of 
the investigation a number of offenders were 
given juvenile cautions.
Case 2
In May 2012, two armed suspects forced entry 
into a house. One week later a suspect was 
arrested and charged with the crime. Over the 
following months more suspects were arrested. 
This matter awaits a court hearing and for that 
reason specific details about the case are not 
included.
Case 3
In May 2012, a suspect broke into a house and 
confronted a female occupant with a bread 
knife taken from the kitchen. The suspect 
subsequently committed additional burglaries. 
The suspect was arrested the following day and 
made full admissions to the crimes. The offender 
was sent to court on the same day and sentenced 
to nine months imprisonment in July 2012.
These are good examples of serious cases that were 
dealt with promptly in terms of gathering evidence 
and effecting arrests.
2. Crimes and incidents that were not 
recorded and not investigated 
The following are cases where crimes were not 
recorded and subsequently not investigated at the 
time of first reporting. 
Volume Crime Case Reviews 
Crimes	Incidents	that	were	Not	
Recorded	and	Not	Investigated	
Case 1
In May 2012, a robbery took place where a 
suspect snatched a handbag from the victim. 
This was not recorded on PULSE until July 
2013	(after	a	request	from	the	Inspectorate).	No	
statement was ever taken from the victim, no 
suspect photographs were shown to the victim 
and no further investigation is recorded. When 
the crime was recorded, it was incorrectly 
categorised as theft, instead of robbery. The 
Inspectorate was informed that the investigating 
garda was cautioned by a supervisor. 
Case 2
In March 2012, a male was assaulted and a 
suspect was identified at the time. This was 
never recorded on PULSE and no investigation 
ever took place. The Garda Síochána has 
acknowledged that the crime should have been 
recorded. The Inspectorate was informed that 
the garda involved in this incident was given 
advice by a supervisor.
Case 3 
In March 2012, an assault took place; the suspect 
was captured on CCTV and the original call 
message shows that a suspect was intercepted by 
gardaí. This crime was not recorded on PULSE 
and no investigation appears to have taken 
place. The Garda Síochána has acknowledged 
that the incident should have been recorded and 
an instruction was given to that effect.
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Case 4
In April 2012, a male reported that his car was 
broken into and his lap top and registration 
documents were stolen. This crime was not 
recorded at the time and a PULSE incident was 
created in October 2013 (after the request by 
the Inspectorate). The crime had occurred in 
another county and the crime was transferred to 
another division to commence an investigation 
some twenty months later. The Garda Síochána 
has acknowledged that the crime should have 
been recorded and the investigating garda was 
subject to a discipline enquiry.
Case 5
In April 2012, a person at a garda station reported 
that their mobile telephone had been stolen. This 
was noted as a robbery in an official station book 
that is used to record calls from the public, but 
it was not recorded on PULSE. This incident was 
recorded some twelve months later (after the 
request by the Inspectorate) as lost property as 
the victim had not made a formal complaint. It 
is the Inspectorate’s view that the victim made 
a complaint of robbery and a crime should have 
been recorded and investigated.
Case 6 
In May 2012, a victim reported that he had just 
seen a suspect who had assaulted him. This was 
not recorded on PULSE until May 2013 (after 
the request from the Inspectorate). The Garda 
Síochána has acknowledged that it should 
have been recorded at the time and the garda 
involved was dealt with by local management. 
This was later recorded in the category of 
Attention and Complaint and not as a crime. The 
garda that dealt with this incident did not have 
any details of the victim, but believed that they 
were intoxicated at the time. There is no record 
to show that a unit responded to this call. 
Case 7
In April 2012, a car was broken into and a bag 
was stolen. This bag was later recovered nearby. 
The PULSE record states that the victim did not 
want to make a statement, as they had recovered 
their property. On checking the PULSE record 
the Inspectorate identified that this PULSE 
incident was not created until June 2013 (after 
the request from the Inspectorate). 
Case 8
In May 2012, a victim presented himself to 
gardaí with a cut to his head and information 
that threats had been made to his life. This 
information was corroborated by family 
members who confirmed the information 
provided. This crime does not appear to have 
been recorded as the victim refused to provide 
a statement. 
Case 9
In September 2012, a victim rang the gardaí to 
say that she was the victim of a robbery and her 
mobile phone had been stolen. In July 2013, a 
PULSE incident for lost property was recorded 
(after the request from the Inspectorate). The 
report from the division stated that the victim 
was intoxicated at the time and did not mention 
the loss of a mobile phone. The PULSE narrative 
conflicts with the information recorded by the 
garda call taker. 
Case 10
In June 2012, the occupier of a house called the 
gardaí to report that they had disturbed two 
males trying to load the victim’s lawnmower 
onto a van. This was not recorded on PULSE until 
July 2013 (after the request from the Inspectorate) 
and then in Attention and Complaints and not as 
a crime. The PULSE narrative conflicts with the 
information recorded by the garda call taker. 
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Domestic violence Cases
•	 In June 2012, a victim contacted the gardaí 
and stated that her husband had beaten her 
and she wanted him arrested. By the time 
the garda attended the scene the husband 
had left the house. Ten days later the victim 
attended court to obtain a court order. This 
incident was not recorded on PULSE until 
twelve months later (after the request from 
the Inspectorate). The Inspectorate was 
informed that the garda involved in this case 
was reminded about their responsibilities. 
When recorded, it was categorised as a 
domestic dispute. This conflicts with the 
information provided by the victim to the 
original garda call taker;
•	 In	 April	 2012,	 a	 domestic	 violence	 report	
was received where the victim stated that 
the suspect pushed her, injured her back 
and knee and damaged a bed. From the 
correspondence returned to the Inspectorate 
it appears that no gardaí responded to the 
incident.	No	PULSE	incident	was	created	at	
the time and the Garda Síochána reported 
that the garda was subject to a discipline 
enquiry. A domestic dispute report was 
created in May 2013 (after the request from 
the Inspectorate);
•	 In	June	2012,	a	domestic	violence	report	was	
received where it was alleged that a male 
was “breaking up the place.” This was not 
recorded on PULSE until July 2013 (after the 
request from the Inspectorate) and it was 
recorded as a domestic dispute incident. 
There was no explanation from the division 
concerned as to why this was not recorded at 
the time.
other Cases
•	 In March 2012, the occupier of a house heard 
a noise at the back door and noticed that the 
back door keys were missing. The back door 
keys were later found at the side of the house. 
This was not recorded as a crime and a crime 
scene examiner was not called to look for 
forensic opportunities;
•	 In	March	2012,	a	caller	reported	a	car	crime.	
No	follow	up	was	ever	made	and	it	was	not	
recorded on PULSE.
Key Findings
There are a number of serious issues arising from 
these cases:
•	 Crimes	were	not	recorded	and	investigated	
at the time of reporting; 
•	 Several	 PULSE	 incidents	 were	 created	
after the request for information by the 
Inspectorate;
•	 Victim	 and	 witness	 statements	 were	 not	
always taken and in most cases, there was 
no further victim contact; 
•	 There	is	an	absence	of	intrusive	supervision.
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3. Delays in investigating Crimes with a 
suspect
The following are cases where there were delays in 
investigating crimes where a suspect was present, 
was known or could have been identified.
Volume Crime Case Reviews 
Delays in Investigating Crimes 
with Suspects
Case 1 
In April 2012, a victim in a night club was 
assaulted by a male. Initially this was incorrectly 
classified as an assault minor, but was changed 
to assault with harm in December 2013 (after 
the Inspectorate asked for a copy of this case). 
A statement was taken from the victim, which is 
less than one page long and is short on detail for 
such a serious assault. The victim provided the 
name of a friend who identified the suspect by 
name. There is no statement in the case papers 
provided from the victim’s friend or any door 
staff that helped the victim on the night of the 
assault.	Nineteen	months	later,	the	investigating	
garda conducted an interview under caution 
with a male that they described as “knowing 
from the general area”. There was no explanation 
as to how this person is linked to the crime. 
During this interview, the garda asked a number 
of questions including “Are you capable of biting 
someone, male or female in a row”. During the 
interview the suspect was not asked if they were 
at the night club at the time of the assault. On 
checking the case file and the PULSE record, 
there is no record of any supervision of this case, 
until after the time that the Inspectorate asked 
for details. There is also no evidence on the file of 
obtaining a medical statement from the hospital 
regarding the injuries sustained by the victim 
and there is no explanation as to why a named 
suspect was not placed on an identification 
parade. This is a poor investigation of a named 
suspect who had committed a violent assault. 
Case 2
In April 2012, a teenage boy was the 
subject of an unprovoked head butt by a male. 
The PULSE incident was created six days later 
and was incorrectly classified as a minor assault. 
At the time of dealing with the victim, the garda 
was given information about the suspect’s 
details and on viewing the CCTV the garda 
recognised the suspect. A victim’s statement 
was taken six days later and nineteen days later 
a witness statement was taken. The suspect was 
not arrested, but was interviewed twenty-six 
days later, where they fully admitted the offence. 
The seriousness of this assault was reflected in 
an	eleven	month	prison	 sentence	 in	November	
2012. This was a serious assault that was not 
investigated promptly and there were long 
delays in taking victim and witness statements 
and dealing with the suspect.
Case 3 
In May 2012, a victim was head butted in the face 
and a glass was broken over his head, causing 
injuries. Suspects were identified at the time of 
the offence and this was confirmed on CCTV 
footage. The suspects were not interviewed 
until August and September, some three to four 
months later. The delay is not explained in the 
case file.
Case 4 
In May 2012, a male was assaulted outside a 
night club. The assault was captured on CCTV. 
The suspects were not arrested and interviewed 
about the matter until August 2012. The case went 
to a first hearing at a district court in February 
2013, by which time one of the offenders had 
absconded to another jurisdiction.  
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Case 5 
A	victim	was	assaulted	in	November	2012	whilst	
walking home with his girlfriend and sustained 
serious facial injuries. The assault was captured 
on CCTV. Despite clear lines of enquiry, the 
suspect was not arrested until May 2013. Delays 
in obtaining medical statements are mentioned 
in the case papers, but it does not appear that 
such statements were ever obtained. This case 
was still shown as outstanding at the time of the 
inspection.
Case 6
An aggravated burglary was committed in 
September 2012 by a suspect with a knife. A 
named suspect was arrested in December and 
it transpired that this person was not actually 
involved in this crime. A second suspect was later 
identified and arrested in May 2013. During an 
interview with this suspect it transpired that the 
crime as described by the victim had not in fact 
occurred. The Inspectorate asked for additional 
information from the Garda Síochána in respect 
of this crime to establish how the second suspect 
was identified. This information was requested 
in October 2013, but was not provided.
Case 7
In	 November	 2012,	 a	 victim	 was	 assaulted	
and sustained a facial injury. A suspect was 
identified, but was not interviewed until April 
2013. Despite permission from the victim to 
access their medical records, a statement from 
the doctor who examined the victim was not 
obtained. There is evidence on the case file of a 
sergeant questioning why medical evidence was 
not obtained, but there was no follow up.
Case 8
In May 2012, a victim was punched in the face 
and bitten by a named suspect. This crime 
was recorded on PULSE in September 2012. 
The crime was recorded as an assault minor, 
but the case file has many references to a more 
serious assault. Although the suspect was 
present at the time of the incident, no arrest 
was made and it took four weeks to obtain a 
victim’s statement. Suspects for this case were 
not interviewed until July and August 2013 
and a case file was submitted to an inspector 
in	October	2013.	In	November	2013,	directions	
were received to prosecute the suspect. 
Case 9
In May 2012, a victim was hit in the face with 
a glass, resulting in stitches from the injury. 
The suspect made an admission at the time, 
but was not arrested. The victim’s statement is 
only fourteen lines long and is poor in content, 
e.g. there is no description of the suspect. A 
key witness statement did not include any 
description of the suspect. The suspect was not 
arrested until two months later. 
Key Findings
There are a number of key findings arising from 
these cases:
	•	 Delays	 or	 failures	 to	 gather	 victim	 and	
witness statements;
•	 Unexplained	 delays	 in	 dealing	 with	
identified suspects;
•	 Some	 poor	 quality	 victim	 and	 witness	
statements; 
•	 Late	 recording	 of	 crimes	 and	 in	 one	 case	
created five months later;
•	 Delays	 in	 gathering	 evidence	 and	 making	
arrests;
•	 There	 was	 an	 absence	 of	 intrusive	
supervision.
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4. investigations that were not progressed 
effectively 
The following are cases where investigations were 
not progressed effectively.
Volume Crime Case Reviews 
Investigations	that	were	Not	
Progressed Effectively
Case 1
A	 burglary	 occurred	 in	 March	 2012.	 No	
investigation appears to have taken place until a 
new investigating garda was assigned in August 
2013 (after the Inspectorate had asked for details 
of the case). The Inspectorate was informed that 
the investigating garda had subsequently retired 
and would have faced disciplinary proceedings 
if they were still in the service.  
Case 2
In May 2012, a victim and family member were 
in their car when two youths smashed the 
window and slashed the car tyres. The initial 
entry on PULSE mentions the need to check for 
CCTV, but there is no further information that 
this was ever conducted. On checking PULSE, 
there is an entry on the record that states that 
numerous attempts were made to contact the 
victim and eventually the victim stated that they 
did not want to make a statement of complaint. 
On examination of this entry, the Inspectorate 
identified that this information was entered on 
PULSE in May 2013 (after the Inspectorate had 
asked for details of the case).
Case 3
In May 2012, a victim was attacked in their 
driveway by a group of males and was punched 
in	the	face	causing	injury.	No	statement	appears	
to have been taken from the victim and there 
are no updates on PULSE as to any further 
investigation.	 No	 case	 file	 was	 sent	 to	 the	
Inspectorate.
Case 4
In April 2012, a crime took place where the 
suspect said they had a knife. This was recorded 
as a theft, but the victim’s statement makes it 
clear that a robbery took place. The last update 
was	 recorded	 in	 August	 2012.	 No	 record	 of	
investigation exists since that time and there is 
no information about any attempts to identify 
a suspect. The case file mentions that CCTV 
was requested and the investigating garda is 
awaiting those outcomes. Some twelve months 
later, there was no PULSE update on whether 
any further investigation took place and whether 
any CCTV enquiries were conducted.
Case 5
In June 2012, a burglary occurred and PULSE 
shows that entry was gained through an open 
window and that property was stolen. The 
PULSE incident was initially categorised as a 
burglary, but was reclassified as Attention and 
Complaints on the same day and closed. There 
was no recorded rationale to explain why this 
was not a crime and why it was not investigated. 
Case 6
In May 2012, a burglary took place where a 
number of suspects drove a car through the 
closed doors of a garage and were disturbed by 
a neighbour, as they were searching through a 
press in the garage. Two months later a victim’s 
statement was obtained, but no statement from 
the neighbour was supplied to the Inspectorate. 
The crime was incorrectly classified as criminal 
damage. There is no mention of enquiries to 
trace CCTV in the initial PULSE entry, but two 
months later the investigating garda reports 
that no CCTV was available. One year later no 
case file was made available to the Inspectorate 
and PULSE has no update about any attempts to 
trace the vehicle or the suspects.
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Case 7
In June 2012, a male was stabbed several times. 
Garda correspondence describes the victim as 
unwilling to make a statement and the district 
officer authorised for the crime to be reclassified 
from an assault with harm to an assault minor, 
as the victim was unwilling to assist. On the 
night of the assault the victim was described 
as intoxicated and aggressive to gardaí, but 
co-operative with the ambulance service. A 
photograph was taken of the victim’s injuries. 
There was no record of a detective or a supervisor 
assigned to try and obtain a statement at a time 
when the victim was more amenable.  
Case 8 
In April 2012, armed suspects entered a shop 
and threatened to shoot staff. Two victim 
statements were taken at the time which 
consisted of nine lines and fifteen lines, 
respectively. The statements are lacking 
in detail and there is no evidence of any 
supervisor identifying this, or the taking of 
additional statements. Whilst the recovery of 
clothes worn by the suspects is mentioned, 
there are no details about any examination of 
the items found.
Case 9
In May 2012, a victim reported damage to door 
locks in what appeared to be an attempted 
burglary. A case file tracking form was 
completed by the investigating garda detailing 
the investigative actions taken. On examination 
of the case file, the Inspectorate found that it was 
completed after the Inspectorate’s request for 
information on this particular case. The victim’s 
statement was not taken until May 2013. The 
crime tracking form was submitted to a sergeant 
fifteen months after the date of the crime.
Case 10 
In May 2012, a violent robbery took place in a 
pub after closing hours. Two suspects entered, 
one armed with a hand gun. The suspects 
pushed one witness to the ground and placed 
a gun to the head of the other. Statements 
were taken at the time, but they were short 
and missing key details, e.g. a witness 
mentioned a third suspect, but there is no 
further information and no description. With 
the redactions of the names of the gardaí in 
the information supplied to the Inspectorate, 
it was unable to determine whether a detective 
or non-detective garda took these statements.
Domestic violence Cases
•	 In	 June	 2012,	 the	 Gardaí	 were	 called	 to	 a	
domestic violence assault, where the suspect 
was	 present,	 but	 was	 not	 arrested.	 No	
statement was taken from the victim at the 
time.	 Nine	 days	 later,	 the	 victim	 contacted	
the garda to withdraw the allegation;
•	 In	March	 2012,	 two	 ex-partners	made	 cross	
allegations of assault and this is recorded 
in garda correspondence. As no statements 
of complaint were provided, this incident 
was initially created as an Attention and 
Complaints and later marked as invalid, e.g. 
no crime took place. This should have been 
recorded as two assaults and marked as a 
domestic violence incident.
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other Cases
•	 In	June	2012,	a	window	of	a	car	was	smashed	
and property taken. The PULSE incident 
shows that enquiries are on going. Twelve 
months later there are no updates on PULSE; 
•	 In	 June	 2012,	 a	 victim	 reported	 damage	 to	
locks that could have been an attempted 
burglary or a criminal damage. A crime 
tracking form showing details of all the 
actions taken was created in August 2013 
(after the request by the Inspectorate);  
•	 In	 June	 2012,	 property	 was	 stolen	 from	 a	
motor vehicle. There was no case file and no 
PULSE investigation update since the first 
day of recording;
•	 In	 May	 2012,	 a	 crime	 scene	 examiner	 was	
not called to an attempted burglary. In an 
internal memorandum, the investigating 
garda provided an update in October 2013, 
stating that CCTV and house to house 
inquiries were completed. This information 
was recorded on PULSE (after the request for 
information from the Inspectorate);
•	 In	April	 2012,	 a	 burglary	occurred	where	 a	
significant amount of identifiable jewellery 
was stolen. The stolen property list was not 
collected until August 2013 (after the request 
from the Inspectorate).
Key Findings
There are a number of issues arising from these 
cases:
•	 Investigations	 were	 not	 effectively	
progressed;
•	 Some	case	forms	and	updates	were	created	
at a much later stage on PULSE (after the 
request from the Inspectorate);
•	 Victim	 and	 witness	 statements	 were	 not	
always taken and in most cases there was no 
further victim contact; 
•	 Delays	in	gathering	evidence;	
•	 There	 was	 an	 absence	 of	 intrusive	
supervision.
5. Delays and Lost opportunities to gather 
Best evidence 
The following are cases that highlight delays in 
investigations and lost opportunities to gather 
evidence.
Volume Crime Case Reviews 
Delays and Lost Opportunities 
to Gather Best Evidence
Case 1
In June 2012, a robbery took place in a shopping 
centre by a suspect who threatened to assault 
the victim, and at the time, the suspect may 
have been armed with a knife. Gardaí attended 
the scene, but did not obtain and view available 
CCTV	 footage.	 In	 November	 2012,	 CCTV	
footage was viewed and a garda recognised the 
suspect who was immediately arrested. During 
an interview, the suspect made a full admission 
to the offence. This was a serious crime, but it 
took five months to view CCTV evidence which 
led to an arrest. There was no evidence of any 
instrusive supervision in this case. 
Case 2
In May 2012, a burglary took place, but the 
victim’s statement was not taken until seven 
months later. There is no explanation as to why 
it took so long to take the statement. An entry 
on PULSE showed CCTV was viewed, but this 
entry was not placed on PULSE until May 2013 
(after the Inspectorate had made a request for 
information).
Case 3
In April 2012, a male entered a shop with an iron 
bar, threatened and assaulted the owner and 
stole money. It took five days to take a victims, 
statement and to show the victim photographs 
of potential suspects.
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Lost Forensic opportunities and other 
Delays 
These are a selection of other delays and lost 
opportunities 
•	 In	May	2012,	a	burglary	occurred	and	CCTV	
enquiries were not conducted until three 
months later;
•	 In	 September	 2012,	 a	 robbery	 occurred	 at	
the victim’s home and the victim heard the 
mention of a gun. The victim was allowed 
to clean up the crime scene before a crime 
scene examiner could attend. The victim 
later declined to attend an identification 
parade. There is no information on PULSE or 
in the case file to show any intervention from 
a supervisor to persuade the victim to take 
part in an identification process. 
Delays in obtaining victim and Witness 
statements
The following are a selection of cases where 
there were delays in taking statements:
	•	 In	 April	 2012,	 a	 call	 was	 received	 to	 a	
domestic violence case involving the breach 
of a safety order. A victim’s statement was 
not taken until September 2012; 
•	 In	 April	 2012,	 a	 call	 was	 received	 to	 a	
domestic violence case where the suspect 
breached a safety order and damaged a car 
wing mirror. It took five months to obtain a 
victim’s statement;
•	 A	 burglary	 reported	 in	 May	 2012	 and	 a	
victim’s statement taken in December 2012;
•	 A	 robbery	 in	 May	 2012	 where	 no	 victim’s	
statement appears to have been taken;
•	 A	robbery	on	a	young	victim.	It	took	ten	days	
to obtain a victim’s statement and by that 
time the victim did not want to go to court as 
a witness;
•	 A	knife	point	robbery	in	May	2012,	a	witness	
statement was not taken until February 2013; 
•	 In	 June	 2012,	 a	 suspect	 was	 arrested	 for	
burglary. It took two months after the arrest 
to take a statement from the witness who 
called the garda;
•	 A	 robbery	 case.	 Most	 witness	 statements	
were taken immediately, but it took seven 
weeks to obtain a key witness statement.
Findings
There are a number of important key findings from 
the Inspectorate’s review of these cases:
•	 Unacceptable	 delays	 to	 gather	 and	 view	
CCTV evidence;
•	 Significant	 delays	 in	 obtaining	 victim	 and	
witness statements;
•	 Poor	quality	statements	lacking	details	taken	
from victims and witnesses by the gardaí.
the five areas examined in this analysis of the 
158 case studies highlight the inconsistencies 
in crime investigation from some excellent 
investigations to crimes that were not recorded 
and not investigated. 
the detailed examination of the 158 random cases 
across seven divisions highlights deficiencies in 
the recording, investigation and supervision of 
crimes notified to the garda síochána. the delay 
or lack of investigation of a crime and not dealing 
with a named suspect in a crime results is a poor 
service to victims. it also creates a risk of further 
crimes committed by the same suspect.  
Dealing with Failures to record a Crime
Not	recording	a	crime	or	conducting	an	appropriate	
investigation is a very serious matter. In dealing 
with this problem, the seven divisions have 
taken very different approaches to dealing with 
the gardaí involved. One division reported that 
gardaí were disciplined, one division stated that 
gardaí were cautioned, some divisions issued 
management advice and some did not take any 
action. One consistent theme across all divisions in 
respect of such cases was the noticeable absence of 
any comment about supervisory responsibility for 
ensuring that a crime was recorded correctly and 
investigated diligently. This is in common with the 
issues highlighted in the Guerin report. 
 recommendation 9.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an examination of the 
process of dealing with named suspects in a 
criminal investigation. (short term).
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 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	 a	 national	 Standard	 Operating	
Procedure to reduce delays in identifying 
and locating suspects; and to provide clear 
protocols for arrest and charging suspected 
offenders; 
•	 Ensure	that	suspected	offenders	are	arrested	
at the earliest opportunity;
•	 Develop	the	use	of	photo	fit	identification	as	
an investigative tool;
•	 Review	 and	 update	 as	 necessary,	 the	
guidance provided by the Garda Crime 
Investigation Techniques Manual.
9.7 Garda Professional Standards 
Unit
The Garda Professional Standards Unit (GPSU) 
was established in 2006 under the 2005 Garda 
Síochána Act. The purpose of the unit is to examine 
and review, as directed by the Commissioner, the 
operational, administrative and management of 
performance of the Garda Síochána at all levels.
As part of the inspection process, the Inspectorate 
requested copies of all GPSU examinations 
conducted in the seven divisions visited. At the 
time of the request, only four of the divisions had 
been examined by GPSU. The Inspectorate also 
conducted a field visit to the GPSU.  
gpsU examinations of Divisions visited
The Inspectorate reviewed the examinations 
conducted on four of the seven divisions, which 
took place between 2008 and 2011. Whilst the 
examinations did focus on some high risk areas, 
they did not conduct a thorough examination of 
how crime is managed, including the examination 
of case files and calls for service. The examinations 
did not identify poor recording practices, 
crimes that were not effectively investigated or 
inappropriate classification of crime. From talking 
to those involved in these types of examinations, 
the GPSU focused on policy review and the 
questions they asked at that time focused on 
whether people were aware of a particular policy 
and where they could find it. Domestic Violence 
(DV) was examined in two divisions, and the 
outcome of the examination concluded two areas 
of strength and a few areas of improvement. 
There is no evidence in these examinations of 
a focus on crime investigation practices, such as 
a review of CAD or paper records for calls from 
victims or that case files were examined to check 
that investigations were conducted thoroughly. 
In both of the divisions reviewed by the GPSU, 
the Inspectorate found incidents of DV that were 
not properly investigated. At no point in the 
examinations is there any evidence of GPSU staff 
checking the implementation of policies and the 
quality of crime investigations.
During 2012, the GPSU began a new process for 
conducting examinations. In that year, the GPSU 
examined a division that was one of the divisions 
visited by the Inspectorate in 2013. This allowed 
the Inspectorate to compare its findings against 
those of the GPSU. Under this new process, crime 
investigation case files were examined and some 
of the findings in the report confirm many of the 
issues that the Inspectorate found such as:
•	 Of	 the	 eighty-four	 case	 files	 requested	
by GPSU, the division was unable to find 
twelve;
•	 Garda	 notebooks	 were	 not	 checked	 by	
supervisors;
•	 Garda	statements	were	not	always	dated;	
•	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 serious	 robbery,	 it	 took	
twelve months to interview named suspects. 
This case was already four years old when 
the GPSU examined it;
•	 Not	 all	 gardaí	were	 aware	 of	 the	 policy	 in	
relation to reporting and investigation of 
sexual assaults; 
•	 Not	 all	 investigations	were	monitored	 and	
supervised;
•	 In	 three	 sexual	 assault	 cases,	 GPSU	 were	
unable to determine if the files were ever 
sent to the DPP.
During this examination, the GPSU did not check 
compliance rates from calls made for garda services 
to the creation of a PULSE record. 
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In 2013, under new management and with new 
direction, the GPSU has significantly changed 
the way that examinations are conducted. The 
Inspectorate reviewed one examination on which 
comparison could be drawn. The examination 
identified some of the issues that the Inspectorate 
found in respect of: 
•	 Domestic	 Violence	 cases	 inappropriately	
categorised;
•	 Unsatisfactory	 investigation	 of	 sexual	
assaults and inappropriate recording of 
sexual assaults in Attention and Complaints; 
•	 PULSE	 records	 created	 after	 the	 GPSU	
request;
•	 Case	files	completed	after	a	request	from	the	
GPSU;
•	 An	inability	to	find	out	the	results	for	calls	
for service;
•	 Statements	and	other	papers	undated;
•	 Tardiness	 in	 investigations	 and	 delays	 in	
submission of files for directions;
•	 Named	 suspects	 not	 arrested	 or	 delays	 in	
interviewing or conducting arrests; 
•	 Cases	not	 reallocated	 to	a	new	 investigator	
following a retirement or during absence, 
such as extended sick leave. 
The Inspectorate welcomes the new GPSU 
approach, finding it to be a much more intrusive 
and evidence-based process, but considers that 
it should include some risk areas that are not yet 
subject to examination, such as reclassification of 
crime, victim satisfaction and detections.
The GPSU start the year with a plan of activity, 
but the plan is often interrupted to do bespoke 
pieces of work, such as conducting critical incident 
and serious crime reviews for significant cases, 
where prosecutions have not been successful. 
Part 6 of this report and the most recent GPSU 
examinations,  identify issues with the recording, 
non-investigation and supervision of complaints 
of sexual assault.  
The Inspectorate found that garda national units 
have never been subject to GPSU examination. 
Some of those units have been operating for 
seventeen years without any formal inspection 
process, either internally or by the Garda 
Inspectorate. This is far from an ideal situation 
and should be addressed.
The current GPSU programme of conducting 
four divisional examinations a year is not 
going to address the issues that exist across the 
twenty-eight divisions. Following receipt of the 
Crime Investigation Reports, the Garda Síochána 
must review how the GPSU will be tasked in 
the future. There are thematic areas, such as 
incident and crime recording, classification of 
crime, investigation of crime and particularly the 
investigation of victim based offences that should 
fall within the GPSU remit. 
The Inspectorate believes that the GPSU must be 
focused on dealing with the high risk areas that 
are presenting the greatest danger to victim and 
community confidence. 
 recommendation 9.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána reviews the programme 
of examinations conducted by the garda 
professional standards Unit (gpsU). (short 
term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	GPSU	are	 tasked	pursuant	
to the high risk issues including those 
identified in the Crime Investigation 
Report, such as reviews of compliance of 
PULSE policies on entries, classification and 
reclassification of crime and detections;
•	 Establish	a	robust	process	of	monitoring	the	
implementation of GPSU recommendations. 
The provision of GPSU reports to the Garda 
Inspectorate has greatly assisted with this 
inspection. In order to facilitate its statutory 
remit and to help identify emerging trends, the 
Inspectorate recommends that copies of all future 
GPSU reports are provided to the Inspectorate.
 recommendation 9.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána provides all future gpsU reports to 
the garda inspectorate. (short term).
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9.8 Dealing with Persons in 
Garda Detention
introduction 
There are a number of reasons why a person is taken 
to a garda station, including persons arrested and 
those who are vulnerable and in need of immediate 
care and attention. The decision whether to arrest 
a suspect or not at the discretion of an individual 
garda dealing with an incident. For example, there 
are some occasions where a garda has a duty to 
apprehend a person wanted on a warrant and 
bring the person to court.  Another example would 
be where a garda is dealing with a suspect and 
there is reasonable suspicion that the person has 
committed an offence. The Garda Síochána also 
detain and bring to a garda station persons that 
have not committed crimes, but are being detained 
for their own well-being. Situations where this 
might arise include cases where persons whose 
may be suffering from mental health issues, whose 
behaviour may pose a serious risk to themselves or 
others. 
The decision to arrest is also driven by factors such 
as the seriousness of the offence. The more serious 
the crime, the more likely it is that an arrest should 
take place. The location of an incident and the 
distance from the nearest garda station may also 
be factors which may influence a decision to make 
an arrest. The presence of alcohol in a suspect or 
a victim can also hinder an arrest, as a garda will 
not always be able to obtain a statement, if a person 
is unfit through intoxication. The Inspectorate was 
informed by members that in more rural areas, 
discretion is often applied when considering 
whether to arrest or not. A single patrol unit in a 
rural area is often faced with the dilemma as to 
whether to make an arrest in circumstances where 
to do so would remove the only unit that is available 
to answer emergency calls.  
Detained persons and transfer to a garda 
station
A person who is arrested should be transferred to 
a garda station as soon as possible after arrest. The 
absence of suitable transportation for convening 
persons to garda stations was raised at every 
division visited. Often, there is no suitable garda 
station van available to transport a person and 
garda are using patrol cars as a result. For compliant 
persons, and in the absence of a van, this may be 
a suitable option, but for non-compliant persons 
this is not good practice and the use of a patrol 
car presents a risk to the escorting garda and the 
detained person. 
Following an arrest and under certain 
circumstances, a garda can place handcuffs on 
arrested persons.  During the inspection, the 
Inspectorate was informed that whilst some gardaí 
are trained in the use of rigid handcuffs, this 
equipment has not been issued. Rigid handcuffs 
are in operation in many other international 
police services. This type of restraint offers far 
more options than traditional link handcuffs and 
provides more control for an officer if a person 
is resistant. The Inspectorate believes that rigid 
handcuffs should be issued to gardaí trained in 
their use.
 recommendation 9.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána issues rigid handcuffs to gardaí 
trained in their use. (short term).
Detention in garda Custody
The detention and treatment of persons brought to 
garda stations is covered by the Custody Regulations 
of 1987, as amended by the 2006 Criminal Justice 
Act. The regulations outline a number of practical 
protective measures for those detained. Regulations 
19 and 20 deal specifically with conditions and 
treatment of persons in custody. Detention in a 
garda station is available for the purpose of proper 
investigation of a crime. Prior to authorising a 
person’s detention in custody at a garda station, a 
member-in-charge must have reasonable grounds 
to suspect that detention is necessary for the proper 
investigation of the offence for which a person was 
arrested. Where the grounds for detention later 
cease to exist, a person should be informed and 
immediately released.
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supervision of Detained persons taken to 
garda stations 
As a counterbalance to the power of arrest and 
interview for questioning under the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1984, the concept of a “member-
in-charge” was simultaneously introduced. 
The member in charge has a number of key 
responsibilities, such as authorising detention of 
a person, if it is deemed necessary for the proper 
investigation of an offence. Other responsibilities 
include the monitoring of the detention period, 
the recording of information concerning the 
arrested person, the recording of the details of 
their arrest and providing guidance to the proper 
conduct of an interview. Outside of Dublin, the 
member in charge role is usually performed by a 
garda and the person is often a member attached 
to a regular unit. In divisions visited as part of this 
inspection, the Inspectorate found that a garda 
designated as member in charge will often have 
other daily responsibilities, such as looking after 
the public office and answering the main station 
telephone line.  
In the Dublin Metropolitan Region, the Station 
House Officer (SHO) is a sergeant assigned with 
responsibility for managing detained persons 
at garda stations. The SHO also has other daily 
responsibilities, such as providing advice to gardaí 
on patrol who are dealing with complex or serious 
incidents. On occasions, this may necessitate a SHO 
attending a crime scene. 
Many persons detained at garda stations are 
vulnerable for a variety of reasons, including those 
with medical conditions, mental illness or those 
who are intoxicated and as a result, their behaviour 
may present a significant safety risk to themselves 
or others. The role of member in charge and 
SHO is very important and it places considerable 
responsibility on the person designated to that role. 
training of sergeants and members in 
Charge
During meetings with sergeants and gardaí, the 
Inspectorate identified that the vast majority of 
sergeants and garda performing the member in 
charge role have received no specific training. 
During a recent visit by the Inspectorate to the 
Garda College, it was established that the Garda 
Síochána has developed a new training course 
for those performing the member-in-charge role. 
Whilst the Inspectorate acknowledges that a course 
is now available, there are still a significant number 
of untrained gardaí and sergeants performing this 
role.
In	 the	 PSNI,	 only	 those	 who	 have	 completed	 a	
custody training course are used in this role. This 
is a four week course for sergeants, officers and 
civilian detention officers who work in custody 
suites. The course includes all aspects of dealing 
with detained persons and related areas such as 
dealing with those who are wanted on a warrant or 
on bail. The course also contains a practical exercise 
for participants. 
supervision of Custody suites in other 
policing Jurisdictions 
The Garda Síochána does not operate a custody 
sergeant system that is used in many other 
international police services. These services have 
established the position of custody sergeants, 
who have sole responsibility for the management 
of those who are detained at a police station. The 
role of this sergeant is seen as key to ensuring 
that there is control of everything that happens 
within a custody suite. Custody sergeants are often 
posted for extended periods to this role to avoid 
circumstances where different people perform the 
role every day. Dedicated custody sergeants have 
professionalised the management of detained 
persons. They are supported by police officers or 
civilian detention officers who have designated 
responsibilities, such as conducting regular checks 
on detained persons and taking fingerprints and 
other samples.  
The	PSNI	assign	dedicated	custody	sergeants	and	
currently have seventy-two personnel performing 
those roles. All custody sergeants receive a formal 
training course and there are 180 other trained 
sergeants who can perform the custody sergeant 
role as cover during leave and other absences. 
Other policing jurisdictions are moving towards the 
utilisation of civilian support staff in custody suites. 
Across many services, civilian employees are now 
routinely deployed in custody suites as detention 
officers in a gaoler capacity. Some services have 
also developed detention officers to deal with the 
initial reception of a detained person on arrival at a 
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police station. This has released custody sergeants 
from administrative duties such as data inputting, 
to provide better supervision of detained persons. 
The use of police staff releases police officer time 
for	 front-line	 duties.	 The	 PSNI	 now	 have	 146	
civilian detention officers. The Greater Manchester 
Police (GMP) deploys 108 sergeants and 200 civilian 
detention officers. Only fully trained staff are 
authorised to work in custody suites. 
The responsibility for managing detained persons 
is an important role and includes the welfare and 
safety of persons in custody and also ensuring 
that investigations are conducted diligently and 
expeditiously. 
Custody sergeants can also provide guidance and 
direction to an investigator dealing with a detained 
person in respect of the next steps and ensuring 
that	 all	 necessary	 action	 is	 taken.	 The	 PSNI	 and	
other police services now operate a system called 
Evidential Reviewing Officers (EROs) who are 
supervisors that are usually attached to prisoner 
processing or case progression units. EROs conduct 
an early assessment of a person in detention and 
provide advice on the way forward.  
garda inspectorate report on Front-Line 
supervision 
The Inspectorate’s report on Front-Line 
Supervision, published in 2012, highlighted 
inadequate supervision of detained persons and 
recommended that sergeants should be responsible 
for all processes relating to a detained person. 
The recommendation of solely using a sergeant to 
process detained persons was rejected at that time 
by the Garda Síochána. The Inspectorate believes 
that this recommendation is still valid and should 
be implemented.
Custody Facilities
Across Ireland, many garda stations have a number 
of cells and detention rooms used for housing those 
detained in custody. Detention rooms are often 
used for young persons. The numbers of cells and 
detention rooms varies greatly from stations with 
one to three cells in the more rural areas, to stations 
in cities with over twelve to twenty cells. During 
inspection visits to divisions outside of the main 
cities, the Inspectorate regularly found no persons 
actually detained in custody, at the time of the visit. 
Most divisions operate multiple custody facilities 
at the various district stations and at the time of 
the visits, the Inspectorate established that in the 
DMR alone there are forty separate locations where 
detained persons can be held.  
The number of custody suites in the divisions 
visited ranged from five to twelve. The Inspectorate 
was informed by members that there are occasions 
where one or two persons are detained at each site 
at the same time. The Inspectorate does not view 
this use of multiple custody facilities, each staffed 
by a member in charge or an SHO, as best use of 
garda resources.  
The Inspectorate visited many of the custody 
facilities and found that the condition of custody 
facilities varied greatly between district stations. 
Some station custody facilities had been refurbished 
and were in a good state of repair and some were in 
poor overall condition, with cells often covered in 
graffiti. In one district station, 50% of the cells were 
out of commission and were used to store property 
and exhibits. Most of the district stations with poor 
facilities had plans to modernise the facilities and 
to include CCTV, showers and exercise areas.
Chart 9.1 outlines the Inspectorates findings from 
visits to custody areas in the seven divisions. 
‘Insecure areas’ described in the chart refer to 
custody areas without key pad entry systems and 
areas with unrestricted access.
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4 
4 AFIS is an automated fingerprint identification system. It has 
increased quality over ink systems and can often return a 
search of a million records in under a minute
chart 9.1
inspectorate assessment of Custody areas in selected Divisions
garda station number of cells supervision comments
Ballymun  
dMr north 
6 cells sHo •	 CCTV	in	operation
•	 Insecure	area
•	 AFIS	livescan		machine
•	 Overall	satisfactory	condition
castlebar 
Mayo
4 cells Member-in-charge •	 Upgraded	following	a	PSU	examination
•	 AFIS	livescan4 machine
•	 Overall	good	condition
crumlin 
dMr south
4 cells  
2 detention rooms 
sHo •	 Detained	persons	are	processed	next	to	the	public	
office	which	is	not	ideal	as	conversations	can	be	
heard by callers to the station
•	 Insecure	area
•	 No	CCTV	
•	 No	showers	
•	 Two	interview	rooms	away	from	the	custody	area	
•	 No	AFIS	livescan	machine
•	 Custody	area	requires	refurbishment
Henry street 
Limerick
12 cells sHo •	 50%	of	cells	out	of	service
•	 Detained	persons	brought	in	via	the	public	office	
and	down	two	flights	of	stairs
•	 Insecure	area	
•	 Interview	rooms	on	first	floor
•	 AFIS	livescan	machine
•	 Custody	area	requires	refurbishment
Milford 
donegal
3 cells one out of 
service
Member-in-charge •	 140	persons	detained	in	2012
•	 No	AFIS	livescan	machine
•	 Two	interview	rooms
•	 Insecure	area	
•	 General	condition	satisfactory
naas 
Kildare
6 cells 
1 detention room
Member-in-charge •	 1,100	detained	persons	per	year	
•	 No	CCTV	
•	 AFIS	livescan	machine
•	 Custody	area	requires	refurbishment
Waterford 6 cells Member-in-charge •	 3,500	detained	persons	per	year	
•	 Due	for	refurbishment
•	 No	CCTV
•	 All	cells	covered	in	graffiti	
•	 Two	interview	rooms	upstairs	
•	 Insecure	area	
•	 No	shower	facilities	
•	 AFIS	livescan	machine
Source: Data obtained from sampling of custody areas by the Garda Inspectorate
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entering garda Custody areas
In most policing jurisdictions, a detained person 
is brought by police transport to a secure entrance. 
Entrance to the custody suite is made through a 
caged area attached to the back of a custody suite. 
In most divisions visited as part of this inspection, 
these facilities are not in place. Several district 
stations bring detained persons through the main 
entrance of a garda station through the public 
waiting area and into the main part of the station. 
On occasions this involves bringing people who are 
non-compliant through the public waiting area and 
potentially past victims of crime. This is not good 
practice and all detained persons should, where 
possible, be brought through the rear of a garda 
station and directly into the custody area. In one 
district station, the custody suite is in the basement 
and arresting officers have to walk people down 
two flights of stairs. This presents a significant and 
unnecessary safety hazard for all concerned.  
Custody security
During these inspections, the Inspectorate did not 
find any secure custody area. In most other policing 
jurisdictions, a custody area has a secure entry 
and exit system to prevent persons entering into 
a custody unauthorised area and also to prevent 
persons from escaping. There were also a number 
of windows in interview and doctors’ rooms that 
were not secure and provided opportunities for 
people to escape or to discard concealed property.  
CCTV was limited to a few places and often systems 
only covered the entrance into a custody area. This 
is an important security feature that is used in most 
other policing jurisdictions along with audio and 
visual recording, which acts as a good safeguard 
to those with responsibility for managing detained 
persons.  
interview rooms 
All the stations visited had facilities for conducting 
interviews with detained persons, but in many 
garda stations these interview rooms were away 
from the custody area and in some garda stations it 
necessitated taking a detained person up and down 
flights of stairs to rooms on other floors. Again, it is 
good practice to have interview facilities as part of a 
secure custody area. With solicitors now attending 
interviews, the Garda Síochána will have to provide 
secure facilities for private consultation.
Health provision in Custody suites
As part of the reception of a person into garda 
detention, the SHO or a member in charge should 
conduct a risk assessment of the individual. This 
is a fairly basic risk assessment and other police 
services have developed a more comprehensive 
risk assessment process. Gardaí conducting risk 
assessments are untrained and should receive 
training on all aspects of dealing with detained 
persons. Many of the persons detained will require 
medical attention and a local doctor should be 
called to examine the person and to see if they are 
fit to remain at a garda station. 
In the UK, there is a move towards the health 
service taking responsibility for commissioning 
medical care provisions of those in police custody. 
In	 the	 PSNI,	 by	 2015,	 all	 health	 care	 for	 detained	
persons will be governed by the health department. 
In	 Scotland,	 the	 National	 Health	 Service	 controls	
custodial	 healthcare.	 Currently,	 the	 PSNI	 spend	
£3.5m (€4.4m) a year to operate a forensic medical 
examiner scheme that utilises doctors to attend 
custody suites. The Garda Síochána process of 
medical care is very similar to that used in other 
police services. Many UK police services are now 
employing nurses in centralised custody suites to 
provide immediate care to a detained person. Police 
services have found that there are opportunities to 
improve health care, whilst reducing overall costs.  
engagement with partner agencies 
The	PSNI	 identified	many	detention	 issues	where	
police officers are fulfilling roles that should 
be performed by other agencies. This includes 
custody suites that are used as places of safety 
for those with mental health issues and who need 
immediate	care	and	attention.	The	PSNI	has	issued	
an instruction that custody suites are not to be 
used as a place of safety for those who are clearly 
in	need	of	medical	 treatment.	Currently,	 the	PSNI	
is working closely with the Health Department 
and local hospitals to work through this particular 
issue. These authorities are trying to resolve the 
issue of hospitals receiving people in the custody 
of the police who are suffering from mental health 
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issues. Police officers are experiencing long delays 
at hospitals waiting for psychiatric assessments 
to take place and for a decision to be made as to 
whether the person will be admitted.  
The	 facts	as	described	 in	 the	PSNI	are	 replicated	
in the Garda Síochána on a daily basis. The 
current practice of using garda stations as 
places of safety puts the person at risk and is 
resulting in the Garda Síochána dealing with 
an issue on behalf of another agency. This is not 
addressing the key needs of the person and it is 
placing unnecessary corporate risk on the Garda 
Síochána. The Inspectorate believes that the Garda 
Síochána should engage key partner agencies to 
develop action plans for managing people that are 
suffering from mental health issues and who come 
to the attention of garda members for care and not 
for criminal matters. Improvements in this process 
could release a significant amount of garda time 
that is currently spent on non-garda duties.
 recommendation 9.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to explore the following 
recommendations in respect of health care 
provision and demand reduction for persons 
in custody. (Long term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Review	 and	 implement	 international	 best	
practice for improvement in health care 
provision for persons detained in custody;
•	 Develop	 clear	 and	 unambiguous	 protocols	
among the strategic partners for dealing 
with persons, in both public and private 
locations, that are suffering from mental 
health issues and in urgent need of medical 
attention;
•	 Establish	clear	and	unambiguous	protocols	
among strategic partners for an appropriate 
response to young persons who are taken 
to garda stations, particularly after normal 
office hours; (See page 28, Young Offenders 
in Custody)
•	 Ensure	 a	 comprehensive	 risk	 assessment	
process for detention of prisoners.
international Custody Facilities
The current situation in Ireland is very similar to 
the position previously found in many UK police 
services, namely a proliferation of small custody 
facilities, often in poor condition, managing small 
numbers of detained persons. It is the Inspectorate’s 
view that refurbishing multiple sites within a single 
division is not the best use of public funds. Likewise, 
trying to manage multiple custody facilities that 
operate significantly under capacity is not best use 
of garda resources.
Other police services have moved to larger 
centralised custody suites designed to meet the 
needs of a division, a region or a whole police 
area. Clearly, the location of a centralised custody 
suite needs careful consideration as this can have 
a high impact on operational resources.  Most 
police services place custody facilities in key 
geographical areas and also co-locate other units 
such as detective units, crime scene examiners, 
prisoner processing units, warrant offices and 
property stores at the same locations.  
In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 the	 PSNI	 has	 reduced	 the	
number of custody suites from twenty-nine to 
sixteen with further plans to significantly reduce 
that number. Belfast operates a fifty cell centralised 
custody facility at Musgrave and there are plans to 
develop a small number of similar sized suites to 
cover	 the	 services’	 needs.	 	 The	PSNI	 also	need	 to	
cater for rural needs and are likely to situate custody 
suites within a reasonable travelling distance. The 
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) has reduced 
custody suites numbers from eighteen to ten (two 
of which are held in reserve) and deal with 80,000 
detained	persons	a	year.	Like	the	PSNI,	the	GMP	is	
moving towards super sized custody facilities with 
fifty to sixty cells.  Scotland has forty-two primary 
custody centres, which can manage 200,000 
detained persons a year. West Yorkshire Police has 
taken a slightly different approach to managing 
offenders with separate adult and juvenile custody 
suites.  
In Dublin, Cork, Limerick and other cities, there 
are opportunities for rationalisation of custody 
facilities. The main detention centre in Dublin City 
is located at the Bridewell, which has thirty cells, 
but is in poor condition. The Bridewell would need 
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significant investment to upgrade the facilities, 
but in the long term it has the potential to provide 
centralised custody facilities for several divisions 
or the whole of the DMR. Cork City has a similar 
facility to the Bridewell, which is also in poor 
condition and in need of significant investment. The 
Inspectorate understands that there are plans to 
build a new court facility in Cork and it is believed 
that there could be benefits in reviewing the plans 
to see if there is an opportunity to develop a 
centralised custody facility for Cork City. There are 
additional benefits of co-location with the courts in 
reducing the need to transfer prisoners to and from 
garda stations.  
Custody and Cell management
Many UK police services have taken the 
responsibility for custody away from the control of 
divisions and created a separate unit/directorate 
that provides a service to those divisions. This has 
removed many of the previous problems where 
divisions were saying that their custody facilities 
were full when in fact this was not the case. 
These cells were being held for the division’s own 
requirements. This resulted in officers having to 
contact different detention facilities until someone 
agreed to accept a prisoner. This was an issue raised 
by officers working in Dublin and particularly at 
Dublin Airport, who have to call garda stations 
looking for cell space.
garda inspectorate report on Front-Line 
supervision 
The Inspectorate’s report on Front-Line Supervision 
recommended the rationalisation of stations 
designated for detaining persons for longer than 
six hours. This recommendation was accepted but 
has not been implemented.
The report also highlighted certain requirements 
for an effective and efficient custody facility, which 
include:
•	 Sufficient	trained,	dedicated	staff;
•	 A	sergeant	designated	as	a	custody	officer;
•	 CCTV	 that	 records	 visual	 and	 audio	 from	
entering the rear of a garda station yard 
through to the custody suite and the whole 
custody area;
•	 A	 secure	 environment	 that	 stops	
unauthorised people entering and prevents 
those who might attempt to escape.
Most of the current custody facilities used by the 
Garda Síochána do not meet these standards. The 
Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána needs 
to conduct a full review of all custody facilities 
and explore opportunities for rationalisation, 
centralisation and where opportunities exist, to 
co-locate with other justice partners. The Garda 
Síochána also needs to explore opportunities for 
creating much more efficient and effective custody 
suites.
Detention time
The period spent from the time of a person’s 
arrest to the time of their release from a garda 
station is referred to as the detention time. On 
arrival at a garda station, the member in charge 
or the SHO must be provided with information 
about why a person was arrested and why it is 
necessary to detain them to investigate a crime. 
Before authorising the detention, a member in 
charge must be satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to detain a person for an investigation. 
The member in charge has a pivotal role at this 
point to determine if a person needs to be detained 
or not. The use of gardaí in this role of member 
in charge can place that garda and particularly, 
a young and inexperienced garda in a difficult 
position. From checking a number of custody 
records, the Inspectorate did not find any examples 
of where a member in charge refused to authorise 
the detention of an arrested person.
For most criminal offences, a person can be detained 
at a garda station for a period of six hours from 
the time of arrest. After that period has expired, 
a person should be charged with an offence or 
released from detention. If further investigation 
is required, further periods of detention can be 
authorised by a superintendent for an additional 
six hours and an additional twelve hours on the 
authority of a chief superintendent. For offences 
against the State, a person can be detained for 
twenty-four hours, with further twenty-four hour 
periods authorised by a chief superintendent and 
then a district judge. For a case involving murder 
and drug trafficking, significantly longer periods 
can be authorised to allow the investigation of the 
crime to take place.  
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Detention time for Complex and serious 
Crime investigations 
The initial period of six hours for detention of 
a person in Ireland is a relatively short period 
and was created during a time when there was 
a different landscape for dealing with detained 
persons and when there was far less complexity of 
crime investigation. With serious crimes and often 
more complex crimes such as fraud investigations, 
this six hour period is often insufficient to enable an 
effective investigation to be completed. A significant 
period of any detention time can be used waiting 
for transport to go to a garda station, dealing with 
the reception of a detained person and waiting for a 
solicitor to attend. Dealing with a detained person 
can also be delayed whilst victim and witness 
statements are taken or while CCTV or other 
evidence is gathered and examined. Currently, 
interviews in garda stations are tape recorded and 
require a contemporaneous written record to be 
made at the time of the interview. These interviews 
are using a significant period of the detention time. 
With the recent introduction of solicitor’s access to 
an interview, there is likely to be more delays in the 
starting time of an interview and an extension to 
the duration of an interview.
The actual starting point for a detention time in 
Ireland is the time of arrest. In the UK, the detention 
time starts at the time of arrival at the first police 
station in the police service area. This deducts any 
time spent travelling and particularly if the person 
is arrested a long way from a police station. Scotland 
used to operate under the same six hour detention 
period as Ireland, but this was extended to twelve 
hours with the option of extending that period to a 
further twenty-four hours. In the UK and Denmark, 
a person can be detained for a period of twenty-four 
hours without charge and with the authority of a 
superintendent for a further twelve hour period. In 
Denver, people can be detained for up to seventy-
two hours without charge and in Chicago complex 
cases have forty-eight hours to process a detained 
person. The extended detention period does not 
mean that a person has to be detained any longer 
than absolutely necessary, but it does allow more 
time to fully investigate a crime.  
During meetings, senior gardaí consistently raised 
the issue of time pressures of trying to deal with 
complex cases in six hours. The Inspectorate 
believes that the six hours initial detention period is 
too short and that an increase to twelve or twenty-
four hours would provide sufficient time (where 
required) to fully investigate most offences.
suspension of Questioning
The Criminal Justice Regulations 1987 state that 
persons should not be interviewed between 
midnight and 8 a.m., except in cases where there 
are serious reasons for continuing or starting an 
interview. This is particularly relevant to persons 
who are arrested late at night or in the early hours 
of the morning. Where a person is arrested under 
Section 4 of the Criminal Law Act, 1984, a member 
in charge may determine that questioning should 
be suspended to afford the person a reasonable 
period of rest, providing the detained person 
consents. In contrast, where a person is detained 
under the Offences against the State Acts, such 
consent is not required. Any such breaks in 
detention are not included in determining the 
length of detention time. It is not always in the best 
interests of a detained person to be interviewed 
during those times and any evidence gained may 
not be accepted by a court. Suspension of detention 
also takes place where a person requires medical or 
hospital treatment or an appearance at court.
In England and Wales, people are usually placed 
into a period of uninterrupted (usually eight 
hours) rest from the investigation during the night, 
but the detention time is not suspended. The fact 
that UK police services have twenty-four hours 
to hold a person in detention, removes this as an 
issue of insufficient time to conduct a thorough 
investigation.  
Many other policing jurisdictions have one single 
piece of legislation that provides powers of arrest, 
search and detention for all offences and provides 
a consistent basis for all dealings with detained 
persons, irrespective of the offence for which they 
are detained.
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extensions of Detention
Where an investigation for a more serious crime 
is unable to be progressed within the six hour 
period, the power exists to extend detention in 
custody without charge. This process involves a 
superintendent or a chief superintendent reviewing 
the progress of a case and making a decision about 
whether the case is being dealt with efficiently and 
effectively. The permission to grant an extension 
can only be authorised at the time when the six 
hours is due to expire, although it can be completed 
by telephone. As a result, superintendents receive 
telephone calls at all hours of the day and night to 
consider extensions of detention. In other policing 
jurisdictions, an extension can be authorised in 
advance, if the circumstances of the case will 
require additional detention time. The position in 
the UK and Scotland is that an inspector who is 
on duty conducts reviews of a person’s detention 
at specific times to ensure the case is progressed 
diligently and a superintendent is only required 
to conduct a review of a person’s detention as the 
twenty-four hour period approaches.
statements regarding extensions of 
Detention
Another aspect of the extension process is the 
large amount of statements that are generated by 
superintendents and chief superintendents who 
are authorising extensions in detention. For all 
extensions, a full statement is completed as part of 
a case file and senior gardaí are frequently notified 
as witnesses to go to court. The Inspectorate was 
informed that whilst senior gardaí are warned 
to attend court they are not always required to 
give evidence. In other policing jurisdictions, it 
is highly unusual for senior officers to complete 
such statements and even rarer to attend court as 
a witness.
intoxicated persons arrested for minor 
offences 
A number of senior gardaí raised an issue of 
persons arrested for public order and other minor 
offences who are intoxicated and after six hours in 
garda detention are still incapable of taking care 
of themselves. An extension beyond six hours for 
their safety is not governed by statute. In these 
cases, gardaí do not want to release a person when 
still unfit through drink or drugs. An increase in 
detention time or a change in legislation would 
provide a legal basis for detaining persons until fit 
to be released.
suspension of Custody and police Bail
Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011 provides a 
new system to make more effective use of detention 
periods. This provision allows the period of 
detention to be suspended and the person released 
during the period of suspension. This allows 
gardaí to follow up on information such as an 
alibi obtained during questioning and to conduct 
further investigations. This provision requires a 
person to return to a garda station on no more than 
two occasions and the period between the first and 
subsequent detention must not exceed four months. 
During the inspection visits, the Inspectorate did 
not find any evidence of this power being used and 
many investigators did not appear to be aware of 
the provision. The Inspectorate believes that the 
provision provides an opportunity for a much 
earlier arrest of a suspect and the release pending 
any further investigation that needs to take place.  
UK police services use this process and it is referred 
to as police or station bail. This is an extremely 
useful provision and it has certainly led to a much 
quicker initial arrest with many benefits to this. 
Station bail in the UK also allows the police to attach 
conditions to the bail such as not contacting any 
victims in the case. It can also reduce the time that a 
person spends in detention as they can be released 
to return at a later date. However, the experience 
of some UK services has shown that police station 
bail is often over used and people are bailed for 
extended periods. (See also Part 10).
The Inspectorate fully supports the use of 
suspension of custody and or police bail. If managed 
effectively, it provides an opportunity for early 
arrest, early interview and, if necessary, to release 
a person pending further enquiries. The limitation 
period of four months is a good safeguard to 
prevent any abuse of the process.
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re-arrest to Charge
A garda can re-arrest a person to enable a charge to 
take place. The Inspectorate found an inconsistent 
approach to re-arresting across the seven divisions, 
with some places using it far more often than 
others. During examination of custody records, 
the Inspectorate found some examples where the 
custody record showed that a person was arrested 
for the purpose of charging, but no charges were 
actually attached.
The Inspectorate believes that the subject of 
detention times and authorities for detention 
should be reviewed by the Garda Síochána with key 
criminal justice partners to determine if the initial 
detention period is sufficient to allow the effective 
investigation of an offence.  
Young offenders in Custody
A young person under the age of eighteen should 
have a parent or guardian informed about their 
arrest so they can attend a garda station to act as 
an appropriate adult for the young person during 
any interviews. In the absence of a parent or 
guardian the garda try to use the services of a Peace 
Commissioner, a volunteer or a social worker. A 
young person should be released from detention to 
an appropriate person. In the absence of a guardian 
for the young person, the HSE are contacted with a 
view to accept the young person. Gardaí reported 
that they are finding it increasingly difficult to 
obtain the services of a social worker and to place a 
young person with the HSE.
Drug testing and support and treatment
Some of the most persistent and prolific offenders 
have significant drug habits and turn to crime to 
fund their addiction. Apart from driving whilst 
intoxicated, those detained at garda stations are 
not subject to any substance drug testing. Scotland, 
West Yorkshire and other police services test 
persons arrested for crimes designated as “trigger 
offences”. These are usually acquisitive crimes such 
as burglary and robbery. A sample taken can test 
for up to six drug types and results are produced 
within five minutes. In West Yorkshire results are 
included in a court case file and the information 
is placed before the court. Early intervention is 
crucial and drug referral workers (non-police) are 
often attached to custody suites to offer services 
to those who admit to having a drug problem. In 
one division in the UK, drug referral workers and 
police officers are conducting a pilot to visit known 
offenders prior to an arrest to try to persuade them 
to enter a treatment programme.
 recommendation 9.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána engages key partner agencies to 
develop an effective drug arrest referral 
scheme for those detained in garda stations. 
(medium term). 
9.9 Custody Records and Prisoner 
Logs
paper Based Custody records
All persons detained at a garda station should have 
a custody record completed for them. This is a paper 
based system completed by the member in charge.
The Inspectorate found the custody records to be 
cumbersome. The sections are disjointed and not 
user-friendly. The Inspectorate was informed that 
a new version is being developed, but it is not yet 
in operational use. Storage of completed custody 
records is also an issue as they physically take up 
a lot of space.  
On examination of custody records, the Inspectorate 
found many parts of the record that require 
completion were not filled in. A custody record 
is an important document that is usually part of 
a case file and will be disclosed as part of a court 
prosecution. The Inspectorate is aware that court 
cases have been lost because custody records were 
not completed or details in the custody records 
conflicted with other documents.
With most paper based systems, the most used part 
and potentially the most important, is the record of 
actions taken whilst a person is in detention. This is 
titled on the custody record as “details of actions/
occurrence” and is a free text section to record all 
incidents or actions taken in respect of a detained 
person. In this section, space is very limited and 
for many of those detained beyond six hours, 
continuation sheets are required. Continuation 
sheets are kept in separate A3 bound books and 
the Inspectorate found it difficult to reconcile 
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some custody records with the continuation 
record. In some cases, stations were unable to find 
a continuation sheet for a custody record. This is 
unsatisfactory and the separation of two parts of 
what should be one custody record is not good 
practice. Sergeants and members in charge do not 
find the custody records or continuation sheets to 
be user friendly. There is also significant waste in 
each custody record as many sections are never 
used.  
examination of Custody records
During this inspection, the Inspectorate visited a 
number of custody suites at the district stations and 
examined approximately 100 custody records per 
district for persons detained at those stations. The 
following are the key findings:
Custody Record Examination 
Key Issues 
Legibility of written records 
The quality and legibility of handwritten 
custody records varied greatly from record to 
record and from officer to officer. Some were 
written legibly and easy to follow and other 
records were not.
Details of arrest - offence in respect of 
which arrest/detention made: 
(This section records the reasons for arrest)
•	 One	district	station	completed	this	section	to	
an excellent standard and correctly identified 
the offence and the date it was committed;
•	 Most	 custody	 records	 did	 not	 contain	 the	
date of the original crime. In some cases, 
the arrest was made on the same day, but in 
other cases, the crime took place sometime 
previously. This omission made it difficult to 
supervise and audit the custody record.
recording reasons/grounds for detention
The Inspectorate found inconsistencies in the 
custody records in the recording of the reasons 
for detaining a person in custody. In one 
district, the members in charge all recorded 
why the person was arrested and detained 
and wrote the details directly onto the custody 
record. In most other district stations, the 
member in charge recorded that as a result 
of a conversation with the investigating or 
arresting garda, the person was detained. The 
Inspectorate was informed by members in 
charge that the record of the conversation is 
kept in garda notebooks. The Inspectorate does 
not view this as good practice and believes that 
all relevant information should be recorded on 
a custody record as the location of primary and 
best	 evidence.	 Notebooks	 may	 be	 misplaced,	
gardaí retire or transfer, and there is a risk that 
information about a detained person is lost. 
It is good practice to record the reasons for 
detaining a person in a custody record, rather 
than to say, “as a result of what I was told I 
authorised detention”. The absence of such data 
made it very difficult to audit custody records 
without details about when the crime took 
place and what evidence linked the person to 
the offence for which they were arrested and 
the grounds for authoring detention.
multiple custody records
In one district, the Inspectorate found that two 
custody records were sometimes created for the 
same detained person on the same date. The 
first record concerned the arrest and interview 
of a person and the second record concerned 
the arrest of the person for the purpose of 
charging. This was brought to the attention of 
the divisional chief superintendent. 
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released from detention without 
explanation
The Inspectorate found a large number of 
custody records where it was unclear why 
persons were released. In one case, two people 
were arrested for burglary, but were not 
interviewed and were released within seventy-
five minutes of arriving at the garda station. In 
this case, a sergeant contacted the arrested garda 
and it was established that the victim had stated 
that the alleged money that was stolen had been 
found. It would be good practice to have an entry 
in the custody record to that effect. 
In several other cases of robbery and burglary, 
people were arrested late in the evening and 
released shortly afterwards. In these cases, 
the persons arrested were young people and 
appeared to be released into the custody of a 
parent or guardian. They were not interviewed 
and there was no explanation as to why they 
were released and what was going to happen 
to the case. An entry should be completed to 
explain the reasons for release such as, released 
due to their age and the time of the night and 
that they would be interviewed in the morning. 
arrested, but not interviewed
The Inspectorate found a number of custody 
records where people were arrested for a 
criminal offence, but were not interviewed 
whilst in detention. In some cases, the member 
in charge had recorded in the custody record 
that the person was drunk. There was no entry 
to explain why they were released without any 
apparent action taken.
people detained for charge 
The Inspectorate found custody records marked 
“arrested for purpose of a charge”, but in some 
cases no charge was actually shown on the 
custody record. There were also examples 
where people were arrested and released 
shortly afterwards, without any apparent action 
taken. In these circumstances, an entry should 
be recorded on the custody record as to the 
circumstances of the case and why a person was 
not interviewed or released without charge.
Custody record sections not used 
In most custody records examined, many 
sections of the records were not completed. 
The sections on fingerprints and photographs 
were often not completed.  
The section on property taken from the person 
detained or retained by the person was not 
always filled in correctly. This section has very 
little space for recording property and exhibit 
details and there is limited capacity to describe 
exactly what the item looked like and any 
distinguishing features. This is an important 
section if there is any dispute over property at 
a later stage. Other jurisdictions take great care 
over this particular issue. 
timing of entries in custody records
The Inspectorate found some discrepancies 
in the times of entries in custody records and 
the times recorded in other documents. This 
included some custody records where the 
times recorded on the memorandum of the 
taped interviews did not correlate with the 
times shown in a custody record. For example, 
the Inspectorate found some custody record 
entries that showed that a person detained 
was returned to a custody area from interview 
at a time that the record of interviews shows 
that it was still being conducted. The 2013 
GSOC Annual Report recommended that 
digital clocks should be available in custody 
suites and the Garda Inspectorate views this 
as a sensible proposal to ensure accuracy of 
entries in custody records and other associated 
documents. 
Delays in arrests 
During inspection visits, the Inspectorate identified 
the following custody records where there were 
delays in making arrests.
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Custody Record Examination 
Delays in Arrests
Case 1
A case of violent disorder committed in 
December 2012 where the offenders involved 
were known to the investigating officer. The 
suspect was not arrested until March 2013. 
Case 2
In August 2012, a victim sustained an injury. 
A known suspect was captured on CCTV, but 
was not arrested until December. Following 
the arrest, it is unclear what happened to the 
subject, but they were not charged with an 
offence.
Case 3
An offensive weapon offence that took place in 
July	2012.	The	suspect	was	arrested	in	November,	
but was not charged. 
Case 4
A serious assault took place in January 2013 with 
an arrest made in April. In this case, it took three 
months to take statements from witnesses
Case 5
An Assault case in August 2012 where the 
suspect was not arrested until December. The 
suspect was not charged at the time of arrest.
Case 6
A	theft	and	fraud	crime	committed	in	November	
2012, with an arrest in March 2013.  
garda professional standards Unit District 
examinations 
Custody records are regularly inspected during 
the examinations conducted by the GPSU. The 
Inspectorate has reviewed those examinations and 
has identified some common themes: 
•	 Some	 excellent	 custody	 records	 and	 some	
poorly completed records;
•	 Inconsistencies	 in	 the	 quality	 and	 details	
recorded in custody records;
•	 Prisoner	logs	are	not	always	closed.
These results were generally consistent with the 
findings of the Inspectorate.
Computerised Custody records
Within the garda custody paper based system, 
there is limited management information available 
and utilised. As part of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate requested information in connection 
with persons in detention that would be readily 
available in other policing jurisdictions. In the 
absence of a computerised custody system, some of 
this information was difficult to extract and some of 
the data would have required manual examination 
of custody records. 
There are many advantages to a computerised 
system, which include:
•	 Entries	 in	 custody	 records	 are	 timed	 and	
dated; 
•	 There	are	no	legibility	issues;
•	 Electronic	 systems	 provide	 important	
management information that does not 
require a manual search, i.e. average time 
to process detained persons for particular 
offences;
•	 Live	 custody	 records	 can	 be	 checked	
remotely.
The other police services visited during the course 
of this inspection have computerised custody 
systems. Whilst in most cases it can take longer 
to initially process a person electronically, there 
are many benefits. Some services have developed 
integrated systems where custody links directly to 
call management and crime investigation systems, 
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which avoids double keying of data. It also provides 
far more information about a detained person and 
any risks that may be posed to themselves or others. 
prisoner Logs
In the absence of a computerised custody system, 
the Garda Síochána has developed an application 
on PULSE called a prisoner log. When a person is 
detained in a garda station, a PULSE prisoner log 
entry should be created. This records basic details 
of the person, the time of arrest and the time of 
release from detention. This allows remote access 
and a garda can check if a person was previously 
arrested and what is happening in other cases. 
The Inspectorate found that prisoner logs were 
not always created or updated and persons were 
still shown as being in custody, although released 
some time previously. Also, some of the personal 
data entered on prisoner logs conflicted with data 
contained on custody records.  
Custody record as primary evidence 
Many gardaí have interaction with detained 
persons and often create notebook or diary entries 
about the action or decision that they have made. 
Examples include a superintendent authorising an 
extension of detention or a sergeant that checks 
with a detained person that an interview is being 
conducted properly. Following an intervention 
with a detained person, an entry is also made 
in the custody record to that effect. Where a 
case is progressing to a prosecution case file, the 
superintendent or the sergeant is required to 
make a formal witness statement about any action 
undertaken. Three entries are made in different 
places and often consist of the same information.  
Internationally, the custody record is usually 
accepted as primary or best evidence and all entries 
such as extensions of detention are placed directly 
onto the custody record. In other jurisdictions, 
this action existed prior to any introduction of a 
computerised custody system. This process also 
retains all information about the detained person 
in one place and should remove the need for 
duplication of a notebook entry and a statement. 
A member explained that they had written 
hundreds of statements for actions taken with 
detained persons who were interviewed, but have 
never actually been required to attend court and 
give evidence. The Inspectorate believes that the 
custody record should be classified as primary or 
best evidence and disclosed as part of a case file in 
a court case. All matters pertaining to a detained 
person should be recorded directly onto the custody 
record and not in an individual’s notebook or diary. 
All senior gardaí that met with the Inspectorate 
would like an electronic custody system. 
Internationally, there are many different versions 
in operation and the Inspectorate recommend that 
the Garda Síochána should identify a system that 
best meets their needs and that is integrated with 
other garda IT systems. The Inspectorate believes 
that the Garda Síochána must operate an electronic 
and fully integrated custody management system. 
 recommendation 9.8   
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána develops and implements a 
technology based custody system to ensure 
appropriate oversight and management 
of persons in custody. the inspectorate 
recognises that this a long term solution, 
but the planning and development should 
start now. (Long term).  
 in the interim, to achieve the above 
recommendation, the following key action 
needs to be taken:
•	 Develop	a	more	user	 friendly	 and	detailed	
paper custody record which contains all 
relevant information for a detained person 
and ensures through active supervision that 
entries are accurate. 
 recommendation 9.9 
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána conducts a full review of 
custody provisions to include centralisation/
rationalisation of facilities, and potential 
for improvements to security arrangements, 
supervision and training. (medium term).
 To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
Facilities
•	 Rationalise	 the	 current	 custody	 facilities	
and move to a smaller number of improved 
purpose built custody suites; 
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•	 Centralise	 custody	 facilities	 on	 a	 regional	
basis (urban areas) and a divisional basis 
outside of cities; (Long term)
•	 Seek	opportunities	to	share/develop	custody	
facilities with partner agencies; 
•	 Introduce	digital	clocks	in	custody	suites.	
Operations
•	 Appoint	 dedicated	 custody	 sergeants	 with	
responsibility for persons in custody;
•	 Appoint	civilian	detention	officers;
•	 Ensure	 that	 only	 trained	 personnel	 are	
deployed into custody suites; 
•	 Ensure	that	all	gardaí	are	fully	aware	of	the	
provision to suspend custody;
•	 Provide	effective	supervision	and	guidance	
to investigators dealing with a person in 
garda detention;
•	 Ensure	 that	 prisoner	 logs	 are	 completed	
correctly.
prisoner processing and Case progression 
Units
As highlighted in Part 6, the Garda Síochána 
operates a system where an arresting garda will 
retain responsibility for investigating crime and 
dealing with prisoners. This greatly impacts on 
regular units and an arrest will effectively remove 
them from patrol for extended periods of time.
Other police services operate systems whereby 
response officers deal with the original call, gather 
all available evidence in so far as is possible at 
that time, and where possible make an arrest. On 
arrival at a station the person is booked in and 
the case handed over to an investigation unit. The 
seriousness of the crime will dictate who deals with 
that prisoner. 
The	 PSNI	 operate	 Case	 Progression	 Units,	 which	
consist of a mixture of detectives and unformed 
officers who take on responsibility for that 
investigation. Officers attached to this unit are 
trained in interviewing prisoners and in other 
investigative skills such as managing disclosure. 
This releases response officers to go back out 
on patrol and ensures that trained investigators 
progress the interviews and secondary investigation. 
The Greater Manchester Police (GMP) operates a 
similar system called Prisoner Processing Units. 
As highlighted in Part 6, South Wales also use a 
similar system. These units have become proficient 
at processing detained persons and are often 
trained to higher levels of interviewing skills and 
complete investigations and submit case files for 
decisions on prosecutions. 
With larger custody facilities, the use of case 
progression is good practice and provides a much 
more efficient way of maintaining officer numbers 
on patrol and for responding to calls.  
 recommendation 9.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána considers the implementation of 
case progression units aligned to centralised 
custody facilities. (medium term). 
9.10 Interviewing Suspects in 
Detention 
One of the main reasons for the arrest of a person 
in connection with a crime is to provide an 
opportunity for a person to give an explanation of 
an incident. It also presents an opportunity for an 
investigating garda to ask the person to account for 
their movements and actions in connection with a 
criminal investigation.
All interviews with detained persons at garda 
stations are audio and visually recorded. The garda 
stations visited by the Inspectorate with custody 
facilities have designated rooms that are used to 
conduct such interviews. Most stations are still 
using VHS video tapes, which are bulky and the 
retention causes pressures on storage capacity. 
Some divisions have moved towards DVDs, which 
will greatly relieve the pressure on property stores.
In addition to the audio and visual recording, the 
Garda Síochána is required to record in writing 
anything said during the course of an interview. 
Due to the wording of the caution given to a 
person detained at the start of an interview, the 
Garda Síochána is required to contemporaneously 
record anything said during the interview. The 
second part of the caution states “whatever you say 
will be taken down in writing and may be given 
in evidence”. This situation creates a number of 
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unnecessary obstacles in the interview process, 
including the slow process of writing down all of 
the questions asked and the responses given during 
an interview. As a result, it necessitates two gardaí 
for each interview one who usually conducts the 
interview, whilst the other is used to record the 
questions and answers. The constant stopping 
and starting of questioning to ensure an accurate 
written record is made, removes any spontaneity or 
flow in the questioning process.  
An interview for a volume crime offence, without 
manually recording all of the conversation, could 
usually be completed within thirty minutes, but 
with the current process it can easily take two to 
four times longer to complete it. The Inspectorate 
found interviews for non-serious crimes that 
have taken over two hours to complete. There is a 
significant waste of garda time contemporaneously 
recording	 taped	 interviews.	 Not	 only	 is	 valuable	
garda time lost, but it is also unnecessarily keeping 
people in detention for longer periods of time. A 
significant proportion of time is lost with the six 
hour detention period. With the recent change to 
allow access of solicitors to interviews the interview 
time is likely to increase further. 
The manual recording of an interview is not 
required in other policing jurisdictions when the 
interview is digitally recorded. The Inspectorate 
is aware that the Garda Síochána and key criminal 
justice partners have been examining this issue 
for several years. The Inspectorate previously 
submitted a written paper5 supporting the need 
to remove the requirement to contemporaneously 
record taped interviews. The removal of the need to 
record a conversation would significantly improve 
the quality of a taped interview and would release 
an enormous amount of gardaí time. This is an 
issue that was raised during every divisional visit 
and by all gardaí involved in investigations. 
5 To the Advisory Committee on Garda Interviewing of 
suspects following recommendations of the Morris Tribunal
records of taped interviews 
At the conclusion of a taped interview, the written 
record is transcribed into a typed version to 
accompany case papers to assist a district officer 
or a prosecutor to make a decision on a case. A 
transcript will also be required as an exhibit in a 
subsequent trial. At present, the default position 
appears to be the creation of a full transcript 
of the interview. The Garda Síochána currently 
has responsibility for completing this task and a 
variety of methods are used for typing them. This 
includes the use of police support staff, but also 
investigating gardaí. The use of gardaí to type up 
records of an interview is not best use of their time. 
Internationally, many police services use trained 
audio typists or send the notes to external providers 
though there is a significant cost in doing this. An 
interview conducted without the requirements to 
take notes is likely to contain more questions and 
creating a full transcript will therefore take longer. 
The Inspectorate is aware that the concerns about 
the cost of a taped transcript is a major obstacle 
in removing the need to take notes at the time of 
the interview. The Inspectorate believes that the 
current garda time lost in conducting interviews 
and typing transcripts is significantly higher than 
any cost that would be incurred to have typists 
completing them. 
In the UK, the default position is to only create a 
record of an interview for cases going to trial. 
Also, full transcripts are not completed as a matter 
of course. A Written Record of Taped Interview 
(WROTI) is created, which covers the salient points 
of an interview. This is agreed by the prosecution 
and defence and it focuses on the important points 
of an interview. The Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) in the UK has published guidelines stating 
that the defence are not entitled to insist on the 
provision of a full transcript. Any approach to 
prepare a full transcript is resisted, unless the 
reviewing lawyer considers it to be essential to the 
proper presentation of the case. If the defence insist 
that the court should have a transcript, the CPS 
has taken a stance that the defence should prepare 
it. The record of the interview is usually resolved 
between the prosecutors and the defence; and on 
occasions, a trial judge can be consulted. The issue 
of taped transcripts needs to be resolved by the 
Garda Síochána and the DPP, in conjunction with 
the courts, with a view to determining when and in 
what format a transcript will be created. 
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interview training
Effective interviewing and communication skills 
are essential for any police officer and particularly 
for an investigator. This training should start at 
the initial foundation training for new entrants to 
a police service and there should be continuous 
professional development throughout an officer’s 
service. Training officers to conduct interviews 
is about skilling staff to gather evidence and 
information and to ask the right sorts of questions in 
the right way. Developing good interviewing skills 
assists officers dealing with vulnerable victims, in 
taking statements from witnesses and interviewing 
suspects who may have committed serious crimes.  
There are four interviewing skill levels for 
conducting interviews, primarily for use with 
suspects, and a separate training programme for 
specialist interviewers that are used to interview 
child and vulnerable adult victims and witnesses:
•	 Level	1	and	2	provide	basic	interview	skills;
•	 Level	 3	 provides	 advanced	 skills	 for	
interviews for serious crimes;
•	 Level	 4	 is	 aimed	 at	 supervisors	 to	
provide support and guidance to Level 3 
interviewers;
•	 Child	Specialist	Interviewing.	
This a model of interview techniques training 
that is used in many other policing jurisdictions. 
Levels 1 and 2 are used internationally to provide 
basic interview skills for all officers and police staff 
involved in investigations. This basic course is also 
used to identify those officers who are particularly 
skilled in interviewing, with an intention to train 
them to Level 3.
Since 2000, new gardaí trained at the Garda College 
received lectures on the procedures and legislation 
for interviewing (Phases 1 and 3 Foundation 
Training). During training, student gardaí were 
shown the machines used for recording interviews, 
but were not trained to use them or to practice 
interviews. These student gardaí were not provided 
with structured and accredited Level 1 and 2 
training.
Continuous Professional Development (CPD) units 
were created to deliver post-induction training and 
to ensure the ongoing professional development 
of gardaí and support staff. Post 2008, CPDs were 
designated to run courses to train gardaí to Level 
2 interview standard and commenced the delivery 
of an abridged version of the current course. It is 
not known how many people received this training, 
but it was not an accredited training course and it 
was not delivered to all staff. Since 2012, no Level 
1, 2 or 3 training has been delivered by the Garda 
Síochána and only Specialist Child Interview 
Training courses have taken place.
The Inspectorate is aware that an external review 
and evaluation of Level 3 training has taken 
place and the Inspectorate met with an external 
consultant involved in the evaluation. This 
evaluation included a questionnaire with ninety 
gardaí, trained to Level 3. Of those who completed 
the questionnaire, 18% had never received any 
Level 1 or Level 2 training (abridged version) and 
of those who had received an abridged training 
course, 68% were unsatisfied with the training 
provided. 
During a visit to the Garda College, the 
Inspectorate was informed that an internal review 
of interview training had identified deficiencies 
in the interview and statement taking training 
notes for the old Foundation Training course. 
The current position in the Garda Síochána is 
that not all garda have received any Level 1 and 2 
training and those that did receive training, may 
not be fully equipped with the skills to conduct 
interviews.  
The Garda Síochána has developed a new 
programme of Interview Techniques training. 
During inspection visits, the Inspectorate found 
that there was a significant demand for Level 3 
and 4 courses and particularly from gardaí and 
sergeants investigating serious crimes.
Most international services have used an accredited 
model for many years that provide interview skills. 
The model requires five days training compared to 
the training which only requires a small number 
hours of training delivered to many gardaí. Since 
2005, approximately 5,000 gardaí have joined 
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the Garda Síochána and a large majority of those 
gardaí have not received any or appropriate 
interview techniques training. It is unclear to the 
Inspectorate how many of the other 8,000 members 
of the Garda Síochána who joined before 2005 are 
trained to an appropriate level. The Garda Síochána 
has developed a new interview techniques course 
and now has the enormous task of trying to train 
and retrain those members involved in criminal 
investigations.  
Throughout this inspection, senior gardaí have 
commented that many witness and victim 
statements lack basic details and are completed to a 
poor standard. The importance of the taking of the 
first victim statement and the interview of a suspect 
is critical in any investigation. The Inspectorate 
believes that the absence of an effective interview 
training course is a contributory factor to identified 
issues with this process.  
With the introduction of solicitors attending 
interviews, a garda needs to be trained in managing 
those interactions and particularly around issues 
such as pre-interview disclosure. Most gardaí have 
had no disclosure training. When the access to 
interviews was opened to solicitors in the UK, both 
police officers and solicitors received training. 
right to silence and Drawing of inference 
When cautioning a person before an interview 
takes place, an investigating garda must tell a 
person that they are not obliged to say anything 
unless they wish to do so. It is therefore not 
unusual for a suspect during an interview to 
decline to comment when specific questions are 
asked or statements are made to them. However, 
there is a provision that allows a garda to advise 
a person that evidence may be given to a court of 
their failure to account for objects, substances or 
marks on their person or of the failure or refusal 
to account for their presence at a location. This 
particularly concerns where a person fails to 
mention facts, when in the circumstances such 
matters clearly call for an explanation. A court or 
a jury may draw inference from the defendant’s 
failure to answer a question. Section 19A of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as amended by Section 
30(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007) requires a 
detained person to mention at interview stage any 
fact, which might later be relied on at trial stage in 
their defence.  
The Act provides that where a person fails to 
account for an object or their movements, a garda 
must endeavour to warn the person that inference 
may be drawn from the failure to account for their 
actions. In such cases, the availability of a solicitor 
to be present at an interview provides an additional 
safeguard to protect the rights of the person being 
interviewed.
Bearing the above in mind, the Inspectorate 
examined a number of tape recorded interviews 
during this inspection process, where persons 
clearly failed to account for objects and other actions. 
In most cases, no warnings were ever provided by 
the interviewing garda. In one particularly serious 
investigation there were a number of interviews 
conducted where a warning should have been 
provided. In that particular case, the Inspectorate 
checked sixty-seven records of interviews and there 
appeared to only be two interviews where a suspect 
was formally warned. 
The issue of silences and inferences drawn from 
them is an area that requires attention in terms of 
training for those involved in interviewing. The 
Inspectorate believes that this should be an integral 
part of the interview techniques course. 
Quality of interviews
To assess the quality of taped interviews the 
Inspectorate examined those cases from the 158 
incidents and crimes that have been tracked 
throughout this inspection. Of those 158 cases, 
sixteen cases resulted in a taped interview of a 
suspect. Within these cases, sometimes more than 
one suspect was interviewed and often suspects 
were interviewed on more than one occasion. 
The following are the findings from those written 
records. 
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Tape Recorded Interviews 
Well conducted interviews 
In one case, there were a number of suspects 
arrested in connection with an aggravated 
burglary. The investigating gardaí conducted 
multiple interviews that were clearly well 
planned, covered the main evidential proofs of 
the case and the questioning was comprehensive. 
inappropriate language and terminology
In examining the records of interviews, the 
Inspectorate found two examples where 
inappropriate terminology and language was 
used and which appeared to be unnecessary. 
This is a record that would be used in a court 
case and the use of inappropriate language 
should be avoided and particularly if it could be 
viewed as oppressive.
Linked crimes at the same location
A number of burglaries took place at the same 
premises where diesel was stolen from sheds. 
One of the cases dated back to April 2012. In 
February 2013, a further crime took place and 
two suspects were arrested. It took six weeks 
to take a victim’s statement, which stated that 
several similar crimes had previously taken place 
at the same location. On checking the interview 
records, one suspect was asked about other 
offences and admitted several other crimes but no 
dates or details of the offences were raised. The 
second suspect was never asked about any other 
offences. Before any interview, an investigating 
officer should prepare for that interview and have 
details of the offence for which they were arrested 
and also any other offences that the suspect 
may have committed. From checking the case 
file this does not appear to have been identified 
by a supervisor and this appeared to be a lost 
opportunity to solve other crimes.
The majority of crimes are committed by a 
small number of prolific offenders and before 
conducting an interview, a garda should conduct 
enquiries to identify other crimes with a similar 
pattern and any intelligence that may link 
that person to those crimes. Where additional 
offences are suspected a garda can further arrest 
a suspect and put additional questions to them.
inferences
A burglary took place, two suspects were 
detained and a total of three interviews were 
conducted by detective gardaí. Due to the 
redaction of the names and personal details 
from the written records supplied to the 
Inspectorate, it was not possible to establish 
which records referred to which suspect. During 
the three interviews conducted, the suspect(s) 
made no comment in response to a large number 
of questions. The vast majority of questions 
were asking the suspects to account for their 
movements and actions around the time that 
the crimes took place. In two interviews no 
warnings were given for failing to account for 
objects found at the time of their arrest and for 
their movements. In one interview, a detective 
said “I will give you a chance to account why 
you were seated in the car”. Whilst this is asking 
the person to account for their movements, 
there was no warning attached to this so that an 
inference could be drawn.
Duration of interviews
The Inspectorate has checked the duration of a 
large number of interviews, including checking 
custody records. With the requirement to make a 
written record, it is hard to establish by checking 
times as to whether an interview was thorough 
(time taken) without checking the content of 
the interview to see the quality of the interview 
conducted. Some interviews that are short in 
duration might result from an interview with 
a person that declined to make any comments. 
Conversely, a long time spent in an interview 
would not necessarily mean that an interview 
was well conducted.  
From the records of interviews conducted, the 
Inspectorate identified that where the crime 
was more serious, interviews were more likely 
to be conducted by detective garda. This is 
good practice as in most jurisdictions detectives 
usually have more experience in interviewing.
The Inspectorate found a number of interviews 
for burglaries, robberies and assaults where 
the person was away from the custody area for 
approximately thirty minutes. That is the time
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from when the custody record shows the person 
was handed over for interview, to the time that 
they were returned. This includes the time 
taken to go to the interview room and to return. 
The fact that questions and answers have to be 
recorded in that time period suggests that little 
time was spent on the interview. For example, a 
burglar arrested in connection with three crimes 
was away from the custody area for interview on 
two occasions for twenty-nine and thirty-seven 
minutes. In the case of a knife point robbery, a 
suspect was booked out for interview for only 
twenty-five minutes. The Inspectorate also 
found a number of interviews that took several 
hours to complete.
specialist Child interviewers
Specialist Child Interviewers (SCIs) are required 
to attend the Garda College for training on three 
occasions. To date, ninety people have been trained. 
Most have completed the training modules, 
although only fifteen people are fully qualified. 
Unlike other interviews, SCIs are predominately 
dealing with victims and witnesses and there is 
no requirement to make a written record at the 
time as interviewers are not cautioning children or 
vulnerable adults.  
supervision of taped interviews
When the Garda College started to deliver interview 
training, it was decided that they would go out 
to districts and check the quality of interviews 
conducted. The College does not have the capacity 
to do this and it has never happened.
During meetings with supervisors, the Inspectorate 
did not find anyone that had listened to the taped 
interviews conducted by their staff. A member in 
charge or an SHO is required to enter an interview 
room during the actual interview to check that 
the interview is being conducted appropriately, 
but do not remain in the room. In some districts 
visited, video links have been installed from 
interview rooms to other offices, which provide 
the opportunity for other investigators to watch 
a live interview. These are primarily used for 
investigations into serious crime, but do provide 
an opportunity for better supervision of day to 
day interviewing. Other police services that have 
checked interviews found that some were poorly 
planned and did not fully investigate the suspected 
offence.  
In some international police services, supervisors 
dip sample interviews conducted by officers and 
check the quality of the interview. Sergeants are 
also encouraged to periodically participate in an 
interview to observe the interviews conducted by 
their officers.   
Whilst many members will have developed 
excellent interviewing skills, it is important to train 
officers and to provide a model and framework that 
ensure consistency in the quality of interviewing 
and particularly that interviews are well planned, 
and conducted in a manner that will secure the best 
possible evidence in an investigation.   
The Garda Síochána needs to address the current 
skills gap in interview training and skills and 
to ensure that any training is focused on those 
members that are currently interviewing persons. 
 recommendation 9.11 
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
garda síochána addresses the existing 
skills gap for gardaí trained in interview 
techniques, statement taking and disclosure. 
(medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Identify	 and	 assess	 the	 skills	 gap	 in	
interview techniques training;
•	 Train	 all	 garda	 members	 involved	 in	 the	
interviewing of witnesses or suspects to 
Level 1 and 2 standard; 
•	 Provide	 Level	 3	 and	 4	 training	 courses	 to	
ensure sufficiently trained garda members 
are available to interview suspects involved 
in serious crime; 
•	 Introduce	 a	 line	 management	 protocol	 to	
check the quality of taped interviews.
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9.11 Evidence of an Arrest 
notebooks and pocket Book rules
Under the Garda Code, official notebooks are issued 
to members for recording important information 
and details of facts which come to their attention 
in the course of their duties. It also states that 
notebooks should be periodically reviewed by 
supervisors, however the Inspectorate only found 
one district where the superintendent was actually 
doing this.   
Notebooks	are	generally	used	by	members	to	record	
information provided during briefings, details of 
incidents that are dealt with and evidence of an 
arrest. There are specific rules about completing 
notebooks and these sorts of rules are used by other 
services. Rules include recording the date and time 
of incidents and not leaving gaps on page lines to 
avoid inference that an entry was made at a later 
date. Where a garda notebook is used to record 
evidence of an arrest or dealing with an incident, 
the notes become the original notes of a case and 
must be retained for evidential purposes. 
In conducting the inspection and from requesting 
case files, very few copies of notebooks were 
attached to the cases files and generally gardaí 
evidence was presented in the form of typed 
statements. In many cases the statements were 
written some time after the arrest was made.  
Where notebook entries were supplied to the 
Inspectorate, the quality of the entries was 
poor and did not appear to adhere to any 
standardised notebook rules. As part of this 
review, the Inspectorate visited the Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission to review the 
types of complaints that are received in respect 
of crime investigation. A recurring theme in the 
investigation of complaints was the poor quality of 
notes made at the time of dealing with a crime or 
an arrest. GSOC have found that notes can be very 
short and do not always record details of significant 
events, such as when force is used to restrain an 
arrested person. Statements are often written some 
time later and the notebooks should be the basis for 
creating a statement. In some cases, garda members 
are creating very detailed statements at a later date 
from their very brief original notes. It is also good 
practice with arrest notes to record the time and 
date that the notes were made. Some international 
services have a device in custody areas that stamps 
a date and time directly onto arrest notes to record 
the actual time when completed.
When gardaí are dealing with a victim, a witness 
or a suspect at an incident, notes should be taken 
about what was said and what happened. Where 
a statement is not taken at the time or a suspect is 
not arrested, it is good practice to make a record at 
the time and, where significant statements such as 
an admission to an offence, it is good practice to 
contemporaneously record any comments made 
and to invite a witness or a suspect to read over 
the notes and to invite them to sign the notes as an 
accurate account of any conversation. 
Gardaí that witness an arrest or witness an incident 
should also make a notebook entry about what 
they have seen. From the case files provided to 
the Inspectorate, it was unclear if this always 
takes place. This can only be properly checked by 
searching incident logs or CAD messages to see 
what units attended and then comparing this with 
case files to check for notes from all those involved. 
With the implementation of car and radio tracking 
devices, it will be much easier in the future to 
establish which officers were present at an incident. 
Notebooks	 are	 retained	 by	 gardaí	 and	 carried	
with them whilst on duty. There is always a risk 
that notebooks can be misplaced and with that 
any original arrest notes. Other police services 
use notebooks to record details of crimes or other 
incidents that are reported to officers, but are not 
generally used to record evidence of an arrest. In 
these services, a separate arrest booklet is used and 
is written fully to record all aspects of the evidence 
leading to an arrest. This booklet is retained with 
case papers and is not returned to the officer 
unless the case is required at court. Some of the 
gardaí working in national units reported that they 
sometimes retire a notebook for a serious case to 
ensure that it is not lost.
The Inspectorate believes there should be standard 
operating procedures for the recording of entries 
in garda notebooks, which should be routinely 
supervised for compliance. 
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statements 
As part of the request for case files, the Inspectorate 
received a significant number of typed victim, 
witness and garda statements. On most occasions, 
victim and witness statements contained the 
date that the statement was obtained. With garda 
witness statements and case file documents, 
the practice of including the date was far less 
consistent. Many statements, case file covering 
reports and other memoranda were undated and 
sometimes not signed. This practice was not just 
restricted to gardaí, as some sergeants were also 
not dating statements. This made it impossible to 
determine when statements were taken and when 
case files moved from one person to another. The 
same issue was also identified by the GPSU during 
a recent examination. It is unclear why this is 
happening. The failure to date a statement could 
lead to evidential challenges. All statement forms 
should have the date as a mandatory field and all 
statements should be dated.  
volume Crime Case reviews - Undated 
garda statements
On checking cases where gardaí completed their 
own witness statements in a case, the Inspectorate 
identified that many typed statements were 
undated and this included statements completed by 
supervising officers. Evidentially it is important in 
a chain of evidence to date any document. 
Conversely, most victim and non-garda witness 
statements checked by the Inspectorate contained 
the date on which the statement was taken.  
In other policing jurisdictions, witnesses (including 
police officers) are required to sign the bottom of 
each page of a statement after the last word. This 
removes any suggestion that further details are 
added at a later stage.
The current practice of undated and, in some cases, 
unsigned statements and garda documents must be 
stopped. 
 recommendation 9.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána improves investigative skills for 
gathering best evidence, including the taking 
of witness statements, arresting, interviewing 
suspects, gathering CCtv and the disclosure 
of evidence. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	that	garda	notebooks	are	completed	
to a high standard and that supervisors 
check notes books as outlined in the Garda 
Code; 
•	 Ensure	that	all	gardaí	present	at	an	incident	
complete a notebook entry including any 
evidence of an arrest or incidents that took 
place; 
•	 Consider	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 separate	
booklet for completing arrest notes;
•	 Develop	clear	guidance	on	the	recording	of	
contemporaneous notes;  
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 statements	 are	 dated	 and	
signed at the foot of each page and after the 
last line of a person’s statement;  
•	 Introduce	 a	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	
supervisor checks the quality of statements 
taken from victims and witnesses; 
•	 Implement	a	national	standard	for	the	taking	
of a withdrawal witness statement; 
•	 Ensure	 that	 PULSE	 is	 used	 to	 record	 the	
gathering and attempts to gather evidence.
Home address searches
Many persons arrested, may well have committed 
other similar connected offences and the proceeds 
of those crimes or other evidence could be found at 
a place where they reside or control. Where a valid 
arrest is made on private property, gardaí have the 
power to search those parts of the premises in the 
possession or control of the suspect at the time of 
the arrest. If the person is arrested away from a 
home address gardaí need to obtain a warrant to 
search that address.  
Section 6 Criminal Justice Act 2006 provides 
a power to search an address for an arrestable 
offence, where it is suspected that there is evidence 
of or relating to the commission of an arrestable 
offence. The Irish Constitution provides that “the 
dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not 
be forcibly entered save in accordance with law”. A 
dwelling therefore enjoys a special constitutional 
protection, which other premises do not. 
Applications to search residential premises are 
generally made on sworn information to a judge of 
the district court. Out of office hours this is more 
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difficult and particularly, if the offender’s residence 
is a long distance from the location of arrest. Where 
a person is arrested for burglary, gardaí need to 
obtain a warrant under the Theft and Fraud Act, but 
are unable to do this outside of court hours. In cases 
of an emergency, it is necessary to convene a special 
sitting of the court to apply for a warrant. In practical 
terms this can seriously delay the investigation of a 
crime and it is expensive to convene a court. Prolific 
offenders will often have arrangements in place to 
ensure that action is taken to dispose of evidence if 
they do not return within a specific time. During 
meetings with gardaí, it was clear that these sort of 
obstacles prevent some searches from ever taking 
place.  
In England and Wales, the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE) provides a power to conduct 
post-arrest searches of premises, without a warrant 
if authorised by an inspector. The legislation also 
permits an address to be searched before a suspect 
is first taken to a police station. This is used where 
the arresting officer suspects that stolen property 
or drugs may be moved, if the arrested person 
does not return within a given time. This power 
is particularly used for those arrested for volume 
crime and drug offences.   
The Inspectorate requested details of the numbers 
of warrants obtained to search a home address 
for persons arrested for burglary, robbery, car 
crime and drugs. In the absence of a computerised 
custody system the Garda Síochána do not know 
how many of those people arrested for the types 
of crimes mentioned above had their addresses 
searched and what the results were. During 
focus groups with members, the Inspectorate was 
informed that searches that should be conducted 
do not always take place. During a visit to a 
detective training course at the Garda College, 
the participants provided the Inspectorate with a 
copy of a search log. This is a document that can 
be used by an officer in charge of a search to record 
important information. The search log provided 
did not have a section that catered for exhibits 
and particularly what was found and where. The 
detective’s training course explained that search 
logs are used in some districts, but not in all and 
there is no national standard form. This is standard 
practice in other police services and ensures that all 
important details are recorded and acts as a formal 
record of the search. The Garda Síochána should 
create a national standard search log to be used for 
all searches.
 recommendation 9.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that where appropriate, 
addresses of detained persons are searched. 
(short term).
 To achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	a	Standard	Operating	Procedure	for	
conducting address searches for detained 
persons;
•	 Develop	a	national	standard	form	for	search	
logs.
The current powers for searching addresses in 
Ireland has additional safeguards to the UK powers, 
but it is impacting on the number of searches 
that take place and the time taken to complete 
them. The searching of addresses connected to 
a person detained can be an important part of an 
investigation and the Inspectorate believes that the 
Garda Síochána must make sure that necessary 
searches are conducted in a timely manner.  
independent Custody visitors
An Independent Custody Visitors Scheme (ICVS) 
has been operating in the United Kingdom since 
1993. It involves volunteers from local communities 
attending police stations to visit people detained in 
police custody to ensure that they are being properly 
treated. Custody visitors make unannounced visits 
and are granted full and unobstructed access to 
custody areas and to those detained persons who 
agree to see them. A report from each visit is sent 
to the officer in charge of the station. The visitors 
provide an accountability framework to the 
management of detained persons. The value of the 
custody	visitors	was	highlighted	by	Baroness	Nuala	
O’Loan,	 the	first	Police	Ombudsman	for	Northern	
Ireland, at a Department of Justice Seminar on 
garda reform in June 2014. 
An independent custody scheme brings many 
benefits to a police service and ensures greater 
openness and transparency. 
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9.12 Fingerprints and 
Photographs
powers to take Fingerprints and 
photographs 
Where a person is detained under the following 
legislation, they may be fingerprinted and 
photographed once detention is authorised:
•	 Section	4	Criminal	Justice	Act,	1996;
•	 Section	 30	 Offences	 Against	 the	 State	 Act,	
1939;
•	 Criminal	Justice	(Drug	Trafficking	Act)	Act,	
1996;
•	 Section	50	Criminal	Justice	Act,	2007.
A person detained under the above legislation 
may have their fingerprints and photographs 
taken on the authority of an officer not below the 
rank of inspector. Fingerprints may also be taken 
voluntarily if the person detained consents. Where a 
person is under the age of eighteen the consent of an 
appropriate adult must be obtained. Responsibility 
for taking fingerprints and photographs rests with 
the arresting member.  
During field visits, the Inspectorate noted that it 
has become common practice in garda stations to 
ask persons detained to voluntarily provide their 
fingerprints, regardless of whether or not one of the 
four pieces of legislation mentioned above applies. 
It was explained that if a person consents to the 
taking of their fingerprints, such prints are retained 
indefinitely. Where fingerprints are taken under the 
authority of an inspector and where proceedings are 
not instituted within twelve months or proceedings 
are discontinued, the person can apply to have 
their fingerprints destroyed. In many divisions, the 
Inspectorate was informed by gardaí that they are 
also taking fingerprints with consent, in respect of 
other offences outside of the statutory powers. 
The unavailability of an on duty inspector at certain 
times was raised as another contributory factor to 
asking people to voluntarily give their fingerprints. 
In other police services, the authority rests with the 
designated custody sergeant and it only escalates to 
an inspector if the person refuses to allow them to 
be taken.  
The Garda Síochána has drafted a new fingerprint 
policy that is currently operating on a pilot 
basis in a number of stations. This draft policy 
specifies that consent should only be requested 
in circumstances where it is not practicable or 
possible to take fingerprints under the authority 
of an officer not below the rank of inspector. The 
Inspectorate supports the removal of the practice 
of taking fingerprints voluntarily, but recommends 
legislative changes to devolve the authority to a 
custody supervisor. 
In other jurisdictions, a custody sergeant is in 
charge of a custody area and has full responsibility 
for the care and management of an individual while 
detained at a police station. A custody sergeant, in 
these jurisdictions, is responsible for authorising 
the detention of a person in custody and is best 
placed to ensure that fingerprints are taken in 
appropriate cases. The Inspectorate believes that 
the authority level should be at sergeant rank and 
that fingerprints and photographs should be taken 
under the authority to take them, rather than on a 
voluntary basis.
electronic and Wet ink Fingerprinting
The Garda Síochána operates two systems for 
obtaining fingerprints. There is an electronic system 
called AFIS Livescan (Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System) and the traditional method 
of wet ink fingerprinting. AFIS is now operating in 
many garda stations and there are many advantages 
to the electronic system including:
•	 Instantaneous	 upload	 onto	 the	 AFIS	
fingerprint system;
•	 Results	 are	 returned	 automatically	 to	
confirm identities;
•	 The	system	indicates	a	poor	quality	capture	
at the time the prints are taken; 
•	 It	 provides	 previous	 details	 on	 a	 detained	
person to ensure that a risk assessment 
contains all known information;
•	 It	is	a	cleaner	process	for	taking	prints.
AFIS provides a rapid identification system for 
those persons whose fingerprints are already on 
the system. This is particularly useful for those 
people who are wanted or who give false details 
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when arrested. AFIS also provides information 
about people who may present a significant risk to 
themselves or others. 
Where wet ink fingerprints are taken, these are 
sent to the Fingerprint Section in Technical Bureau 
for searching against other fingerprints that may 
be on the system. Except in urgent cases, wet ink 
fingerprinting is a much slower process and results 
can take several weeks. An assessment of the 
quality of wet ink prints is only made when they 
reach the Technical Bureau. In cases of poor quality, 
the fingerprint form is sent back to the division 
concerned and is effectively unusable.  Between 2% 
and 3% of all wet ink fingerprints are rejected by 
Technical Bureau as unsuitable. With this method 
of obtaining fingerprints, there is a significant 
risk that a person, who has provided a false name 
and address and who may be wanted for a serious 
crime, may be released from custody.   
Unfortunately, AFIS is not in operation at all garda 
custody sites and many persons are still being 
fingerprinted under the old system. The use of 
AFIS in other jurisdictions has resulted in the 
identification of many persons who have provided 
false details and who were wanted in connection 
with serious offences. Indeed, many people wanted 
for serious crimes are sometimes arrested for 
less serious crimes such as traffic or public order 
offences. In the absence of AFIS, a person has 
the opportunity to provide false details to avoid 
detection for a serious crime.  
Chart 9.2 highlights the numbers of fingerprints 
taken electronically on AFIS and the number taken 
using wet ink.
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The chart shows wide variance in the use of 
AFIS across the twenty-eight divisions ranging 
from 99% in Louth to 2% in DMR Eastern. The 
Inspectorate recommends that all persons 
arrested should be taken to a station where AFIS 
is operating and wet ink fingerprinting should 
only be used if AFIS is not working at that 
particular time. 
Failure to take Fingerprints
From meetings with gardaí of all ranks it was 
stated that fingerprints (AFIS or wet ink) are not 
always taken from persons who should have their 
fingerprints taken under the four distinct pieces 
of legislation. Reasons provided for not taking 
fingerprints included a lack of training on AFIS 
or no ink or cleaning equipment available to take 
wet ink prints. Many of the district officers and 
detective superintendents highlighted the failure to 
take fingerprints as a major issue of concern. 
During visits to custody areas, the Inspectorate 
met many gardaí performing the role of member 
in charge. Whilst many of them were trained to 
take fingerprints on AFIS, there was limited or 
no knowledge of how to obtain results from the 
prints taken. The main advantage of AFIS is the fast 
time identification of a person in custody, which is 
negated if the member does not know how to obtain 
the result.
chart 9.2
Fingerprints taken* in 2012 -  aFis and Wet ink 
division afIs Wet Ink Prints total taken number taken on afIs as a Percentage
cavan/Monaghan 98 122 220 45%
clare 186 85 271 69%
cork city 233 296 529 44%
cork north 85 110 195 44%
cork West 118 29 147 80%
d.M.r. eastern 2 131 133 2%
d.M.r. north central 343 108 451 76%
d.M.r. northern 110 307 417 26%
d.M.r. south central 230 100 330 70%
d.M.r. southern 248 206 454 55%
d.M.r. Western 378 126 504 75%
donegal 110 36 146 75%
Galway	 206 71 277 74%
Kerry 106 97 203 52%
Kildare 159 18 177 90%
Kilkenny/Carlow 320 45 365 88%
Laois/offaly 97 28 125 78%
Limerick 499 53 552 90%
Louth 485 1 486 99%
Mayo 40 38 78 51%
Meath 123 29 152 81%
roscommon/Longford 42 40 82 51%
sligo/Leitrim 94 51 145 65%
tipperary 125 86 211 59%
Waterford 365 101 466 78%
Westmeath 192 54 246 78%
Wexford	 122 100 222 55%
Wicklow 146 40 186 78%
total 5,262 2,508 7,770 68%
*Fingerprints taken under Section 4 of Criminal Justice Act,1984, Section 30 of the Offences against the State Act,1939,Section 5 of the 
Criminal Justice Act (Drugs Trafficking) Act,1996 and Section 50 of the Criminal Justice Act,2007.
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
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The failure to take fingerprints is a serious matter. 
Fingerprints link a person arrested at the time to 
the crime that they are suspected of committing. 
People arrested often provide false details and 
without fingerprints, an innocent person whose 
personal details are used can later be investigated 
or arrested for a crime that they did not commit. 
Where a person arrested provides false details, the 
absence of fingerprints makes later identification of 
that person very difficult if not impossible. 
During a visit to the Garda Vetting Unit, it was 
stated that vetting applications could be progressed 
much more efficiently if fingerprints are taken, as 
it would allow for much easier identification of the 
applicant.
Detained persons in other Jurisdictions
In other policing jurisdictions, all persons detained 
at a police station are fingerprinted, photographed 
and	 have	 their	 DNA	 taken.	 With	 electronic	
fingerprinting, a result is obtained almost 
immediately. This process ensures that a person 
previously fingerprinted is able to be identified at 
a very early stage following their arrival at a police 
station. There is also a health and safety factor in 
this process. The person in detention may present 
a significant risk to themselves or others. The 
Inspectorate believes that these sorts of risks could 
be reduced by extending the powers to fingerprint 
all persons, once their detention is authorised.
Custody record sections for Fingerprints 
and photographs
Within a custody record, there are two distinct 
sections for recording the authority to take 
photographs and to take fingerprints. In the 
majority of custody records checked these 
sections were not completed and the Inspectorate 
was unable to determine if the fingerprints and 
photographs were actually taken. The custody 
records checked, included persons arrested for 
assaults, burglaries and robberies. These sections 
should be completed and signed by the member in 
charge. The Inspectorate believes that there is a lack 
of supervision for these most important elements 
and before a person is released, a supervisor 
should ensure that all actions are completed.  The 
Inspectorate believes that a custody sergeant system 
would ensure compliance in properly completing 
custody records and successfully implementing all 
investigative processes.
request for Fingerprint Data 
The Inspectorate made several requests for 
information about the numbers of people arrested 
for offences where a power existed to take 
fingerprints from detained persons.  
The data in chart 9.3 is the most recent data supplied 
to the Inspectorate for the years 2012 and 2013. 
The Inspectorate asked for the numbers of people 
arrested and taken to garda stations under the four 
pieces of legislation (authority to take prints)6 and 
of those persons, how many actually had their 
fingerprints taken. All of those people should have 
had their fingerprints taken and there should be 
100% compliance rates.
chart 9.3
Fingerprints taken* in 2012 -   
aFis and Wet ink
Year number 
of Persons 
in garda 
custody
number of 
fingerprints 
taken
number 
taken as a 
Percentage 
of number 
in custody
2012 17,332 7,770 45%
2013 15,657 7,104 45%
*Persons detained in garda custody under Section 4 of 
Criminal Justice Act,1984, Section 30 of the Offences against 
the State Act,1939,Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act (Drugs 
Trafficking) Act,1996 and Section 50 of the Criminal Justice 
Act,2007.
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána
Chart 9.3 shows that in both years only 45% of 
those arrested for the offences listed in this 
chart had their fingerprints taken. Additional 
information in 2013, was provided by the 
Technical Bureau that 12,351 persons in custody 
provided their fingerprints voluntarily. A 
significant number of these people provided 
fingerprints for offences where there is no specific 
power to take fingerprints.
2012 analysis of Fingerprints 
Chart 9.4 is a breakdown of the numbers of persons 
detained in garda custody in 2012 who should have 
had their fingerprints taken versus the number 
actually obtained. 
6 Persons detained in Garda custody under Section 4 of 
Criminal Justice Act,1984, Section 30 of the Offences against 
the State Act,1939,Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 
(Drugs Trafficking) Act,1996 and Section 50 of the Criminal 
Justice Act,2007.
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Chart 9.4 demonstrates a wide variation on the 
numbers of persons fingerprinted in the twenty-
eight divisions and the compliance rates ranged 
from 21% in DMR Eastern to 73% in Louth. 
Chart 9.5 provides a breakdown of persons detained 
in garda custody for specific crime types in 2012 
who should have had their fingerprints taken as 
against the number actually obtained. In selecting 
these offences, the Inspectorate sampled a number 
of serious and volume crimes. 
chart 9.4
persons Detained in garda Custody * vs Fingerprints taken in 2012 
by individual Divisions
division number of Persons in garda 
custody
number of fingerprints 
taken
number taken as a Percentage 
of number in custody
cavan/Monaghan 568 220 39%
clare 483 271 56%
cork city 785 529 67%
cork north 404 195 48%
cork West 240 147 61%
d.M.r. eastern 634 133 21%
d.M.r. north central 1333 451 34%
d.M.r. northern 1218 417 34%
d.M.r. south central 1060 330 31%
d.M.r. southern 1055 454 43%
d.M.r. Western 1227 504 41%
donegal 347 146 42%
Galway	 494 277 56%
Kerry 363 203 56%
Kildare 431 177 41%
Kilkenny/Carlow 559 365 65%
Laois/offaly 289 125 43%
Limerick 922 552 60%
Louth 668 486 73%
Mayo 225 78 35%
Meath 565 152 27%
roscommon/Longford 338 82 24%
sligo/Leitrim 284 145 51%
tipperary 694 211 30%
Waterford 870 466 54%
Westmeath 406 246 61%
Wexford	 461 222 48%
Wicklow 409 186 45%
total 17,332 7,770 45%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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Findings
Even with the most serious of cases listed above 
such as murder, rape and aggravated burglary, the 
compliance rates for the taking of fingerprints is 
poor. In respect of many offences such as burglary 
and car crime offences, the use of fingerprints is a 
key weapon in identification of a suspect involved in 
a future crime. The failure to take fingerprints has 
an impact on other areas such as vetting checks and 
finding people wanted on warrant who provided 
false details when arrested.
A recent Garda Síochána draft policy highlights the 
importance of taking fingerprints and namely “this 
duty is triggered each time a person is in custody in 
a garda station, notwithstanding that he/she may 
have been fingerprinted on a previous occasion”. 
It further states that “fingerprints taken under 
lawful authority by Section 28, Criminal Justice 
Act 1984 are used to prove convictions both 
nationally and internationally. For this reason it is 
of the utmost importance that members exercise 
their powers under this section to the fullest”. 
the garda síochána has supplied data to the 
inspectorate that shows a systemic failure to 
fingerprint persons in garda custody for crimes 
where the taking of fingerprints are authorised 
under law. this is an area that requires urgent 
attention and compliance rates should be to 100%. 
Fingerprints and photographs after 
Conviction
There are many occasions when a person is 
summonsed to court for an offence, without 
an arrest taking place. This may occur when 
someone is not arrested, but is invited to attend 
a garda station in connection with a crime or is 
summonsed directly to court. In such cases, the 
investigating gardaí has not had an opportunity to 
take a person’s fingerprints and photographs. If that 
person is later convicted at court of an indictable 
offence, the person should be served with a form 
directing the individual to attend a nominated 
garda station to have their fingerprints taken. This 
should take place within seven days of conviction. 
Under Section 28, Criminal Justice Act 1984, it is an 
offence for a person to fail to present themselves 
and proceedings should be initiated where they 
do not. The taking of fingerprints in these cases 
link that individual to the conviction and it is very 
important to prove convictions both nationally and 
internationally. It is immaterial if the person’s prints 
were taken on a previous occasion and fingerprints 
should be taken on each conviction. It is good 
chart 9.5
persons Detained in garda Custody vs Fingerprints taken in 2012 
By incident Category/type
Incident category/type no of Persons in garda 
custody
number of fingerprints 
taken
number taken as a Percentage 
of number in custody
assault causing Harm 1,293 604 47%
assault Minor 247 94 38%
aggravated Burglary 226 113 50%
Burglary 3,057 1,324 43%
drugs 2,438 1,379 57%
Murder 115 62 54%
robbery 1,284 627 49%
rape 182 97 53%
Sexual	Offences	(other	
than rape)
360 185 51%
theft from M.P.v. 472 6 1%
unauthorised taking 
(Vehicle)
511 199 39%
total 10,185 4,690 46%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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practice to have equipment available at courts, as it 
ensures that persons committed directly to prison 
also have their fingerprints taken.  
In many of the divisions visited, there was no 
system in place to ensure that fingerprints are 
taken in these circumstances. This is a major gap. 
In one division, forms were served but there was 
no follow up to make sure that the person turned 
up. In another division, a court sergeant manages 
this process and there was evidence of people being 
prosecuted for failing to provide their fingerprints. 
Chart 9.6 shows the number of people convicted of 
indictable offences at all courts in 2012 and 2013, 
who should have had their fingerprints taken.
The chart shows that a considerable amount of 
people have not had their fingerprints taken under 
Section 28. In 2012, only thirteen out of twenty-
eight divisions took any fingerprints under this 
power and in 2013 this increased slightly to fifteen 
divisions. 
chart 9.6
Fingerprints taken Under section 28 of the Criminal Justice act 1984  
in the years 2012 and 2013 
2012 2013
division fingerprints taken fingerprints not taken fingerprints taken fingerprints not taken
cavan/Monaghan 0 216 6 134
clare 32 152 16 127
cork city 100 623 52 474
cork north 16 230 62 148
cork West 53 130 85 125
d.M.r. eastern 0 303 0 213
d.M.r. north central 0 924 0 737
d.M.r. northern 0 755 0 564
d.M.r. south central 0 858 0 715
d.M.r. southern 0 390 0 301
d.M.r. Western 0 628 0 468
donegal 2 150 0 90
Galway	 70 342 45 251
Kerry 27 126 12 87
Kildare 0 232 0 187
Kilkenny/Carlow 10 155 2 107
Laois/offaly 0 266 1 225
Limerick 19 342 89 225
Louth 0 194 0 131
Mayo 2 121 2 44
Meath 0 233 2 132
roscommon/Longford 0 199 2 132
sligo/Leitrim 0 136 0 103
tipperary 1 275 0 208
Waterford 35 247 10 135
Westmeath 10 201 3 154
Wexford	 0 166 0 95
Wicklow 0 223 0 129
total 377 8,817 389 6,441
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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In 2011, there were only 152 prosecutions for failing 
to attend a garda station to provide fingerprints 
and only eighty-two prosecutions up to September 
of 2012. In 2012, one of the selected divisions 
visited was responsible for almost 50% of the total 
prosecutions.  
there is a systemic failure to effectively deal with 
persons convicted of indictable offences at court, 
where fingerprints should always be taken.  
overall Compliance rates 
The total number of fingerprints taken and not 
taken in 2012 and 2013 is contained in Chart 9.7. This 
includes those arrested and taken to garda stations 
and those convicted of indictable offences at court, 
who should have had their fingerprints taken.
Chart 9.7 outlines that in a two year period, a total 
of 32,607 offenders did not have their fingerprints 
taken. 
implications for Failing to take Fingerprints at a 
garda station and after a Conviction
The failure to take fingerprints has many 
ramifications including:
•	 A	 person	 could	 be	 released	 from	 custody	
having provided false details; 
•	 A	 person	 could	 be	 released	 from	 custody	
who is wanted for a serious crime;
•	 Warrants	are	issued	in	false	names	or	in	the	
names of innocent people;
•	 Fingerprints	 found	 at	 a	 future	 crime	 scene	
cannot be matched to a person who was 
never fingerprinted;
•	 A	 fingerprint	 is	 positive	 identification	
and provides the link between the person 
arrested and a court conviction;
•	 An	identification	aid	for	the	Vetting	Unit	is	
not available.
the inspectorate believes that the garda síochána 
must urgently address the two processes for taking 
fingerprints and to ensure 100% compliance rates. 
Whilst a new process may improve the current 
situation, it will not be able to address the fact 
that many thousands of offenders each year have 
never had their fingerprints taken.
multiple Fingerprint identities on pULse
As mentioned in Part 8, during a visit to the Garda 
Interpol Unit, an issue was raised about requests 
from other police services to check fingerprints 
from a crime scene or from a person that is detained. 
The Inspectorate was told of a case where a suspect 
detained by another police service was found to 
have seven different identities on PULSE, but with 
the same fingerprints. This creates difficulties in 
linking a person to a particular crime recorded 
on PULSE. It was suggested that an alert system 
is required in the Fingerprint Section to inform 
an investigating garda immediately if a person is 
matched to a different identity. This should result 
in additional enquiries to establish the identity 
of the person and is a good example of how AFIS 
could immediately identify a person and allow the 
correct identification at the time of arrest. 
positive Fingerprint identifications
Fingerprints found at a crime scene are sent 
to Technical Bureau to check against existing 
fingerprint records. Where a match is found, 
Technical Bureau inform the local district station 
chart 9.7
total Fingerprints* that should Have Been taken vs Fingerprints taken  
2012 and 2013 
Year number of Persons 
who	Should	Have	Had	
fingerprints taken
number of 
fingerprints taken
number fingerprints not 
taken
number  not taken 
as a Percentage
2012 26,149 8,147 18,002 69%
2013 22,098 7,493 14,605 66%
* Includes fingerprints for offences under Section 28 and Section 4 of Criminal Justice Act,1984, Section 30 of the Offences against the State 
Act,1939,Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act (Drugs Trafficking) Act,1996 and Section 50 of the Criminal Justice Act,2007.
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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and in most cases, the results are sent to a detective 
unit to take action or directly to the investigating 
member. Divisions reported that it takes between 
six to eight weeks to receive results on fingerprints 
found. In some cases, the fingerprints found may 
belong to a person who has legitimate access to the 
crime scene such as the occupier of a house. One 
district had received ten positive identifications 
in the first four months of 2013, of which five 
belonged to persons with legitimate access and 
five belonged to suspects who had been arrested. 
Technical Bureau do not currently track fingerprint 
identifications found at crimes and were unable 
to state how many are progressed and how many 
are still awaiting action. It is important that when 
identifications are made that action is taken to 
establish if the fingerprints belong to suspect or to a 
person with legitimate access. 
photographs
Although the Inspectorate found a higher 
compliance rate with obtaining photographs from 
those arrested at garda stations, there are still 
many occasions when they are not taken. Criminal 
Intelligence Officers (CIOs) have responsibility for 
uploading images onto PULSE and many reported 
regular difficulties, where gardaí do not complete a 
photograph form and in the absence of a form, CIOs 
are unable to upload any photographs onto PULSE. 
Some divisions reported that only one in ten forms 
are correctly completed and CIOs are wasting time 
reminding gardaí to complete the form. The Garda 
Síochána must ensure that photographs are always 
captured and to introduce a system that ensures 
that photographs are uploaded onto PULSE as soon 
as possible.
 recommendation 9.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an urgent examination 
of the whole process of fingerprinting and 
photographing persons detained in custody 
and those who are convicted of an indictable 
offence at court. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Use	 AFIS	 Livescan	 digital	 fingerprinting	
technology for all fingerprints;
•	 Implement	 a	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
requirements of Section 28 Criminal 
Justice Act, persons subject to mandatory 
fingerprint identification, are fulfilled;
•	 Train	 all	 frontline	 gardaí	 to	 take	 AFIS	
fingerprints and how to obtain results; 
•	 Develop	 a	 Standard	 Operating	 Procedure	
to ensure 100% compliance with the taking 
of fingerprints, photographs and other 
samples; 
•	 Reduce	 the	 authority	 level	 for	 authorising	
fingerprints from an inspector to a custody 
sergeant; 
•	 Provide	divisions	with	regular	management	
information on fingerprint compliance; 
•	 Introduce	a	 tracking	system	to	monitor	 the	
progress of fingerprint identifications;
•	 Create	 a	 protocol	 to	 search	 for	 and	merge	
multiple intelligence records with AFIS 
records to ensure proper identification 
information exists in the PULSE records 
system.
identification processes
There are two specific identification processes. 
One stage is prior to the identification of a named 
suspect. This aspect was covered in Part 3 in actions 
at a crime scene and showing a victim or a witness a 
number of photographs of potential suspects.
Where a crime takes place and there is a dispute 
about the identity of the offender, the gardaí have 
two identification processes for trying to confirm 
or disprove a person’s involvement. Where the 
identity of a suspect is known, the garda should 
seek to conduct a formal identification parade. The 
current default position in the Garda Síochána is to 
arrange a live parade where the suspect is placed in 
a line-up and a witness is asked if they recognise 
the person who committed the particular crime. 
A live parade can be extremely difficult to arrange 
and is time consuming, as it requires a minimum of 
eight people of similar age, height and appearance 
to the suspect who agree to participate in a parade. 
Parades are also dependent on the suspect’s co-
operation. A formal parade provides more reliable 
evidence than an informal identification process 
which is generally of lesser evidential value. Where 
a person refuses to participate in a live parade a 
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garda is entitled to obtain identification through 
informal means. An informal identification can be 
conducted by taking a witness to a public place, 
which the suspect may frequent. An informal 
process should not be used where there is an 
opportunity to conduct a formal identification 
parade. Whilst identification processes are used by 
the gardaí, it is not provided for in statute and has 
developed as a result of case law.  
electronic parades
In other policing jurisdictions, it is now unusual to 
conduct a live identification parade and electronic 
parades are often conducted. Finding a minimum 
of eight people of similar appearance often presents 
huge challenges and particularly if the suspect has 
distinctive features. For a victim it can also be a 
traumatic process to actually see the person who 
may have committed the crime. Some investigators 
prefer the live parade and believe that a victim may 
be more able to identify the person. The current 
system used in most UK services has a database of 
photographs taken against similar backgrounds. 
The system contains clips of over 50,000 different 
people, which can be downloaded to police laptops 
to allow identification to be conducted away from a 
garda station at a witness’ home or hospital.  
Electronic parades reduce the time taken to conduct 
parades and provides a more flexible approach to 
holding parades. Defence solicitors are always 
invited to attend such a process on behalf of the 
suspect. The Inspectorate welcomes the provision 
in the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Bill, 2010 to provide regulations for the use of video 
identification. 
 recommendation 9.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána examines the effectiveness of the 
current process for conducting identification 
parades and moves towards an electronic 
system of identification parades where 
appropriate. (medium term).
refusal to participate
The Garda Crime Investigation Techniques Manual 
highlights that courts are not concerned about a 
suspect’s refusal to take part in an identification 
parade or attempts to frustrate it once it is assembled. 
In the UK under PACE (Codes of Practice Code D 
3.17 part v), the suspect is informed that a refusal 
to co-operate may be disclosed in any subsequent 
trial and that police can proceed covertly without 
consent or make other arrangements to test whether 
a witness can identify them. The Inspectorate 
believes that like taped interviewing, it would be 
helpful to criminal investigation if the garda could 
draw inference from a refusal to participate in an 
identification process. 
Facilities for identification parades
The Garda Síochána does not have purpose-built 
facilities for conducting identification processes. 
Other services have developed identification 
suites, which were separate from custody suites 
to avoid contamination of processes and to reduce 
possibilities for confrontation.  
Whilst there is no current legislation governing 
the conducting of identification parades, the 
matter is included Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Bill, 2010 that will allow the capture 
of a photograph for the purposes of showing 
the photograph to a witness. The Inspectorate 
supports the intention to legislate for the process 
of conducting parades, but it must be accompanied 
by training for gardaí and a move towards an 
electronic system.  
Many police services had dedicated units and 
purpose-built facilities for conducting live parades. 
In most services, such facilities are located away 
from police stations to avoid contamination 
between suspects and witnesses and to remove the 
likelihood of witnesses meeting with the families 
and friends of suspects. 
verification of Detained person’s Details
In the absence of using fingerprints or where a 
person is previously not known to the gardaí, it is 
very important that a person’s name, date of birth 
and address is verified before being released. The 
Inspectorate did not find any standard operating 
procedure about how personal identity is verified. 
In some divisions, the Inspectorate was confident 
that gardaí are contacting local stations where the 
person lives to verify personal identities; while in 
other locations the Inspectorate were less reassured 
that this is standard practice. If a person is released 
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without verification, then locating them in the 
future becomes far more difficult. The Inspectorate 
believes that there should be clear garda guidelines 
about verification of details and this is further 
discussed in Part 10. 
Code of practice 
The Inspectorate is aware that the Garda Síochána 
is developing a code of practice for the issues 
around dealing with taped interviews and legal 
representatives. The Inspectorate welcomes the 
development of a code of practice, but would 
recommend that the Garda Síochána considers 
a code of practice for all matters concerning the 
search, arrest and detention of a person. In the UK, 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act has a code of 
practice that sets out procedures and the rights of 
an individual. It is a single document that covers 
the following areas: 
•	 Stop	and	search;
•	 Arrest;
•	 Detention;
•	 Investigation;
•	 Identification;
•	 Interviewing	detainees.
A code of practice provides one source of reference 
for all authorities and powers and provides 
guidance for all persons involved in dealing with 
detained persons and investigative processes.
9.13 Exhibits and Property 
Management
The Garda Síochána is seizing and retaining a 
vast amount of property and exhibits. From visits 
to operational garda units, the Inspectorate found 
many places with excellent property systems 
and many with poor or no systems in place. The 
management of property coming into garda 
possession is a high risk area and requires careful 
management.  
There are currently a number of places where 
property is recorded, which includes:
•	 Property	books;
•	 Custody	Records;
•	 PULSE;
•	 Drugs	Unit	Registers;
•	 PEMS	store	databases;
•	 Non-PEMS	property	records.
The Garda Síochána is in the process of 
implementing a Property and Exhibits Management 
System (PEMS), primarily across the twenty-eight 
operational divisions. At the time of the inspection 
visits, three out of the seven divisions visited did 
not have a PEMS in place and one had just launched 
its new system. Some of the divisions visited were 
in the early stages of PEMS and some divisions had 
experienced long delays in implementing property 
management systems. Reasons for delays included 
difficulties in finding suitable premises and a lack 
of people to staff the property stores. In some places, 
gardaí and sergeants were managing stores, which 
the Inspectorate does not view as a role which 
requires a sworn member.
The Inspectorate welcomes the concept of PEMS 
as a process of managing property. Unfortunately, 
PEMS is not a national property IT system; it is 
a local stand-alone database in some divisions 
operating independently from other PEMS stores, 
from the Technical Bureau and the Forensic 
Science Laboratory. The Inspectorate believes that 
that the Garda Síochána should be developing 
an electronic system that will, in the long term, 
allow	 bar	 coding	 of	 all	 exhibits,	 including	 DNA,	
which would track exhibits from crime scenes to 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 9: Investigation and Detention of Suspects
Part 9  |  53
laboratories for analysis. The Inspectorate is aware 
that the Garda Síochána has submitted a bid for 
funding to the Government Audit Committee to 
provide a joined up electronic PEMS IT system. 
The Inspectorate welcomes any improvement 
to property management, but any system that is 
developed should have the technology to allow it 
to be integrated with other garda and key partner 
agency IT systems that will be implemented in the 
future.  
visits to Divisions and national Units 
Good property management is not reliant on 
PEMS and during visits, the Inspectorate found 
some excellent property stores operating outside of 
PEMS and this was usually associated with good 
supervision by a station sergeant. In some district 
stations, the Inspectorate found property stores 
that were overflowing with items and with no 
clear systems to store and find property. Another 
division was using half of their custody facilities to 
store bulky property and drugs exhibits.
During all visits, the Inspectorate found exhibits 
and other property items in garda stations in 
all sorts of places, including gardaí lockers, in 
corridors, on top of cupboards, as well as in 
conference and parade rooms. In one district 
station, the Inspectorate found exhibits in an 
unsealed bag in a parade room. When gardaí were 
asked where exhibits are kept, the usual answer 
was “everywhere”. This was not isolated to any 
one place.
The chain of evidence and continuity of the 
management of exhibits are factors required 
for a court case. The Garda Síochána must have 
a system that ensures that exhibits and other 
property are booked into a property store and only 
removed when necessary for examination, court or 
restoration to an owner. The Inspectorate is aware 
that there are several recent cases where property 
taken to garda stations was lost or stolen. These 
matters need to be addressed and, in particular, 
supervision is key to ensuring proper management 
of property and exhibits.
Forensic samples
Most, but not all, district stations visited had 
dedicated fridges for exhibits that require storage 
in a cool place. On examination, the Inspectorate 
found that many of the fridges were full to over 
flowing with exhibits and some exhibits were dated. 
Some of these exhibits were retained in anticipation 
of	new	DNA	legislation.	With	 the	new	legislation,	
exhibits will require careful management. 
Other police services have dedicated detective 
sergeants for managing such exhibits, ensuring 
that samples are sent for analysis and not left in 
fridges. The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána nominate a divisional lead for 
management of such exhibits. The new process for 
taking	DNA	from	persons	in	detention	has	removed	
the need for those exhibits to be chilled and can 
now be stored without the need for refrigeration.
Forensic examination of samples
Exhibits taken from crimes scenes and samples 
from suspects that require examination are taken 
to three different places. Fingerprints, photographs, 
documents for examination and other similar 
exhibits are examined by Technical Bureau. If the 
exhibit is a computer or a mobile telephone then 
the exhibit is analysed by the Computer Crime 
Investigation Unit (CCIU) in the Garda Bureau of 
Fraud Investigation. If the exhibit is a blood or fibre 
sample, drugs or a shoeprint, then the exhibit is sent 
to the Forensic Science Laboratory. With serious 
crime cases, there are often occasions when all three 
units will be examining exhibits for the same case.  
The Forensic Science Laboratory has been operating 
since 1978 and is located alongside the Technical 
Bureau at Garda Headquarters. The Laboratory 
provides a scientific service to the criminal justice 
system	and	will	act	as	the	custodians	of	the	National	
DNA	Database.		
Computers and other digital equipment that 
requires forensic examination are taken directly to 
the CCIU. All other exhibits are taken to the Forensic 
Liaison Office (FLO) in Technical Bureau. On receipt 
of an item, the FLO creates an entry on an exhibits 
tracking system, which is not linked to PEMS or to 
PULSE, and this is used to monitor the movements 
of	exhibits.	A	National	system	that	links	PULSE	to	
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property so that exhibits in cases are easily tracked 
would be of benefit to the inventory process. In the 
absence of such a system, it requires investigating 
gardaí, crime scene examiners and the FLO to 
update PULSE with the progress of exhibits. This 
is not something that happens in all cases. The 
Inspectorate was told that it is sometimes hard to 
find historical exhibits going back beyond 2008, as 
records were not always updated. There are also 
issues with finding historical exhibits that were 
not labelled correctly. 
Where an exhibit needs to go to the Laboratory, 
the FLO books the exhibit out of their system, and 
it is hand delivered. On receipt of the exhibit, the 
Laboratory create their own entry on an internal 
tracking system, which allows them to track the 
exhibits through their own system. The Laboratory 
would like to move to bar coding for drugs 
exhibits, but this will only track the exhibit within 
the laboratory. There is clearly wasted time and 
resources in this process and it would make sense 
to have one point of entry for all exhibits and for 
one IT system to track the progress of examinations. 
For serious crime, the Laboratory stated that 
the introduction of Senior Investigating Officers 
has improved the management and direction of 
exhibits sent in for analysis. However, in less 
serious crimes, the Laboratory get far less direction 
from investigating officers. In many cases, the 
Laboratory do not know the status of a case and are 
concerned that in some cases they are examining 
exhibits in cases that are complete. The Laboratory 
experience difficulty in contacting individual 
gardaí and on occasions, will send a request to an 
investigating garda to question if they still want an 
exhibit examined. 
The Laboratory is not operating an email system for 
results, which would speed up the process from an 
exhibit arriving, to the time that the result can be 
sent to an investigator. 
The analysis of shoeprints has moved from 
Technical Bureau to the Forensic Science Laboratory 
and as highlighted in Report 3, there are now very 
few submissions of shoeprints.
Currently, the Laboratory is completing the analysis 
of drugs exhibits in thirty days. There is a twenty-
two week backlog for serious crime examinations 
and this is linked to several serious crimes from 
the start of the year. The Laboratory finds it hard to 
catch up when demand suddenly rises. 
The FLO often receive drugs exhibits without 
knowing the details of the contents of the package. 
This is passed to the Laboratory, which receives the 
exhibit and are not always aware of what should be 
in the package. Following analysis, the Laboratory 
hand back the exhibit in a sealed package and the 
person collecting it does not always know if the 
contents are as described.  
retention of exhibits
Like other police services, the Garda Síochána 
are unnecessarily seizing and retaining exhibits. 
In some cases, a photograph may suffice or an 
undertaking from the owner to keep an item for 
any further use at court. In some divisions, there 
was no clear system for the outcome of cases and 
the destruction or return of property to an owner.  
The Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) focuses on 
organised criminality and those responsible for 
serious crime. The main focus of operation is 
to freeze, seize and confiscate assets under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act. Currently CAB has to 
retain seized property for seven years, unless 
the person who had possession of the property 
agrees to its disposal. This includes seizing assets 
lodged abroad. CAB informed the Inspectorate that 
they would like this period to be reduced to two 
or three years. An international group (Arrow) is 
trying to develop international best practice on the 
management of seized assets.
The issue of retention of property is also replicated 
in non-CAB cases and items of property are often 
retained after court cases for extended periods 
pending any appeal against the court decision. There 
is a significant cost involved in storage of bulky 
items and in some intellectual property crimes, 
victims are paying for those costs. Some items of 
property, such as cars, depreciate and are losing 
value whilst being retained for prolonged periods. 
The Garda Síochána has managed to recycle some 
seized vehicles for use in daily policing operations. 
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This is an area that the Garda Síochána and the 
DPP should examine and issue clear guidance 
about what needs to be retained and what could be 
restored to an owner.
garda professional standards Unit 
During a visit to the Garda Professional Standards 
Unit (GPSU), the Inspectorate was informed that 
they are currently conducting a national review of 
property management, starting with garda stations 
where property was missing and an audit of the 
management of drugs and drugs registers. The 
following are the general issues identified by GPSU:
general property issues
•	 PEMS	is	not	always	used	to	store	exhibits;
•	 The	 section	 ‘Item	 of	 Interest’	 on	 PULSE	
incidents is not always completed;
•	 Property	books	are	not	always	used;	
•	 Exhibits	 charts	 in	 case	 files	 do	 not	 always	
match entries on PULSE;
•	 Limited	evidence	of	 reconciliation	between	
PULSE and property books;
•	 Chain	of	evidence	is	not	transparent.
Drugs registers and seizures 
•	 There	 is	 no	 national	 standard	 for	 drugs	
registers;
•	 Not	all	seizures	had	a	PULSE	record;
•	 Some	exhibits	were	unable	to	be	found;
•	 Not	all	cases	had	an	investigation	file;
•	 PULSE	 is	 not	 always	 linked	 to	 a	 drugs	
resister reference;
•	 Following	 analysis	 the	valuation,	 type	 and	
quantity of drugs is not updated on PULSE.
The GPSU found that generally there were better 
systems in place to monitor drugs seizures, but there 
were inconsistencies in the information recorded 
in drugs registers in drugs units. The GPSU are 
advocating a national drugs register that ensures 
that all drugs units record the same information. 
The GPSU identified a general lack of supervision 
in respect of dealing with property and exhibits. 
Many divisions and national units are retaining 
large amounts of cash and one unit was holding 
in excess of €70,000. In most other policing 
jurisdictions cash may be forensically examined, 
but after that point, it is lodged in a bank account. 
The GPSU advised the Inspectorate that this 
issue is the subject of an internal working group 
consideration.
Continuity of evidence 
Each item of physical evidence uplifted in the course 
of an investigation must be treated as a potential 
exhibit in court (Garda Crime Investigation 
Techniques Manual Chapter 8 Para 12). All persons 
involved in the process of managing exhibits are 
required to provide statements of continuity.  
The chain of custody/evidence is very important in 
any prosecution to ensure that there is a clear record 
of the security of exhibits during their movements 
from place to place. Often, PULSE and property 
store descriptions of exhibits are not always 
recorded in the same way. It is very important to 
always accurately describe an exhibit in the same 
way.
The practice of statement writing extends fully to 
the chain of evidence and all garda and support 
staff involved in the process of transferring exhibits 
are required to write statements. Examples include 
a crime scene examiner that delivers exhibits to the 
FLO and the FLO officer that accepts them. Both 
these gardaí are required to complete statements. 
This is also required for exhibits sent to the 
Laboratory. For drugs analysis, the Laboratory 
complete a certificate and this is accepted in court 
as best evidence and removes the need for a forensic 
scientist to have to attend court to give evidence 
in all drugs cases. The Laboratory has received 
agreement	 in	 the	DNA	 Bill	 to	maintain	 a	 similar	
arrangement. However, this does not remove the 
requirement from the person accepting the exhibits 
at reception points of having to write a statement 
and potentially to go to court. The Inspectorate is 
unaware of any other policing jurisdiction where 
statements from those delivering and receiving 
exhibits are required to make evidential statements 
or to attend court.
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presentation of exhibits in Court
All serious crimes are forensically examined 
and specialist crime scene examiners will take 
photographs and may create maps of the crime 
scenes and surrounding area. Where a case proceeds 
to court, at least sixteen albums (photographs/
maps) are provided for each case. The Inspectorate 
understands that the cost per year ranges from 
€60,000 to 80,000. When the new Central Criminal 
Court was built, the use of technology to display 
such exhibits was considered and some of the courts 
were equipped to allow the electronic viewing of 
such exhibits. The Inspectorate understands that 
some of the monitors will need to be moved and 
jurors’ rooms will require screens to be fitted. This 
electronic presentation of exhibits is currently 
used	 by	 the	 PSNI.	 The	 Inspectorate	 understands	
that the equipment, in the Central Criminal 
Court, has never been used for this purpose. The 
Inspectorate believes that there is an opportunity to 
use technology to significantly reduce the current 
cost of producing these sorts of exhibits. Technical 
Bureau would also like technology that allows the 
transfer of an exhibit, such as a fingerprint to be 
sent directly to them from a crime scene.  
good practice - Drug testing
to reduce the amount of drugs that are sent for 
analysis, the garda síochána has introduced 
presumptive drug testing. this is used to 
test small seizures of cannabis and white 
powder and has removed the need to send 
large numbers of exhibits for analysis. this 
has reduced the amount of exhibits that were 
previously analysed by 70%. 
Central repository store in Dublin 
The Inspectorate visited the Central Repository 
Store in Dublin. This is used to store case files 
and exhibits for major cases and is also used for 
the retention of large volumes of garda files. This 
is a modern, well run store, but the pressure of 
storage space has already resulted in a plan to re-
organise the store to cater for long term storage. 
As mentioned earlier, the move to DVDs for taped 
interviews will greatly reduce the pressure on all 
property stores.
It is vitally important for any police service to have 
an effective property management system in place. 
The police have a duty to safeguard any property 
that comes into their possession and to ensure 
that the chain of evidence for exhibits is protected. 
The Inspectorate believes that PEMS needs to be 
rolled out across all units and divisions and that all 
exhibits must be kept in secure property stores.  
 recommendation 9.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an urgent examination of 
the current process for exhibit and property 
management. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Implement	 an	 integrated	 IT	 solution	 to	
record all property seized and to track its 
movements across all of the systems (Long 
term); 
•	 Complete	 the	 roll	 out	 of	 the	 Property	 and	
Exhibits Management System (PEMS) across 
all divisions and national units;
•	 Develop	a	national	drugs	register	to	ensure	
consistent inventory and data entry by all 
drugs units; 
•	 Review	 the	 production	 of	 exhibits	
(photographs/maps) at court and seek 
opportunities to use technology to reduce 
costs;
•	 Introduce	 technological	 opportunities	 to	
provide immediate transfer of crime scene 
exhibits for examination;
•	 Nominate	 a	 person	 at	 national/divisional	
level to have responsibility for forensic 
samples to ensure they are sent for analysis. 
 recommendation 9.17
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to explore options for 
legislative change to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of crime investigations. (Long 
term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
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•	 Extend	 the	 detention	 time	 in	 custody	
without charge; 
•	 Address	 the	 legislative	 gap	 in	 the	 powers	
of gardaí to detain a person arrested for 
minor offences, who after six hours, is still 
incapable of looking after themselves; 
•	 Provide	 authority	 for	 the	 Garda	 Síochána	
to fingerprint, photograph and obtain 
DNA	 from	all	persons	detained	at	 a	 garda	
station, as commensurate with international 
identification standards;
•	 Consolidate	 all	 legislation	 dealing	 with	
powers of arrest, search and detention to 
facilitate compliance and ensure consistency 
across relevant legislation;
•	 Develop	a	Code	of	Practice	for	the	treatment	
and detention of persons in garda custody;
•	 Consider	mandatory	drug	testing	of	persons	
detained for “trigger offences” including but 
not limited to burglary and robbery;
•	 Remove	 the	 requirement	 to	
contemporaneously record notes at the 
time of a taped interview;
•	 Resolve	 the	 issues	 in	 respect	 of	 tape	
transcripts and a move to a Written, Record 
or Tape and Interview (WROTI) type system; 
•	 Designate	 a	 custody	 record	 as	 primary	
evidence, to record all actions in a person’s 
custody record and to remove the need 
for statements to be completed for all 
interactions; 
•	 Introduce	an	Independent	Custody	Visitors	
Scheme to provide for custody care 
assurance;
•	 Improve	 the	 use	 of	 technology	 in	 court	
documentation and exhibits in criminal 
justice cases;
•	 Establish	the	process	of	identification	parades	
in law and to consider the implications when 
a suspect refuses to participate;
•	 Review	the	requirements	for	maintaining	a	
chain of evidence for an exhibit and seek to 
reduce the necessity for chain of evidence 
witnesses completing statements and 
attending court. 
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10.2 Offender Management
Young offenders
In Ireland, a young offender is a person aged over 
12 and under 18 years, who has committed a crime. 
Where a person within this age group is identified 
as a suspect in a crime, the young person must 
be referred to the Garda Youth Diversion Office 
(GYDO). GYDO is part of Garda Community 
Relations Unit and has a statutory duty, outside 
of the remit of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP), to make decisions about the case disposal 
of a crime involving a young offender, regardless 
of the seriousness of the crime. The statutory duty 
rests with the Director (GYDO) and not the staff 
in GYDO. The Director acts “under the general 
superintendence and control of the Commissioner” 
(Section 20, Children Act 2001). The Director may 
delegate his/her functions to an officer not below 
Inspector. This is a unique pre-charge system 
for young offenders where the Director (garda 
superintendent) of GYDO makes all decisions on 
whether to prosecute or not; up to and including 
serious assaults and murder. This is a major 
responsibility and there is a view in GYDO that the 
DPP should be making decisions in respect of such 
serious crimes. The Director may consult with the 
DPP on complex cases and the Inspectorate is aware 
that this action is taken in some cases. 
Section 52 of the Children Act 2001 states that “a 
child under 12 years of age shall not be charged 
with an offence”, with the exception that a child 
aged 10 or 11 years may be charged with murder, 
manslaughter, rape, rape under Section 4 Criminal 
Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 or aggravated 
sexual assault. Section 52(4) states that where a child 
10.1 Introduction 
Persistent and prolific offenders are responsible for a significant proportion of 
volume crimes; particularly burglary, handling stolen property, robbery and 
car crime offences. In this part of the report, the Inspectorate examined the 
Garda Síochána processes to identify and manage prolific offenders of such 
crimes, including young and adult offenders.
Of equal importance is the ability of a police service to manage those prolific 
and persistent offenders following a court case, or at the end of a custodial 
sentence, to ensure that their opportunity to commit further offences is 
minimised. This is especially important in the case of high risk offenders, such 
as registered sex offenders. An effective approach to offender management 
will allow a police service to focus on those offenders who present the 
greatest risk to communities. Management of offenders post-conviction is best 
achieved with other partners such as the Probation Service, Local Housing 
Departments, Health Service Executive, Department of Social Protection 
and jobseeker agencies. A collaborative approach to offender management is 
crucial to protect communities from further crime and provide an individual 
with opportunities to encourage them to change their behaviour. 
This part also examines the management of warrants and offenders on bail, as 
these two areas present high risks for the Garda Síochána and the communities 
they serve. 
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under 14 years of age is charged with an offence, no 
further proceedings, other than remand in custody 
or bail may be taken without consent from the DPP.
referrals to gYDo
Once a young person’s details are entered onto 
PULSE in connection with a crime and categorised 
as a ‘suspected offender’ by the investigating garda, 
the PULSE record is automatically referred to 
GYDO. 
The majority of young offenders are referred to 
GYDO for crimes that include theft, drugs and 
criminal damage. Most young offenders start 
committing minor crimes and their offending 
level can often escalate to more serious offences. 
However, some young offenders will enter the 
referral process with a more serious crime and 
GYDO stated that there is a noticeable increase 
in the referrals of young females, particularly in 
assault cases.
The Inspectorate was informed that there are some 
cases where a district supervisor needs to review 
and sign-off a PULSE incident, before GYDO 
can gain access to the PULSE record. GYDO can 
see these cases on the system, but cannot access 
them. Examples were provided where such cases 
are six months old, but are still in draft and have 
not been referred to them. In one extreme case, 
an investigation waited in draft stage for eighteen 
months without a referral to GYDO. A caution for 
a youth offender is not time bound by statute and 
GYDO are receiving late referrals. In cases where 
GYDO decide that a young person is unsuitable for 
a caution, there is a risk with late referrals that the 
time frame to bring a prosecution may have lapsed.1 
In making decisions about whether to charge or to 
caution a young person, GYDO take into account 
many factors such as:
•	 Whether	the	young	person	is	admitting	the	
offence;
•	 The	gravity	of	the	offence(s);
•	 Rights	of	society	and	the	rights	of	the	young	
person.
1 The timescale to issue a summons in summary (minor) cases 
lapses six months from the date of the incident.
Sometimes the poor quality of a narrative 
(description of how the crime took place) on a PULSE 
record makes decision making difficult and in these 
cases, GYDO have to request a case file for more 
information. This delays the GYDO process in that 
a more detailed narrative on PULSE would reduce 
the need for GYDO to seek more information. In 
more serious cases, GYDO may request a case file or 
additional information to ensure that the decision 
making takes into account all the factors of a case. 
The assessment of a young person is based on their 
suitability for the caution scheme.
Juvenile Liaison officers (JLos)
There are 115 garda Juvenile Liaison Officers (JLOs) 
based at garda divisions and eight full time sergeants 
supervising some of those JLOs. Once a decision is 
made to accept a person onto the scheme, the young 
offender is referred by GYDO to a JLO based in the 
area where the young offender lives and not to the 
area in which the crime was committed. Following 
the referral, a JLOs is required to prepare a suitability 
report on the young offender and to send the report 
to GYDO, who will make the final decision. Cases 
are allocated by GYDO directly to individual JLOs. 
Some are dealing with large volumes of cases and 
JLOs reported managing 250 to 300 cases a year. In 
making the assessment report, the JLO will usually 
facilitate a meeting with the young person and their 
parents or guardians. 
Approximately 80% of all referrals to JLOs are 
accepted onto the scheme. The 20% assessed 
as unsuitable are returned to the investigating 
garda to initiate a prosecution. The Inspectorate 
found examples where cases returned to original 
investigating gardaí were not progressed. This 
becomes more difficult for JLOs where the case 
belongs to another division, and the JLO is relying 
on the garda in that division to progress the case. 
On checking PULSE incidents, the Inspectorate 
found cases that were referred back for 
prosecution, but no work towards a prosecution 
is recorded on PULSE. Whilst the case is shown 
as detected on PULSE, the detection is invalid, as 
no charge or summons was issued. 
If GYDO decide that an offender is suitable for a 
caution, then the case is again referred back to the 
JLO to arrange for that caution to be given. For a 
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young person to be accepted on the scheme, they 
must admit the alleged crime and accept a caution. 
With some sexual assaults, where age is a factor 
in the crime, many young offenders are unwilling 
to admit to serious offences such as rape. Where a 
young person refuses to accept a caution, the case is 
referred back to the original investigating garda to 
progress a criminal prosecution. 
JLo outcomes
Of those cases referred back to JLOs, 51% are given 
an informal caution with a JLO supervision order 
for six months. A further 15% of young offenders 
are given a formal caution, with a twelve month 
supervision order attached. JLOs would prefer a 
procedure where a caution is given with or without 
a supervision order rather than the current formal 
and informal caution system. Many young offenders 
are cautioned on several occasions, before being 
placed before a court. From meeting with JLOs, 
there was a clear sense of frustration about cases 
where a JLO believed that a further caution was 
unsuitable and yet GYDO directed that the person 
be further cautioned. JLOs gave examples where 
young people were cautioned on five previous 
occasions. Many JLOs believe that continuing 
to caution young offenders is not a deterrent, but 
bringing them to court sends a message that this 
continued behaviour will no longer be tolerated. 
Many JLOs are concerned about the seven to eleven 
age group, as they have no responsibility for that 
cohort. Some young offenders start their criminal 
behaviour before the age of criminal responsibility 
and JLOs would like to work with these younger 
offenders. The Inspectorate understands this 
concern. Other jurisdictions are examining early 
intervention options to engage families and young 
people who are coming to the notice of partner 
agencies.
JLOs sometimes deal with disturbed young people 
and with young offenders who have committed 
serious sexual assaults. Many JLOs do not believe 
that they are currently qualified to deal with young 
people with severe emotional and behavioural 
issues. JLOs informed the Inspectorate that the HSE 
struggle to meet the needs of some young offenders 
in respect of referrals for anger management or other 
behavioural support. However, they also praised 
the support given by many schools that fill gaps in 
provision by arranging courses for young people. 
Schools have good knowledge of young people and 
their families and provide an invaluable service to 
the process of dealing with young offenders. 
restorative Justice
JLOs are trained in mediation and delivering 
restorative justice practices. As part of the JLO 
process, there is an opportunity to use restorative 
processes, such as bringing victims and young 
offenders together. This may well be a process 
in which not all victims wish to participate, but 
for some, the process has helped to deal with the 
impact of the crime. 
Restorative justice was introduced on a statutory 
basis for the first time in the Children Act 2001. 
There are two restorative justice initiatives provided 
for in the Act:
•	 A	 restorative	 conference	 or	 restorative	
caution included in the Garda Diversion 
Programme; 
•	 A	 court	 ordered	 restorative	 justice	
conference delivered through the Probation 
Service.
In a restorative justice conference, a victim can 
speak directly to a young person about the hurt 
and harm that they have caused. In some cases, an 
agreement is reached on a way that the child can 
compensate the victim or to do something positive 
such as an apology. Other options include financial 
or other reparations to the victim or an initiative 
with the child’s family and community that might 
help to prevent re-offending.
At present, about one in twenty cases are dealt with 
in this way. In the UK, research over a seven year 
period showed that following the use of restorative 
justice practices, re-offending rates fell by 27%. 
UK research shows that for every £1 spent on 
restorative processes, £9 was saved on the cost of 
re-offending. Surrey Police Service has found that 
good restorative justice programmes significantly 
reduced young offenders entering the criminal 
justice system.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 10: Offender Management
Part 10  |  4
treatment
Many JLOs raised concerns about referring 
young people for treatment without mandatory 
attendance. In particular, JLOs raised concerns 
about those young offenders who commit sexual 
offences who are not currently mandated to attend 
adolescent sex offender treatment. 
Diversionary activity 
Up to 5,000 young people each year are referred 
for diversion programmes and of those, 55% are 
referred following a JLO caution, and some are 
referred as they are young people on the ‘cusp’ of 
criminality. The courses focus on changing a young 
person’s behaviour. Considerable funding for such 
programmes is available through the Irish Youth 
Justice Service (IYJS). Attending such diversionary 
activity is not compulsory, but a failure to 
participate, may impact on the outcome if a young 
person re-offends. 
The Irish Youth Justice Service, manages the funding 
and the delivery of 100 Garda Youth Diversion 
Projects (GYDPs) nationwide. IYJS, in partnership 
with GYDO and community based organisations, 
is engaged in a major change programme to 
enhance the effectiveness of GYDPs. These projects 
are developing outcome focused programmes for 
young people in their charge based on evidence-
informed service planning and delivery. 
The Inspectorate understands from the Irish Youth 
Justice Service that before a child is accepted on 
a diversion programme, the Referral Committee 
(JLO & youth justice workers) consider all aspects 
of the child’s case. This facilitates the sharing of 
information. The youth justice workers also use the 
screening version of the YLS/CMI risk assessment 
tool. In 2015, IYJS will role out the full version of 
the assessment tool to all GYDPs which can be used 
to develop an intervention plan for the children 
referred. Some JLOs appear to be unaware of any 
such formal information sharing protocol. The 
JLOs informed the Inspectorate that they would 
like a formal process to provide for the sharing of 
information in cases where young people, with 
behavioural issues, are attending diversionary 
activity.
Throughout Ireland, the Garda Síochána are 
involved in many activities, particularly to engage 
young people in sport. In Dublin, gardaí run a late 
night football league to engage young people, aged 
between thirteen and twenty-one years, at a time 
when young people are most likely to be involved 
in crime and anti-social behaviour.
schools programme
The Garda Síochána has a long standing schools 
programme where gardaí visit primary and 
secondary schools to deliver talks on personal 
safety and drugs. A reduction in the numbers of 
community gardaí has resulted in difficulty in 
the delivery of the programmes and in 2013 only 
40% of schools covered by the plan received the 
scheduled visits. Other policing services have 
changed the way that police schools programme 
are delivered and elements of the Garda Programme 
are delivered by health professionals. Police officers 
are more involved with problem solving in and 
around the schools, rather than delivering class 
inputs. 
outcomes of the JLo scheme 
GYDO has no performance targets and does not 
record any statistics on outputs or outcomes in 
connection with re-offending rates. The Garda 
Síochána was unable to provide any data or 
research on what works in terms of JLO cautions, 
diversionary activity or restorative processes. It 
would be very beneficial to know the recidivism 
rates for each stage of the JLO process and what 
interventions have the greatest impact on the 
behaviour of young people. The absence of such 
data makes it difficult to determine the validity of 
GYDO decision-making in terms of JLO cautions 
and if they are cautioning too much, or at the 
wrong stage in a young person’s offending. GYDO 
informed the Inspectorate that the Garda Síochána 
did some evaluation of the programme in early 
2000, but GYDO was unaware of the outcomes. 
The current work with young offenders is far 
more established than for adult offenders, but the 
absence of outcomes and what works is a gap. 
There is clearly some excellent work with young 
people, but there is no performance or evidence-
based measures to guide those involved as to where 
effort and resources will provide the best chance of 
preventing a young person from re-offending.
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Case management for Young offenders
Garda Youth Case Management is a Garda 
Project which was developed as a pro-active 
and progressive approach to deal with prolific 
and persistent youth offenders. This process 
includes the appointment of a named member of 
the Garda Síochána to act as a Case Manager for 
a young person who is the subject of prosecution, 
generally for multiple offences. The Case Manager 
is responsible for leading, co-ordinating and 
managing the young person’s interaction with the 
criminal justice system, the juvenile’s family and all 
other agencies. 
The main goal is to identify young people at risk 
and to engage and coordinate all appropriate 
services and stakeholders with a view to achieving 
a positive outcome for the child.
Future of gYDo
Whilst the Garda Síochána has responsibility for 
managing youth diversion, it is not a function that 
needs to stay solely within their remit. GYDO has 
developed excellent relationships with Irish Youth 
Justice Service and Young Persons Probation. 
The Inspectorate believes that bringing the right 
agencies together in a co-located team would 
provide a more co-ordinated and effective service 
to young offenders. The Inspectorate recognises 
that this may take some time to be achieved. 
The current system of managing young offenders 
has many positive attributes and is a well 
established scheme. In the UK, multi-agency Youth 
Offending Teams have operated since 1999. These 
are managed by local authorities under the control of 
a Youth Justice Board. The teams are co-located and 
members of Youth Offending Teams have expertise 
in areas relevant to the care and rehabilitation of 
young offenders. These may include areas such as 
the Police Service, Probation Service, Social Services, 
the Health Service, Education, and Psychology. 
This co-location model has improved the sharing of 
information about young people and provides a one 
stop service for agencies to develop programmes to 
divert young people away from crime. The teams 
deal with young offenders aged ten to seventeen. 
Services provided include preparing reports to 
inform courts, supervising young offenders who 
are awaiting sentence and supporting parents and 
guardians.
 recommendation 10.1
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene a 
cross-departmental and multi-agency working 
group to progress the development of a co-
located and fully integrated youth offender 
service. (Long term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Examine	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Garda	 Youth	
Diversion Office (GYDO), in pre-charge 
decision-making processes involving 
juvenile offenders suspected of serious 
crimes such as murder and rape;
•	 Consider	 the	 application	 of	 a	 suitable	
engagement or diversionary scheme for 
those aged under twelve who come to the 
notice of the Garda Síochána;
•	 Promote	 the	use	of	 restorative	processes	 in	
accordance with the Children Act, 2001;
•	 Introduce	 an	 information	 sharing	 protocol	
between Juvenile Liaison Officers and 
diversion programmes to assist in the 
identification and treatment of behavioural 
issues; 
•	 Reassess	the	process	of	formal	and	informal	
cautions;
•	 Produce	 evidence-based	 performance	
measures to assist in the planning of 
diversionary activity;
•	 Engage	with	a	research	partner	to	develop	
best practice in regards to the GYDO 
process and the Garda School Programme 
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; 
•	 Review	 the	 participation	 requirements	 for	
treatment programmes for young offenders 
and particularly those who have committed 
sexual offences. 
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 recommendation 10.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána improves the current operation of 
the garda Youth Diversion programme. (short 
term)
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	that	all	eligible	cases	are	referred	to	
GYDO for decisions;
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 processing	 of	 young	
offenders is completed in a timely manner; 
•	 Ensure	 that	 cases	 deemed	 as	 unsuitable	
for JLO cautions are progressed towards 
prosecution;
•	 Evaluate	 and	 clarify	 garda	 policy	 in	 the	
application of multiple cautions.
10.3 Adult Offenders 
garda adult Case management
The adult case management system is not as 
developed or proportionally resourced compared 
to the young offender system. The Garda Síochána 
conducts a large number of effective policing 
operations on high risk and prolific offenders, but 
do not have a co-ordinated, multi-agency approach 
to offender management. 
There is a less formal system in operation for adult 
offenders eighteen years and over. The Garda 
Síochána is running a national pilot scheme called 
‘Adult Case Management’. This is very much in an 
embryonic stage and, at the time of the inspection, a 
total of 300 gardaí were trained in case management. 
These gardaí are allocated to individual offenders 
and their role is to co-ordinate court cases. Where 
a person breaches bail or commits another offence, 
the nominated garda should be informed, so that 
action is taken to bring any other cases together. 
An adult offender included in this scheme is 
highlighted on PULSE and the details of the garda 
case manager is included. This process could speed 
up the time taken to arrange court appearances, but 
at the time of completing this report, there was no 
empirical data to show the impact of the initiative. 
This is very much about case management, rather 
than about the more complex process of offender 
management. 
regional approach to adult offenders
As discussed in Part 8, regional detective 
superintendents play a key role in tackling offenders 
who operate across divisional and regional 
boundaries. In the Southern Region, Operation 
Bliain is a targeted operation to identify and arrest 
burglary suspects who move between Kerry, 
Limerick and Cork. A key part of the operation 
is the identification of a number of suspected 
offenders and the allocation of case managers. Once 
arrested, a suspect is dealt with for all outstanding 
matters, including warrants. In the Western Region, 
Operation Aimsir also targets cross border burglary 
suspects. Active steps are taken to locate and arrest 
offenders. The regional detective superintendent 
has the ability to deploy additional resources, such 
as surveillance teams to follow suspects and gather 
evidence. In the Northern Region, the Inspectorate 
found the regional detective superintendent taking 
a positive lead in tackling cross border criminality 
with the PSNI. A case manager is assigned to the 
top ten suspects and has the responsibility for 
monitoring all police contact with the suspect, as 
well as liaising with agencies to locate the offender 
and affect an early arrest. 
In the Dublin Metropolitan Region (DMR), there 
was less clarity about offenders who move between 
divisions and who is actually responsible for co-
ordinating activity. Given the level of organised 
crime and gang related violence in and around 
Dublin, this is a missed opportunity. For example, 
at the time of the inspection there was no gang or 
firearms meeting held in Dublin that would bring 
together all the detective superintendents dealing 
with gang related activity. The Inspectorate visited 
two divisions in the DMR and found little evidence 
of co-ordinated plans to manage known prolific 
offenders who move across the city. 
Divisional and District approach
The Inspectorate found some good examples of 
pro-active operations to target offenders operating 
at district and divisional level. For example, in 
one division, pro-active cross district operations 
(Operations Alloy and Trasna) were conducted 
to tackle car crime and burglary offences. These 
operations involved covert and high visibility 
patrols in areas where analysis showed offenders 
were most active. Both operations had clear and 
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effective tactical plans to address vehicle crime and 
burglary offences, including effective monitoring of 
suspected offenders. 
restorative Justice processes
The Restorative process for adult offenders is far 
less developed and used. The Probation Service, in 
partnership with community based organisations 
(CBOs) and some of its statutory partners currently 
deliver Restorative Justice Programmes and 
interventions, although not nationally. These 
include Restorative Justice Projects available to a 
number of the District Courts in Dublin and the 
Midlands. 
The Probation Service published its Restorative 
Justice Strategy in 2013. In accordance with the 
strategy the expansion of the delivery of restorative 
justice service in the Criminal Courts of Justice 
(Dublin) and to Cork District Court is being 
conducted on a pilot basis. In order to facilitate this 
expansion an increase in the community funding 
was approved for the 2014 allocation for the two 
restorative justice CBOs. During the inspection, the 
restorative justice process for adults was described 
as “floundering” due to insufficient resources and 
this is a missed opportunity to deal with offenders 
more effectively.
Other police services have trained community 
officers in mediation and restorative skills with 
a view to addressing quality of life issues, crime 
and anti-social behaviour that impact on local 
communities. Mediation is a good process for 
dealing with issues concerning neighbours and 
people who live in close proximity. 
persons released from prison or subject to 
supervision orders
A significant number of people leave prison early 
under various circumstances. This includes people 
on temporary release, early release, part suspended 
sentences, on parole or as part of a community 
return. There are also other schemes that provide 
alternatives to a custodial sentence. The Probation 
Service has many and varied responsibilities in 
terms of supervision of people who are subject to 
supervision orders: 
•	 Community	Service	Orders	
 As an alternative to a custodial sentence, 
offenders can be given a Community Service 
Order (CSO).2 The Criminal Justice (Community 
Service) Act, 1983, provides that a court may 
make a Community Service Order (CSO) as 
an alternative to a sentence of imprisonment 
or detention in respect of any individual over 
the age of sixteen who has been convicted of a 
criminal offence and who consents to the Order 
being made. In some of the divisions visited, 
there were large numbers of people on CSOs 
who were completing between forty and 240 
hours on community projects. 
•	 Community	Returns
 Community Return, introduced in 2011, is an 
incentivised schemes operated by the IPS and 
the Probation Service. It provides for earned 
temporary release for offenders who receive a 
custodial sentence of twelve months or more 
in return for unpaid work completed under 
supervised community service conditions. This 
requires people to complete two to three days 
work per week doing jobs within communities. 
Whilst it is still in the early stages, the 
compliance rates appear to be high. 
Both of these initiatives are quite labour intensive 
for the Probation Service, but research has proved 
that community sanctions can help to reduce 
offending. 
•	 Temporary	Release
 Most garda divisions receive lists of those on 
temporary release from prison, but the details 
are sometimes received after the person has 
been released. Those on temporary release are 
often required to report to their local garda 
stations at certain times. This is further covered 
in the bail section in this part of the report. 
2 The legislation for Community Service Orders allows a Judge 
to sentence a person to complete between 40 and 240 hours 
unpaid work in the community.
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•	 Post	 Release	 Supervision	 and	 Temporary	
release supervision 
 Some people will have a post release 
supervision order attached to their sentence. 
In effect, when released from prison the 
Probation Service will try and help the person 
to re-integrate into the community and to 
avoid further offending. Some persons on post 
release orders can be subject to supervision for 
long periods of time, such as six years.
 For some higher risk offenders who are due for 
release, a case conference is usually arranged 
and a probation officer will meet with prison 
staff and the offender. The first few days of a 
release from prison are extremely important 
for a person and without certain supports in 
place there is a likelihood of re-offending. The 
Probation Service, local authority and other state 
agencies have certain responsibilities; which 
include providing access to accommodation, 
training, education and obtaining work for the 
individual. 
 Conditions attached to orders can be particularly 
helpful to the Probation Service, who try to 
modify and encourage a change of behaviour. 
•	 Supervision	During	Deferment	of	Penalty
 In some cases, a judge will defer a sentence for 
a period of time to see if the behaviour will 
improve. This period of time can range from a 
month to twelve months. Often, the offender is 
not subject to any supervision order during that 
time. If the offender has not come to the notice 
of gardaí during that period cases can be often 
struck out.
•	 Pre-Sanction	Reports	
 Once the facts of a case have been proven to 
the court, and before deciding on how to deal 
with the case, a judge may ask the Probation 
Service for a pre-sanction report, providing 
information about an offender and their 
personal circumstances. Adult reports are 
generally completed within six weeks and 
young offender reports within twenty-eight 
days. In 30% of cases, further probation service 
interventions are not required and these are 
usually for cases of possession of drugs and 
public order offences committed by low risk 
offenders. 
 As part of this process, probation officers are 
obliged to contact investigating gardaí to seek 
their views. In some areas, the Probation Service 
receive a good response to requests for views, 
but in other areas they find it difficult to contact 
gardaí and reports are often submitted without 
completing this process. 
 Probation officers reported that they often 
find it  difficult to obtain a copy of the garda 
case précis or statement of facts. The Probation 
Service is not routinely provided with a copy, 
although it would greatly assist with the 
preparation of reports. 
•	 Offenders	with	Addictions
 Offenders may need long term treatment 
for their addictions. For those on shorter 
prison sentences, they do not always receive 
sufficient treatment programmes to meet their 
needs and impact on offending behaviour. 
On release, offenders without treatment often 
return to their previous lifestyle, including re-
offending. The Probation Service focuses on 
those offenders released on a supervision order. 
For other offenders, it may be more difficult to 
access public treatment and the cost of private 
treatment may be prohibitive to many of those 
with addictions. This cohort can be responsible 
for committing high levels of crime.
•	 Civil	Orders	–	Post	Release
 Section 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007, 
amended in 2009, introduced a new order to 
place restrictions on certain activities following 
release from prison. It was created to deal with 
those offenders involved in serious offences 
and to prevent people from engaging in named 
activities, such as associating with certain 
people and visiting certain places. These orders 
can apply for a period up to seven years and it 
is an offence to breach it. The Inspectorate did 
not find any examples of the application of this 
legislation. 
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•	 Breaches	of	Orders
 When a supervision order is breached, a 
person should be returned to court to face the 
consequences. This can include an alternative 
penalty, up to and including a custodial 
sentence. A probation officer will apply for a 
summons to bring the offender to court, and 
a garda will serve it. Where a person fails to 
appear at court a warrant can be issued. For 
offenders on a treatment programme, probation 
officers are sometimes reluctant to deal with the 
breach, as this would impact on the offender’s 
treatment. In some cases they work on a ‘three 
strikes’ rule. For minor breaches, the Probation 
Service often prefer the garda to deal with 
the breach, as probation action can severely 
impact on the relationship with their client. The 
outcome at court for a breach of an order very 
much depends on the local judge. 
integrated offender management in other 
Jurisdictions
Persistent and prolific offenders, as well as those 
subject to early or temporary release from custodial 
sentences, may be more effectively managed 
through an Integrated Offender Management 
(IOM) approach. IOM operates in the UK and other 
European counties and brings together the police, 
probation service, health service, prison service, 
local housing departments and job seeker agencies. 
By understanding what causes an individual to 
commit crime, police and other statutory agency 
professionals can work together to put plans in 
place to reduce re-offending. This approach allows 
for joint identification and assessment of offenders, 
and a key feature is agreed information sharing 
between the agencies about those offenders who 
pose the highest risk of harm to local communities. 
It works particularly well with offenders who 
receive short sentences or those who are released 
from prison without statutory supervision. One 
of the key aims of IOM is to break the cycle of 
persistent or prolific offending, particularly where 
drug or alcohol addiction is a factor in offending 
behaviour. 
Several jurisdictions operate an integrated approach 
to high risk offenders. In Denmark, the police and 
key partner agencies work together to co-ordinate a 
plan designed to prepare prisoners for release from 
custody by arranging employment, housing and 
addressing any health issues. 
south Wales integrated offender 
management Unit
In South Wales, there is an established and dedicated 
Integrated Offender Management Unit (IOMU) 
in one of the busiest divisions at Cardiff Bay. The 
unit is jointly headed by a sergeant and a probation 
manager. The team is staffed by a combination of 
police officers and probation officers who act as case 
managers for offenders. There is also representation 
from the Youth Offending Service, a job centre 
advisor, a local authority employment advisor and a 
housing officer. A dedicated probation officer deals 
with those young people who move up from youth 
to adult status, (those aged seventeen to eighteen).
The cohort dealt with by the IOMU, are those at 
high risk of re-offending based on their criminal 
history, personal circumstances, health issues 
including drug usage and those who are released 
both on licence and non-statutory release. Priority 
is given to those convicted of burglary and robbery 
offences, as well as those involved in organised 
criminal gangs. The IOMU manages 270 offenders, 
of which just over 50% have been released from 
prison. There is a clear referral mechanism to 
determine, which offenders will be accepted 
for management by the unit. Those not selected 
are passed to the offender’s local division to be 
monitored by neighbourhood teams and pro-active 
units.
The selection process starts with referral by one or 
more of the agencies, who identify an offender as 
problematic, high risk or prolific. Offender history 
is assessed through a Home Office Integrated 
Offender Management matrix, which not only 
assesses their propensity to re-offend, but also the 
cost of their offending to date to the police service, 
other agencies, to victims and the Criminal Justice 
System. There is a strong emphasis on protecting 
the public and to reducing overall costs to the 
justice system. 
A multi-agency selection panel makes the final 
decision and the offender enters the programme. 
Some offenders are referred to the programme as a 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 10: Offender Management
Part 10  |  10
condition of their licence or part of a drugs treatment 
order by the courts and some agree to participate. 
Those selected are subject to bespoke and fast time 
interventions to get them into permanent housing, 
employment where possible and to address health 
and welfare issues. The unit has a daily briefing and 
tasking meeting to manage the offenders. Those on 
curfews will be checked daily, and offenders are 
classified into one of three categories: 
1. Those fully engaged and compliant with 
interventions;
2. Those with mixed or poor compliance with 
interventions; 
3. Those who are re-offending, wanted, 
disengaged with supervision or treatment 
programmes or in breach of orders.
Group three are categorised as high risk and will be 
the subject of pro-active action on that day to find, 
arrest and return the offender to court. Information 
about all of the offenders is shared with divisional 
officers and staff. In addition, the IOMU has a 
dedicated analyst who assesses emerging crime 
trends to identify those offences, which might be 
linked to IOMU subjects. This analyst works closely 
with the divisional intelligence team. 
outcomes of the integrated offender 
management Unit (iomU)
The outcomes since the inception of the IOMU in 
Cardiff are:
•	 Average	 re-offending	 rate	 of	 prolific	 and	
persistent offenders has almost halved – a 
reduction of 48%;
•	 A	 52%	 reduction	 in	 serious	 acquisitive	
crimes in the Cardiff Bay area;
•	 Cost	savings	to	the	Criminal	Justice	System	
of approximately €700,000 based on the 
Home Office costing matrix;
•	 Those	 supported	 into	 employment	 show	 a	
50% retention of that employment.
integrated offender management in 
Hertfordshire 
In Hertfordshire in the UK, offender management is 
a key tactic used extensively across most pro-active 
and reactive teams. This includes tasking twenty-
four hour uniform response teams to target prolific 
offenders. IOM works at several levels, including a 
countywide multi-agency team which operates a 
scheme entitled ‘Choices and Consequences - C2‘. 
This offers prolific offenders a realistic opportunity 
to break free from the cycle of crime. Launched in 
2007, it is supported by all criminal justice partner 
agencies, including, the senior crown court judge. 
Police identify offenders who must demonstrate 
a desire to rehabilitate by admitting to all past 
offences. Offenders are assessed by the probation 
service and if suitable for the programme, the final 
decision rests with the courts. The courts can defer 
a sentence for up to six months, whilst the offender 
undertakes an extensive rehabilitation programme 
that may include drug treatment, life skills, training, 
education and employment. The scheme is suitable 
for the most persistent and prolific offenders who 
often have some form of substance addiction that 
drives their offending behaviour. 
There is a strong emphasis on education and training 
to give the offender a sustainable way of earning 
a living in the future. Unpaid work is frequently 
a feature of the community order imposed by the 
court. Any sentence that a C2 offender may have 
received is deferred by the courts and the offender 
must stay away from offending and deal with any 
addiction problems for a period of up to three years. 
Failure to do so will result in the imposition of the 
original sentence. C2 is now utilising GPS tracking 
technology to monitor offenders with many 
volunteering to wear tracking devices. Tracking 
provides information about the offender’s location 
and is readily available to police and probation 
officers. It also allows checking to ensure that the 
offender was not in the area at the time that an 
offence similar to the offender’s was committed. 
An additional benefit of this approach is that 
offenders must admit to all of their previous 
offences. This gives police the opportunity to solve 
other crimes and to provide closure for victims of 
those crimes.3
3 Further information can be found be found at www.herts.
police.uk/C2programme.
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electronic monitoring
The Irish Prison Service ran an electronic 
monitoring pilot and involved a total of thirty-one 
selected prisoners and a maximum of eighteen 
at any one time. The purpose of the pilot was to 
test the feasibility of using GPS satellite tracking 
technology to monitor prisoners on temporary 
release in the community and assess its potential 
for future use on a wider scale. Key potential 
benefits of electronic monitoring were seen as relief 
of overcrowding and enhanced reintegration of 
prisoners in their communities. 
In other police services, more use is made of 
electronic monitoring, which some offenders 
request to be fitted. In some cases it allows offenders 
to refuse the requests of associates to get involved 
in crime and sends a clear message that they are 
being overtly monitored. For others, it is a way of 
more effectively managing curfews, with continual 
monitoring of their movements. In some police 
services, a failure to return or be at home at the 
start of a curfew time, sends a signal to the IOMU 
and this breach is then pro-actively acted upon. 
Electronic monitoring provides a continual record 
of the offender’s movements.
Electronic monitoring has the following benefits:
•	 Assists	with	the	detection	and	prevention	of	
crime;
•	 More	 effectively	 manages	 resources,	
especially officer time;
•	 Provides	a	more	effective	way	of	managing	
curfews, exclusion orders and other court 
orders; 
•	 Improves	 compliance	 with	 community	
supervision orders;
•	 Improves	 the	 available	 information	 and	
intelligence about prolific offenders.
The PSNI is currently tagging offenders with an 
external company fitting the tags and base station at 
the person’s home and monitoring compliance. The 
UK has just launched a pilot to fit sobriety tags to 
offenders convicted of alcohol related crimes. The 
devices will check for alcohol traces twice a day and 
any breaches will be brought back to court. 
strategic approach to offender recidivism 
The Garda Síochána has developed a new pilot 
scheme called the Strategic Approach to Offender 
Recidivism (SAOR) designed to ensure that a 
national and strategic approach is taken to the 
management of young and adult offenders. 
The objectives include:
•	 Identify	prolific	offenders;
•	 Reduce	crime;
•	 Manage	prolific	and	persistent	offenders;
•	 Ensure	 a	 consistent	 approach	 to	managing	
offenders nationally;
•	 Work	in	partnership	to	manage	offender	and	
reduce crime. 
There are three tiers, including adult case managers, 
divisional based activity with key partner agencies 
to identify offenders and a multi agency regional 
forum. This was launched in the DMR Region and 
was accompanied by training and briefings to key 
personnel. 
Integrated	Offender	Management	–	The	
Way Forward
In May 2013, the Irish Prison Service and the 
Probation Service launched a joint strategic 
plan that stated a commitment to create an 
integrated offender management programme. The 
Inspectorate fully supports that programme, but it 
needs the involvement of other partner agencies, 
including the Garda Síochána, local authorities 
and other agencies that are involved in offender 
management. There is significant good practice to 
be found in England, Wales, Scotland, and further 
afield in Europe. 
 recommendation 10.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to progress the 
development of a co-located multi-agency and 
fully integrated adult offender management 
service. (Long term). 
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 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Focus	on	those	who	present	the	highest	risk	
to community safety; 
•	 Promote	the	use	of	restorative	processes;	
•	 Evaluate	 the	 treatment	 of	 offenders	 with	
addictions during short term sentences; 
•	 Review	 the	 process	 for	 managing	 those	
offenders due to be released from prison;
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 provisions	 in	 law,	 such	 as	
Civil Orders for managing offenders post 
sentence, are considered in appropriate 
cases;
•	 Consider	 electronic	 monitoring	 and	 other	
initiatives to monitor offenders;
•	 Research	 and	 publish	 performance	
measurements of offender management 
effectiveness.
 recommendation 10. 4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána improves the current operation of 
the adult offender management programme. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Increase	 the	 divisional	 and	 regional	 co-
ordination of the management of prolific 
offenders; 
•	 Promote	the	application	of	restorative	justice;
•	 Provide	the	Probation	Service	with	a	copy	of	
the precís or statement of facts to assist with 
preparation of pre-sanction reports;
•	 Fully	inform	the	Probation	Service	of	garda	
views for pre-sanction reports, to ensure 
that probation reports contain the views of 
the investigating garda;
•	 Develop	the	use	of	post	release	Civil	Orders.
sex offender risk assessment and 
management (soram) 
A number of high risk offenders require additional 
levels of monitoring to ensure that there is regular 
review of the risks posed and a clear process to 
mitigate and manage the identified risk. One such 
group are convicted sex offenders, who are required 
to register with the Garda Síochána and provide 
details of their place of residence and any intention 
to travel for a period of more than seven days. In 
June 2010, a joint model of sex offender management 
was introduced, known as Sex Offender Risk 
Assessment and Management (SORAM). This 
brought together the Garda Síochána and the 
Probation Service to assess the risk of re-offending 
and to agree a co-ordinated plan to mitigate those 
who pose the highest level of risk. The initiative 
was piloted in five areas in Louth, Mayo, Tipperary, 
Cork City and DMR North. An evaluation was 
undertaken in 2011, which recommended the 
inclusion of the Health Service Executive (HSE) as 
a partner agency. 
At the time of the inspection field visits, SORAMs 
were not in place in all the divisions visited, but 
are now in operation across all twenty-eight 
divisions. The Inspectorate visited divisions 
operating SORAM as well as those that did not. 
Where SORAM was operating, the Inspectorate 
observed a better sense of understanding about 
the requirements of the process and of the need 
to follow up risk assessments. The Inspectorate 
found that in some districts there were one or 
two dedicated officers, generally detectives, with 
responsibility for visiting and monitoring the 
activities of registered sex offenders. In many UK 
police services, local community officers also share 
the responsibility to visit medium and lower risk 
offenders to maintain that regular contact, as well 
as a continual reminder about their responsibilities 
to avoid further offending behaviour. 
SORAM teams should convene regularly and is a 
good platform for agencies to share information 
and intelligence. From meetings with those 
involved in SORAM, there was a mixed response 
to how it was operating. In some divisions, 
SORAM was described as a dynamic process and 
in others as being very slow and evolving. One 
SORAM reported that the HSE were not attending 
and as a result, scheduled meetings did not 
always take place. In some divisions, there was 
excellent feedback on the work that takes place 
between gardaí managing sex offenders and local 
probation officers. In one serious case, a garda 
did some excellent work with a local community 
to manage the return of a person convicted of a 
serious sexual offence. 
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Prolific and predatory sex offenders pose a high 
risk to community safety and can be devious 
and manipulative in their dealings with others, 
including police and probation officers. The 
introduction of the SORAM process is welcomed 
as a way of co-ordinating the response to a small, 
but high risk group of offenders. There is a need 
to deploy dedicated officers, ideally those who 
have received training to manage this unique type 
of offender. There is also a need for clear lines of 
command and accountability for the SORAM 
process and this is one area which should fall 
within a revised remit for a divisionally based 
detective superintendent. The Inspectorate also 
advocates that there should be a comprehensive 
annual evaluation of how SORAM panels are 
operating, to share good practice, as well as 
addressing any problems at an early stage. 
sex offenders management Unit
Within the National Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation, sex offenders are monitored centrally 
by the Sexual Offenders Management Unit (SOMU). 
SOMU has responsibility for maintaining records 
of all persons subject to the Sex Offenders Act.
Following the inspections visits, the Inspectorate 
was unclear as to the level of compliance with 
the Act, the number of offenders who have failed 
to register or have failed to register correctly. 
The Inspectorate was informed that the Garda 
Síochána developed Operation Jeopardy to 
examine cases where people had failed to register 
correctly or had not registered at all. The operation 
began in February 2014, when 101 sex offenders 
were unaccounted for and the current position is 
that ninety-nine of the 101 have been located and 
a number of prosecutions have been initiated. The 
remaining two have been identified as residing 
outside of the jurisdiction. The Inspectorate has 
been informed that Operation Jeopardy continues 
to monitor these offenders. 
Following a conviction at court, the SOMU should 
receive notification from the court by fax or by post 
that a person is required to register. The Inspectorate 
was informed of cases where following a conviction, 
a court may not have made the required order or 
where an order is made, court offices are not always 
notifying the SOMU. Sometimes an offender 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment is not always 
notified by the court of the requirement to register. 
The Irish Prison Service has responsibility for 
notifying the garda when a person is due for release 
and to provide the person’s future address following 
release. The period of registration depends on the 
severity of the offence and for some offenders they 
will be registered indefinitely. A person must be on 
a Probation Service supervision order to be placed 
on SORAM. 
Currently persons have seven days to register with 
the Garda Síochána and can do so by letter. Often 
offenders register through their solicitor and do 
not attend a garda station. The offender can also 
notify any garda station, not necessarily the local 
one where they live. The Garda Síochána would 
like the seven day period to be reduced to three 
and for persons to be required to attend the local 
garda station. Once the gardaí are notified, a risk 
assessment takes place to assess the risk posed by 
the offender and to decide if they will be monitored 
by SORAM. In the UK, sex offenders must confirm 
their registration annually. Many of the gardaí 
involved in this process have not received any risk 
assessment training and many of those involved in 
SORAM are also untrained. This is a gap where the 
Garda Síochána and the Probation Service intend to 
deliver joint training.
Fingerprinting, photographing and taking DNA 
from convicted offenders should be taken as part 
of the investigation and prosecution process. As 
described in Part 9, the taking of fingerprints is 
an area of  weakness for the Garda Síochána, who 
should ensure that all persons who are required 
to register have provided fingerprints and other 
samples. 
Divisions are required to nominate an inspector 
with responsibility for monitoring sex offenders. 
The SOMU would like to have more interaction 
with these inspectors, but highlighted staffing 
levels as a reason that this does not always 
happen. Divisions are required to provide six 
monthly returns to SOMU on their sex offenders, 
but at the time of the inspection only 50% of 
divisions were providing this information. 
PULSE contains a warning system that alerts a 
garda that a person is a registered sex offender 
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and many CIOs have created intelligence profiles 
on registered offenders. SORAM operates across 
three agencies using three different IT systems 
and this is a barrier to effective sharing of 
information. SOMU are in the process of visiting 
each SORAM with representatives from Children 
and Family Services and the Probation Service. 
The officers attached to SOMU are working the 
pilot garda roster and all work on the same shift. 
This means that the whole unit are off-duty at the 
same time, which greatly reduces the coverage of 
the office. The unit investigates some cases and at 
the time of inspection had ten open investigations. 
SORAM is a process that is well established in other 
countries, but it needs well trained members and 
good interaction from all partner agencies. The 
Inspectorate recommends that SORAMs should 
be subject to multi-agency annual reviews across a 
range of key performance indicators. 
 recommendation 10.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána, Hse and the probation service 
conduct annual reviews of the progress of 
individual sorams. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
• Provide oversight and governance to locate 
those offenders who have failed to provide 
proper notice pursuant to the requirements 
of the Sex Offenders Act 2001;
•	 Assess	the	exchange	of	information	between	
the agencies with ongoing review of IT 
solutions for improved data sharing;
•	 Ensure	that	all	members	of	SORAM	receive	
appropriate training and particularly those 
involved in the risk assessment process;
•	 Provide	 for	 interagency	 communication	
and training to ensure that good practice is 
shared;
•	 Mandate	 that	 divisions	 provide	 bi-annual	
information returns on registered sex 
offenders; 
•	 As	part	of	a	functional	model	for	divisions,	
the detective superintendent should be 
responsible for SORAM.
paedophile investigation Unit
The Paedophile Investigation Unit (PIU) is based 
in Dublin and consists of a small team that 
investigates complex, high profile cases and those 
with an international element. The remit of the 
unit includes child trafficking and cases involving 
the production and possession of pornographic 
images of children. PIU currently receives about 
twenty-five requests per week in connection 
with identifying Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
connected to possible offences. In most cases the 
unit will identify the IP address and send this to 
the local district to investigate the intelligence 
received. PIU provides advice to districts, such 
as how to obtain a search warrant. The current 
Garda Síochána IT system restricts the sending of 
evidence electronically, resulting in investigators 
having to travel to Dublin to view evidence. PIU 
only have access to one stand alone computer 
to receive and download evidence, as they are 
unable to use PULSE. This is a fundamental tool 
for investigation of these crimes. When evidence 
arrives, it can take days to download information 
and this removes the availability of the computer 
to be used by investigators coming to the unit to 
view evidence for other cases. PIU gave an example 
where one case had over 8,000 videos. Another 
problem area is the restriction placed on districts 
accessing social media sites. As a result, the PIU is 
swamped with requests from districts for help in 
cases under investigation. 
Since 2001, the unit has used a paper system for 
managing investigations and would like to move 
to an electronic system. Internally, the PIU uses an 
electronic spread sheet to monitor cases. There is a 
concern that two investigators could potentially be 
looking at the same suspect, without knowing that 
another garda is also investigating a crime against 
the same suspect. Like the SOMU, all PIU staff work 
on the same roster and again are all off-duty at the 
same time. 
The delay in obtaining evidence from analysis of 
computers has contributed to a situation where no 
PIU investigation case file has been sent to the DPP 
for directions in the last four years of operation. 
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recommendation 10.6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána assesses the working practices and 
technology needs of the sexual offences 
management Unit and the paedophile 
investigation Unit. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Resolve	 the	 current	 IT	 issues	 that	 are	
impacting on service delivery such as the 
sharing of potential evidence, the delays in 
examination of images and the potential for 
two investigations to run concurrently on 
the same suspect(s) (See Recommendation 
6.24); 
•	 Ensure	minimum	staffing	levels	rather	than	
all members in the unit resting on the same 
day;
•	 Ensure	that	all	persons	convicted	of	sexual	
offences have their fingerprints, photographs 
and DNA taken. 
 recommendation 10.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to consider 
the following changes to the registration and 
management of sex offenders. (Long term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Following	a	conviction	in	court	to	ensure	that	
all offenders are notified of a requirement to 
register under the Sex Offenders Act;
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 Sexual	 Offences	
Management Unit are always informed of 
an order made against an offender; 
•	 Consider	 a	 reduction	 from	 seven	 days	 to	
three days in the requirement to register 
with the garda and to a requirement to 
register at the garda station where they will 
be residing;
•	 Consider	 a	 requirement	 for	 an	 offender	 to	
confirm registration annually. 
non soram High risk violent offenders
The SORAM process only manages registered sex 
offenders, unlike the process in the UK known as 
the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA) that also monitors violent offenders. This 
was covered in Part 6 under domestic violence. At 
this time, there is no additional process to manage 
other high risk violent offenders within the Garda 
Síochána or with partner agencies. (See also Part 6).
10.4 Warrants 
Managing and executing warrants is an important 
part of any offender management system and 
the management of warrants is a high risk area. 
For police services, the most high risk warrant 
categories are bench and committal warrants. 
Categories of warrants include:
•	 Bench	warrants	are	issued	for	those	offenders	
who fail to attend court for a hearing, having 
been charged or summonsed by the garda 
for an offence. These are people who are 
unlawfully at large and who may commit 
further offences;
•	 Committal	warrants	are	issued	to	commit	a	
person to prison following conviction for an 
offence at court;
•	 Penal	and	Estreatment	warrants	are	 issued	
for non-payment of fines. These types of 
warrants account for the vast majority of 
warrants issued by courts; 
•	 Family	 and	 Civil	 warrants	 are	 issued	 in	
connection with a number of other warrants 
connected to civil matters such as family 
law; 
•	 Search	 warrants	 are	 issued	 to	 the	 Garda	
Síochána to enter premises to look for 
wanted persons or to search for evidence 
connected to a crime. 
Arrest and committal warrants must be actioned in 
a timely manner to find the offender and bring them 
to court or to prison. Over time, historical warrants 
become much harder to execute, particularly when 
an offender is aware that a warrant is in existence. 
Warrants are issued on a daily basis and to be 
successful in reducing overall numbers, a concerted 
effort is required by a police service to execute more 
warrants than are being issued by courts. 
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Warrant records
With the introduction of PULSE, warrant 
management was transferred from paper based 
records to electronic records. As a result, the 
PULSE system has many warrants that date back 
to the introduction of PULSE in 1999. During visits 
to warrant units, the Inspectorate was informed 
that some old warrants that pre-dated PULSE 
never went onto the PULSE system and one unit 
estimated that the district had 200 to 300 warrants 
in this category. The Inspectorate is unaware of 
the types of warrants and the offences for which 
they were issued and whether these warrants were 
cancelled at the court of issue.
In one district warrant unit, the Inspectorate was 
shown a box of dated warrants dating back to early 
2000 that were never placed on PULSE and are 
marked for cancellation due to the length of time 
that has now expired. These warrants are, therefore, 
not counted in the districts warrant numbers. These 
warrants were marked as unsafe to execute, but as 
of yet have not been placed before a court to cancel 
them. 
There are two distinct records of warrants: court 
records where the warrant was first issued and the 
PULSE system. The Inspectorate is not aware of 
any examination to reconcile how many warrants 
are issued by courts each year and how many of 
those warrants are actually recorded on PULSE. 
It is believed by the Inspectorate that there may 
be a significant gap between the two systems. The 
Garda Internal Audit section conducted two audits 
and found indications that significant numbers 
of warrants are not tracked correctly. An audit 
conducted in 2010 found that 49% of the warrants 
examined were not tracked correctly. A further 
review conducted in 2011 found an improvement in 
tracking in a number of divisions. However, there 
was still a significant difference in the records kept 
by the two systems.
Finding Warrants
The Inspectorate is aware that the Garda Síochána 
has completed three comprehensive warrant audits 
over the last three years  At the time of completion 
of this report, the most recent audit was in draft 
form and unavailable for inspection. The two 
previous audits found that 22% of warrants could 
not physically be located on the day that the audits 
were conducted. This equates to a significant 
number of warrants. 
The Inspectorate is aware that when people are 
stopped or arrested, the Garda Síochána are not 
always able to find the warrant. On some occasions 
people are released from garda stations without 
executing a warrant and on other occasions, people 
are taken to court in the absence of a warrant and 
the case is sometimes struck out.
There are many different reference numbers 
connected with warrants such as a PULSE number, 
a court case file number, a charge sheet number 
and a warrant number. A unique reference number 
shared between the court and the Garda Síochána 
would certainly reduce some of the confusion over 
a warrant reference number. 
 recommendation 10.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána in conjunction with the Courts 
service reviews the process for tracking 
warrants from the courts to garda stations. 
(short term).
reducing the number of Warrants issued
As mentioned previously in Part 9, many warrants 
issued at court and summonses that are not served 
result from ineffective verification of the identity of 
a person that the Garda Síochána or other agencies 
have dealt with. Essentially, where the person’s 
identify has not been accurately indentified, a 
warrant may be issued for the wrong person or a 
non-existent person. The Garda Síochána has a 
substantial number of warrants and summonses in 
false names and for addresses that do not exist or 
that have no connection to the person named on the 
warrant. This is generating a considerable amount 
of unnecessary warrants and summonses, and 
creating an unnecessary burden on warrants units 
that have to try and find the person who committed 
the original offence. A warrant in a false name or 
with a false address often results in the offender not 
being brought to justice. 
There are two occasions when verification of 
offenders is crucial. Firstly, when dealing with an 
offender for an offence away from a garda station 
and secondly, at a garda station when an offender 
has been arrested. It is imperative to get the 
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identification right first time when dealing with an 
offender, because any failure to establish the correct 
identity of a person will make further action more 
difficult. 
verification away from a garda station
It can be more difficult to confirm the identity of a 
person away from a garda station. Many warrants 
and summonses are issued following a road traffic 
offence. Where a member of the Garda Síochána 
suspects that a person has committed a specified 
offence under the Road Traffic Act 1961, Section 107 
allows a garda to detain a person and demand the 
person’s name and address. A garda also has a power 
of arrest, where a person fails or refuses to provide a 
name and address or where the garda suspects that 
the details given are false or misleading. In all cases, 
gardaí should obtain as many details of a vehicle as 
possible and to record that information in their note 
book and later on a PULSE record. A garda dealing 
with a person in the street should make all necessary 
enquiries to establish the correct identity of a person 
before allowing them to leave. Extra time invested  at 
this point might save a considerable amount of time 
in the future. 
There are a number of ways to verify a person’s 
details, such as the voters register, photo 
identification enquiries with a local garda station 
or for a non-Irish national, through enquiries 
with Interpol. Recording physical details of a 
person is equally important; such as any visible 
marks, scars, tattoos or other distinguishing 
features that may prove invaluable if the person 
does not turn up at court. A driving licence is a 
good identification document. Warrant units 
have raised the issue of people failing to produce 
a driving licence to a garda as a contributory 
factor to poor identification. A person who fails to 
produce a driving licence on demand is given ten 
days in which to produce it and warrants units are 
unaware of any actual prosecutions for a person 
who has failed to produce a driving licence. 
A pilot is currently running in the DMR whereby 
gardaí are using mobile telephone technology 
which allows a member to conduct a PULSE 
intelligence check on a person who they are dealing 
with on the street. 
With regard to stopping a person in the street who is 
not in a vehicle, there is no power similar to that in 
the Road Traffic Act 1961 to detain a person to allow 
warrant enquires to be conducted. In these cases, 
a garda has to let a person go or to make an arrest 
where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the person is wanted.
verification at a garda station
A person should not be released from custody at 
a garda station until their identity and address 
are verified. Again, it is good practice to record 
details on PULSE of any methods verification 
obtained. As previously mentioned, a failure 
to take fingerprints or photographs will have a 
significant impact on identification at a later date. 
Electronic fingerprinting is available at many 
garda stations, providing an almost immediate 
identification of a person who is recorded on the 
system and ensures that a person who is wanted 
or who has given false details is not released 
from detention. 
Conducting checks on PULSE prior to releasing a 
person from garda custody or on the street would 
strengthen the verification process and reduce the 
opportunity for false details. 
In the absence of fingerprints taken at the time of 
an arrest, the main way of resolving the matter is 
for the original garda that dealt with the incident 
to identify the offender. Difficulties arise when 
there is a lapse of time between the incident and the 
identification or the garda has transferred or retired 
and this identification opportunity can be lost.
The Garda Síochána also has responsibility for 
executing warrants for offences that are prosecuted 
by other agencies. This includes offences such 
as unpaid television licences, revenue offences 
and offences on public transport. The agency 
representatives dealing with these offences have 
fewer powers than gardaí in terms of requesting 
details from persons that they deal with. A failure 
to pay a fine or to answer a summons will result in 
a warrant that is sent to the local garda station to 
execute. Gardaí often receive warrants without dates 
of birth or details of identifying features that would 
help to identify the person involved. The absence of 
a date of birth is a major factor and particularly in 
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cases where people with the same name live at the 
same address. In many cases without a date of birth 
or other method of identification, the warrant will 
never be executed. 
A small investment of time to conduct proper 
enquiries at the first stage of dealing with an 
offender will significantly reduce the number of 
warrants that are issued by courts. 
 recommendation 10.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates a standard operating 
procedure for identity verification. (medium 
term). 
Issuing	of	Bench	Warrants	
A bench warrant issued in the Dublin City courts 
is put directly on to PULSE by court staff when the 
charge sheet is received from the court. This is a 
good system that ensures that warrants are notified 
to the Garda Síochána at the earliest opportunity. 
Once a warrant is on PULSE a garda dealing with 
a wanted person is in a position to make an arrest. 
Outside of the Dublin City area, bench warrants 
are sent from the courts by post or hand delivered 
by a garda working at the court. With this system, 
there is a delay in the warrant being placed onto 
PULSE and in some cases, it can take five days for 
the relevant garda station to receive a warrant. This 
adds a delay to executing a warrant and by this 
time, opportunities to arrest the wanted person 
might already have been lost. Circuit court bench 
warrants are not entered onto PULSE by court 
offices and are sent to garda stations. Circuit court 
warrants are likely to be issued in more serious 
cases. The Inspectorate believes that all bench and 
committal warrants should be entered directly onto 
PULSE on the day of issue. 
Committal Warrants
In most cases, a person is present at court when 
sentenced to a period of imprisonment. In these 
cases, a committal warrant directs that a person 
be taken to a named prison. The Garda Síochána 
has an obligation to physically hand this committal 
warrant to the prison to authorise the prison to 
accept the person. In some cases, this involves a 
garda driving long distances to deliver the warrant. 
Electronic delivery of a warrant from the court to 
the prison concerned would remove the need for a 
warrant to be hand delivered. 
issuing of penal and estreatment Warrants 
Penal and estreatment warrants are sent by post 
from the issuing court to the station in the garda 
district where the person lives. Some districts 
often receive very large numbers of penal and 
estreatment warrants at one time and these can take 
a period of time to enter onto the PULSE system. 
The Inspectorate was informed during visits to the 
seven divisions that there can be delays from three 
weeks to three months in receiving and recording 
these warrants on PULSE. This delay allows an 
offender additional time to avoid detection and 
there is a risk that if the person is stopped by a 
garda, there is no warrant recorded on PULSE and 
the person is not arrested. 
When people are released from court on bail 
to return at another date, a court may set a 
bond (a promised sum of money) to ensure 
that the person attends for the next hearing. In 
circumstances where a person fails to appear for 
their case, two warrants are actually issued; a 
bench warrant for the failure to appear at court 
and an estreatment warrant for the forfeiture 
of the bond. The bench warrant will be issued 
immediately, but estreatment warrants have to 
be validated by a specific court and can arrive a 
month later. In some cases, the bench warrant is 
already executed, before the estreatment warrant 
is issued. Duplication arises as gardaí still have to 
execute the estreatment warrant.
stayed Warrants 
Sometimes judges stay (postpone) the issue of a 
warrant, where an offender is given time to present 
themselves to the court. This can be in cases where 
an offender is ill and did not attend court on the day 
that their case was due to be heard. Warrants are 
sometimes stayed for five days to allow the offender 
to present themselves to the court. In these cases 
the warrant is not activated and great care needs to 
be taken to ensure that a person is not arrested on 
the warrant in the interim period. 
pULse Warning markers
When a warrant is recorded on PULSE, it 
automatically places a warning marker (WRT) 
on that person’s intelligence record. If the person 
is stopped and an intelligence name check is 
completed, the warning marker should highlight 
the existence of a warrant amongst any other 
intelligence reports on that person. There is an 
anomaly with the warning marker, as it does not 
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update the original PULSE record for the crime 
the suspect is linked to, and it does not link the 
warrant to the address where the person resides. 
This could result in a garda attending an address 
linked to the suspect on PULSE and being unaware 
that a person at that address is wanted for a crime. 
Such important information should be passed from 
a garda control room to a unit on their way to deal 
with a call. 
 recommendation 10.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána reviews the system of pULse 
warning markers and sources an it solution 
to ensure that markers are automatically 
flagged to an address or an incident on pULse 
to which that person is connected. (medium 
term). 
publishing Wanted suspect Details
Criminal Intelligence Officers (CIOs) often 
circulate details of warranted persons on garda 
bulletins to ensure that local gardaí are aware of 
the existence of a warrant. In other jurisdictions, 
police services also use national and local media 
to publish photographs of most wanted persons 
and engage the public in helping to find them. 
This is well received by the public and can 
generate information about where people might 
be found. 
 recommendation 10.11
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána seeks opportunities, such as media, 
to engage the general public in helping to find 
wanted persons. (short term). 
garda responsibilities for managing 
Warrants
There are different systems for managing warrants 
in the DMR and across the rest of the country. In the 
DMR, all bench warrants issued by the city courts 
go to one central point at the Bridewell Station 
where the warrant is retained. Outside of Dublin 
City, warrants are sent to district stations where 
they are held and entered onto PULSE.
A warrant is sent to the garda district where a 
person lives and that district has responsibility for 
executing the warrant. This is a sensible approach 
in terms of making enquiries, but creates a cost and 
time issue when a person is later arrested for another 
offence that was committed a long way from where 
they live. With penal warrants, when information is 
received that a person has changed their address, 
the warrant should be transferred to the district in 
which the person now lives. With bench warrants, 
a garda district will retain the warrant, irrespective 
of whether the offender moves at a later date. 
Some divisions have, or are in the process of 
amalgamating, district warrant units to move to 
a more centralised approach. One district visited 
received an additional 3,500 warrants as part of an 
amalgamation of two districts warrant units. 
10.5 Warrants Received, Executed 
and Cancelled
The Garda Síochána receives and manages high 
numbers of warrants. Chart 10.1 shows the numbers 
of warrants that were on PULSE awaiting action as 
of 1st January for the years 2012 to 2014. The term 
“On Hand” refers to the numbers of warrants 
recorded on PULSE and this represents the total 
number across all twenty-eight divisions.
Chart 10.1
Warrants on Hand in all Divisions 
1 January 2012 to 1 January 2014
Warrant 
type
On 
Hand 
1 Jan 
2012
On 
Hand 
1 Jan 
2013
On 
Hand 
1 Jan 
2014
% reduction 
in Warrants 
on Hand 
between 
1 Jan 2012 - 
1 Jan 2014
Bench 31,645 30,895 31,166 2%
Committal 3,128 2,863 2,552 18%
Penal 89,259 88,702 88,618 1%
total 
Warrants
124,032 122,460 122,336 1%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána 
As outlined in the chart, the numbers of warrants in 
the three categories has reduced slightly, but there 
has not been a significant reduction since 2012. 
There are still over 122,000 outstanding warrants 
and over 31,000 outstanding bench warrants. 
execution of Warrants in 2013
Chart 10.2 shows the numbers of new warrants 
received in 2013 and the total number of new and 
existing warrants that were executed. 
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The Garda Síochána executed 50,350 warrants in 
2013, as outlined in Chart 10.2. Of the total number of 
warrants executed in 2013, 84% were new warrants 
and a much smaller percentage of warrants dating 
from previous years were executed. As time moves 
on, the historical warrants are much harder to 
execute.4
Cancellation of Warrants 
Chart 10.3 shows the numbers of new and old 
warrants that were cancelled in 2013.
Chart 10.3
Warrants on Hand in all Divisions 
1 January 2012 to 1 January 2014
Warrant 
type
total 
Warrants 
Cancelled
new 
Warrants 
Cancelled 
Old 
Warrants 
Cancelled
% of 
total 
Warrants 
Cancelled 
that were 
new
Bench 1,679 674 1,005 40%
Committal 369 86 283 23%
Penal 11,001 4,821 6,180 44%
total 
Warrants
13,049 5,581 7,468 43%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána 
A total of 13,049 warrants were cancelled in 2013. 
The chart shows the comparison between the old 
and the new warrants that were dealt with in this 
way. It shows that a large number of new warrants 
received in 2013 were cancelled. For example, 40% 
of all bench warrants cancelled in 2013 were new 
warrants. In terms of high volumes of cancellations, 
older warrants accounted for 57% of the total that 
were cancelled. Without the cancellation of large 
numbers of warrants the Garda Síochána would 
be unable to reduce the number of warrants in 
existence. 
4 A new warrant is a warrant issued in that year.
missing Warrants 
Chart 10.4 shows the numbers of warrants that are 
missing. 
Chart 10.4
Warrants Unaccounted for as of 
31 December 2013
Warrant type Missing Warrants
Bench 526
Committal 85
Penal 3,152
total Warrants 3,763
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána 
Chart 10.4 shows that there are 3,763 warrants that 
are unaccounted for. Warrant units informed the 
Inspectorate that some warrants are lost in transit 
from the court to the garda station and from garda 
station to garda station. Some warrants may also 
have been removed from a warrant unit in order to 
execute a warrant, but are not always returned. It 
is important that copies of warrants should always 
be taken if a warrant is going to be removed for an 
enquiry to execute it.
Warrant Unit staffing Levels
During the field visits, the Inspectorate visited 
warrant units in each division. The Inspectorate 
found a wide variation in terms of the numbers 
of warrants and the staffing levels assigned to 
different warrant units. It was noted that some of 
the districts with very high volumes of warrants 
had disproportionately fewer staff. 
Chart 10.2
execution of Warrants in 2013 all Divisions
Warrant type new Warrants 
Issued & received 
total Warrants 
executed 
new Warrants 
executed 
Old Warrants 
executed
% of total Warrants 
executed that were 
new 4
Bench 19,728 17,330 15,445 1,885 89%
Committal 1,114 1,001 801 200 80%
Penal 46,035 32,019 25,911 6,108 81%
total Warrants 66,877 50,350 42,157 8,193 84%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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Historically, warrant units operated with 
significantly fewer staff and in one district, up and 
until 2010, only one garda was managing warrants. 
This has resulted in a back log of historical warrants 
and in one district 85% of the warrants in existence 
are over four years old. The Inspectorate is aware 
that the Garda Síochána is now investing more 
resources into managing warrants, but the prior 
low staffing levels have resulted in a large number 
of unexecuted historical warrants. 
Warrants are generated daily by courts and police 
services need to have appropriate staffing levels 
and systems in place to make sure that actions are 
taken to execute them. From visits to divisions, it is 
clear that in some districts, all gardaí are involved 
in executing warrants, but in other districts the 
function is left solely to the warrants unit. The 
effective management and execution of warrants 
needs the participation of all garda units.
The data on warrants showed one district receiving 
approximately 3,000 new warrants a year. As a 
result, that district needs to execute or cancel eight 
warrants a day just to maintain the current levels. 
Currently, districts manage their own warrants. 
The Inspectorate believes that warrants should be 
managed on a divisional basis. This would provide 
far more consistency in dealing with warrants and 
provide more resilience with warrant unit staffing 
levels. 
The Inspectorate established that some warrant unit 
support staff do not have the same level of access as 
gardaí do to PULSE intelligence and to prison data. 
The Inspectorate was unable to establish any reason 
for different authority levels.
 recommendation 10.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána provides the same level of access to 
garda and partner agency it systems for all 
warrant unit staff. (short term). 
executing Warrants
Responsibility for executing warrants rests with 
the investigating garda for the original offence 
and the warrant unit where they exist. Bench and 
committal warrants carry the highest risk and are a 
priority for warrants units.
It is very important that a garda completes 
sufficient checks to make sure that a warrant is 
in existence, before making an arrest. The actual 
warrant is usually retained by a warrant unit. 
Outside of office hours, warrant units are locked 
and there can be difficulties in gaining access to 
retrieve the warrant. It is particularly challenging 
when an offender is wanted in several divisions. 
In these cases, the arresting garda must locate 
the warrants and charge sheets in preparation for 
a court appearance. Where a person is wanted at 
several courts, they can be taken before the local 
district court on all matters. 
Most warrant units suggested that it would be 
good practice to scan a warrant onto PULSE, 
where it would be available at all times. Where a 
warrant is held at a garda station far from where a 
person is arrested, a faxed copy is usually sent to 
the station of the arresting garda. Most, but not all 
courts are willing to accept a copy of a warrant. The 
Inspectorate agrees that scanning would provide a 
more efficient process.
There are also difficulties in locating an original 
court charge sheet to make it available to the court 
where the person is appearing. Where a person 
is arrested a long way from the court of issue, a 
person is placed before the local district court. A lot 
of garda time is wasted in searching for the actual 
warrant and the charge sheet from the court. If 
the warrant and charge sheet is located at a garda 
district that is a long way from where the person 
was found, it can require a significant time and 
resource investment to execute.
Persons arrested on warrants issued by circuit 
courts and the High Court must appear before the 
issuing court. If the court is unavailable at the time, 
the Garda Síochána has to arrange a special court 
sitting. This is expensive to arrange. 
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The Inspectorate believes that the inefficiencies 
involved in re-uniting the original warrants and 
the charge sheets and the need to arrange special 
courts need to be resolved.
Charging with Failing to appear at Court
Where a person bailed from a garda station or 
from a court, has signed a bond and fails to attend 
court, they commit an offence under Section 13 
Criminal Justice Act 1984. This offence does not 
apply for failure to attend court when a summons 
was issued. The Inspectorate was informed that 
charges are not always brought in these cases. This 
is very important in future cases, where a gardaí 
might want to object to bail. A charge under Section 
13 can be raised as an objection to bail in future 
court appearances. A failure to charge for such an 
offence, removes the opportunity to raise this as an 
objection to granting bail. 
The offence becomes statute barred after twelve 
months and a person arrested outside of this time 
period cannot be charged with this offence. 
 recommendation 10.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána initiates a prosecution for persons, 
who having entered into a bond fail to appear 
at court. (short term).
enquiries to Find people
During visits to garda stations, the Inspectorate 
looked at the activity conducted to execute 
warrants. In some divisions, it was clear that there 
were concerted efforts by all gardaí to try to execute 
warrants. In other divisions some gardaí held a 
view that warrants were the remit of a warrant 
unit. The experience in other jurisdictions is that 
warrants are only well managed when detectives 
and all uniform police play their part in regularly 
executing warrants. Many districts have purges 
and warrant arrest days, but this sort of activity 
only provides unsustained reductions in warrant 
numbers. Long term impact requires daily and 
concerted activity. 
Warrant units make a number of enquiries to 
locate people, including checking PULSE criminal 
intelligence and contacting other agencies. Some 
of these enquiries often establish that the address 
attached to the warrant is false or that the person 
does not exist (see also Part 8). 
Warrant units send letters to people asking them 
to hand themselves in at a garda station. This is 
a tactic used in other policing jurisdictions and 
it helps to reduce the numbers of warrants. One 
district warrant unit reported a very good response 
to their letters and on the day of the visit, the 
Inspectorate was informed that fourteen people 
had presented themselves at the garda station 
in connection with outstanding warrants. On 
checking PULSE, the Inspectorate found examples 
where the letter appeared to be a once off event 
and there was limited evidence of any follow up 
action such as a visit to the address. Whilst letters 
are a valid option, further action is needed where 
a person does not present themselves. The letter 
viewed by the Inspectorate was softly worded and 
the Inspectorate believes that it could be worded 
more robustly to highlight the ramifications for a 
person who fails to hand themselves in. 
Where a garda finds a person wanted solely on 
a bench warrant, they have a duty to arrest the 
offender and to bring them to the next court sitting. 
This involves the arresting garda going to court 
and giving evidence of the arrest. Where a person 
is arrested for other crimes as well as the warrant, 
a court presenting officer can deal with the case 
and the arresting garda is not required to attend. 
As highlighted in Part 8, some gardaí informed the 
Inspectorate that arrests are sometimes not made, 
as this requires the arresting member to attend 
court. 
On the day of visiting a district warrant unit, 
the Inspectorate was informed that two gardaí 
had travelled a long distance to Dublin with an 
arrested person. These gardaí needed to find the 
warrant and the charge sheet and attend court to 
give evidence of the arrest. There is a significant 
cost in this scenario and the gardaí were effectively 
lost to operational policing for the whole day. 
The Inspectorate believes that a court presenter 
should present all arrests on warrant for the first 
appearance at court and that the requirement for an 
arresting garda to attend court should be removed. 
During Inspectorate visits, warrant units expressed 
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their frustration that suspects are released from 
garda custody without executing existing warrants 
or on some occasions bench warrants are executed, 
but penal warrants in existence for the same person 
are not. A consistent policy and practice is needed.
arrest enquiries
PULSE has a tab that is available to record 
all attempts and actions to find a person and 
execute a warrant. It is important to record all 
activity on PULSE to show the attempts made to 
execute a warrant. Many warrants checked by 
the Inspectorate appeared to have had little or no 
action recorded on PULSE. In some cases, action 
was recorded that a letter was sent, but it tended to 
be a once off action, without any further activity. 
Checks with other agencies such as Social Welfare 
were not always conducted in good time. In one 
case sampled, it took three years to conduct a 
check that identified a possible address for the 
offender. All warrant units said that gardaí are 
sent out to addresses to make enquiries, but the dip 
sample on PULSE found little activity recorded. A 
failure to conduct activity or to accurately record 
activity has serious implications if an offender 
goes on to commit a more serious offence. It can 
also contribute to a failed application to have a 
warrant cancelled, if the court is not convinced 
that sufficient efforts were made to execute the 
warrant.
Historical Warrants 
The Garda Síochána has a high number of 
historical warrants that date back many years and 
in some cases, over sixteen years. The Inspectorate 
examined several cases of historical warrants and 
found that in many of these cases very little action 
has been taken to execute these warrants. Many of 
the original crimes investigated at a much earlier 
date may not now be capable of evidential proof. 
Also, witnesses in cases that are sixteen years 
old may not still be available. The Inspectorate 
believes that it is necessary to formally review these 
warrants to see if they are still evidentially capable 
of proof. If not, and in cases of minor offences, it 
may be appropriate to have the warrants cancelled. 
 
 recommendation 10.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts a review of historical 
warrants to establish if the original case is 
still capable of proof. (short term).
Cancellation of Warrants 
Gardaí can return to a court to apply for the 
cancellation of a warrant. In such cases a court 
would expect extensive enquires to have been 
conducted to find the person. This occurs in cases 
of less serious crime and where it is established 
that the offender provided false details or is 
no longer living in this jurisdiction. One judge 
hears all applications for cancellations in the 
Dublin area. The judge is quite rightly robust in 
approach with an expectation that gardaí have 
made exhaustive enquiries to find the person. If a 
case involves a more serious offence, then the DPP 
should always be contacted to seek the authority to 
cancel the warrant. The Inspectorate was informed 
that gardaí apply to cancel warrants for serious 
crimes. The cancellation of a warrant for a serious 
crime is not something that the Inspectorate would 
encourage.
In all of the visits to warrant units, the Inspectorate 
did not find a clear and current policy providing 
guidance as to when a warrant may be cancelled. 
In the absence of a policy, there is an inconsistent 
approach, whereby some districts are cancelling 
bench warrants and some are not. 
 recommendation 10.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a standard policy about 
when a warrant can be cancelled. (short term).
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Bench	Warrant	Examinations	
The following are cases highlighted to the 
Inspectorate during visits to warrant units.
Bench Warrants
Case 1
A warrant office had twenty warrants for a 
person who cannot be identified and there are 
no fingerprints or addresses that can be checked 
to verify the identity of the offender. Requests 
have been sent across the country to different 
districts asking for any additional information 
that could help to identify the person. To date 
very few districts have replied to the requests. 
In one case of shoplifting in 2006, the arresting 
garda is unable to remember the case. To date, 
eighteen of the twenty warrants have already 
been cancelled and it unlikely that the other two 
warrants will be progressed. 
Case 2
An eight year old bench warrant for theft, 
where there are no fingerprints, photos or other 
identification opportunities. The arresting garda 
is unable to recall the incident. This warrant 
remains unexecuted and there is no likelihood 
of an arrest. 
Case 3
A person was stopped in a car and provided 
false details. It was established that the driver 
did not have insurance and was arrested and 
the car was seized. The driver was later released 
without executing two bench warrants and nine 
penal warrants.
Case 4
A garda changed an address for a person wanted 
on warrant and the new address was in another 
garda district. This warrant was transferred on 
PULSE and was sent to the district responsible 
for the new address. The garda that had changed 
the address and sent the warrant to the new 
district went back onto PULSE and accepted the 
warrant on behalf of the new district. 
Case 5
A garda stopped a person and later completed 
an intelligence report on PULSE stating that 
after dealing with the subject and letting them 
go, the garda established that the person was 
actually wanted on warrant. At a date after that 
event, the same garda stopped the same person 
and entered another intelligence record with the 
same reason for not arresting.
miscellaneous issues
•	 In	one	division,	 the	Inspectorate	 found	that	
there are many bench warrants in excess of 
ten years old, where no enquiries have been 
made to arrest the persons.
•	 People	 are	 arrested	 at	 garda	 stations,	 but	
garda are unable to find the warrant and 
they are released.
•	 People	 stopped	 at	 the	 road	 side	 are	 not	
always arrested for outstanding warrants. 
•	 People	 are	 arrested	 and	 taken	 to	 court,	 but	
sometimes charge sheets and warrants 
cannot be found and cases are struck out.
•	 Enquiries	are	sent	to	other	districts	to	make	
arrests. Warrant units often receive no replies 
to such requests. 
•	 Multiple	identifications	for	the	same	suspect	
on PULSE make identifications more 
difficult. 
•	 Some	of	the	addresses	shown	on	warrants	do	
not exist.
The above cases highlight key issues in respect 
of the management of warrants and failures to 
execute them. In Case 3 a suspect in garda custody 
was released without the execution of  a significant 
number of warrants.
Following a Garda Síochána review of the Guerin 
Report, a new system will shortly be introduced 
that requires a sergeant or a member in charge of 
detained persons at garda stations to cover five key 
points before a person is released from custody. 
This includes ensuring that the person is not 
wanted on warrant. 
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activity sampling
The Inspectorate visited warrant units and 
examined PULSE records for outstanding warrants. 
A random selection of twenty warrants were dip 
sampled to see what action was taken and when. 
Chart 10.5 outlines the results of that dip sampling. 
Chart 10.5
Warrant activity pULse
date/year Issue Offence Warrant type activity details dates of activity 
2008 drink driving Penal nothing recorded on PULSe not applicable 
2014 Public Order act Bench nothing recorded not applicable 
2014 Public Order act estreatment nothing recorded not applicable 
Oct 2013 Unauthorised taking Penal Letter 2013
dec 2009 theft Bench Check at address
Check at address
Social Welfare check – new 
address obtained 
March 2010
2013
2014
dec 2012 no offence recorded Bench Letter sent July 2013
Jan 2004 and 2009 theft – two warrants Bench Suspect gone from address 
Whereabouts not known 
Social welfare check
2005
2011
2014
July 2011 traffic Bench Social Welfare check – found 
letter sent
2014
feb 2002 Public Order Bench Called at address 
Check made 
2009
2013
July 2007 theft Bench Checked address
Social Welfare Check 
2009
2014
June 2012 no Insurance Bench Social Welfare Check July 2014
Oct 2012 no offence recorded Penal Letter sent and tried to call nov 212
June 2013 Public Order Penal nothing recorded not applicable 
June 2013 Public Order Penal nothing recorded not applicable 
May 2013 driving offences Penal Letter sent May 2013
Oct 2008 Criminal damage Bench nothing recorded not applicable 
2005 theft from shop Bench address checked 
Letter sent 
transferred to Limerick – not 
known at the address 
June 2005
2007
2012
2006 fraud Bench nothing recorded not applicable 
2009 drink drive Bench address checked 2009 
2009 Unauthorised taking Bench Check with landlord apr 2010
Source: Data obtained from sampling warrants by Garda Inspectorate
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Chart 10.5 includes some examples where: 
•	 No	activity	is	recorded	on	PULSE;
•	 Long	periods	without	activity	recorded;
•	 Once	 off	 letters	 sent	 to	 wanted	 suspects	
without follow-up;
•	 Checks	with	Social	Welfare	that	took	several	
years to complete.
Dealing with penal and estreatment 
Warrants 
Penal warrants are issued for non-payment of fines 
and, as discussed earlier, estreatment warrants are 
issued in connection with a bond set by a court. 
Penal and estreatment warrants account for the 
vast majority of warrants that are in existence and 
gardaí have a duty to collect fines or to bring a 
person to prison in lieu of the non-payment. 
Penal warrants are not enacted until thirty-one 
days have elapsed from the date of warrant issue 
and the fine remains unpaid. Considerable delays 
can arise in sending the penal warrant from a court 
to the district station. Some districts reported that 
delays of up to three months in receiving warrants. 
Warrant units informed the Inspectorate that they 
received a notification not to execute estreatment 
warrants that were issued before 2013. As a result, 
thousands of such warrants were cancelled. 
In other policing jurisdictions, non-payment of fines 
is not a matter for the police and there is no actual 
police power of arrest in respect of non-payment 
of fines and outstanding fines are managed by the 
court service. These are treated as administrative 
processes and are not the responsibility of police. 
The Inspectorate does not believe that the Garda 
Síochána should be dealing with penal and 
estreatment warrants and should be released to 
concentrate on the more serious warrants in their 
possession. 
renewals of Warrants
Bench warrants are not statute time bound, but 
a penal warrant expires after six months and if 
unexecuted must be renewed by the issuing court. 
In many cases penal warrants lapse and are not 
renewed. Some of the busier warrant units reported 
receiving very large numbers of penal warrants 
at any one time and that volume is a reason for 
not renewing penal warrants after the six month 
period. Some districts only renew a penal warrant 
if the person comes to notice at a future date. This 
approach delays the process of an arrest, as they 
have to go back to the court to apply for a renewal 
and then to try and find the person again. 
A warrant unit explained that where a penal 
warrant was issued in another court area, it has 
to be sent back to the court of issue for a renewal. 
This warrant unit has sent a considerable number 
of warrants back to the courts of issue for renewal. 
Some of these requests date back two years and 
they have not received any responses. 
Lodging persons in prison
When a penal warrant is executed, the gardaí have 
a duty to collect the attached fine. Where a person 
refuses to pay the fine, a garda should not take a 
person to a garda station, but should take them 
directly to the prison named on the warrant. In some 
cases, this is not always the nearest prison. Many 
of the prisons do not accept people on warrants on 
certain days and after certain hours. This presents a 
dilemma for the gardaí and particularly late at night 
and at weekends. Sergeants and gardaí dealing 
with persons arrested on penal warrants explained 
that they often spend several hours trying to get a 
prison to accept a person. In the interim, gardaí are 
taking people to garda stations. Sergeants informed 
the Inspectorate that prisons are often contacted 
outside of the stated hours and are informed that 
they are delivering people to them as the Garda 
Síochána has no power to detain them. 
time served
Penal warrants have a wide variation in the numbers 
of days to be served in lieu of non-payment of a 
fine. This can range from two to several hundred 
days. The taking of a person to a garda station is 
automatically registered as one day served and if 
kept overnight, they have technically served two 
days. 
When a penal warrant is received, the warrants 
unit check with prison lists to see if the person 
served a term during periods that coincide with 
the penal warrant. If the person has served time, 
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albeit on a different matter, the penal warrant may 
be shown as executed as time is already served. To 
clarify this matter, the warrants unit contact the 
prison and resolve this by confirming the dates of 
imprisonment. 
For divisions close to a male or female prison, the 
conveyance of a person to prison is a much easier 
proposition than it is for those divisions located 
further away. The following examples show the day 
to day reality of executing such warrants. 
Penal Warrants – Case Studies
Case 1
A persistent female offender in a rural division is 
regularly arrested for offences such as theft from 
shops. The offender is charged and court cases 
usually result in a fine. The person does not pay 
the court fine and a penal warrant is issued. The 
local gardaí are unable to persuade the person to 
pay fines and eventually the offender is arrested 
on a number of penal warrants. The offender 
needs to be taken to a female prison in Dublin. If 
a station van is unavailable, three gardaí are sent 
to escort the person to Dublin. All three gardaí 
are lost from front line policing for the day and 
will incur expenses as they are away from their 
district. On arrival at the prison the offender is 
often released immediately. 
In many cases, where a person is unable to make 
their way home, the gardaí may take them home 
or the prison may pay for a taxi. 
Case 2
A male arrested in Dublin was taken to a Dublin 
prison escorted by gardaí. On arrival back at the 
garda station, the officers found a coat left by the 
person on the back seat of the patrol car. One of 
the gardaí went to the person’s home address to 
leave the coat with relatives, but was met by the 
person who had arrived back from prison.
Case 3
A warrant unit arrested a male on three 
penal warrants totalling €4,000 with 225 days 
imprisonment attached. At the time of the arrest 
the warrant unit had only located one of the 
warrants and the offender was taken to prison. 
The sergeant from the warrant unit located the 
other two penal warrants and later that same 
day drove to the prison to hand over the other 
two warrants. By the time the sergeant arrived at 
the prison the person had been released.
Miscellaneous	Cases	–	Other	Agencies
•	 TV	 licence	 case	 where	 the	 penal	 warrant	
was in the name of a baby that lived in the 
household.
•	 Dublin	 Bus	 case,	 where	 there	 was	 no	 date	
of birth for the offender, the address is 
unknown and the warrant is likely to be 
cancelled immediately.
•	 Penal	 warrants	 in	 false	 names	 and	 false	
addresses where inspectors from other 
agencies do not have the power to demand 
identification. 
•	 A	 Revenue	 case	where	 Revenue	would	 not	
provide a date of birth for the person unless 
the warrant unit applied under the Freedom 
of Information Act.
These examples show a small fraction of the daily 
waste of resources across the criminal justice 
system, including garda time and money in dealing 
with offenders who do not pay their fines. In these 
examples, the cost of lost time and, in the example 
of driving from the rural division to Dublin and 
back, far exceeded the value of the original fines. 
The current system is not best use of garda time and 
is taking significant resources away from patrol 
duties. 
value of paid and Unpaid Fines
The value attached to penal warrants differs greatly 
from relatively small sums to many thousands. 
Gardaí contact people to collect fines and only 
accept cash in payment. Generally it is the same 
people who pay and the same people who do not. 
There is very little incentive to pay, as many people 
know that they may not in fact spend any time in 
prison. 
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In two warrant units, the total value of Penal and 
Estreatment fines that were part of outstanding 
warrants amounted to €3.4m in one district and just 
under €1m in the other. The latter district collected 
only €22,000 in unpaid fines in 2013 and €15,000 
to date in 2014. There is a significant amount of 
money in unpaid fines that will effectively never 
be collected. The effort and cost that is currently 
invested in dealing with penal warrants at each 
district is completely disproportionate to the return 
in revenue and the time served in prison. 
The Inspectorate believes that this is a very 
inefficient scheme that takes gardaí away from core 
policing functions. It is a process that is open to 
abuse and the fines that are attached are not being 
paid by regular defaulters and custodial sentences 
are not always served. 
The Garda Inspectorate Report on the Fixed Charge 
Processing System made recommendations about 
how penalty notices could be handled and with a 
view to reducing the number of summonses and 
warrants that are generated.5
The Inspectorate welcomes the new Fines Act 
commitment to introduce attachment of earnings 
to recover unpaid fines. Criminal justice agencies 
need to work together to create an efficient system 
for dealing with such cases.
european arrest Warrants
The number of European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) 
is increasing, with many people wanted in other 
countries living in Ireland, and many people 
wanted in Ireland, often fleeing to other countries. 
In 2005, there were five EAW’s, rising to a peak of 
400 in 2009. 
The Garda Síochána has an Extradition Unit that 
deals with the more complex cases and those 
offenders believed to be in Dublin. Other cases are 
sent out to districts to try and find those who are 
wanted. Currently, the Extradition Unit is dealing 
with sixteen cases. European Arrest Warrants 
have to be certified before the High Court prior 
to entering EAWs on PULSE. The process of 
extradition can be complex and it requires a level 
5 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, The Fixed Charge 
Processing System, A 21st Century Strategy, 
of specialist knowledge. Some European countries 
are circulating details of all offenders, even in 
cases of very minor offences. Some of the offenders 
for crimes committed in Ireland are also for less 
serious offences and when a person is arrested 
abroad, there is an obligation to bring them back 
and in some cases to go and collect them. When a 
person, who is going to be sent to another country is 
considered a safety risk, the police service involved 
may collect them or the Extradition Unit may travel 
with them. 
search Warrants outside of Court Hours 
Throughout the inspection, investigating gardaí 
of all ranks have raised difficulties in obtaining 
warrants to enter premises outside of court sitting 
hours. This includes obtaining warrants for serious 
crimes such as murder. It is not unusual for this 
process to take three to four hours and this can 
significantly delay an entry into premises to 
conduct an arrest or to search for evidence of an 
offence. Where a suspect may be in possession of a 
firearm or other weapon, any delay to the process of 
obtaining a warrant may result in additional safety 
risks to the public or to the police. In the case of a 
warrant to search for drugs, a Peace Commissioner 
can issue a warrant. This is a far quicker process and 
one that is generally used for all types of warrants 
in most other policing jurisdictions. 
With less serious crimes, the Inspectorate was 
informed that delays might deter a garda from 
trying to obtain a warrant for an address that 
should be searched.
Future of Warrant management
In summary, warrants are a high risk area for any 
police service and at present there are vulnerabilities 
in the way that the Garda Síochána manages 
warrants. The Inspectorate found no correlation 
between the numbers of warrants and the numbers 
of staff employed in warrant units. Many units were 
staffed by gardaí on restricted duties, who were 
unable to leave the station to arrest people, but were 
able to conduct telephone enquiries and PULSE 
intelligence checks to find people. There are roles 
in warrant units that do not require sworn powers 
and there are opportunities to increase the number 
of support staff assigned to these units.
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The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
should move away from district warrant units to 
a divisional approach. This would bring small 
numbers of staff together into one central point 
and provide a consistent approach to the way 
that warrants are managed. In the cities there are 
opportunities to have one centralised location for 
warrants and warrant units. For example, within the 
DMR, the Inspectorate believes that warrants could 
be centralised at the Criminal Courts of Justice 
(CCJ), which would ensure that all warrants and 
charge sheets are situated in one place. A dedicated 
warrants court at the CCJ could be used to deal with 
all persons on the first warrant appearance. The 
Inspectorate also recommends a change in the law 
to allow court presenters to provide evidence of an 
arrest on a warrant. 
 recommendation 10.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops a standard operating 
procedure for the management of warrants. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Move	 to	 a	 divisional	 approach	 for	 the	
management of warrants;
•	 Confirm	 that	 all	warrants	 are	 entered	onto	
the PULSE system;
•	 Ensure	 that	 all	 reasonable	opportunities	 to	
execute a warrant are explored and entered 
on PULSE;
•	 Provide	 for	 good	 supervision	 around	
dealing with warrants and failures to 
execute warrants; 
•	 Provide	 appropriate	 staffing	 levels	 in	 all	
warrant units; 
•	 Ensure	 that	 a	 person	 in	 garda	 custody	 is	
never released without searching for and 
executing outstanding warrants.
 recommendation 10.17
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to examine 
and consider the following changes to the 
processing of warrants. (Long term). 
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Develop	a	centralised	location	for	warrants	
and charge sheets;
•	 Provide	 for	 a	 centralised	 and	 dedicated	
warrants court; 
•	 Reconcile	court	warrant	records	and	PULSE	
warrant records; 
•	 Remove	 the	 requirement	 for	 an	 arresting	
garda to attend court on the first appearance 
for a person arrested solely on a warrant; 
•	 Develop	 a	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 warrants	
are placed on PULSE immediately; 
•	 Review	the	requirement	for	High	Court	and	
Circuit Court bench warrants to return to 
those courts on a first appearance; 
•	 Consider	 the	 scanning	 of	 warrants	 onto	
PULSE and the acceptance of the scanned 
PULSE copy by the court in the absence of 
the original warrant; 
•	 Review	 the	 process	 of	 managing	 penal,	
estreatment and similar warrants and 
consider other options for the recovery of 
non-payment of fines; 
•	 Review	 the	 practice	 of	 issuing	 stayed	
warrants;
•	 Review	Section	13	Criminal	Justice	Act	1984	
in respect of the twelve month time period 
to bring a prosecution to court; 
•	 Improve	 the	 process	 for	 obtaining	 search	
warrants out of court hours;
•	 Consider	 the	 use	 of	 electronic	 committal	
warrants from courts to prisons. 
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10.6 Bail 
Bail is a high risk area for any police service. People 
on bail are those charged or summonsed for an 
offence and, having appeared at court, are released, 
pending the conclusion of their case. Some people 
released on bail are subject to certain conditions 
intended to protect victims and communities and 
to ensure that a person returns to court. 
release from garda stations
Whilst the Garda Síochána do not grant bail, they 
make the first decision in respect of whether to 
keep a person in garda custody prior to court or 
to release a person under their own recognisance 
to attend court. Following a decision to charge a 
person, a Station House Officer (SHO), or a member 
in charge, is the responsible person for making 
a decision about whether to keep a person in 
custody. The decision can be influenced by many 
factors including the seriousness of the offence, 
whether the identity of the person is known and 
whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the person will not turn up at court. This is 
an extremely important process as the responsible 
person has to decide whether to release someone 
to attend court. The decision to release a person to 
appear at court with or without a surety is known 
as “station bail”. A failure to attend court will result 
in the issuing of a bench warrant. Where a person 
is kept in custody, the reason for doing so should 
be recorded in the custody record and on the court 
case papers. People kept in custody are taken to 
court at the next available sitting. 
The Inspectorate was informed that persons who 
should be kept in custody are sometimes released 
on station bail, when the local court is not sitting 
on the next day. In such cases, according to the law, 
the person should be taken to another court with 
jurisdiction. The Inspectorate was also informed 
that the majority of people are released from 
custody on station bail.
Cash Lodgements 
The Garda Síochána can take a surety, or cash 
lodgement, prior to releasing someone from a garda 
station for later attendance. This lodgement can be 
forfeited if a person does not turn up at court. This 
system is infrequently used in some divisions and 
is never used in others. Clarification is needed as to 
whether it is garda policy to use this process and to 
ensure a consistent approach to its use. 
Court	Bail
The decision to grant bail in a particular case 
is a matter for the court, which is, subject only 
to the Constitution and the law, independent 
in the exercise of its judicial functions. There is 
a constitutional presumption in favour of bail, 
since, in the eyes of the law, a person is innocent 
until proven guilty. While the Garda Síochána 
may propose conditions to be attached to bail in 
a particular case, the conditions of bail will be a 
matter for the court to decide.
Bail is a form of conditional release and is granted 
upon the person entering into a recognisance, 
with or without a surety, to turn up for their court 
case. Bail also needs to be considered following 
a person’s conviction, where the person wishes 
to appeal against the conviction or the sentence 
imposed. Not everyone that appears at court 
presents a need to be kept in custody. There are 
however, some dangerous or prolific offenders that, 
if released on court bail, may present a risk to public 
safety. These individuals provide the highest risk to 
communities. 
There are two distinct legal grounds for objecting 
to the granting of court bail. There are objections 
that can be given under Section 2 of the Bail Act 
1997 and there are the O’Callaghan Rules. 
The criteria governing the granting or refusal 
of bail were laid down by Hanna J. in The State v 
Purcell.6 These were:
1. The seriousness of the charge faced by the 
accused;
2. The severity of punishment imposed by law;
3. The strength of the case against the accused;
4. The prospect of a reasonably speedy trial;
5. The opposition of the Attorney General.
6 [1926] I.R. 207
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A further criterion was added; if there was evidence 
that the accused was likely to interfere with the 
course of justice, the court would be entitled to 
consider this as material against granting bail. 
The argument of including the likelihood of 
committing further offences whilst on bail was 
rejected by the Supreme Court. However, Article 
40.4.7 of Bunreacht na hÉireann7 provided that 
“provision may be made by law for the refusal of 
bail by a court to a person charged with a serious 
offence where it is reasonably considered necessary 
to prevent the commission of a serious offence by 
that person.” 
The Bail Act 1997 defined a serious offence, as an 
offence that is punishable by at least five years 
imprisonment. A member of any rank may give 
evidence in proceedings under Section 2 of the Bail 
Act. In determining the issue of bail, a court must 
have regard to factors such as the:
•	 Nature	 and	 gravity	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	
likely punishment; 
•	 Strength	of	evidence;
•	 Previous	 convictions	 and	 convictions	 in	
respect of offences whilst on bail;
•	 Seriousness	of	offence;
•	 Any	other	offence	with	which	the	accused	is	
charged and is awaiting trial.
o’Callaghan’s Case
The People v O’Callaghan is a Supreme Court 
decision in 1966, which still applies today. This case 
set out a number of factors, which a court should 
consider when deciding whether an accused 
should be granted bail. These are matters to which 
regard may be had in endeavouring to answer the 
fundamental question of whether an applicant for 
bail will evade justice by failing to appear for his 
or her trial or by interfering with witnesses, jurors 
or evidence. O’Callaghan’s case recognised the 
presumption of innocence of the accused and that 
the primary purpose of granting bail is to secure 
7 Article 40.4.7 of the Constitution was inserted by an 
amendment of the Constitution (the Sixteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution, approved by referendum in 1996.
the attendance of the accused to meet the charges. 
It is up to the prosecution to show that the accused 
is likely to attempt to evade justice if granted bail.
Section 2A of the Bail Act provides for an officer 
not below the rank of chief superintendent to 
give evidence of his or her belief that refusal is 
reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of 
a serious offence. This is used by some divisions, 
but not all and is particularly used in cases where 
offenders are involved in serious crime and 
organised criminal networks. 
A breach of bail or a failure to attend court will 
result in the issuing of a warrant for the persons 
arrest and the forfeiture of any sum of money 
lodged either by the person or a third party on their 
behalf. 
Understanding	and	Application	of	Bail	by	
the garda síochána 
The Inspectorate found an inconsistency in 
objecting to bail and when to use Section 2 Bail 
and the O’Callaghan rules. An example of the 
knowledge gap included an understanding of the 
definition of a serious offence under the Bail Act, 
which is different from the usual definition with 
serious crimes. Under the Bail Act, this would 
include offences such as shoplifting, which would 
not usually be defined as a serious offence. In 
Dublin, a knowledge gap was identified in respect 
of bail and its application and a sergeant has been 
assigned, who is a trained barrister, to deliver 
training across the city.
risk of Complacency
In regard to objecting to bail, the Inspectorate found 
that there was a general perception from gardaí 
that all people get out on bail and that there is no 
point in objecting. An example was given where a 
person was arrested for shoplifting, charged and 
sent to court. The person was released from court 
and went straight out and committed a further 
shoplifting offence. The same process was followed, 
the person was charged and sent to court, but was 
again released on court bail. 
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Some senior gardaí raised concerns with the 
Inspectorate about complacency with the bail 
system. As a result, gardaí may not always object 
to bail in circumstances where objections should be 
raised. 
Applications for bail are granted in the absence 
of objections by the gardaí. The Inspectorate was 
informed during court visits that there are some 
cases where the courts were surprised that a garda 
did not object to bail. Complacency in objecting to 
bail is a real and significant risk to public safety. 
The Garda Síochána must ensure that decisions 
around bail are always carefully considered and 
objections are raised in appropriate cases. This is 
an area that requires close supervision.  
In other policing jurisdictions, where the person 
charged is a dangerous or prolific offender, it is 
seen as good practice to send a detective supervisor 
involved in the case to attend court to assist with any 
questions that a court may wish to ask. This ensures 
that an experienced officer, with good knowledge of 
the offender, and the crime committed attends to 
present the objections to bail. This is an approach 
that is used by some but not all of the divisions 
visited as part of this inspection.
High	Court	Bail	Appeals	
Where a person appears at a district court and 
is remanded into custody until the next court 
appearance, they can appeal the refusal of bail. All 
bail appeals are heard at the High Court. This court 
sits on a Tuesday and a Thursday and whilst most of 
the appeals concern Dublin cases, cases from all over 
the country are also presented, requiring gardaí to 
travel long distances to attend the hearings. In some 
cases video link has been used, but there are still a 
large number of officers travelling on a weekly basis. 
This is an expensive process and is taking gardaí 
away from other duties. Even within the Dublin 
area, ten local sergeants may be in attendance to 
deal with their district’s cases. This is not best use 
of garda time. The Inspectorate believes that other 
options should be considered, such as managing 
appeals at local circuit courts and the use of a court 
presenting scheme if the High Court continues to 
deal with appeals. Gardaí should not be travelling 
long distances to attend hearings and if evidence 
is required, it should be delivered by video link. 
Gardaí also expressed a perception that people who 
appeal at the High Court will usually get bail. 
Court	Bail	Conditions
A good way of managing a person, who is not 
remanded in custody to await trial, is to attach 
conditions to their court bail. This allows a garda 
investigator to ask a court for conditions, such 
as those designed to protect a victim or witness 
from further offences or intimidation. A court can 
impose a sum of money in the name of a bail bond 
to encourage a person to turn up at court, which 
will be returned if the person answers to their bail. 
A person released from court with bail conditions 
signs a bail bond to confirm that they are fully 
aware of the conditions that are attached. In the 
case of a young person, it is good practice to ensure 
that any such bail conditions are discussed with 
a parent or guardian to ensure that they are fully 
understood. A breach of any condition should be 
brought to the attention of a court. 
On checking bail conditions attached to persons, 
the Inspectorate found that in many cases gardaí 
are asking for the attachment of multiple bail 
conditions. These included conditions of residence, 
a requirement to report to a garda station, a curfew, 
a requirement not to contact a victim and in some 
cases a sobriety condition. In other jurisdictions, 
conditions may include either a curfew or a 
condition to report to a police station. The use of 
multiple conditions creates challenges for the Garda 
Síochána in terms of ensuring that those conditions 
are monitored.
Notification	of	Bail	Condition	to	the	Garda	
síochána
Unlike warrants that are entered onto PULSE by 
court staff or by warrant units, there is no similar 
process for updating PULSE with court bail 
decisions. This process relies heavily on a person to 
present themselves at a garda station with the details 
of their bail, or for a court presenter or investigating 
garda who was at court, to notify a district station 
that a person is on bail with conditions attached.
Bail conditions are not routinely going onto a 
person’s PULSE intelligence record and again, 
unlike warrants, there is no PULSE warning marker 
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highlighting that a person is on bail. If a person is 
stopped and in breach of their bail, a garda may 
not always know that the person is on bail and the 
conditions attached. 
Criminal Intelligence Officers (CIOs) in some 
districts are circulating bail conditions on 
internal bulletins. The Inspectorate met several 
CIOs who were not always told of persons on 
bail. CIOs should always be informed as they 
have responsibility for ensuring that this sort of 
information is circulated to all gardaí. The volume 
of people with bail conditions is making it difficult 
to keep gardaí up to date with developments. 
A sergeant in Dublin that deals with the district’s 
High Court bail applications, uses a subject’s 
intelligence record to enter details of a person’s bail 
decisions. This intelligence then is available to any 
garda that stops that individual.
Numbers	on	Bail
At the time of the Inspectorate’s visits to garda 
stations, no division was able to accurately tell the 
Inspectorate how many people were on bail at that 
time and the conditions attached. There is a PULSE 
application to record those on bail and the details 
of bail conditions, but the Inspectorate found this 
is not always used. One district station tried to run 
an enquiry on PULSE to establish the number of 
people currently on bail at that station. PULSE was 
unable to provide the result as the number exceeded 
1,000 records.
The Inspectorate supports the use of bail conditions, 
but such use needs to be appropriate and the Garda 
Síochána needs to be able to monitor compliance. 
signing on at garda stations
A common bail condition requires people to report 
to a garda station between certain time periods on a 
daily basis or on specified days of the week. In other 
jurisdictions this bail condition is primarily used 
for persons who may be a flight risk and enables 
a police service to monitor their daily movements. 
Even with a daily check it still provides a person 
with a twenty-four hour period in which to leave 
the country. The use of signing on at police stations 
is a reactive way of monitoring bail and relies on 
the individual attending at the set times. Outside of 
those times, an individual will know that they are 
unlikely to be monitored. 
Other jurisdictions have moved away from 
use of this bail condition towards curfews. For 
those on bail for acquisitive crimes, requiring a 
person to sign on at a police station often brings 
them through areas where they have previously 
committed crimes or where they may be tempted 
to do so. Also, bringing large numbers of people 
on bail to police stations is mixing persons on 
bail with the general public and often with 
victims of crime who have come to garda stations. 
Apart from those on court bail, some people on 
temporary release from prison are also required 
to sign on at garda stations. 
The obligation to attend a garda station with the 
details of their bail rests with the person on bail. 
The person brings a court record detailing the 
requirements for signing on and the bail conditions 
attached. If a person did not turn up and present 
themselves at the garda station, the Inspectorate 
was unconvinced that the systems in place would 
identify this. In the event that a person fails to 
sign on, the investigating garda should be notified 
immediately. 
A ‘signing-on book’ is used in each garda station 
to record the times and dates when people attend. 
The stations visited by the Inspectorate had 
separate signing-on books for those on court bail 
and for those on temporary release from prison. 
The signing-on books have separate sections for 
individuals, but have limited space and after two 
months, a new section needs to be created. This 
results in multiple books in operation at any one 
time and is an inefficient process.
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The following are key findings in respect of 
sampling the signing-on books at two garda 
stations.
Signing-on at Garda Stations 
Signing-on	Books
• There were multiple books for those on 
temporary release and those on court bail.
•	 There	was	limited	space	for	recording	entries	
in individual sections (62 entries per person 
per section). As a result there were entries for 
the same individual in multiple numbers of 
books. 
•	 One	 individual	 had	 signed	 on	 for	 the	 last	
seven years (drugs case).
Details of the case in the signing-on book
•	 Limited details were included. 
•	 No	details	of	the	offence	for	which	they	are	
on bail were recorded. 
•	 No	details	of	the	next	court	appearance	were	
recorded.
•	 Some	 entries	had	no	 information	 about	 the	
reporting details, e.g. to report daily. 
•	 There	was	no	information	on	the	identity	of	
the investigating garda (no name or contact 
number).
•	 No	photograph	or	identifying	features	were	
included.
reporting details 
•	 There was no index to show who was due to 
sign-on during a particular day. 
•	 The	last	entries	in	some	sections	dated	back	
to January. There was no indication as why 
the person is no longer reporting. 
•	 Entries	were	not	shown	as	closed.
Failure to sign on 
•	 The Inspectorate found many examples of 
gaps in signing-on conditions, but nothing 
was written on the entry to show that any 
action was taken.
supervision
•	 There was a complete absence of any 
supervision of the signing-on books.
pULse
•	 There	is a PULSE tab for entering those who 
sign-on, but this was not routinely used. 
The signing-on books were sparse in details about 
the person, the crime that they are on bail for, the 
investigating garda and, in some cases, the details 
about when they are supposed to sign-on. 
There was no process in place for a daily check of 
the signing-on books to identify anyone that had 
failed to present themselves. In other policing 
jurisdictions, a person is nominated to check the 
signing-on book each day and to initiate immediate 
action for a person who has failed to sign-on. The 
paper based system witnessed by the Inspectorate 
is not pro-active and is not effective or efficient 
as a system to manage those signing on at garda 
stations. PULSE was not updated when people 
came to sign-on.  
In other jurisdictions, where paper based systems 
are used, these include full details of the person 
signing on and the use of continuation sheets as 
required. The Inspectorate would question the use 
of garda stations for those on temporary release 
and whether these individuals should be meeting 
with a probation officer instead.
Curfews
Many police services have moved away from 
signing on at police stations to the use of curfews 
as a preferred option. This is a pro-active way of 
managing people on bail. The use of curfews is a 
good way of managing those who commit certain 
types of offences and to ensure that they are at 
their place of residence at particular times, usually 
during the night. Many curfews include a direction 
for people to make themselves available for officers 
calling on an address and this is referred to as ‘door 
step’ curfew. The gardaí are also now including 
the provision of a mobile telephone number in 
bail conditions to be available so that a person can 
be contacted directly. Checking compliance with 
curfews is crucial to ensure that people are at their 
place of residence.  
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good practice
in one district visited, the inspectorate found 
that there was a very good system for checking 
people on curfews and ensuring that checks 
were completed. all persons subject to a 
curfew are visited at least once a day to check 
compliance and high risk individuals are 
sometimes visited on a second occasion. those 
who fail to adhere to their curfew are taken 
back before the court for breach of their bail 
conditions. the checks are recorded in a bail 
management book as well as an intelligence 
report on pULse. this is a good example of an 
effective system to manage people who are on 
bail and should be used as good practice across 
all divisions.
This system was not replicated across the 
seven divisions and the Inspectorate found that 
monitoring arrangements were not always in place 
and curfew checks were not routinely allocated as 
tasks to be completed. 
Breach	of	Bail
There is no power of arrest for breach of a bail 
condition. Where a breach of bail occurs, a garda 
should always bring this to the immediate attention 
of a court and a warrant can be issued for the 
arrest of the person. The absence of a direct power 
of arrest adds a delay in the process of bringing 
a person back to court. The Inspectorate was 
informed by senior gardaí that not all breaches 
of bail conditions are brought to the attention 
of a court. It was explained that some courts do 
not want people brought back for a single breach. 
Section 7 of the Bail Act 1976 in the UK confers 
a power upon the police to arrest a person if an 
officer has reasonable grounds for believing that 
a person is likely to break any of the conditions 
of bail or has reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that a person has broken any of those conditions. 
The Inspectorate believes that provision should be 
made for a power of arrest for any breaches or a 
likelihood to breach a bail condition.
The Inspectorate has been advised that a  General 
Scheme of a Bail Bill has been drafted. It is proposed 
to bring forward a number of amendments to 
improve the operation of the Bail system. 
Committing	Offences	on	Bail
There are a number of prolific offenders who 
regularly commit offences whilst on bail. During the 
visits to district stations, examples were provided 
where an offender had 142 convictions, of which 
123 were committed on bail and another offender 
with 192 convictions of which 148 were committed 
whilst on bail. In such cases, it is difficult to extract 
the information from PULSE to present to a court. 
The Inspectorate examined a prolific offender’s 
history to establish the problems with obtaining 
this sort of data. In the PULSE Bail Catalogue, 
the Inspectorate were unable to read the whole 
narrative of a case and had to cut and paste the 
information into a Word document in order to see 
all the information. PULSE only allows viewing of 
one case at a time and it is very time consuming to 
view all records for a prolific offender.
Another difficulty encountered with PULSE is the 
absence of court results for cases that have been 
completed. In some cases, the missing court results 
are for serious offences. Enabling a full picture to 
be presented to a court requires considerable work 
by the garda dealing with the offender and in some 
cases, necessitates the garda having to contact 
investigating officers in other cases to establish 
the outcome of those cases. For an offender in 
custody, this is an impractical situation. Given time 
constraints, some offenders may be placed before 
the court without the disclosure of the full offender 
history. This issue is further discussed in Part 11. 
The current management of bail is a high risk 
area for the Garda Síochána that needs urgent 
attention. The Inspectorate believes that the Garda 
Síochána must review the whole approach to bail 
from dealing with a person in garda custody, to 
presenting objections at court and to monitoring 
those persons who present most risk. Bail needs 
to be managed electronically as, the current paper 
based system in garda stations is inefficient for 
offender management.
 recommendation 10.18
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an urgent examination of 
the use of bail. a national standard operating 
procedure should be created for the whole 
process of bail management. (medium term).
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 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Ensure	 consistent	 standards	 in	 the	 use	 of	
station bail and cash lodgements; 
•	 Ensure	 objections	 for	 bail	 are	 raised	 in	 all	
appropriate cases;
•	 Review	the	types	of	bail	conditions	imposed	
on offenders and provide guidance to 
investigating officers to ensure a consistent 
approach; 
•	 Ensure	that	bail	conditions	are	entered	onto	
an person’s PULSE intelligence record with 
a warning marker; 
•	 Provide	 appropriate	 legal	 awareness	 and	
other update training for those managing 
bail; 
•	 Provide	protocols	and	supervisory	oversight	
for effective management of bail conditions 
that require sign-on at garda stations; 
•	 Promote	 the	 use	 of	 curfews	 as	 a	 bail	
condition; 
•	 Ensure	 that	 gardaí	 are	 tasked	 to	 monitor	
compliance with bail conditions;
•	 Improve	 the	 current	monitoring	 of	 bail	 on	
PULSE and ensure that the IT infrastructure 
allows electronic monitoring; 
•	 Ensure	that	breaches	are	always	brought	to	
the attention of a court;
•	 Ensure	 that	 Section	 2A	 of	 the	 Bail	 Act	 is	
used in appropriate circumstances; 
•	 Develop	a	court	presenters	scheme	for	High	
Court applications;
•	 Promote	the	use	of	video-links	for	court	bail	
applications wherever possible; 
•	 Improve	 the	 recording	 of	 bail	 and	 court	
convictions on PULSE and create a more 
efficient system for extracting information 
for court cases. 
 recommendation 10.19
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a multi-agency working group to consider 
the following changes to the operation of bail 
processes. (Long term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Provide	a	power	of	arrest	 to	gardaí	 to	deal	
with bail offences;
•	 Develop	 a	 bail	 notification	 system	 from	
courts to garda divisions; 
•	 Review	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 rationale	
for the current system, where those on 
temporary release are required to sign-on at 
garda stations. 
prison release notifications
In any offender management system, the early 
notification of the release of a person from prison 
helps a police service to put plans in place to engage 
those who may present a high risk to the public 
and those prolific and often chaotic offenders 
who have committed high volumes of crime. This 
process relies heavily on the Prison Service and 
the Probation Service. Most of the divisions visited 
had systems in place to monitor releases and lists 
of those released from prison are sent to them. On 
occasions, late notifications are received after a 
person has been released and divisions suddenly 
notice an increase in crime, clearly linked to a 
prolific offender. 
In the UK, 95% of the police and law enforcement 
agencies use a system for notifying police services 
when people are due for release. This can be part of 
the wider Integrated Offender Management system 
and also provides other functions, such as running 
a daily check of the prison population against police 
warrant registers. 
10.7 The Way Forward
The Garda Síochána has a well established system 
for dealing with young offenders, but could 
improve its processes for dealing with high risk 
and prolific adult offenders. Internationally,  police 
services have developed an integrated approach to 
offender management and co-located resources 
with key partner agencies. 
This report has highlighted two high risk areas 
of warrant and bail management. Both of these 
areas require urgent attention and the Inspectorate 
should review the process made by the Garda 
Síochána in twelve months time.
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11.2 Crime Counting Rules
The parameters governing the detection of crime 
are contained in the text of a Garda Síochána 
HQ Directive which is generally referred to as 
the Crime Counting Rules. This HQ Directive 
was referenced previously in Part 4 in respect 
of recording criminal offences on PULSE. For a 
crime to be shown as detected, PULSE needs to be 
updated. 
There are three main criteria for considering 
whether or not a crime should be recorded as 
detected:
11.1 Introduction
Crime detection is about identifying an offender and solving a crime. To enable 
a police service to show a crime is detected, the evidence available should 
be of a sufficient standard, which if given in court would have a reasonable 
probability of resulting in a conviction.
The success of a police service is usually assessed on the ability to reduce 
crime and solve cases. Many police services refer to solved cases as detections. 
Detection rates are generally shown as the number of detections recorded in a 
given year as a percentage of the total number of crimes recorded in the same 
period. When measuring effectiveness rates, by crime type, there is a clear 
correlation between both crime levels and detections; with lower recorded 
crime levels, fewer detections may be required in order to be considered 
effective. As highlighted in various parts of this report, the Inspectorate has 
identified poor recording practices and under-recording of crime. This part of 
the report examines the impact of those practices on Garda Síochána reported 
detections. 
There is no doubt that one of the most vital parts of an investigation process 
is the identification of an offender. When a crime occurs, a victim has a 
reasonable expectation that a police service will take all necessary steps to 
find the offender and bring them to justice. Detecting crime is an important 
element of policing and influences public confidence in the criminal justice 
system.
This part of the report also examines the issuing of summonses, delays in 
getting cases to court and whether the timeliness of an investigation contributes 
to this delay. Part 11 focuses on the consequences of delays in investigations 
and how they impact on the prosecution of crimes. 
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1. Where criminal proceedings have commenced 
against at least one person for the criminal 
offence: the commencement must be based on 
sufficient evidence to charge, which if given in 
court would have a reasonable probability of 
resulting in a conviction. When this is not the 
case, the crime incident will remain undetected;
2. Where approval has been granted for a child to 
be dealt with in accordance with the Diversion 
Programme: this process was explained in Part 
10 in respect of dealing with young offenders 
and the use of informal and formal cautions; 
3. Where a decision not to prosecute has been 
taken for one of the following reasons:
•	 There	 would	 be	 sufficient	 admissible	
evidence to charge, but the victim or an 
essential witness refuses or is permanently 
unable to attend court, or if a juvenile, is not 
permitted by parents or guardians to give 
evidence;
•	 The	offender	dies	before	proceedings	could	
be initiated or completed;
•	 The	offender	is	ill	and	is	unlikely	to	recover	
or is too infirm or too mentally unwell for 
proceedings to be taken;
•	 The	 complainant	 or	 an	 essential	witness	 is	
deceased and the proceedings cannot be 
pursued;
•	 The	crime	was	committed	by	a	child	under	
the age of criminal responsibility;
•	 There	 is	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 charge	 the	
offender, but the DPP or relevant district 
officer decides that the public interest would 
not be well served by proceeding with a 
charge;
•	 There	 is	 sufficient	 admissible	 evidence	
to charge the offender with a criminal 
offence in respect of which a time for the 
commencement of criminal proceedings 
applies, but that time has expired and the 
relevant district officer approves of the 
decision not to prosecute. 
The Crime Counting Rules also stipulate that  if a 
person is prosecuted and then subsequently not 
convicted of the criminal offence, the relevant 
district officer should conduct a full review of all 
the circumstances. If satisfied that there was a 
reasonable probability, based on sufficient evidence, 
that the person charged committed the criminal 
offence, then the detection status will remain as 
detected. During visits to garda divisions, the 
Inspectorate found that many district officers were 
not aware of the requirement to review unsuccessful 
prosecutions, and no evidence was provided that 
this takes place. Indeed, the general comment was 
“that once a crime is detected, it stays detected”.
Once claimed under one of the above rules, a crime 
continues to be shown on PULSE as detected. There 
will be occasions when a single crime is solved but 
there is more than one offender. These cases should 
be recorded as one detection.
Crimes taken into Consideration
A prolific offender may be arrested for one particular 
crime, but is suspected of many others. Police 
services will try and detect additional offences 
through interviews with this type of offender, as on 
some occasions an offender may wish to admit to a 
number of crimes. Where the number of offences 
is extremely high, a police service may not always 
charge with each individual crime, but may use the 
process of Taken Into Consideration (TIC).1
This process can help: 
•	 The	 prosecution	 to	 gain	 a	 better	
understanding of the offender’s behaviour 
in order to make submissions to court on 
issues such as bail; 
•	 The	 court	 to	 gain	 a	 better	 picture	 of	 the	
offending behaviour of the offender and in 
speedy disposal of cases, without additional 
court hearings; 
•	 The	 offender	 to	 receive	 credit	 for	 a	 plea	 of	
guilty and to avoid further prosecution for 
these offences;
•	 The	gardaí	to	increase	detection	rates,	and	to	
dispose of crime cases efficiently; 
•	 The	 victim	 and	 the	 public	 to	 gain	 more	
confidence in the criminal justice system.
1 “A defendant may ask a court passing sentence to take into 
consideration other offences of a similar nature in accordance 
with a well established and recognised practice.”[Archbold 
2006 5-107. See also generally Archbold 2007 5-107 et seq.]
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TICs are very useful in order to achieve high 
detection rates for crimes, such as burglaries and 
vehicle crimes. During the inspection, there was 
limited evidence found of the use of TICs.
international rules
All polices services have rules around how crime 
should be recorded and when a crime can be shown 
as detected. Ireland, like most jurisdictions, has its 
own version of the Crime Counting Rules, which 
guide the gardaí in how to record and detect a 
criminal offence. The published guidance notes for 
many of the countries examined by the Inspectorate 
are far more detailed. In the United States, the 
rules around crime recording are governed by 
the FBI Uniform Crime Reports Programme, 
with information available on their website. The 
responsible body in the UK is the Home Office, who 
publish the relevant guidelines pertaining to crime 
recording and counting. (User Guide to Home 
Office Crime Statistics 2011).
The Garda Síochána HQ Directive on crime 
counting rules is eleven years old and consists of 
four pages. It does not cover new processes, such 
as Fixed Charge Notices and informal cautions 
that are discussed in this part of the report. The 
Inspectorate believes that new guidance procedures 
are required to enhance compliance with crime 
counting rules.
In other jurisdictions, the rules around crime 
detections are much stricter than those in Ireland, 
and a crime is usually not detected unless there is a 
judicial disposal. Such detections are referred to as 
sanctioned detections and include where a person 
is or has been;
•	 Charged	or	summonsed;
•	 Cautioned;	
•	 Admits	 other	 offences	 that	 are	 taken	 into	
consideration (TICs);
•	 Received	a	penalty	notice;	
•	 Received	 a	 formal	 warning	 for	 cannabis	
possession. 
Sanctioned detections are the measure commonly 
used to determine the investigative performance 
of a police service. A sanctioned detection in the 
UK is only claimed when an offender is charged 
or another criminal justice disposal has taken 
place. The result is a determined approach by an 
investigator to ensure that an offender is charged or 
other formal action is taken.
Prior to 2007, the UK used a process of non-
sanctioned detections, which were very similar to 
the criteria used by the Garda Síochána in respect 
of where a decision is taken not to prosecute. 
During that time over 70% of all detected crimes 
were not recorded as a sanctioned detection. In 
those cases, an investigation identified a suspect, 
but for a variety of reasons a prosecution had not 
taken place. A low sanctioned detection rate gave 
the public the perception that a police service was 
inefficient. As a result, the UK continues to use 
sanctioned detection rates, but also produces the 
following information to show police activity:
•	 Prosecution	not	in	the	public	interest;
•	 Offender	 is	 under	 the	 criminal	 age	 of	
responsibility;
•	 Community	Resolution;
•	 Victim	declines	to	support	police	action;
•	 Investigation	complete,	no	suspect	identified.	
Crime investigated as far as reasonably 
possible.
In Scotland, a crime is shown as detected when a 
case has been reviewed by an internal Criminal 
Justice Unit and the case is sent to the Procurator 
Fiscal (Prosecutor). This crime remains detected, 
irrespective of the decision of the Procurator Fiscal. 
The standard in Denmark is even higher and a 
crime is only detected when a person is charged. 
In the US, a crime is “cleared” (detected) by arrest 
with criminal charges or an exceptional clearance 
such as the death of a suspect or charging with a 
different offence similar to a TIC. 
In Ireland, detections are claimed at a much earlier 
stage and often before formal action has taken place. 
Once a crime is detected, an investigator is often 
under less pressure from supervisors as the case 
is effectively solved. By claiming detections early, 
there is a danger that the case is not progressed and 
the Inspectorate has found many examples where 
detections are claimed without finishing the case 
and charging or summonsing an offender.
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Detection rates
Chart 11.1 shows the annual detection rate in 
Ireland for all recorded crime during the period 
2006-2012. Detection rates reached a peak of 
69% in 2008 and have slightly reduced to 66% in 
2012. The detection rate includes the majority of 
detected crimes but excludes traffic offences and 
some miscellaneous categories as the volume 
of these incidents distorts the recorded crime 
detection picture.
Within the total detection rate of 66%, there are 
crime types which have their own individual 
detection rate. The following are some of the crime 
type detection rates in 2012: 
•	 Murder	66%
•	 Assault	harm	74%
•	 Assault	minor	62%
•	 Robbery	from	the	person	42%
•	 Burglary	(not	aggravated)	19%
•	 Theft	from	motor	vehicle	11%
Appendix 5 shows the burglary detection trend 
line from 2006 to 2012. The detection rate ranges 
from 22% to 26%.
There are a number of crime types where police 
generated activity creates both a crime and an 
immediate detection. Some of these categories 
are high volume offences with high detection 
rates. Examples include public order offences and 
in 2012, there were 43,087 such offences with a 
detection rate of 94%. In addition, there were 16,452 
drug offences recorded with a detection rate of 
99%. The volume of these crime types will have a 
significant impact on the overall detection rate.
As previously explained in the Introduction, 
countries use different rules to record a crime as 
detected. Though the Inspectorate would have liked 
to have compared Ireland with other policing 
jurisdictions, the variances in crime definitions 
and legislation also apply in respect of detection 
rates. The complexities of comparing jurisdictions 
are fully articulated in the Introduction. 
 recommendation 11.1 
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality initiate 
a process, in which the Cso should have 
a central role, towards the development of 
new Crime Counting rules for detections. 
(medium term). 
chart 11.1
Crime Detection rates in ireland 2006 -2012
Source: CSO detection data, aggregated by Garda Inspectorate.
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11.3 Divisional Detections
Responsibility for crime in Ireland rests at district 
and divisional levels. The Inspectorate looked at 
the overall national average for the detection of 
crime in 2012 and then compared that against the 
seven divisions visited by the Inspectorate. Charts 
11.2 and 11.3 show recorded detection rates in the 
divisions visited.
chart 11.2
selected Divisions and national average 
Crime Detection rates 2012
chart 11.3
recorded Detection rates for seven Divisions and national average 
assault, Burglary, robbery and theft from motor vehicle in 2012
Source: CSO detection data, aggregated by Garda Inspectorate.
Source: PULSE data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
DM
R 
N
DM
R 
S
Do
ne
ga
l
Ki
ld
ar
e
Lim
er
ick
M
ay
o
W
at
er
fo
rd
Na
tio
na
l
43% 44%
64%
39%
57% 56%
65%
54%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DMR N DMR S Donegal Kildare Limerick Mayo Waterford National
43
%
44
%
52
%
49
%
13
%
28
%
6% 6%
12
%
32
%
15
%
64
%
82
%
19
%
44
%
59
%
18
%
39
%
66
%
43
%
11
%
18
%
10
%
57
%
75
%
36
%
37
%
18
%
56
%
70
%
86
%
57
%
26
%
13
%
30
%
37
%
65
%
75
%
84
 %
20
%
54
%
19
%
42
%
68
%
18
%
11
%
68
%
5%
Overall Detection
Rate 
Assault
Burglary
Robbery
Theft from Person
Theft from
Motor Vehicle
Crime Investigation Report       Part 11: Detecting and Prosecuting Crime
Part 11  |  6
Chart 11.2 shows the detection rates for all 
crimes in the selected divisions which range 
from 39% to 65%. Chart 11.3 shows a breakdown 
of detection rates in four crime types that are 
part of the main focus of the inspection. This 
chart shows a wide variation in detection rates, 
such as in assaults with the highest detection 
rate of 82% and the lowest of 49% , and burglary 
detection rates that ranged from 11% to 36%. 
Other police services pay particular attention to 
divisions where detection rates are significantly 
above or below averages. For those divisions 
performing significantly better than others, there 
may be opportunities to share good practice and 
it is equally important to confirm that recording 
practices are correct. Conversely, for those 
performing significantly worse, focus should be 
on why better detection rates are not achieved as 
compared to other divisions.
The Inspectorate did not find any evidence of 
activity at regional or headquarters level of  quality 
assurance to determine if detections are correctly 
recorded or to share any good practice with those 
divisions with lower detection rates. This includes 
the Garda Professional Standards Unit, who did 
not check detections as part of their examination 
process. 
Detection status
The mechanism to record a crime as detected 
requires the insertion of a name into the ‘Suspect 
Offender’ field on PULSE and a date to be entered 
into the relevant ‘detected date’ field. The insertion 
into the date field is mandatory and must be 
completed; otherwise the detection cannot be 
claimed. This marks the crime as detected and 
records the date that the crime was solved. There 
is also a field that contains details of the unit that 
detected the crime, such as a detective or uniform 
unit, but not the details of the person who has 
detected the crime. PULSE also has a field to show 
a crime as undetected, but the Inspectorate found 
limited use of this field.
PULSE has detection status codes, which were 
originally designed to show how the crime was 
solved and under which Crime Counting Rule. 
Over time, the codes have been amended to reflect 
changes in processes. However, it must be noted that 
the ‘Detection Status Code’ field is not a mandatory 
one and can be omitted when recording a detection.
The current detection status codes are as follows:
•	 Caution	(Informal);
•	 File	to	DPP;
•	 Adult	Caution;
•	 File	to	DO	(District	Officer)	for	Direction;
•	 Under	Investigation;
•	 Proceedings	Complete;
•	 Proceedings	Commenced;
•	 No	 Proceedings	 offender	 under	 12	 years	
of age; 
•	 Committed	for	Trial;
•	 DO	-	No	Proceedings;
•	 DPP	-	No	Proceedings.
The current detection status codes are confusing, 
as some descriptions, such as ‘under investigation’, 
‘proceedings complete’ or ‘committed for trial’ 
are investigation updates and not detection 
outcomes. On checking PULSE incident records, the 
Inspectorate found many cases marked with these 
types of status codes that were marked as detected. 
Another anomaly is the detection status code for a 
file that is sent to a District Officer or to the DPP 
for directions, as to whether to charge or summons 
a person for a crime. In these cases, a crime is 
sometimes shown as detected, well before any 
decision as to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
take proceedings. With some specific crime types, 
such as sexual assaults, the Garda Síochána is 
obliged to send a file to the DPP, even in cases where 
there is clearly no likelihood of a prosecution. In 
these cases, the crime is often marked as detected.
The Inspectorate found a number of cases where 
an investigator had entered details of the detection 
in the PULSE narrative and highlighted that the 
person has been charged or summonsed. This 
is good practice, but is not always used. When a 
file is sent to the DPP or to the District Officer for 
directions, it would be good practice to record this 
information on PULSE.
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The Inspectorate also found many detected crimes 
where the status code field on PULSE was left 
blank. In these cases, the system does not require 
the completion of the status code field to record a 
crime as detected.
Where a crime is shown as ‘proceedings 
commenced’ or ‘proceedings complete’ there 
should be an associated charge or summons. The 
Inspectorate found many instances of PULSE 
incidents which recorded these types of detection 
codes and did not, in fact, have an associated charge, 
summons or a caution. This will be expanded on 
later in this part of the report.
 recommendation 11.2
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána creates two distinct procedures and 
data fields for recording the investigation 
update and the detection status of an incident 
on pULse. (short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Create	 a	 mandatory	 field	 on	 PULSE	 that	
notes the name, rank and registered number 
of the person recording a crime as detected;
•	 Create	 new	 Detection	 Status	 Codes	 that	
reflect the accurate detection outcome;
•	 Create	a	new	investigation	status	field	which	
reflects the current status of an investigation; 
•	 Mandate	 that	 each	 Detection	 Status	 Code	
which refers to ‘proceedings commenced’ 
or ‘proceedings completed’ have a charge, 
summons or caution directly linked to it.
achieving Detections
Solving a crime and achieving a detection requires 
the collective effort of a number of different people. 
This includes front-line patrolling gardaí and 
those involved in investigative roles. Achieving 
good detection rates requires the identification of a 
suspect and action to bring that person to justice. 
All patrolling gardaí should be contributing to 
crime detection. There are also a number of gardaí 
in specialist roles who have opportunities to 
achieve detections, such as Juvenile Liaison Officers 
(JLOs) Community Policing and Traffic officers. In 
addition, some specialist gardaí are crucial to this 
process, such as Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs), 
and Criminal Intelligence Officers (CIOs). In Part 
3 of this report, the Inspectorate highlighted the 
absence of performance data as a major gap in 
identifying excellent performance of CSEs and 
identifying those who require additional training.
With the implementation of a national DNA 
Database, the role of the CSE will become more 
important in helping to solve crime.
recording of Detections at gisC
As outlined in Part 4, a PULSE record is normally 
created when a garda contacts the Garda 
Information Service Centre (GISC) with the details 
of an incident. The Inspectorate found that on 
many occasions, a crime is shown as detected on 
the same day that the PULSE record is created.
GISC perform a key role in respect of creating 
a PULSE record and ensuring that a crime 
classification is correct, but have not been assigned 
any specific responsibilities in relation to 
detections. Consequently, when a garda contacts 
GISC to notify that a crime is to be shown as 
detected, no questions are asked as to the validity 
of the detection. As outlined in Part 4, there 
are a number of mandatory fields that GISC 
examine to ensure that the data entered is correct. 
In crime classification, GISC can question the 
appropriateness of the classification and generate 
a PULSE review (enquiry) to the investigating 
garda or their district, if a question arises. 
The Inspectorate was advised that the relevant 
fields relating to detection are not ones that are 
automatically reviewed by GISC. 
Throughout the sampling of PULSE records, 
the Inspectorate did not see any evidence of 
a GISC generated review in connection with 
the appropriateness of crime detection. The 
Inspectorate found a large percentage of crimes 
where there were obvious questions about 
the validity of the detection of the crime. On 
checking two HQ Directives issued in 2013,2 
the Inspectorate did not find any mention of 
detections and specifically who has responsibility 
for checking the validity of a detection. Whilst the 
2 There were two HQ Directives: (i) A review of PULSE 
incidents roles and responsibilities of GISC sergeants, garda 
and district officers and (ii) A review of PULSE incidents 
supervisory responsibilities.
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directive instructs that sergeants take responsibility 
for PULSE incidents of members on their units, there 
is no specific mention of who has the responsibility 
for checking that detections are correctly recorded.
The Inspectorate believes that GISC should have a 
key role to play in crime detections and a GISC call 
taker should ask questions, in order to establish if a 
crime is detected and there is evidence to support 
it. In order to assist GISC call takers, a drop-
down menu or aide memoire should be provided 
with a list of questions to be asked. Whilst there 
will be a training requirement, it should not be 
an onerous task, as GISC staff are already very 
familiar with most of the crime counting rules. In 
the future, the completion of detection related fields 
should automatically form part of the review and 
validation process of a PULSE incident. As with 
crime classification, GISC should be designated as 
the final decision maker in determining if a crime 
is detected. 
 recommendation 11.3
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
information service Centre (gisC) is assigned 
responsibility for ensuring that detections are 
authorised and correctly recorded on pULse. 
(short term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken: 
•	 Include	detections	as	part	of	the	mandatory	
GISC review process;
•	 Develop	 a	 drop-down	 menu	 or	 aide	
memoire to assist GISC call takers to validate 
detections; 
•	 Ensure	 that	 a	 review	 of	 detection	 status	
is conducted in respect of cases where a 
conviction is not obtained at court. 
Detection Decision making
The Inspectorate found little evidence of any 
supervision of detected crime on PULSE or in case 
files. A process must be introduced which ensures 
that all detections are checked for compliance with 
crime counting rules.
The ninety-six district superintendents are the 
ultimate decision makers on whether a crime 
should be detected in his/her area of responsibility. 
Many files for less serious crimes are sent to the 
district officer for a decision on what action will be 
taken against a named offender. More serious crime 
cases should be referred by the district officer to the 
DPP for a decision on whether to prosecute or not. 
The decisions made by the DPP and district officers 
should determine when a detection is suitable to be 
claimed; but in many cases the detection is already 
recorded prior to any assessment of the strength of 
a case. 
During the Inspectorate’s field visits, when 
questions were posed to senior gardaí around the 
crime counting detection rules and in particular, 
when a crime should be shown as detected on 
PULSE; the answer invariably was “only on the 
occasion of an arrest, charge or caution”. However, 
during PULSE and case file examinations, the 
Inspectorate found that this is not always the case.
Assessing the validity of detections for the first two 
crime counting rules criteria is relatively straight 
forward, in so much that a crime is detected if 
a person is charged, summonsed or approval is 
granted to deal with a person under the young 
offender diversion programme. Therefore, in the 
absence of those outcomes, a case should not be 
recorded as detected.
The third category for claiming a crime as 
detected3 allows considerable scope for a district 
officer to detect a large percentage of crime when a 
suspect is identified. The Inspectorate found cases 
in this category where a crime is shown as detected, 
but there was no rationale on PULSE to explain the 
reason why the case was detected.
Detection Decision making in other 
policing Jurisdictions
Other policing jurisdictions, such as West Yorkshire, 
have trained inspectors (usually detectives) called 
‘Dedicated Decision Makers’ (DDMs) who operate 
at divisional level to make decisions relating to 
detections. These individuals are the only persons 
who are permitted to show a crime as detected. 
South Wales police operate a similar system but 
the decision makers are outside of the operational 
environment and are based at Headquarters. This 
3 Where a decision not to prosecute has been taken for one of 
the reasons shown as point 3 of the Crime Counting Rules. 
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supports the objectivity and independence to the 
decision making process. Reducing the number of 
people with authority to detect crimes reduces the 
opportunity for inconsistencies and poor decision 
making throughout the process. DDMs in other 
jurisdictions also have responsibility for crime 
management units that are recommended in Part 5.
The Inspectorate believes that there should be a 
small number of authorised DDMs (inspectors) at 
divisional level with responsibility for deciding if 
a case is suitable for detection. Before contacting 
GISC to record a detection, an investigator should 
first obtain approval from a DDM. Once a detection 
is approved by a DDM, an investigator should 
contact GISC to record the detection and the reasons 
for detecting the crime on PULSE. Once a crime is 
recorded as detected, a GISC Reviewer (supervisor) 
should quality assure that the detection is correctly 
claimed. 
In Part 5, the Inspectorate recommended that 
a Garda Crime Registrar be appointed with 
responsibility for introducing systems to ensure 
compliance with detection counting rules and be 
the final decision maker for any appeals raised 
about decisions. As highlighted in Part 5, the Crime 
Registrar needs to be outside of operational line 
command of crime investigation and detection. 
Where there is a dispute over the claiming of a 
detection, it should be referred to the Garda Crime 
Registrar as the final decision maker.
 recommendation 11.4
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána appoints and trains Dedicated 
Decisions makers on a divisional basis with 
responsibility for approving a pULse record 
to be recorded as detected. (short term).
 recommendation 11.5
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
Crime registrar as described in part 5 has 
responsibility for validating detections 
and ensuring compliance with the Crime 
Counting rules. (medium term).
11.4 PULSE Sampling of 
Detections 
To check the compliance of crime counting rules 
for detections, the Inspectorate requested detection 
data from the Garda Síochána in the form of a 
PULSE search of the selected seven divisions. The 
request covered a three month period in 2012 and 
focused on a number of the key volume crime areas 
that have featured throughout this inspection: 
burglary, assault, domestic violence, vehicle crime 
and robbery from the person. The period was 
selected to allow a reasonable timeframe for the 
cases that occurred in 2012 to be detected, with 
the examination taking place in 2013, some twelve 
months after the crimes were first recorded on 
PULSE. 
Chart 11.4 outlines the total sample number of 
crimes and detections recorded by the Garda 
Síochána across the selected divisions between 
May and July 2012.
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In total, out of 2,195 crimes  recorded on PULSE, 946 
were shown as detected, resulting in a detection 
rate of 43%. Of the total number of crimes detected, 
only 390 had a charge or a summons attached to 
the PULSE incident, leaving 556 crimes that were 
marked as detected, but without a charge or a 
summons attached. 
As part of this process, the Inspectorate examined 
in detail 318 of the 556 PULSE incidents, where 
there was no charge or summons recorded and this 
sample formed the basis for the analysis of many 
aspects of the detection process. 
The analysis of these PULSE detections followed 
the same method as the Inspectorate had applied 
to the examination of crime classification and 
reclassification incidents earlier in the report as 
outlined in Parts 4 and 5. Detected crime incident 
records were sampled to see if the claimed detection 
was correct based on the available evidence and 
in accordance with the Crime Counting Rules. 
The Inspectorate also sampled a number of the 
detections that were shown as having a charge 
or summons attached and they were found to be 
correctly recorded. 
Detection status Codes 
Chart 11.5 shows the breakdown of the status codes 
assigned to the 318 PULSE incidents shown as 
detected. 
Findings
Chart 11.5 highlights that many of the 318 detections 
had no basis for showing the crime as detected and 
these included:
	•	 10%	 of	 the	 detections	 had	 a	 blank	 status	
code; 
•	 20%	were	shown	as	still	under	investigation;
•	 A	further	10%	involved	case	files	being	sent	
to either the DPP or the District Officer for 
directions. 
These detection status codes do not satisfy the 
requirements of the Crime Counting Rules. 
chart 11.4
total number of Crime pULse incidents recorded in the 
selected Divisions and the number of Detections Claimed 
may - July 2012
recorded crime number of Detected 
crimes 
Detection rate Detections with a charge 
or summons
Detections without a 
charge or summons
2,195 946 43% 390 556
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
chart 11.5
Detected incidents without Charge or summons in  
selected Divisions may - July 2012
Detections status type total number % of total
adult caution 8 3%
Blank 32 10%
District officer - no Proceedings 22 7%
DPP - no Prosecution 1 0.5%
File to DPP 14 4%
JLo caution* 39 12%
no Proceedings - under 12 4 1%
Proceedings commenced 100 31%
Proceedings complete 16 5%
under investigation 63 20%
File to D/o for Direction 19 6.5%
total 318 100%
*While this is not an official status code, it was the reason why the case was detected.
Source: Data obtained from sampling 318 PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate.
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Crime type versus status Code
The Inspectorate examined the 318 PULSE 
incidents by specific crime types and the table 
above shows examples of some of the crimes 
examined and the status code attached.
Key Findings
•	 Several	 cases	were	 correctly	 recorded	with	
charges and cautions attached as per the 
crime counting rules;
•	 A	 number	 of	 cases	 were	 shown	 as	
proceedings commenced, but there was no 
charge or summons attached;
•	 There	 were	 many	 detections	 for	 serious	
crimes such as robbery, burglary and assault 
where cases were marked as detected on 
PULSE, but there was no charge or summons 
or other case disposal information;
•	 A	 number	 of	 cases	were	 shown	 as	 files	 to	
the DPP where a detection was claimed 
in advance of any DPP decision and in the 
absence of a charge or summons. 
reporting a Crime and recording a 
Detection on the same Day
As previously stated, the mechanism to enter a 
detection of a crime incident on PULSE is to insert 
a name into the ‘Suspect Offender’ field and insert 
a date in the relevant date field. The date field is 
mandatory and must be completed, otherwise the 
detection cannot be claimed. 
The Inspectorate examined a number of PULSE 
records that were shown as detected, well before 
any proceedings were taken. In the 318 PULSE 
records examined, the Inspectorate found that in 
60% of the detections, the detected date was the 
same as the reported date for the crime. In addition, 
where the crime was reported but not recorded on 
PULSE until a later date, in two-thirds of the cases, 
the detection date was shown as the date that it 
was first reported. This suggests that there is a link 
between the reported date and the detection date. 
A comparison was conducted on the date that 
the incident was actually recorded (some crimes 
are recorded at a later date) on PULSE and it was 
found that the detected date was the same as the 
recorded date in 38% of the cases examined. This 
suggests that it is more likely that the detected 
date is linked to the date of the report to the Garda 
Síochána, rather than the date the incident is 
recorded on PULSE.
there are no restrictions on pULse to stop a 
member from showing a crime as detected. 
pULse also allows a retrospective detection date 
to be entered. this facility should be stopped and 
only a current date for the entry for a detection 
should be allowed to be entered on pULse.
Detection Dates for 318 crimes 
The following table shows that many of the 318 
crimes were marked as detected on the date that 
the crime was recorded on PULSE.
Crime type vs status Code examples
crime type status code inspectorate Finding 
assault Harm Blank no outcome
assault Harm File to DPP no charge or summons 
assault minor adult caution this was correctly recorded 
Burglary investigation no outcome 
Burglary Proceedings commenced three suspects but no charge or summons 
Burglary Proceedings commenced Victim withdrew allegation - no charge or summons
robbery File to DPP no charge or summons 
robbery Proceedings commenced three suspects charged 
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Key Findings
•	 Many	crimes	were	detected	on	the	day	that	
they were recorded on PULSE. At the time 
of the Inspectorate examination, twelve 
months had passed since the detection was 
first claimed and no further action had been 
taken;
•	 In	many	cases	there	was	no	explanation	on	
PULSE as to why the crimes were shown 
as detected and in the majority of cases 
there was no charge, summons or caution 
included;
•	 A	 number	 of	 crimes	 were	 shown	 as	 ‘no	
proceedings authorised by a district officer’, 
but the PULSE record had no rationale 
to explain why the case was detected e.g. 
which one of the criteria highlighted on the 
second page of this part had been satisfied.
These offences took place in 2012, the detection 
was claimed for that year and the crimes were 
recorded and reported publicly as detected crimes. 
At the time of conducting this examination process, 
divisions were focused on 2013 crimes and senior 
gardaí would have limited interest in revisiting 
crimes detected in 2012. 
The following are two examples of how detections 
are sometimes claimed and managed. 
Case 1
In July 2012, a burglary took place, where a 
house was ransacked by five suspects and three 
vehicles were stolen. The case is shown on 
PULSE as detected on the same day. A forensic 
examination of the house was conducted by a 
crime scene examiner and three weeks later, a 
fingerprint recovered at the scene identified a 
potential suspect. Although the case is recorded 
as a burglary detection, no suspects were ever 
charged or summonsed.
Case 2
In June 2012, a victim suffered a minor assault 
and the crime was recorded as detected on the 
same day. In October, an inspector declined to 
provide authority to charge or summons. Twelve 
months later the case is still shown as detected 
and under investigation.
 recommendation 11. 6
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána amends the pULse system to remove 
the facility for retrospectively recording a 
detection date. (short term).
prematurely Claiming Detections
The Inspectorate found that many of the detections 
on PULSE were claimed well in advance of meeting 
the criteria for detecting a crime. In the 318 cases 
examined where there was no charge or summons, 
the Inspectorate found 60 cases that were correctly 
detected. However, in fifty-three of those cases, the 
detections were prematurely claimed. 
Date crime recorded on PuLse Date Detected crime type Findings 
2/7/12 2/7/12 assault Harm File to DPP, no charge or summons 
15/7/12 15/7/12 assault Harm suspect known, under investigation, no charge or 
summons 
21/7/12 21/7/12 assault Harm DV under investigation, no DV flag, no charge or 
summons 
26/6/12 26/6/12 assault minor DV under investigation, no charge or summons
9/5/12 9/5/12 Burglary under investigation, no charge or caution 
18/5/12 18/5/12 Burglary File to DPP, no charge or summons
11/5/12 11/5/12 Burglary Proceedings commenced, but no charge or 
summons
2/7/12 2/7/12 robbery File to DPP, no charge or summons 
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The following are two examples of premature 
detections:
•	 Assault	 minor	 crime	 was	 recorded	 and	
detected in June 2012, but the adult offender 
was not cautioned until May 2013;
•	 A	robbery	offence	was	detected	in	July	2012,	
but a suspect was not charged with the 
crime until July 2013.
A high risk of claiming detections prematurely is 
the possibility that evidence gathered may not be 
sufficient to support a charge or other case disposal 
and a person initially identified as a suspect may 
not have committed the crime. The Inspectorate 
found that a significant percentage of detections 
were claimed prematurely and this was a situation 
also highlighted in the Guerin Report. This practice 
could lead to over-counting of detections. 
Invalid recording of a detection or the premature 
claim of a detection, is also unhelpful in respect of 
the allocation of new crimes for investigation. A 
supervisor checking PULSE will have a misleading 
picture about an investigator’s current caseload and 
may well assign new crimes for investigation, based 
on assumptions that the garda has in fact detected 
and completed many of the crimes assigned to 
them.
JLo Cautions 
As discussed in Part 10, young offenders accepted 
onto the Garda Síochána diversion programme are 
usually cautioned for an offence. Once approval 
for diversion is granted, the Crime Counting Rule 
allow the crime to be shown as detected. Within 
the 318 detections checked by the Inspectorate, 
12% of all detections fell into this category. On 
examination of those detections, the Inspectorate 
found a similar practice of prematurely detecting a 
crime before a young offender was deemed suitable 
for the diversion programme.
As previously mentioned, 20% of all young offender 
cases sent to the Garda Youth Diversion Office 
(GYDO) are deemed as unsuitable for entry into 
the programme and these cases are returned to the 
originating district to progress the case to court. 
The Inspectorate found a number of those cases 
recorded as detected, even though the person was 
marked on PULSE as unsuitable for the scheme. 
In these cases, the original investigating garda is 
required to charge or summons the young person 
in order to record a crime as detected; however, the 
Inspectorate found limited evidence of such actions 
occurring.
The following are cases that were deemed as 
unsuitable by GYDO, but are still recorded on 
PULSE as detected: 
•	 A	 young	 offender,	 who	 was	 identified	 as	
a suspect in a burglary in June 2012, was 
deemed as unsuitable by GYDO and the 
case was returned to the investigating 
garda. Some twelve months later this case 
had not been progressed, and the crime is 
still shown as detected;
•	 A	 robbery	 occurred	 in	 July	 2012	 and	was	
marked as detected on PULSE on the same 
day. The case was deemed as unsuitable by 
GYDO and returned to the investigating 
garda. Some twelve months later this case 
was not progressed, and the crime is still 
shown as detected;
•	 An	 assault	 committed	 in	 June	 2012	 was	
recorded on PULSE as detected on the same 
day. The case was deemed as unsuitable by 
GYDO in July 2012 and some twelve months 
later the case was not progressed, and the 
crime is still shown as detected.
The response to progressing those cases deemed 
as unsuitable for a GYDO caution varied across the 
divisions visited. One division was clearly taking 
further action and the Inspectorate found evidence 
where summonses were issued. In other divisions 
examined, cases were returned from GYDO, but 
no action had been taken. In cases where there is 
a statutory time limit, some of these cases are now 
outside of that timeframe and statute barred.
The Crime Counting Rules are broad, in as much 
as the young offender only needs to be accepted on 
the Diversion Programme for the crime to be shown 
as detected. The Inspectorate believes that a crime 
should only be marked detected when a caution is 
delivered to an adult or a young offender.
 recommendation 11.7
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána develops standard operating 
procedure, which stipulate that all detections 
should only be claimed on the day that a 
charge, summons or caution is delivered for 
adults and young offenders. (short term).
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Detections – Final assessment 
Chart 11.6 shows the final determination of the 318 
crimes examined and whether the detected crime 
was correctly recorded.
chart 11.6
examination of Detections without 
Charge or summons in selected 
Divisions may - July 2012
number 
Detections 
examined
Detections 
correctly 
recorded 
Detections 
incorrectly 
recorded 
insufficient 
information 
to make a 
Decision 
318 19% 72% 9%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 318 PULSE incident 
records by the Garda Inspectorate 
the chart highlights that 72% of the detections 
examined were viewed by the inspectorate 
as incorrectly recorded (i.e. not in accordance 
with the Crime Counting rules) and a further 
9% had insufficient information to confirm 
if the detection was correct or not. From this 
examination the inspectorate believes that the 
Crime Counting rules were not always followed 
in these cases.
application of findings to overall sample 
of detections 
Chart 11.7 compares the PULSE detection rate to the 
detection findings of the Inspectorate.4
chart 11.7
Comparison of pULse Detection rate in 
selected Divisions with garda inspectorate 
Findings on Detection rate in 
may – June 2012
recorded 
crime 
incidents 
on PuLse
number of 
Detections 
claimed on 
PuLse
Detections 
correct 
per garda 
inspectorate
Detection 
rate 
claimed 
on PuLse
correct 
Detection 
rate per 
garda 
inspectorate
2,195 946 575 43% 26%4
Source: Data obtained from sampling 318 PULSE incident records 
by the Garda Inspectorate and data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
Within the sample of detections reviewed, the 
Inspectorate’s view is that the correct detection rate, 
with respect to the 2,195 reported crimes is 26%, 
and not 43% as recorded by the Garda Síochána 
on PULSE. This does not include the cases where 
there were insufficient details to determine if the 
case was correctly detected or not. In these cases, 
the Inspectorate accepted the detection decision.
examinations by Crime types and by 
divisions
Chart 11.8 shows an analysis of the impact of the 
Inspectorate’s findings on the detection rates for 
2,195 recorded crimes across the five crime types 
in chart 11.6 in the selected divisions. 
4 Detection rate is the number of detections as a percentage 
of the number of reported crimes PULSE determined 
946/2195 *100 = 43% whereas Garda Inspectorate determined 
575/2195*100=26%
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Findings on analysis of Crime types
The data in Chart 11.8 highlights some significant 
differences between the recorded detection rate 
and the detection rate following the application of 
the Crime Counting Rules. 
In this sample the recorded detection rates on 
PULSE are significantly above the detection rate 
viewed by the Inspectorate as correct. Of particular 
note are incidents  of domestic violence where the 
Inspectorate identified the actual detection rate is 
almost half of the rate shown.
The detection rate for burglary offences was 
found to be 8% less than the 22% originally 
claimed on PULSE. This parallels the analysis in 
other parts of this report into inaccurate crime 
recording and classification.
During focus groups, senior gardaí highlighted 
that the current system for managing the 
investigation of serious crimes has an impact 
on detection rates. For those divisions which 
regularly deal with serious crimes, a key number 
of detectives, including supervisors, are taken 
from their ‘day jobs’ to run the investigation of a 
serious offence. This approach is impacting on the 
other cases that they are assigned to investigate 
and on the subsequent detection rates for those 
crimes. 
Some of the detected crimes examined by the 
Inspectorate were for more serious types of 
offences, such as robberies and burglaries, which 
are often harder to solve. Overall detection rates 
for police services are usually increased by crimes 
that are much easier to solve, such as possession of 
drugs, traffic offences and public order offences. 
For these types of offences, a crime is usually only 
recorded once an offender is detected. In practice, 
these cases are often less closely supervised and 
are not routinely tracked by district officers. Many 
of the cases highlighted in the Guerin Report 
are in connection with less serious crimes, such 
as licensing and traffic offences and the report 
highlighted examples where detections were 
recorded but no prosecutions had taken place.
inspectorate Findings on Detections from 
other Data sets
During the analysis of crime classification in 
Part 4, the Inspectorate also captured details on 
the recording of detections. In this dataset of 393 
PULSE incidents the Inspectorate found higher 
recorded detection rates on PULSE than those 
viewed to be correct by the Inspectorate. 
Chart 11.9 shows the results of the Inspectorate’s 
analysis of the detection rate on that database. 
chart 11.9
analysis of Crime Classification Data set 
for Detections in selected Divisions 
may – July 2012
recorded crime 
incidents on PuLse 
sampled by the 
inspectorate
Detection 
rate claimed 
on PuLse
correct 
Detection rate 
per garda 
inspectorate
393 34% 22%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 393 PULSE incident 
records by the Garda Inspectorate
In this analysis, the detection rate recorded on 
PULSE  is 34%. The Inspectorate’s view is that the 
correct detection rate is 22%.
chart 11.8
impact of inspectorate’s Findings on Detections of Certain Crime types 
in selected Divisions may - July 2012
crime type recorded crime incidents 
on PuLse
Detection rate claimed on 
PuLse
correct Detection rate 
per garda inspectorate
assault Harm 152 79% 55%
assault minor 523 66% 39%
Burglary 1281 22% 14%
crime incident with Domestic 
Violence mo Feature
171 90% 47%
robbery 68 59% 37%
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate and data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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non-convictions at Court and review of 
Detections
A criminal offence may be classified as detected 
when criminal proceedings have commenced 
against a person, but if the person is subsequently 
not convicted of the criminal offence, the relevant 
district officer should conduct a full review of all the 
circumstances (per Crime Counting Rules in Garda 
Síochána HQ Directive). If he/she is satisfied that 
there was reasonable probability, based on sufficient 
evidence, that the person charged committed the 
criminal offence, then the detection status will 
remain, despite the non-conviction. As mentioned 
earlier, the Inspectorate found no evidence that 
district officers are reviewing any such cases.
To ensure the robust nature of the detection 
statistics, the Inspectorate recommends that 
the reasons for retaining a detection after a 
non-conviction must be recorded on PULSE. 
Otherwise, the PULSE record should be amended 
to change the incident as undetected. Other 
policing jurisdictions have systems where 
detections are claimed once the person is charged. 
In circumstances where a case is lost at court, 
a review may take place to ascertain why the 
prosecution was not achieved, but not in respect of 
the detection status.
possession of Drugs
During the course of this inspection, issues about 
the recording and detecting of cases of ‘simple 
drug possession’ came to light. This was usually 
possession of a small amount of cannabis for 
personal use. Although drug possession was 
not one of the categories originally designated 
by the Inspectorate for detailed examination, it 
was decided to review the detection levels of 
this type of offence for any potential anomalies. 
Detection rates for possession of drugs should be 
high, as in most cases drugs are found in a person’s 
possession. In addition, high detection rates for 
drugs cases usually have a positive impact on the 
overall detection rate for a police service. 
One of the features of this type of case is that there 
is no facility available to the Garda Síochána to issue 
an adult offender with a caution in drug possession 
cases. For young offenders under eighteen, a caution 
can be given as part of the diversion programme. 
An adult caution is an official reprimand issued by 
a superintendent to a person over eighteen, accused 
of a less serious crime, who admits the offence. A 
decision was taken at the time of introducing adult 
cautions to specifically not include drug possession 
cases in this process. The Inspectorate understands 
the concerns that were raised at the time, but the 
exclusion has created a number of difficulties.
In the absence of an ability to caution a person, 
a garda has no discretion and all cases with 
sufficient evidence should be brought to court. 
When a person is stopped and found in possession 
of a small amount of cannabis, a garda should 
seize the drugs and either arrest the person or, if 
satisfied that details are verified, proceed by way 
of a summons. In cases of simple possession, there 
is a six month time limit for initiating a charge or a 
summons. With the availability of drug testing at a 
garda station, a person should be prosecuted in a 
short period of time.
During focus groups with members, it was 
evident that not all persons stopped and 
found in possession of drugs are charged or 
summonsed. In some cases, drugs are seized and 
a PULSE record is created and detected for the 
crime, the drugs are placed in a drugs register 
and no further action is taken. Some members 
expressed strong feelings about taking a young 
person to court for a small amount of cannabis. 
A court conviction for drugs can have enormous 
consequences and in some cases, members are not 
issuing a summons. Many supervisors shared the 
view articulated by members.
The Inspectorate is aware that some districts and 
divisions have conducted audits of drug cases and 
that a significant number of cases have been found 
where drugs have been seized and no proceedings 
have been taken.
There are a number of issues in connection with the 
failure to take proper action:
•	 The	 detection	 is	 invalid	 as	 no	 proceedings	
were ever taken;
•	 An	offender	is	never	brought	to	justice;
•	 The	 crime	 is	 recorded	 as	 detected	 against	
an individual, who may be unaware that the 
case is shown as detected; 
•	 After	six	months	the	case	is	lapsed;
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•	 The	person	who	was	in	possession	of	drugs	
may at a later date be the subject of a vetting 
check;
•	 Gardaí	have	seized	drugs,	but	the	case	is	not	
completed. 
The Garda Professional Standards Unit is currently 
conducting examinations of drugs cases. The 
following are some of the issues found during their 
examinations:
•	 Drugs	 have	 been	 seized	 without	 a	 PULSE	
record;
•	 Drugs	are	missing	from	property	stores;
•	 Not	all	cases	were	progressed;	
•	 In	 some	 cases,	 summonses	 are	 struck	 out	
and not re-issued. 
analysis of Drug Detections
As part of the analysis of detections, the 
Inspectorate examined seventy-four drugs 
possession cases, which were recorded on PULSE 
in June 2012. All bar one case was recorded as 
detected and most are shown as detected on the 
day that the drugs were seized.
Chart 11.10 highlights the findings from 
examination of these PULSE records.
chart 11.10
analysis of Detections for possession of 
Drugs in selected Divisions - June 2012
recorded Possession 
of Drugs incidents on 
PuLse sampled by the 
inspectorate
Detection 
rate 
claimed on 
PuLse
Detection 
rate correct 
per garda 
inspectorate
74 99% 66%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 74 PULSE Possession of 
drugs incident records by the Garda Inspectorate.
Chart 11.10 shows that there is a recorded detection 
rate of 99% on PULSE. In the Inspectorate’s view 
the correct detection rate is 66%. In many cases 
there was no charge, summons or a young offender 
caution recorded on the PULSE incident record. 
These cases were by this time over twelve months 
old. Most of these cases had a detection status code 
of ‘Proceedings Commenced’, with two showing 
‘Proceedings Complete’ and a further three 
categorised as ‘Under Investigation’. There was an 
absence of evidence of any supervision in these 
cases. 
other Findings
•	 In	 one	 division,	 eight	 out	 of	 the	 nine	
detections were incorrect and the 9th was 
claimed prematurely;
•	 Two	 of	 the	 detected	 cases	 had	 remarks	
entered on the PULSE incident record 
saying cautions were delivered at the time of 
the seizure. There is no caution process for 
an adult that allows such a detection to be 
claimed.
Further analysis showed that the practice of 
prematurely claiming detections, already referred 
to in this part of the report, was also present in 
drug cases. In forty-seven out of the forty-nine 
cases where a detection was correct, the decision to 
claim a detection was premature.
The findings from this analysis confirmed 
information received from members and senior 
gardaí; and the results are similar to other crime 
areas in that 34% of the detections checked were 
found to be incorrect.
Drugs and other Lapsed Cases 
The Inspectorate has found a number of drugs 
and other less serious cases, that are subject to 
a six month window to prosecute, that were not 
progressed. After this time period, the prospect of a 
prosecution is lost. The Guerin Report highlighted 
a number of incidents where cautions were used to 
deal with a case that was outside of the prosecution 
time frame. The Garda Síochána has a significant 
number of cases involving drugs offences and 
other crimes recorded as detected, dating back 
many years that are incorrect. These crimes should 
not be shown as detected and they are incorrectly 
recorded against individuals who have not been 
prosecuted.
 recommendation 11.8
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána conducts an audit of all lapsed cases 
and any that are shown as detected must be 
changed to undetected status. (medium term).
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adult Cautions
Adult cautions are used by most police services 
as an alternative way of dealing with an offender 
who may previously have been of good character. 
If used properly, adult cautions can remove a lot 
of less serious crimes from reaching the courts. A 
number of factors need to be considered, including 
the views of a victim and the public interest. It is 
very important to seek the views of victims, but in 
some cases it may still be appropriate to administer 
a caution. A person must admit the crime before 
they can be cautioned. An adult caution is a formal 
process and an offender is fully aware that the 
crime is detected against them.
The use of an adult caution for possession of a small 
amount of drugs is available in all of the police 
services visited as part of this inspection. In drug 
cases, a caution can be administered quickly and 
in many jurisdictions for adult offenders, this is 
completed at the time of an arrest. This allows a 
case to be closed and a detection is valid. At present, 
many people are stopped by a garda member, 
searched, drugs seized, but no formal action taken. 
An adult caution is a formal process and provides an 
opportunity for a person to change their behaviour 
or face the consequences of a prosecution.
Police services in the UK are able to provide a 
cannabis warning on the street for those who are 
first time offenders and other jurisdictions have 
access to a caution facility for the possession of 
drugs. In the US, it is common to issue a citation 
(summons) in such cases. 
 recommendation 11.9
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to consider extending the 
legislation governing the adult cautioning 
scheme to include possession of drugs and 
other suitable offences. (medium term).
Conditional Cautions
Since 2003, other police services have had the 
facility to deliver conditional cautions, designed 
to improve a person’s behaviour, which supports 
the restorative justice approach. The experience 
of other police services is that a caution with a 
condition is more likely to have a positive longer 
term outcome than a once-off unconditional 
caution. In the UK, there is an 83% positive outcome 
rate with conditional cautioning. Police services in 
Birmingham are using contracts with offenders to 
try and change lifestyle and offending behaviour. 
Criminal justice partners have a role to play in 
providing support and treatment, including anger 
management courses, in order to assist the offender. 
 recommendation 11.10
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to consider extending the 
legislation governing the adult cautioning 
scheme to include conditional cautioning. 
(medium term).
informal Cautions
Under common law, members of the Garda 
Síochána have a power of discretion when 
considering whether to instigate an investigation 
against a person found to be committing an offence. 
This power is usually exercised in the case of minor 
crimes such as traffic or public order incidents.
A practice was noted by the Inspectorate, whereby 
the Garda Síochána are recording some of these 
incidents as crimes on PULSE and showing a 
detected crime under the category of ‘Informal 
Caution’. This process creates a crime and creates 
a detection. This is usually for less serious offences, 
but such a detection adds to the overall detection 
rates.
The Inspectorate has a number of concerns with 
this practice of detecting recorded crimes. This 
process was operating for some time prior to 2011, 
when a decision was taken to stop issuing informal 
cautions. At the time of the inspection visits, the 
process had just been re-introduced, and at that 
time it was estimated that ‘Informal Cautions’ 
could account for 2 to 5% of the total number of 
garda detections. Approximately one-third of the 
informal cautions are issued for traffic offences. 
In cases examined by the Inspectorate, no 
explanation was provided by the investigating 
garda as to why the decision was made to exercise 
discretion. Nor is anything recorded to show that 
the ‘suspected offender’ was informed that an 
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informal caution was issued. There is a possibility 
that a person will only discover such a detection is 
recorded if they are subject to vetting, or in court on 
a separate matter, at some stage in the future.
The Inspectorate believes that the recording and 
detecting of crimes where informal cautions are 
issued, may distort the analysis and interpretation 
of crime trends and detections.
Other police services deal with minor offences by 
way of verbal warnings, advising motorists about 
the manner of driving; but are not recording this 
as a crime. Western Australia police use informal 
warnings/cautions, but these are not recorded as 
crimes and are only retained as intelligence and 
a record that the warning was given. In the US, 
citations are given for traffic offences, but many 
departments also give ‘warning’ tickets in traffic 
matters that are not recorded as offences. 
 recommendation 11.11
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ceases the practice of issuing 
informal cautions as a detection option and 
expunges pULse records that contain this 
detection status. (medium term).
Fixed Charge penalty notices (FCpn)
The Inspectorate recently completed an inspection 
into the Fixed Charge Penalty System (FCPS) that 
was published in February of this year.5 The use of 
notices is outlined in that report as a good way of 
reducing the number of people in custody suites 
and courts, thereby reducing the number of gardaí 
required to attend court. Gardaí can already issue 
penalty notices for intoxication and public order 
offences. 
Other police services have extended the use of 
notices to offences such as minor shoplifting, 
without the need to arrest. During the inspection, 
garda members also raised the possibility of 
extending the current scheme to other traffic 
offences, such as defective tyres, no NCT and non-
conforming number plates.
5 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, The Fixed Charge 
Processing System, A 21st Century Strategy, February 2014
An issue of concern was raised with the 
Inspectorate in connection with non-payment 
of fixed charge notices for non-traffic matters, 
such as public order incidents. Where a person 
does not pay the fine, the case is referred back to 
the investigating garda to take action. Supervising 
gardaí explained that, on occasions, action is not 
taken within the time limits of the legislation and 
the case is lost. The Inspectorate believes that all 
notices should be managed through one central 
point for tickets and that individual cases should 
not be returned to members.
 recommendation 11.12
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to consider extending the 
use of fixed charge penalty notices to include 
other minor crimes and to cease the practice 
of sending unpaid FCpns to gardaí to issue 
summonses. (medium term).
Detecting Crime – the Look Back process
During a number of visits to garda divisions, the 
Inspectorate noted a review process introduced 
to examine open and unsolved investigations and 
to look for detection opportunities. The process 
was called ‘Operation Look Back’ and involved 
detective supervisors, on a quarterly basis, 
checking crimes reported during the previous 
three months. This is good practice and ensures a 
review of cases where there may be opportunities 
to solve a crime.
The Inspectorate examined a number of crime 
categories from the divisions that were using 
the principles of ‘Look Back’. The crimes under 
review were committed in January 2013, but were 
subsequently detected after that time. Chart 11.11 
shows the full results of this analysis. 
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chart 11.11
Crimes recorded in January 2013 in 
selected Divisions Detected as part of 
operation Lock-Back
recorded Look Back 
incidents on PuLse 
sampled by the 
inspectorate
Detection 
rate 
claimed on 
PuLse
Detection 
rate correct 
per garda 
inspectorate
92 100% 47%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 92 Look-Back PULSE 
incident records by the Garda Inspectorate.
Findings of “Look-Back” analysis
The Inspectorate found that less than 50% of 
detections were correctly recorded. Across the 
seven divisions, there was a consistent approach 
of claiming detections without meeting any of the 
requirements of the counting rules.
The following are examples of some of the PULSE 
records that were examined: 
•	 A	 case	 of	 criminal	 damage	 reported	 and	
recorded in January 2013 and detected in 
April 2013. A suspect was identified but not 
arrested. There is no charge, summons or 
other proceedings;
•	 A	theft	from	a	car	occurred	in	January	2013	
and was detected in April 2013. The PULSE 
narrative states: “Suspect interviewed and 
admissions made”. There is no charge, 
summons or other proceedings and the 
detection status is blank; 
•	 An	assault	causing	harm	was	committed	in	
January 2013 and detected in April 2013. No 
suspected offender details are on PULSE, 
the detection status code is blank and there 
are no details on PULSE to explain how the 
crime meets the counting rules.
As highlighted in Part 5, the Inspectorate also 
found crimes that were reclassified as part of 
‘Operation Look-Back’ and in most cases to a less 
serious crime. For these crimes, there were no 
suspects and they were undetected. In many of 
the cases examined, the Inspectorate did not agree 
with the change in category. Examples of a category 
change included burglaries that were changed to 
less serious offences of trespass, criminal damage 
and theft.
In one division, the Inspectorate found that the 
district officer, the detective superintendent and 
a detective sergeant made decisions to change 
burglary offences to a less serious crime. In these 
cases, the Inspectorate did not agree with the 
changes and there was no rationale to explain 
why a crime was moved to another category. A 
reduction in the number of recorded crimes such 
as these burglary offences mentioned above, will 
automatically improve an existing detection rate for 
that particular crime category, without solving any 
more crimes.
reclassification of Crime resulting in 
improved Detection rates 
Whilst examining reclassification of crimes the 
Inspectorate noticed a number of trends connected 
to detections.
Trend 1:
Some crimes were not recorded on PULSE at the 
time of first notification to the Garda Síochána, 
but were subsequently created on PULSE when 
a suspect was identified for the initial crime or a 
subsequent crime. 
For some crimes, there was a long gap between the 
crime and the creation of PULSE. The creation of the 
PULSE crime had clear links to the identification of 
a suspect and the detection of a crime. 
Trend 2:
The Inspectorate found examples of crimes 
initially categorised as one crime, then at 
some point reclassified to a lesser crime and, 
subsequently at a later date, reclassified back to 
the initial crime. In PULSE records examined, 
there was a linked arrest of an offender after the 
first classification was changed. Two examples are 
included below:
•	 An	 offence	 of	 burglary	 in	 July	 2012	
reclassified almost immediately to a less 
serious offence. In October, the district 
officer reclassified it back to a burglary and 
the crime was shown as detected.
•	 A	burglary	was	 recorded	 in	May	2012	 and	
was reclassified almost immediately. A 
detection was shown on PULSE, six days 
later, and the crime was reclassified back to 
burglary.
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Trend 3:
The Inspectorate found examples of incidents 
initially recorded on PULSE in a non-crime category 
such as Attention and Complaints, where the 
identification of a suspect and a detection resulted 
in a reclassification to a crime. The non-crime 
categories on PULSE are used to record certain 
items of information and incidents, but should not 
include any crimes. Examples include: 
•	 An	 Attention	 and	 Complaints	 incident	
recorded on PULSE in July 2012. In October, 
a suspect was arrested and the incident was 
reclassified to a crime of assault.
•	 An	 incident	 was	 recorded	 as	 a	 ‘domestic	
dispute - no offences disclosed’ in June 2012. 
In February 2013, this was changed to a 
minor assault and a supervisor directed 
that the case be shown as detected. There 
was no reason given for why this was 
changed or why it was suitable for detection.
In all of the previous examples viewed by the 
Inspectorate, the PULSE incidents and the initial 
classification of the crime appeared to be correct. 
When reclassified, there was no rationale as to 
why it was changed to a less serious crime or why 
an incident that was not recorded as a crime later 
became a criminal offence.
The absence of explanation for the changing of 
crime categories raises many questions. Crime 
classifications should never be based on whether 
there is an opportunity to detect a crime or 
not. The moving of a crime to a lesser category 
will reduce reported numbers of serious crimes. 
Conversely, a crime that is moved back to a more 
serious category when an offender is identified, 
will improve the detection rate for the more 
serious crime.
Furthermore, the initial classification of a crime into 
a non-crime category that is later changed into a 
crime category suggests that evidence existed at the 
time of the incident that a crime was committed, 
but a decision was made to not record it as a crime 
at the time.
Lost opportunities for Detecting Crime
The Inspectorate found many examples where a 
crime was shown in a less serious category than 
the PULSE record and the victim’s statement and 
the case file suggested. In these cases, a detection 
was achieved for a lesser crime or not claimed as 
the crime was recorded in a non-crime category. 
This was particularly found in cases of more 
serious assault, which were categorised as a minor 
assault. The following two examples show where 
a detection was lost for a serious crime and for a 
crime recorded in Attention and Complaints:
•	 A	criminal		damage	case	that	was	reclassified	
to Attention and Complaints. A suspect later 
admitted to the crime of criminal damage; 
•	 An	assault	harm	case	reclassified	incorrectly	
into assault minor. A suspect was later 
charged with assault harm. 
In Part 5, the Inspectorate has made a number of 
recommendations to address the issues around 
recording practices.
notifying a victim and informing a suspect 
about a Detection
A significant development in a crime investigation 
is the arrest, charge or other action with an offender. 
As mentioned in Part 7, notifying victims that a 
person has been arrested and charged can often 
remove or reduce their concern that the offender is 
still at large. It is also important that a suspected 
offender knows that a crime has been recorded 
against them. 
There is a gap in cases of informal cautions and 
detections where no formal action has been taken. 
In many cases, a person involved may not have 
committed the alleged crime and they will almost 
certainly not know that a record of a crime exists 
and a detection has been recorded against them. 
 recommendation 11.13
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána ensures that suspected offenders are 
formally notified about any crime shown as 
detected against them. (short term).
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volume Crime Case reviews – analysis of 
Detections
Of the original total of 158 cases the Inspectorate 
examined from start to finish, Chart 11.12 shows 
that ninety were actually investigated as crimes. 
The	 findings	 of	 the	 Volume	 Crime	 Case	 Reviews	
support the other analysis around detections 
conducted by the Inspectorate. In this sample 
29 crimes were recorded on PULSE as detected 
but only 22 were viewed by the Inspectorate 
as correctly detected. Of the correctly recorded 
detections, 27% were claimed early. 
the Future of Detections
There are many common themes in the examination 
of detections, which include: 
•	 Not	 complying	 with	 the	 Crime	 Counting	
Rules; 
•	 Not	 explaining	 decisions	 to	 detect	 an	
incident in the PULSE narrative;
•	 Incorrect	use	of	the	‘Detection	Status’	field;
•	 Prematurely	claiming	detections.
The analysis by the Inspectorate indicates that 
the  Garda Síochána detection rates are incorrect. 
As highlighted earlier, there are links between 
detection rates and poor crime recording 
practices. The Inspectorate has found that in the 
areas examined, detection rates are lower than 
those claimed and this does not take into account 
crimes that are never recorded on PULSE or crimes 
that are shown in the wrong category. Crime must 
be recorded accurately, so that claimed detections 
are correct. (See Parts 4 and 5.)
The Garda Síochána has recently introduced a 
new inspection and review process that requires 
senior gardaí from within the same operational 
environment to audit crime recording practices and 
compliance on crime counting rules. This is not 
good practice and at present, there is an absence of 
any central scrutiny around the recording of crime 
and the recording of detections. The Inspectorate 
would not advocate an internal auditing process, 
as this should be conducted by the recommended 
Garda Crime Registrar, who must be outside of the 
operational command and without responsibility 
for crime recording or crime detecting.
The Inspectorate recommends that an annual 
inspection of detections is conducted by an 
independent body. 
 recommendation 11.14
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene a 
working group to consider the implementation 
of an annual audit of detections by an 
independent body. (medium term).
chart 11.12
volume Crime Case reviews – 158 Cases Detections
number of 
cases
number cases 
investigated
number cases 
with a suspect
number cases 
suspect arrested
number of Detections 
claimed on PuLse 
number Detected 
correctly
158 90 37 24 29 22 (6 were premature)
Source: Data obtained from sampling PULSE incident records by the Garda Inspectorate and data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
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11.5 Investigation Outcomes
Bringing a Case to Court
This part of the report will look at some of the 
systems in place to bring a case to court. It is 
important for any criminal justice system to 
ensure that only cases with evidence reasonably 
likely to secure a conviction are brought to court. 
Throughout this inspection, the Inspectorate has 
received feedback from all parts of the Garda 
Síochána, partner agencies, victims and witnesses 
about time delays in getting cases to court and 
the vast amount of resources involved in the 
prosecution processes. This part of the report 
will examine those processes and some of the 
inefficiencies currently in the system.
summonses 
An option for bringing offenders and witnesses to 
court, without the need for a warrant or an arrest, 
is to issue a person with a summons. Summonses 
are also issued in connection with non-payment 
of fines, such as fixed charge penalty notices. In 
many cases this is an effective way of bringing 
a person to court and releases garda time from 
arresting and charging people for less serious 
crimes. It is also the case that for many offences 
where summonses are used, an investigating 
garda has six months from the date of the offence 
to apply for a summons. 
There are some disadvantages in using a summons 
process, including:
•	 Investigations	can	be	delayed	as	a	garda	has	
six months to complete an investigation and 
apply for a summons;
•	 Once	 a	 summons	 is	 issued,	 a	 court	 case	
will not take place for at least another three 
months; 
•	 A	 summons	 needs	 to	 be	 served	 on	 the	
offender. This can be expensive if recorded 
delivery is used and time consuming if a 
garda personally serves the summons;
•	 If	 a	 summons	 is	 not	 served	 in	 time	 for	
the court date, a case will not always 
proceed and the whole process needs to be 
recommenced.
In many cases, prosecutions may well proceed by 
summons, rather than by arrest and charging. Many 
gardaí prefer this system as it provides more time to 
prepare case files for court. A major disadvantage 
with issuing summonses is the additional time 
taken to apply for a summons and allocate a court 
date. The longer it takes an investigating gardaí 
to complete an investigation, the more time it 
takes to get a case to court. From examination of 
case files and PULSE records, the Inspectorate 
found that many less serious cases go very close 
to the six month time limit before an application is 
made for a summons. In these cases a member is 
placing themselves and the courts under pressure 
to commence proceedings, before the case becomes 
statute barred. Additionally, when a three to four 
month period for a summons and a court date is 
added, a case has already reached the ten month 
stage before the first court appearance. During 
visits to courts, the Inspectorate found that there 
are also significant delays in many non-time statute 
barred cases, often taking over twelve months to 
reach summons application stage. 
numbers of prosecution summonses issued 
The numbers of summonses issued by the courts 
in 2013 is outlined in Chart 11.13. These figures are 
for offenders and not for court witnesses. 
chart 11.13
summons Details - 2013
summons type numbers issued
electronic summonses issued (sa1) 122,474
manual summonses issued (sa1) 6,087
re-issues (sa2) 11,861
Source: Circuit Court and District Court data 2013.
Chart 11.13 shows that 140,422 summonses were 
issued or re-issued in 2013. Approximately 2,700 
summonses are issued each week with the 
majority for less serious cases, such as traffic 
offences or thefts. Where an application for a 
summons is not made in time, the case lapses and 
proceedings cannot be instigated. 
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How a summons is prepared and issued 
The process for applying for a summons lies with 
the investigating member who can apply for a 
summons on PULSE by entering the details of the 
case (shown as SA1 in the chart) and the district 
court details. Once the request for a summons 
has been marked on PULSE, supervisors at GISC 
are able to track it and will send a reminder to the 
member to finalise the process before the 180 day 
limit expires. Those summons requests started, 
but not sent at 170 days, will be forwarded to the 
relevant court by GISC as a ‘fail safe’ unless the 
investigating member records a reason not to do so. 
A problem arises however, where the investigating 
member fails to take any steps to generate the 
offence summons. Supervisors informed the 
Inspectorate that there are many occasions when 
a garda is aware that an offender needs to be 
summonsed, but they fail to start the process 
within the six month time limit. Administrative 
support from GISC is only possible where the 
investigating garda has started the summons 
process. In cases where no action has been taken 
to apply for a summons, the local supervisor is 
required to ensure the process is started. Due to a 
lack of available data, the Inspectorate was unable 
to determine the scale of this problem, but the 
Inspectorate was advised by court officers that this 
happens in all the divisions visited.
There are some occasions where investigating 
gardaí are awaiting directions from the district 
officer or DPP to determine the seriousness of a 
charge. The nature of the charge is important, as 
it may determine whether there is a six month 
time limit for a summons. This is a regular 
occurrence in assault cases, where a minor assault 
would require the issue of a summons within six 
months. Some gardaí are creating a summons in 
anticipation, but do not send it off until directions 
are received. 
Once the details are recorded on PULSE, the 
request goes to a central point in Dublin. The 
process is managed through the Criminal Justice 
Inter-operability Programme (CJIP). This unit 
liaises with the local court to nominate a time 
for a hearing and should take into account the 
working shift roster of the members and any dates 
that witnesses would like to avoid. A summons is 
issued back to the district station and a court date 
is usually set for three to four months in advance. 
Once the summons process is commenced, a crime 
can be recorded as detected on PULSE.
The Inspectorate received the findings of an 
internal study of 500 summonses, which focused 
on the date the crime incident took place to the date 
of the first hearing at court. The sample looked at 
a comparison of the incident date and the court 
hearing date taken from 1,247 cases scheduled in 
February 2013, with the following findings:
•	 Most	 cases	 were	 traffic	 offences	 and	 were	
listed within 180 days of receipt;
•	 Some	 traffic	 offences	 took	 considerably	
longer to list ranging from eight months to 
eleven months to arrange the first hearing.
There is a service level agreement between the 
Garda Síochána and the Courts Service under 
which the Garda Síochána has to provide twelve 
week’s notice of a hearing and the courts have 
five months to schedule cases. This snapshot 
shows that cases are extending beyond that time 
period. Whilst the majority of summonses are for 
less serious crimes, there are also a significant 
number of crimes which are considered serious, 
such as burglary, that are also processed in this 
way. In some of these cases, there are delays in 
issuing summonses and examples were provided 
to the Inspectorate where applications for a 
summons in more serious drug cases took longer 
than twelve months. 
A witness summons for a court case is also 
generated by PULSE, but it can be printed locally 
by an investigating garda with certification from 
the local court. No data is available to show how 
many witness summonses are generated each 
year.
Late application for a summons
After five months and one week, a garda is unable 
to apply electronically for a summons and members 
have to make the application manually to the Courts 
Service. Any application after that time must be 
made directly to the court. The previous chart (11.13) 
shows that there were over 6,000 late applications 
in 2013. The current level of late applications is 
above the service level agreement, and some courts 
reported that this is a regular occurrence with a 
noticeable trend of late applications in assault cases. 
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serving summonses
There are a number of different ways of serving 
summonses and there are differences in how 
divisions take action. Examples of summons 
serving practices include:
•	 Dedicated	garda	summons	servers;
•	 Regular	post	or	recorded	delivery;
•	 Personal	service	by	individual	gardaí.
It costs €5.25 per summons to send a summons 
by recorded delivery and the Inspectorate found 
one busy division that posted approximately 1,000 
summonses per month. However in this division, 
50% of the postal summonses are returned as un-
served. This ultimately results in a visit from a 
garda to follow up with personal service. Another 
area reported an 81% success rate for serving 
summonses. The Ministry of Justice in England 
and Wales estimates that charging suspects by post 
saves two hours per police time per suspect and 
some 300,000 officer hours per year.
Some districts used dedicated summons servers 
whose sole role is to try and serve summonses. A 
large amount of garda time is spent on summons 
serving and it is not unusual to make several 
visits to a defendant to effect personal service 
of a summons. During the sampling of PULSE 
incidents, the Inspectorate found an absence of 
supervision to ensure that cases were progressed 
or that cases about to lapse were progressed in 
time. Once a summons is served, gardaí take a 
summons to a Peace Commissioner and the service 
of the summons is endorsed. 
tracking of summonses
In most divisions visited, there was no tracking 
process in place to monitor the numbers of suspect 
and witness summonses generated and what 
happens to them. The Inspectorate found one 
district where progress is monitored to ensure that 
action is taken to serve a summons. The tracking 
of summonses by this district has identified that 
some gardaí are not taking any action to serve 
summonses and some are never returned. The 
failure to serve a summons results in court cases 
that are unable to proceed on the arranged court 
date and a delay in the time to get a case to court. 
summonses not served
Where a summons is not served, it needs to 
be re-issued (shown as SA2 in chart 11.13), and 
in 2013 there were 11,861 such instances. The 
Inspectorate was informed that where summonses 
are not served, in some cases there can be up to 
five re-issues. This is due to difficulties finding 
an offender and where there is no action to 
serve them. The Inspectorate was informed of 
cases where summonses are not served, even 
though the offender has been arrested on more 
than one occasion since the summonses were 
generated. This links very closely to issues found 
with warrants, where they were not executed 
when a person was in custody (see Part 10). The 
Inspectorate was unable to determine how many 
summonses were not served and were not re-
issued. 
On PULSE, the outcome of many court cases is 
shown as ‘case struck out’; but further examination 
shows in some cases this appeared to be because a 
summons was not served. In such circumstances, 
it should be recorded on PULSE as ‘summons not 
served’ and not ‘case struck out’. The Inspectorate 
was informed by a number of different sources 
that investigating gardaí unnecessarily attend 
court for some cases, when a summons is not 
served. This is a waste of garda time as the case 
will not go ahead without a summons being 
served. 
summons Courts
A large number of traffic and other less serious 
offences are dealt with at a summons court. Courts 
often allocate specific days to hear these cases. 
Summons courts are often high in volume, but 
each case hearing is usually relatively short. 
The Garda Síochána operates a court presenter 
scheme in the District Court that will be fully 
explored later in this part of the report. In 
essence, the scheme allows for a sergeant, as court 
presenter, to tender evidence of arrest, charge 
and caution and to manage each appearance 
in the case up to, but not including, the final 
hearing date. The court presenting scheme does 
not routinely operate in summons courts and the 
Inspectorate believes that far too many gardaí are 
unnecessarily attending court for cases that may 
well result in a plea of guilty, where a summons 
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was never served or where a case is not heard 
on that occasion. Some good practice was found 
by the Inspectorate, whereby some Traffic Units 
are operating a court presenter scheme to reduce 
the number of traffic gardaí that were previously 
attending court. In the DMR, traffic cases are 
assigned to court days based on the unit that is 
due to be working on particular days. Whilst this 
ensures that cases are heard on days when gardaí 
are due at work, on some occasions this can remove 
half of the members of a regular unit from their 
usual duties to attend court at the same time.
Witnesses summonses 
A warning is a notice given to a witness of 
the date and time of a court case. The Garda 
Síochána also has responsibility for serving 
witness summonses and in more serious cases, 
the numbers of witnesses can extend to 100 
people that need to be warned for court. National 
Units manage their own summonses and it is not 
unusual to have to personally warn 75-100 people 
for a court case. 
Circuit court case listings often contain far more 
cases than court time permits. A state solicitor 
highlighted that in some circuit court sessions, 
they may warn in excess of 400 witnesses for cases 
that are unlikely to go ahead. On many occasions, 
cases will be remanded to another date and some 
witnesses are receiving three to four summonses. 
DPP guidance to state solicitors is to re-issue the 
initial witnesses summonses for the next court 
session. This is duplicating the first summons 
process and the Inspectorate believes that the 
whole process of witness summonses needs to be 
reviewed and inefficiencies removed.
In circuit court cases, state solicitors are often 
dealing with individual investigating gardaí and 
not a district station unit. In deciding on circuit 
court case lists, state solicitors have to ensure that 
cases are ready and that all witnesses are warned. 
Examples were provided to state solicitors, where 
information was provided that witnesses were 
warned, only to discover immediately before a trial 
or on the day of a trial, that a key witness summons 
was not in fact served.
Future of Dealing with summons 
Across Ireland, a significant proportion of garda 
time is spent trying to serve summonses. In the 
PSNI and Greater Manchester Police, where a 
person is stopped for an offence and provides an 
address, that address is considered as suitable for a 
postal summons to be shown as served. In Ireland, 
many people who have provided addresses to 
gardaí later claim that summonses are not received 
at these addresses. Judges take different views on 
summonses serving, with some preferring personal 
service. 
Many people have e-mail addresses and there 
are opportunities to use e-mail for serving 
summonses. This could significantly reduce the 
time and cost of the current systems to serve 
summonses. 
The Inspectorate’s Report on fixed charge penalty 
notices provided recommendations to reduce the 
number of summons issued.
 recommendation 11.15
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to ensure a more efficient 
summons process system. (medium term).
 to achieve the above recommendation, the 
following key actions need to be taken:
•	 Examine	the	issue	of	summons	service	and	
explore new ways to deal with summonses 
such as E-Service; 
•	 Introduce	a	court	and	garda	tracking	system	
to monitor actions taken;
•	 Reduce	the	time	taken	from	the	date	of	the	
offence to the first court date;
•	 Introduce	 a	 performance	 management	
system for all stages of the process;
•	 Remove	 the	 need	 to	 routinely	 re-issue	
witness summonses for cases that are 
remanded to another date;
•	 Ensure	 court	 outcomes	 are	 correctly	
recorded on PULSE (See page 37); 
•	 Extend	the	court	presenter	scheme	to	cover	
summons courts.
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11.6 Court and Prosecution 
Processes 
As part of the Inspection process, the Inspectorate 
met with key partner agencies including 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), 
state solicitors, courts and probation service 
representatives. The Inspectorate also visited 
several courts to view the court in operation. 
This section of the report will look at some of 
the inefficient processes that currently operate, 
which impact on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the Garda Síochána and offer some solutions to 
improve the way that criminal cases are managed.
timeliness
A very important part of any criminal justice 
system is the length of time it takes to bring an 
offender to justice. This is important for all parties 
and particularly for a victim of crime.
Other policing jurisdictions have invested a 
significant amount of effort in reducing the amount 
of time taken from the initial arrest of an offender 
to the final outcome of the court case. As previously 
highlighted, this includes removing low level 
offences that could be dealt with through restorative 
justice and other disposals, which will allow courts 
to concentrate on more serious offences.
Other areas connected to this aspect of the process 
are:
•	 The	management	of	victims	and	witnesses;	
•	 Examining	 why	 cases	 do	 not	 result	 in	 a	
conviction at court;
•	 Examining	 why	 trials	 are	 remanded	 to	
another date. 
As highlighted in previous parts of this report, 
there are extensive delays in many investigations, 
which add a considerable amount of time to the 
summons process.
Once a crime is detected and a person is charged 
or summonsed, the prosecution process begins in 
earnest. For more serious crimes such as a murder 
or complex fraud cases, the case file preparation 
required for a court case can be significant. The 
early stages of a serious but straightforward case 
may require an intensive investment of resources, 
whereas a complex investigation will require long 
term staffing to prepare a case for trial.
In Ireland, the vast majority of prosecution cases 
that the Garda Síochána deals with are volume 
crime, public order and traffic incidents. In these 
cases, less preparation is required for a court 
case. Prosecution files often consist of victim and 
witness	 statements,	 CCTV	 and	 some	 scenes	 of	
crime evidence. The Inspectorate would therefore 
expect that the vast majority of files for prosecution 
cases could be dealt with in a timely manner. 
In other parts of this report, the Inspectorate has 
identified a number of unnecessary delays in 
completed tasks, submitting files and finalising 
investigations of offences. When this is added to 
delays in charging and summonsing offenders, the 
overall delays are significant. 
Criminal Justice performance Data 
Other policing jurisdictions track cases from the 
date of the crime to the date of the court trial and the 
final outcome of the case. This data identifies where 
there are delays and obstacles and allows criminal 
justice partners to take action to reduce delays in 
cases. The Inspectorate found an absence of good 
data that is created and shared between the Court 
Service, the DPP, the Garda Síochána and other 
agencies involved in the prosecution process. The 
Courts Service measures timeliness in cases once 
it reaches the court stage, however no partnership 
data is produced to monitor performance across all 
agencies. This is common practice is some other 
jurisdictions. 
There are a number of other areas where joint 
performance data would be useful, including 
management of warrants, case attrition6 rates, 
timeliness of probation reports and why trials do 
not result in convictions. The Inspectorate is aware 
that the DPP has looked at some attrition rates for 
particular crimes. The Inspectorate believes that the 
development of good partnership data will enable 
criminal justice partners to take action to address 
obstacles in bringing cases to an earlier conclusion.
6 Attrition is a term used to describe the process of cases not 
proceeding to the completion of the criminal justice process, 
i.e. falling out of the process at various stages e.g. not being 
investigated, or not being prosecuted.
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 recommendation 11.16
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene 
a working group to develop, design and 
implement a system which provides joint 
criminal justice performance data on case 
management. (medium term). 
volume Crime Case review - outcomes of 
Cases 7
This is the final part of the tracking of the 158 cases 
that mostly started with a telephone call to the 
Garda Síochána. Of the total of 158 calls, ninety 
cases were recorded as crimes for investigation. 
Of the ninety cases, twenty-nine were recorded 
as detected. Of those twenty-nine cases, the 
Inspectorate found twenty-two were correctly 
detected. Chart 11.14 shows the outcomes of those 
detected cases.
7 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Gary Doyle [1994] 2 IR 286.
chart 11.4
volume Crime Case reviews – 158 Cases Case outcomes
Date of 
offence
offence case comment court or 
outcome Date
court or case outcome
may 2012 DV Barring 
order 
september 2012 file to state solicitor February 2013 case struck out, liberty to 
reapply 
may 2012 intoxication Domestic Violence call but suspect 
arrested for intoxication 
no case file available. 
september 2012 taken into consideration 
may 2012 assault PuLse created July 2012 n/a adult caution 
June 2012 robbery 5 month delay in obtaining cctV evidence 
nov 2012 file to District officer
no date shown for file to DPP 
awaits Bench warrant issued
april 2012 assault PuLse created 84 days after the crime was 
reported
november 2012 sentenced to 11 months 
imprisonment
april 2012 Burglary investigating garda on extended sick leave april 2013 case struck out at court. gary 
Doyle order8 not complied with. 
may 2012 Domestic 
Violence 
suspect arrested for public order offence July 2012 offence taken into 
consideration 
July 2012 Burglary Young offenders identified september 2012 JLo cautions administered 
april 2012 assault Victim withdrew complaint December 2012 case struck out at court 
april 2012 Burglary two suspects arrested July 2012 December 2012 case withdrawn as a defendant 
had passed away. insufficient 
evidence to proceed against 
2nd offender 
april 2012 assault offender arrested and charged on the 
same day 
october 2012 sentenced to five months 
imprisonment 
may 2012 three cases 
of Burglary 
offender arrested at the time of one of the 
offences 
July 2012 sentenced to nine months 
imprisonment
may 2012 assault PuLse created september 2012. 
File to district officer october 2012
Directions to proceed nov 2012
awaits summonses not served
may 2012 Domestic 
Violence 
offender arrested for intoxication may 2012 Fixed charge penalty notice 
issued 
June 2012 aggravated 
Burglary 
number of arrests and charges awaits awaiting trial 
July 2012 robbery six charges awaits Plea taken – case remanded 
april 2013
may 2012 assault File to district officer october 2012
case moved from district court to circuit 
court may 2013 
awaits summons not served case struck 
out at court. awaits re-issue of 
summons.
may 2012 assault suspect admitted the offence november 2012 sentenced to 180 community 
service 
December 
2011
criminal 
Damage to 
a car
File to district officer February 2012 
summons issued march 2012
awaits Bench warrant issued march 
2013 
June 2012 Burglary summons issued in september June 2013 sentenced to six months 
imprisonment 
Source: Data obtained from sampling summonses by the Garda Inspectorate
Crime Investigation Report       Part 11: Detecting and Prosecuting Crime
Part 11  |  29
Findings
•	 There	 are	 some	 excellent	 outcomes	 and	
particularly, several burglary cases where 
suspects were quickly identified and the 
cases were progressed promptly;
•	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 cases	 where	 there	
were long delays in progressing cases to 
summons stage and getting a case to court. 
In a number of cases there were unnecessary 
delays in dealing with a prosecution, such as 
a case of assault where it took four months to 
create a PULSE record, five months to submit a 
file to the district officer and six months to obtain 
directions for proceedings. This case proceeded by 
a summons and the case is shown as summons not 
served.
Chart 11.15 shows the case disposal outcomes for 
the twenty-two cases.
chart 11.15
volume Crime Case review Case Disposal
case Disposal Percentage of 
outcomes
imprisonment 26%
community service 5%
Withdrawn 5%
caution (adult/young offender) 9%
Bench Warrant issued 9%
Fixed charge Penalty notice 5%
struck out 18%
awaiting trial or sentence 9%
summons not served 5%
taken into consideration 9%
total 100%
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána.
Findings
•	 Out	of	the	original	158	cases	and	ninety	that	
were investigated, only a small percentage 
of crimes had a positive case outcome;
•	 Out	 of	 the	 twenty-two	 correctly	 detected	
cases, just over 50% achieved a judicial 
outcome;
•	 There	 were	 a	 number	 of	 cases	 where	
summonses were not served or disclosure 
was not completed and cases were struck 
out. In these cases there was no indication 
on PULSE or in the case files that any further 
action was taking place to progress the case.
possession of Drugs Cases – outcomes 
As previously outlined, the Inspectorate examined 
PULSE data from seventy-four possession of drug 
cases where a detection was recorded. The initial 
examination showed that the Inspectorate agreed 
with the detection claimed in forty-nine of those 
cases. A further analysis of these forty-nine cases 
revealed that five cases were dispensed by a JLO 
caution, one had insufficient details and another 
had no proceedings. This left forty-two cases where 
there was a charge or summons issued and where 
the cases had progressed to court proceedings. 
Chart 11.16 displays the findings from the analysis 
of those forty-two cases through to a court outcome. 
chart 11.16
Court outcomes for possession of Drugs in 
selected Divisions June 2012 
in court outcome Percentage of 
outcomes
Probation order 10%
Withdrawn 7%
Fined 14%
adjourned 5%
Bench Warrant issued 2%
remanded 2%
struck out 50%
Donation to Poor Box 7%
taken into consideration 3%
total 100%
Source: Data obtained from sampling 42 PULSE Drugs 
possession incident type records by the Garda Inspectorate.
Crime Investigation Report       Part 11: Detecting and Prosecuting Crime
Part 11  |  30
Findings
•	 There	was	a	case	disposal	in	only	26%	of	the	
cases;
•	 In	 50%	 of	 the	 cases	 a	 summonses	was	 not	
served and the cases are shown as ‘struck 
out’. There was no evidence on PULSE that 
the summonses were re-issued in these 
cases;
•	 7%	resulted	in	a	poor	box	donation.	
Detection rates Compared to Case Disposal 
outcomes
The published Garda Síochána detection rates 
convey a positive message about the way that 
crime is investigated and solved. However, 
the Inspectorate found examples of detections 
recorded on PULSE that were incorrectly claimed 
and when cases are followed through the entire 
crime investigation process, many cases do not 
result in a judicial outcome.
Throughout all of the detection analysis, a 
significant number of court cases, in all crime 
categories were shown on PULSE as ‘struck out’. 
In many cases, this means that the summons was 
never served. At the time of examining these 
cases, many were twelve months old and were not 
resolved. 
As previously highlighted, district officers are 
not reviewing cases that are lost at court and 
making decisions on whether detections should 
remain or not. The Garda Professional Standards 
Unit are tasked to review certain cases lost at 
court that are deemed as ‘critical’, but overall, the 
Garda Síochána are not looking at the quality of 
case outcomes.
11.7 Court Processes 
Courts and Jurisdictions
During this inspection, the Inspectorate 
encountered a variety of criminal justice system 
issues that have significant impact on the criminal 
investigation processes in Ireland. The following 
sections identify some of the barriers and 
inefficiencies which contribute to delays in criminal 
investigations. 
District Courts
A person charged or summonsed for an offence 
will, at the first hearing, appear at the local district 
court; in the area where the offence took place. 
Certain offences may be tried on indictment or 
summarily in the district court, providing that a 
judge accepts jurisdiction, the accused consents to 
the case being tried summarily and the consent of 
the DPP is obtained. 
Any garda division will have a number of different 
district courts operating within their divisional 
boundaries. One division reported sending cases to 
four different courts within their geographical area. 
There are variations in the number of days that 
courts sit. Some district courts sit everyday, others 
do not sit on Mondays and Fridays and in more 
rural areas, the court will sit even less frequently. 
Unlike other jurisdictions, district courts do not 
routinely sit on a Saturday and if required on a 
Saturday, a special court must be arranged. This 
is an expensive and time consuming process. At 
present, courts and garda divisions are not aligned 
and this creates difficulties for both the Courts 
Service and the garda divisions. Many court areas 
are reducing the number of district courts e.g. in 
Donegal district courts have reduced from ten to 
three. 
With the recommendation in Part 2 to move to a 
divisional model, the Inspectorate recommends a 
review of district court structures to ensure the best 
possible alignment with the changes to the Garda 
Síochána structures.
Circuit Courts 
The country is divided into eight circuits, each 
circuit court being a court of local and limited 
jurisdiction. The Circuit Court has jurisdiction 
to try all indictable offences with the exception 
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of those which can only be tried by the Central 
Criminal Court (murder, treason and other serious 
offences). The Circuit Court also has appellate 
jurisdiction over decisions made by a district court. 
Circuit Court term and sittings are defined at the 
start of each year.  
Many of those interviewed by the Inspectorate 
involved in cases at circuit courts raised the 
following issues:
•	 Some	courts	do	not	sit	on	a	full	time	basis;
•	 Cases	coming	to	this	court	can	be	often	two	
to three years old. This can be dependent 
upon not guilty pleas and the number of 
judges available to hear cases;
•	 There	are	court	breaks	throughout	the	year.	
(There are courts for warrant and custody 
cases as required during August and 
September); 
•	 Prosecutors	 often	 have	 a	 large	 number	 of	
cases and are struggling to arrange court 
lists during the court sittings. This is 
dependant on the stage of preparation of the 
case on first listing in court;
•	 There	are	no	fixed	dates	for	trials;
•	 The	 first	 day	 of	 a	 circuit	 court	 session	 is	
usually spent deciding which cases will 
be heard as cases are at different stages 
of preparation, e.g. witnesses may not be 
available. This dictates whether a case can 
go ahead on a scheduled date;
•	 Some	 courts	 do	 not	 sit	 on	 a	 Monday	 and	
Friday is not always a full day; 
•	 Courts	 often	 start	 late	 (11am)	 and	 finish	
around 4pm. 
The Inspectorate was informed that some circuit 
court sittings could have a list of over 100 cases to 
manage. Usually, 60% of those cases are remanded 
from the last sitting. Circuit court equivalents, 
in other jurisdictions, sit all year round without 
breaks. This allows prosecutors to fix dates for 
trials well in advance. Most prosecutors felt that 
circuit courts could better manage lists without 
sitting during the breaks, but by ensuring that 
they sit Monday to Friday and for longer days.
Delays in getting Cases to Court 
A key theme throughout the inspection is the link 
between conducting an investigation and getting 
a case to court. In other parts of this report, the 
Inspectorate has highlighted delays in the various 
stages of an investigation which impact on the time 
from the date of the incident to the court hearing. 
The Inspectorate is aware of cases that are 
dismissed where there were unacceptable and 
undue delays in investigations. At district court 
level, it appears that some judges find two year 
delays in less serious cases to be unacceptable.
During visits to courts and garda divisions, the 
Inspectorate was informed about the following 
cases and trends:
•	 An	 example	 was	 provided	 of	 a	 crime	 that	
occurred in August 2012, the summons 
was applied for in December 2012 and the 
first court date was May 2013. The delay in 
this	 case	 was	 due	 to	 obtaining	 CCTV	 and	
witness statements; 
•	 A	case	of	burglary	which	took	four	years	to	
bring to court. By the time of the court case 
the elderly victim was deceased;
•	 National	 units	 reported	 delays	 of	 three	 to	
five years to bring cases to court;
•	 Circuit	 court	 cases	 can	 be	 two	 and	 three	
years old;
•	 Cases	 involving	computer	analysis	 that	are	
now four years old;
•	 Intoxicated	 driving	 cases	 taking	 twelve	
months to come to court.
Disclosure of evidence
At a first court appearance, the issue of disclosure 
known as ‘Gary Doyle Orders’ may be considered. 
Many defence solicitors will request copies of 
all cases papers and evidence that is available. 
This is an element of case management that is 
slowing down court outcomes. Disclosure is a very 
important part of any prosecution case to ensure 
that the defendant is provided with details of 
evidence that will be presented in a court hearing. 
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Unlike other police services, gardaí are generally 
untrained in disclosure issues, particularly in 
presenting evidence that is disclosable or non-
disclosable and in preparing disclosure schedules 
for court. In Ireland the process is dealt with by 
prosecutors while the investigator’s role is to 
supply a list of exhibits. Many court cases are 
adjourned, often for three month intervals, as 
disclosure is not completed. The Inspectorate was 
informed that cases may be dismissed because of 
failure to properly disclose evidence. The provision 
of disclosure training would greatly assist an 
investigator at the early stages of an investigation 
when gathering evidence, as well as preparing a 
case file. The training requirement for disclosure 
was highlighted as a recommendation in Part 9. 
pre-trial Hearings 
Pre-trial hearings commenced as a pilot in January 
2013 and are operating for cases heard in the circuit 
courts. The hearings are aimed at reducing delays 
in cases which do not proceed on the trial date. 
They are usually held four weeks before the trial 
date and involve both defence and prosecution. 
At the hearing, the defendant is required to 
enter a formal plea to the offences charged. The 
prosecution can bring attention to witnesses 
where there is an opportunity to tender statements 
instead of a personal appearance and whether any 
video	link	or	CCTV	evidence	will	be	used.	A	most	
important element is ensuring that disclosure has 
been completed. 
During examinations of PULSE and case files, 
the Inspectorate found that court cases are often 
remanded on several occasions and in some cases 
for long periods of time. The Inspectorate found 
examples where cases were remanded for 6-9 
months and in one case of sexual assault, it was 
remanded for 10 months. One of the district courts 
visited estimated that 80% of cases are adjourned. 
The Inspectorate welcomes the use of pre-trial 
hearings, which operate in most other similar 
policing jurisdictions and the Inspectorate would 
recommend that the hearings are extended to 
district court cases listed for trial. 
presenting Case at Court
The Garda Síochána currently prosecutes cases in 
the district courts, while in the circuit and higher 
courts, state solicitors and the DPP prosecute cases. 
There are thirty-two state solicitors contracted 
to prosecute more serious cases on behalf of the 
DPP. For the most part, state solicitors operate on 
a county basis and are aligned to garda divisions.
The responsibility for prosecuting cases in the 
district courts outside the DMR still rests with the 
local district superintendent. Many senior gardaí 
support the use of the district officer, who in many 
cases is the decision maker on whether to prosecute 
less serious crime in a local garda district. The 
Inspectorate found a wide variation in who actually 
presents cases in court and the abilities of those 
performing this role. The Inspectorate observed 
several members in courts and while most were 
very proficient, some lacked the skills to perform 
this role. Most other jurisdictions have a clear line of 
separation between investigators and prosecutors.
Some superintendents prosecute cases, but 
in most districts this role was delegated to 
inspectors. This situation is often complicated 
when a district officer is posted to a garda 
district a long way from their homes. The 
Inspectorate was informed that the officers in this 
situation are even less available to perform the 
prosecution function. The change in continuity 
of superintendents was highlighted by courts 
staff, with many courts reporting that there are 
frequent changes of superintendents in local 
districts.
The Inspectorate is aware of a division where 
four inspectors share the role of presenting cases. 
Before this district court sits, an inspector may 
have to prepare to present 70-100 cases at court. 
This requires an individual to spend a lot of 
time in preparation for those cases, as some will 
be contested, even though others may result in 
a plea of guilty. For the next occasion at court, 
one of the other inspectors will present the cases 
and will have to go through a similar process to 
the previous inspector. Many of the cases will 
be remanded from the last occasion to the next 
session and this system results in the second 
inspector reading the same files. This inspector 
is also disadvantaged without prior knowledge 
Crime Investigation Report       Part 11: Detecting and Prosecuting Crime
Part 11  |  33
of cases that are coming back to the court from 
the previous hearing. The duplication of case 
file reading and familiarisation is not best use of 
garda resources. It is also important to note that 
the superintendents and inspectors have other 
important roles and the prosecution of cases can 
result in the loss of three days for preparation, 
presenting cases and completing notes on 
outcomes. No formal training is provided and 
the Inspectorate is aware of newly promoted 
inspectors assigned directly into this role. 
Court presenting scheme
In the Dublin Metropolitan Region (DMR), sergeants 
are used as court presenters in district court cases. 
A pilot scheme using court presenters outside 
the DMR commenced in September 2013 in the 
divisions of Tipperary, Wexford and Limerick 
and was due to be reviewed in September 2014. A 
court presenter will deal with all cases at the first 
hearing to reduce the number of gardaí attending 
court. A large percentage of cases are dealt with 
in this fashion. Where there is a guilty plea at first 
hearing, court presenters outline the facts of the 
case only, removing the need for individual gardaí 
to attend court and ensuring consistency in case 
presentation. 
In most cases that move to a trial, the original 
investigating garda takes on the role of prosecuting 
that case at district court level only. In more 
complex cases, such as driving while intoxicated, a 
request can be made for the DPP to present that case 
in court. It is always open to the Garda Síochána to 
ask the DPP to prosecute a case in court. 
Within the DMR, a member who is the 
investigating officer prosecutes a contested case in 
the district court, but outside of the DMR, it may 
be a superintendent who presents the same type 
of case. The process of police officers prosecuting 
cases existed in most other policing jurisdictions 
at sometime in the past, but today, none of the 
police services visited operates a similar scheme. 
The Inspectorate visited the Criminal Courts 
of Justice in Dublin, and viewed two courts in 
operation. Firstly, a district court where a court 
presenting scheme was in operation and secondly, 
a mentions court for circuit court cases where a 
court presenting scheme was not in operation. 
The first court was almost empty with one court 
presenter dealing with all the cases. In the Circuit 
Court dealing with case mentions, there were 
approximately thirty gardaí in court at that time. 
This is a daily occurrence across the courts in 
Ireland and is taking a significant number of gardaí 
away from policing duties. In the absence of an 
alternative system, the court presenting scheme 
should be operating in all divisions and across all 
courts. 
The Inspectorate was told of a large variance of 
skills of those presenting cases at court, with the 
main complaint being the constant changing of 
court presenters. The Inspectorate found that 
across the divisions visited, court presenting 
was managed in many different ways; including 
a variety of different ranks from sergeant to 
superintendent. The Inspectorate does not view 
this as a rank dependant position; but it requires 
a person with the skills to present criminal cases 
in court. 
Without any performance data available on 
individuals prosecuting cases, there is no evidential 
basis to identify those that are very good at securing 
convictions and those who have training needs. 
The Inspectorate supports the use of the 
court presenters and this confirms a previous 
recommendation in the Inspectorate’s report on 
‘Front-Line Supervision’ (2012). The Inspectorate 
advocates that this scheme should, in the absence of 
a state prosecution scheme for district courts, not 
only deal with first hearings but also present all not 
guilty cases at district court level. 
The use of district superintendents and inspectors 
as prosecutors  is not seen as best use of their time, as 
it takes them away from other key responsibilities. 
In the absence of a state prosecution scheme 
for district courts, the Inspectorate views court 
presenting as a better system. The Inspectorate 
believes that the court presenting system should 
be extended and rolled out across all divisions and 
that presenters are selected on skill levels.  
The subject of prosecuting case in district courts 
will be considered as part of the Haddington Road 
Review. 
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 recommendation 11.17
 the inspectorate recommends that in the 
interim, the garda síochána extends the role 
of the court presenters scheme to include 
all the prosecution role in courts, across all 
divisions. (medium term). 
11.8 Inefficiencies in Criminal 
Justice Processes
Charge sheets and Court orders
The current process for sending charge sheets from 
garda station to courts is inefficient. This process 
is managed on paper by the investigating garda 
and is then transferred to the courts, who have to 
manually enter all charges onto the court computer 
system. Where an overnight case is submitted the 
court may receive the charge sheet about an hour 
before the court is due to sit. With complex fraud 
cases, multiple charges may need to be inputted and 
this places court staff under considerable pressure. 
Where a person is charged and released on garda 
station bail to go to court at a later date, the courts 
are sometimes not provided with the charge 
sheet in advance. This is unnecessarily putting 
the court under undue pressure when the charge 
sheet should have been sent much earlier. The 
Inspectorate was informed that charge sheets 
have sometimes not been provided and enquiries 
revealed that they were sometimes placed in 
members’ lockers and not sent to the court.
Once within the court system, a district court is 
unable to electronically send charge sheets to a 
circuit court. In Part 9, the Inspectorate has already 
recommended an electronic custody system that 
would allow charges sheets to be sent electronically 
and directly to court staff. 
There is further inefficiency in the inability of a 
court to be able to enter family law orders directly 
onto PULSE. In these cases, the person who is 
subject to a protection order has to physically take 
the order to their local garda station.  
Witnesses in Court Cases
Prosecution cases usually rely heavily on witness 
testimony and particularly those cases dealt with 
at Circuit and Central Criminal Courts. Cases will 
often be struck out when witnesses do not attend. 
The Inspectorate was informed that arranging 
court dates around garda rosters and annual/sick 
leave often provides enormous challenges and 
cases are sometimes listed on dates when key garda 
witnesses are unavailable. Data is not collected 
on cases that are struck out due to the absence 
of victims or witnesses. It is important to collect 
such data for analysis and to identify trends. The 
Inspectorate believes that this data should be part 
of criminal justice data as recommended later in 
this part. 
Trials in the criminal courts often require the 
attendance of large numbers of witnesses. As 
highlighted in other parts of this report, this also 
includes gardaí and support staff that had contact 
with persons relevant to the court case, those 
who had contact with exhibits and specialists 
who may have attended a crime scene; such as 
photographers. Some of these witnesses are experts 
and provide evidence that has been captured 
or analysed. These experts complete a witness 
statement explaining their action on the case. Large 
numbers of expert members and support staff are 
attending trials throughout the country on a daily 
basis. As specialist units are based in Dublin, this 
often requires travelling long distances to the court 
where the case will be heard. Even though the 
experts are in attendance at court, they are often 
not required to give evidence or the evidence given 
is limited to an explanation of what was found and 
the exhibit that is produced. In essence, this is the 
evidence contained in their statement, which can 
often be non-controversial. Attendance at court is 
taking those experts away from their daily tasks 
and over a period of time amounts to a considerable 
abstraction from their main roles, causing further 
delays in the examination of exhibits. 
As previously highlighted, a considerable number 
of gardaí have contact with people who are arrested 
and a large number of gardaí and Garda Síochána 
support staff have contact with evidence and 
exhibits. All people involved in these processes 
are completing statements and in many cases 
they are warned for court. Again, much or all of 
their evidence is non-controversial and although 
attending court, they are often not required to give 
testimony.  
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With property crimes, victims often provide 
statements explaining that they were not present 
when a crime took place and simply that they did 
not give anyone permission to commit the crime. 
In many of these cases, victims are warned to 
attend court, which is an avoidable inconvenience. 
In addition, there will always be occasions when 
witnesses are warned to attend court for a not-guilty 
hearing and on the day of the trial a defendant 
changes their plea to guilty.
Other policing jurisdictions, such as Western 
Australia, have tried to remove the need for non-
controversial witnesses to attend court cases. In the 
UK, an evaluation of witnesses showed that 58% 
that attended court, were not required to give any 
evidence. 
In Ireland, Section 21 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1984 allows for a written witness statement 
to be admissible in evidence as to the extent of 
oral evidence. There are a number of conditions 
that must prevail to allow this to take place. The 
Inspectorate believes that through increased 
use of this provision, there is great potential to 
significantly reduce the numbers of professional 
and private witnesses that are called to court. 
special measures
Where a victim is young, vulnerable or intimidated, 
special measures can be requested by prosecutors. 
This may include providing evidence from behind 
a screen or via video link. Most district courts 
visited did not have the ability to deal with those 
who require special measures and in such cases 
the trial needed to be moved to a court that had the 
facilities in place.  
Breach of suspended sentence 
The issue of dealing with breaches of suspended 
prison sentences was raised by a number of 
criminal justice agencies. Where a person breaches 
a suspended sentence, they are required to be 
dealt with by the judge and the court where the 
sentence was imposed. Where the subsequent 
offence is committed in a different court area, the 
new case cannot be dealt with until the breach 
of the suspended sentence is concluded. The 
Inspectorate was informed that there is a timeframe 
within which the breach must be addressed, which 
sometimes expires before the case is brought 
back to the original court. The referral back to the 
original court is then impacting on the timeliness of 
the most recent offence. The Inspectorate was also 
informed that breaches of suspended sentences are 
not always brought to the attention of a court. 
pleading guilty at an early stage 
An offender can plead guilty to the offence at 
any stage in a prosecution. An early plea can be 
acknowledged by a judge and credit applied to 
that case. This can result in a lesser penalty. There 
are many occasions where an early plea saves a 
lot of time and removes the need for victims and 
witnesses to attend court. The Inspectorate was 
informed by those involved in prosecutions that 
sometimes offenders enter a very late plea, such as 
on the day of trial, and are given credit for doing so. 
On other occasions, people enter an early plea and 
are not given any credit for doing so. 
Charging advice and Case Feedback 
Access to pre-charging advice is not as developed 
in Ireland as in many other jurisdictions. Many 
investigators do not have direct access to the DPP 
or state solicitors for pre-charge advice and must 
go through their district officer. Some national unit 
investigators dealing with more serious crimes or 
complex investigations reported that they have 
access to DPP advice. In serious crimes, senior 
gardaí said that they have an excellent relationship 
with the DPP and had ready access to advice. For 
volume crime investigations, the access is less 
available. In the case of a charging decision outside 
of office hours, the DPP operate an on-call DPP 
Direct service. 
In most cases, garda investigators complete a full 
case file and submit the file to the DPP for directions. 
This is a formal process and involves a considerable 
amount of work on a case that may never reach a 
standard of evidence that is suitable for prosecution. 
As previously mentioned, a move to electronic files 
would speed up the process of submitting files for 
advice or for charging decisions. 
Early advice could assist an investigator to identify 
further actions required to progress the case to 
prosecution. Other police services visited have 
more access to prosecutors for early advice in 
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criminal investigations. The Inspectorate believes 
that the provision of pre-charge advice should be 
reviewed by the DPP and the Garda Síochána. 
In discussions on the circumstances where the DPP 
directs ‘no prosecution’, there was mixed feedback 
on the information provided by the DPP. National 
unit senior gardaí again reported that they have 
more access to the DPP and are usually told why 
a case has not reached the evidential threshold. 
In volume crime investigations, an investigator is 
usually told that there was insufficient evidence 
to prosecute, but they are not routinely provided 
with feedback on the points that were needed to 
allow a prosecution to proceed. The forthcoming 
EU	Victims	Rights	Directive	provides	that	victims	
have a right to certain information about their case 
throughout the criminal process. Of particular note 
is that on request, a victim should be provided with 
brief details about why a case was not prosecuted. 
Whilst it is important for victims to know why a 
case will not be prosecuted, it is also important 
information for an investigator and their supervisor.
Whilst respecting the independent position of the 
DPP, the Inspectorate believes that the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Garda Síochána would be 
assisted through the provision of pre-charge advice 
to investigators. This would also assist the Office of 
the DPP as it would reduce the number of full case 
files that are currently submitted.
 recommendation 11.18
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality convene a 
working group to examine the current process 
for providing pre-charge advice and feedback 
to investigators on why a case is unsuitable for 
prosecution. (medium term).
Court security
Throughout this crime inspection, the Inspectorate 
found gardaí performing a host of court roles such 
as general security and outside of the DMR, looking 
after jurors. Court escorts for remand prisoners was 
previously highlighted as an inefficient process. An 
example was provided to the Inspectorate where 
gardaí from outside a court area collected and 
brought a remand prisoner to court. The security 
of the prisoner was handed over to gardaí at the 
local court and once the case was finished, the 
prisoner was handed back to the original gardaí 
to return the person to prison. On a daily basis, 
the Irish Prison Service and the Garda Síochána 
are transporting prisoners to and from courts. In 
other policing jurisdictions, prisoner escorts are 
managed by private companies, rather than using 
police or prison officers in this role.  This issue will 
the subject of a more detailed examination as part 
of the Haddington Road Review. 
Court Convictions on pULse 
Many gardaí raised the recording of court 
convictions on PULSE as an area that needs 
improvement. Since 2008, the responsibility for 
putting circuit court case results onto PULSE 
moved from the Courts Service to the investigating 
garda. The Inspectorate was provided with 
many examples where gardaí found that court 
convictions are not recorded on PULSE. This is 
usually discovered when a person re-offends and 
the investigating garda for that offence searches 
PULSE to obtain an updated version of a person’s 
Record of Previous Convictions. On checking 
PULSE, gardaí have found cases that are shown as 
complete, but the court result is not recorded. 
The following are examples of cases where it was 
found that court convictions were not recorded on 
PULSE:
•	 An	 offender	 who	 was	 sentenced	 to	 seven	
years imprisonment for endangerment of a 
child;
•	 A	murder	conviction;
•	 A	case	of	 false	 imprisonment	of	 a	 ten	year	
old child.
It was also highlighted to the Inspectorate that 
suspended sentences are not always recorded on 
PULSE.
non-recording of other agency Convictions 
on pULse
Convictions for non-garda incidents are not 
currently recorded on PULSE. This includes 
persons who may have been arrested and taken 
to garda stations for offences, such as cigarette 
smuggling and evasion of excise duty. Often these 
offenders can be part of serious and organised 
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criminal networks. As the arrest is not always 
linked to a garda incident and may be investigated 
by Customs or another agency, any conviction at 
court is not recorded on PULSE. 
Some of these offenders are sentenced to terms 
of imprisonment. This is an intelligence gap and 
conviction history should be available to all gardaí 
who come into contact with offenders. It would be 
particularly useful information for gardaí based at 
ports of entry and Garda Interpol for enquiries that 
are made from abroad.
Court User groups
In many areas, the Courts Service hosts a multi-
agency Court User Group consisting of the various 
agencies and persons that use the courts. These 
Groups meet regularly to try and improve court 
processes such as the timelines of cases, better 
partnership working and how to provide a better 
service to victims and witnesses. The Inspectorate 
found one court user group that appeared to be 
dynamic, met on a regular basis and there was 
good feedback from those who attended. In 
other places the meetings were ad hoc or rarely 
happened. There is value in holding a court user 
group as it brings together all the agencies that 
use the court, to identify and address efficiencies 
in the criminal justice process, including crime 
investigation.  
11.9 The Way forward
The remainder of this part identifies some 
opportunities to improve the efficiencies of 
prosecutions and court cases. 
video-Linking
Video-linking	is	now	used	in	some	courts	to	allow	
evidence to be given remotely. The Inspectorate 
welcomes the use of video-linking by the Courts 
Service, the Prison Service and by the Garda 
Síochána. Use of video-linking reduces the number 
of offenders and witnesses having to physically 
attend court. This is primarily used for prisoners 
on remand and removes the need to arrange garda 
escorts to bring a person to court. This reduces 
unnecessary movements of high risk prisoners, 
which are resource intensive; and it can also 
prevent conflict at court between associates and 
family members. 
Video-linking	was	not	available	in	the	majority	of	
district courts visited by the Inspectorate. In the 
UK, 50% of the equivalent courts to district courts 
and all equivalent circuit courts have facilities for 
video linking. It allows officers to give evidence 
at court via video camera without having to leave 
the police station, saving time and costs. West 
Midlands Police have monitored its use and stated 
that the system potentially saves 14,416 police 
hours with a cost saving of €396,000 per year 
from	 using	 this	 facility.	 Video-link	 is	 also	 used	
for witness evidence from abroad and to allow 
witnesses such as doctors to give evidence from 
their places of work. 
The Inspectorate is aware that there is a Department 
of Justice and Equality Efficiencies Working Group 
looking at this issue as part of wider criminal justice 
reform and the Group is trying to develop video-
linking between the main criminal justice partners. 
This would assist efficiency in the Garda Síochána 
as it would reduce unnecessary attendance at court. 
Criminal Justice Units
The Garda Síochána does not operate a formal post-
charge unit that manages criminal prosecutions. In 
many of the police services visited, the Inspectorate 
found that a post-prosecution administrative unit 
in operation which are usually called Criminal 
Justice Units (CJUs). Post-charging and issuing of 
summonses are part of the remit of CJUs which 
takes responsibility away from investigators for 
the management of case files and the movements 
of files to and from prosecutors. In Scotland, CJUs 
quality assure all case files before any submission 
is made to the Procurator Fiscal (public prosecutor).
Within the Garda Síochána, case files are left 
with individual investigators and it can often be 
difficult to access a case file. Those difficulties 
are compounded when gardaí are on long term 
absence or where they transfer to another part of 
the country. CJUs manage all issues surrounding 
disclosures and cases that move towards trial. CJUs 
usually operate on a divisional basis and provide 
a single point of contact for all prosecutions. CJUs 
operate one case file and manage that file. 
State solicitors often have to contact individual 
investigators to obtain missing statements in 
connection with an appeal or to confirm if 
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witnesses are warned for court cases. A single 
point of contact in a CJU would remove a lot of the 
burden currently resting with state prosecutors. 
CJUs will, on behalf of prosecutors, arrange for 
officers to complete tasks for cases. CJUs deal 
with administrative issues and are predominately 
run by police support staff with minimal police 
officer involvement. 
During the inspection process, gardaí raised 
issues regarding the management of dates in 
court cases. It is important to be clear on dates 
when witnesses are unavailable for a whole host 
of acceptable reasons. Courts have said it is often 
difficult to arrange adjourned cases to dates when 
witnesses are available. A move to a CJU would 
allow the court to contact one specific unit to 
discuss problems with witness availability.
With the implementation of a CJU, there are 
opportunities to co-locate other units such 
as those currently managing warrants and 
summonses.
Witness Care Units
CJUs usually incorporate a section called 
Witness Care Units and this was the subject of 
a recommendation in Part 7. These units are in 
operation in other policing jurisdictions and were 
recently introduced in the PSNI. Witness Care Units 
take on the role of warning police officers, victims 
and other witnesses for court cases. The units also 
take on the role of keeping witnesses up to date on 
case developments and ensuring that witnesses 
have a central contact point if they want to speak to 
someone about their case. Much of their contact is 
by telephone and e-mail.
 recommendation 11.19
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána introduces Criminal Justice Units. 
(medium term).
Changes in the Criminal Justice process
Criminal Justice Board
Several jurisdictions have established multi-
agency groups containing senior operational 
representatives of all organisations involved in 
criminal justice. The remit of these groups is to take 
a holistic approach to tackling issues across the 
criminal justice system, to overcome operational 
barriers and to solve problems. Examples include 
the Criminal Justice Co-ordinating Committee in 
Minnesota, a Justice Sector Leadership Board in 
New Zealand and the Criminal Justice Board in the 
UK. 
Local Criminal Justice Groups
Many police services have introduced local criminal 
justice groups to support criminal justice activity at 
a local level. These are convened on the equivalent 
of a divisional basis. This group brings together key 
partners such as:
•	 Divisional	chief	superintendent;
•	 Chief	Clerk	of	the	Court;
•	 Senior	Probation	Officer;
•	 Head	of	the	Youth	Offending	Service;
•	 Senior	 representative	 from	 the	 local	
authority;
•	 Head	of	the	victim	support;	
•	 Head	of	a	divisional	criminal	justice	unit.	
This is a very different group to a court user 
group. This group has responsibility for all issues 
concerning the delivery of local justice. The 
strength of the group is the level of decision maker 
that attends and successful groups have members 
that can make operational decisions and assign 
resources. The responsibilities of the group include 
all elements relevant to the agencies such as: 
•	 Probation	orders;	
•	 Warrant	management;
•	 Ineffective	trials;
•	 Victim	and	witness	care;	
•	 Timeliness	of	cases.
At present, there is no such process for bringing key 
partners together to walk through criminal justice 
processes and resolve obstacles to better working 
practices. 
 recommendation 11.20
 the inspectorate recommends that the garda 
síochána, along with key partner agencies 
introduces criminal justice groups at a 
divisional level. (medium term).
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Changes in Criminal Justice Processes
Throughout this report, the Inspectorate has 
identified inefficiencies in systems resulting in 
poor victim service, challenges in the timely 
processing of suspects and lengthy prosecution 
processes which contribute to poor outcomes. 
The Inspectorate has identified areas for review, 
including court processes, information co-
ordination among criminal justice sector partners 
and legislative issues. Acknowledging the 
complexities of the criminal justice system, the 
following areas need to be addressed on a multi-
agency basis.
 recommendation 11.21
 the inspectorate recommends that the 
Department of Justice and equality consider 
the establishment of a Criminal Justice Board 
equivalent to deliver a more effective criminal 
justice service. (medium term).
 the following matters need to be considered:
•	 Ensure	that	criminal	cases	do	not	lapse;
•	 Consider	the	extension	of	pre-trial	hearings;
•	 Address	 inefficiencies	 with	 charge	 sheet	
processes and court orders; 
•	 Reduce	 unnecessary	 and	 repeated	 court	
appearances by witnesses;
•	 Ensure	specialist	measures	are	available	for	
victims and witnesses;
•	 Develop	joint	agency	data	on	case	timeliness	
and factors affecting the outcome of criminal 
cases;
•	 Accurately	 capture	 court	 conviction	
information in all courts;
•	 Develop	video-linking	 to	create	efficiencies	
for garda and other witnesses;
•	 Review	the	use	of	gardaí	in	court	security	
roles and escorting of remand prisoners;
•	 Review	 the	 management	 and	 process	 for	
dealing with those offenders who commit 
offences whilst on suspended sentences.
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2. Methodology
It was not within the Inspectorate’s remit to 
duplicate Mr Guerin’s work by examining the 
action taken by the Garda Síochána in response 
to the relevant complaints, but rather to review 
the process issues raised in Mr. Guerin’s 
report relevant to Garda Síochána practices 
and procedures. This was in the context of the 
Inspectorate’s statutory remit to ensure that the 
resources available to the Garda Síochána are used 
so as to achieve and maintain the highest levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness in its operation and 
administration. 
The contents of the Guerin Report were 
considered against the backdrop of the 
Inspectorate’s ongoing and comprehensive 
inspection of crime investigation and crime 
prevention by the Garda Síochána. Throughout 
the various parts of the Crime Investigation 
Report, references are made to certain issues 
which are raised in the Guerin Report. This 
Addendum brings together the findings of the 
Inspectorate’s report with the issues raised in 
the Guerin Report.
3. Overview of the Guerin Report
The Guerin Report is a review of the action taken 
by the Garda Síochána pertaining to certain 
allegations made by Sergeant Maurice McCabe. 
Sixteen individual incidents, events or matters 
were included under the terms of reference given 
to Mr. Guerin. Ten of these cases involved the 
investigation of a crime, three concerned the subject 
of internal matters, two related to allegations 
of misconduct and the other case was a report 
submitted by Sergeant McCabe.
Mr Guerin stated in his report “that it is 
understood that the purpose of this review is not to 
make findings of fact or to determine any disputed 
question either of fact or law. Insofar as any views 
are expressed on factual matters, those are only 
facts as they appear from a review of the files that I 
have received.”
Having regard to the importance of the issues 
reviewed Mr Guerin recommended in the public 
interest, that a Commission of Investigation be 
established to investigate the individual issues that 
remain unresolved arising from the complaints 
examined in his report. In recommending this, 
Mr Guerin suggested the inclusion of defined 
terms of reference on these matters of urgent public 
importance. Additionally, Mr Guerin recommended 
specific and procedural issues that should be the 
subject of further review by an appropriate body.  
While the issues identified in the Guerin Report 
relate to one specific district, the Inspectorate’s 
findings are the result of a much broader two year 
national review of crime investigation within the 
Garda Síochána. 
The following is a summary of the issues identified 
in the Guerin Report that were relevant to the 
remit of the Garda Inspectorate. While the Guerin 
Report is not explicitly organised in themes, the 
1. introduction
On 26th May 2014, following a report by Mr Seán Guerin S.C. (Guerin Report), 
the Minister for Justice and Equality, Ms. Frances Fitzgerald T.D., requested the 
Garda Síochána Inspectorate, pursuant to Section 117 of the Garda Síochána 
Act 2005, to: 
“carry out an inquiry into all of the crime investigation and other Garda management, 
operational and procedural issues identified in the Guerin report relevant to your 
statutory remit, and report to me as soon as possible.”
This addendum is the result of the Inspectorate’s examination of the Guerin 
Report.
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Inspectorate has identified common issues from 
its own inspection. The Inspectorate considers that 
arranging a response in a themed manner, best 
fulfils the Minister’s requested inquiry. 
Consideration of each theme in the following 
Sections 4-12 first sets out Mr. Guerin’s 
observations and, thereafter, the Inspectorate’s 
own findings on the same theme. The reference 
to parts shown in brackets, identifies where the 
issues highlighted in the Guerin Report is covered 
in the Crime Investigation Report. 
4. First Steps at a Crime Scene 
and Incident Recording 
The Guerin Report highlighted concerns in 
respect of gathering evidence at a crime scene and 
inaccurate entries on PULSE including: 
•	 Unaccountable	delays	in	retrieving	evidence	
such as CCTV (Part 9); 
•	 Many	 incidents	 for	 which	 no	 entries	 were	
made in garda notebooks (Parts 3, 4 and 9);
•	 Missing	reports	(Part	3);	
•	 No	 records	 entered	 either	 on	 the	 garda	
recording system (PULSE) or in incident 
books at stations (Parts 3 and 4); 
•	 Sparse	 detail,	 inaccurate	 and	 incorrect	
entries on PULSE (Part 4); 
•	 Delays	 in	 creating	 and	 updating	 PULSE	
records (Part 4); 
•	 Alteration	to	the	narrative	record	on	PULSE	
(Part 4).
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with gathering 
evidence and incident recording on PULSE:
Incident Recording
Issues concerning the use of PULSE and incident 
recording are made throughout the Crime 
Investigation Report, but those that specifically 
relate to issues raised in the Guerin Report are 
referred to in Parts 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9. The Inspectorate 
found these issues identified during the course of its 
inspection and a number of other related significant 
issues, such as the changing of a crime classification 
from one crime to another and the invalidation of 
PULSE records.
Gathering Evidence 
In the course of the inspection, the Inspectorate 
came across a number of examples where there 
were delays in gathering evidence and progressing 
investigations. In Part 9, there are examples of 
cases where CCTV or other evidence was either 
not gathered or there were delays in the collection 
of such evidence that impacted negatively on an 
investigation. The Crime Investigation Report 
generally makes a number of references to CCTV in 
different sections, and recommends improvements 
to the gathering of CCTV evidence and the creation 
of a national CCTV database, containing details of 
all systems that are operating.
PULSE Narrative
The Inspectorate found that PULSE narratives 
were often short in length, sometimes lacked detail 
about the crime or incident, and the action taken by 
the first responder. A poor narrative often made it 
difficult to determine the level of offence that had 
taken place. 
The Inspectorate found examples where PULSE 
narratives were changed and cases where it was 
accompanied by a reclassification of a crime to a 
less serious offence. For example, in one indecent 
assault case, the word “indecency” was removed 
from the narrative and the crime classification was 
changed to a minor assault. 
Part 9 of the Inspectorate’s report contains 
examples where the PULSE narrative and 
classification of an incident does not correspond 
with the information provided by a victim which 
was recorded by the garda call taker.
As identified in the Guerin Report, the Inspectorate 
also found examples where the PULSE incident 
classification and the narrative did not reflect the 
gravity of the crime that was actually committed.
Recording Incidents on PULSE
The Inspectorate spoke to victims of crime who 
reported that they had later discovered that a 
crime, reported to the Garda Síochána was not 
recorded on PULSE. Garda members who spoke 
to the Inspectorate, highlighted crimes that were 
not always recorded on PULSE or crimes that were 
recorded in a non-crime category.
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In addition, the Inspectorate found delays in 
creating PULSE incidents after crimes are reported. 
Sometimes this was completed on the next tour of 
a member’s duty, but on some occasions crimes 
were not recorded on PULSE for weeks or months 
later.
Through analysis of 158 calls for service, referred 
to in the Crime Investigation Report as the Volume 
Crime Case Reviews (outlined in Part 3), the 
Inspectorate followed these calls from the first 
contact with the Garda Síochána to the outcome of 
the investigation. The 158 people that made contact 
with the Garda Síochána all reported that a crime 
had taken place. With regard to the recording of 
PULSE incidents, the Inspectorate found that 
28% of those calls for service were not recorded 
as PULSE incidents, 15% were recorded as non-
crimes and 9% were recorded after the request was 
made by the Inspectorate for details of the case. 
Recommendations 
A number of recommendations have been made 
throughout the Crime Investigation Report to 
address the issues relating to PULSE and incident 
recording. In particular, Recommendation 4.10 
removes the ability to change the narrative on 
PULSE. The recommendations extend to a new 
crime investigation and case management system. 
In the interim, PULSE must to be re-designed, with 
the removal of access to conduct certain activities. 
The Inspectorate has made many recommendations 
to improve the recording of calls, such as the 
introduction of a national electronic recording 
system to log all calls received from the public. 
5. Crime Investigation
The Guerin Report highlighted poor standards 
in crime investigation from the first instance, 
including: 
•	 Lengthy	delays	 in	 taking	 statements	 (Parts	
6, 7 and 9); 
•	 Related	absence	of	notebook	entries	(Parts	4	
and 9);
•	 Flaws	 in	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 chain	 of	
evidence (Part 9);
•	 Evidence	 of	 assisting	 gardaí	 was	 not	 always	
recorded in notebooks or in statements (Part 6);
•	 Delays	in	investigations	(Parts	6	and	9);
•	 Late	summonses	(Part	11);
•	 Poor	 standards	 in	 identification	 parade	
management and interviewing (Part 9). 
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with standards 
in crime investigation:
Delays in Taking Statements 
The Inspectorate encountered many examples of 
delays in taking statements from victims, witnesses 
and suspects, as identified in the Guerin Report. 
Part 7 of the Inspectorate’s report highlights the 
victim’s perception of this matter. The report 
includes many examples of significant delays in the 
taking of victim and witness statements (Part 9) and 
shows the negative impact it can have on a victim’s 
willingness to make a statement of complaint. 
The Inspectorate found many examples where 
the reluctance of a victim to make a statement of 
complaint was accompanied by a change in the 
classification of a crime to a less serious crime or to 
a non-crime category. 
Delays in Investigations
Throughout the inspection, the Inspectorate found 
many cases where there were unnecessary delays 
in progressing an investigation of a crime (Parts 
6 and 9). In Part 6, the Inspectorate highlights the 
current system for crime investigation with the vast 
majority of day-to-day investigations remaining 
with regular unit gardaí. Many of these officers are 
investigating high volumes of crimes without any 
investigation time built into their working roster. 
The pilot roster also causes delays to investigations, 
as members are away from work for extended 
periods of time. 
There are a number of examination processes 
that are contributing to delays and these include 
examination of computers and obtaining telephone 
call data (Part 6). The need for timely forensic 
examination of computers is significantly impacting 
on crime investigations.
The Inspectorate found many issues that impact on 
the timeliness of investigations. Part 6 outlines that 
investigations are generally progressed more slowly 
in Ireland than in other policing jurisdictions. With 
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most investigations, garda investigators have three 
months to complete investigations and in many 
cases this is extending to a six month time limit 
for issuing a summons in certain minor cases. 
With more serious offences, this often extends to 
over a year. This is particularly worrying in cases 
where there are named suspects at large who may 
well re-offend during this period. Other policing 
services endeavour to make an early arrest and 
where possible, to charge a person on the day 
that the crime was first reported. In Ireland, the 
Inspectorate found some cases with unnecessary 
delays in this regard. 
In some other policing jurisdictions, many crimes 
are progressed by dedicated investigation units 
that have time allocated to investigate crime; and 
as a result, cases are generally progressed much 
quicker. 
Inexperienced Investigators
The Guerin Report highlighted that inexperienced 
gardaí were investigating serious crimes. The 
Inspectorate found a similar situation, in that 
some inexperienced gardaí and non-appointed 
detectives are investigating serious crimes. One 
of the main differences between the two reports, 
is the fact that Mr. Guerin looked at incidents 
primarily in 2007 and 2008, and the Inspectorate 
looked at crime investigated in 2012 and 2013. 
Prior to the recent intake of new gardaí, there 
had not been any recruitment since 2009 and the 
gardaí investigating crime at this time are no 
longer probationer gardaí and in fact, most have 
five or more years experience. 
Garda Notebooks 
Inspectorate findings as to the use of garda 
notebooks matched issues identified in the Guerin 
Report. During field visits, the notebook entries 
viewed by the Inspectorate did not appear to follow 
any rules for completing entries and the details 
of incidents were sometimes short in content. 
Issues relating to notebook entries are mentioned 
in a number of areas in the Inspectorate’s report, 
but the most relevant recommendation is 9.12. 
This recommendation includes key actions to 
improve skills in gathering evidence and the use of 
notebooks in that regard. 
Chain of Evidence/Exhibit Management
The Inspectorate identified a number of issues 
relating to the chain of evidence in respect of 
managing exhibits (Part 9). The Inspectorate 
found that exhibits were not always kept in secure 
property stores and are sometimes kept in other 
places, such as garda lockers. This situation was 
found during all field visits. Recommendation 9.16 
makes a specific recommendation with key actions 
to improve exhibit and property management. 
Identification Processes
The examination of the identification parade 
system highlighted the need to improve the 
current processes. Recommendation 9.15 advocates 
examining the effectiveness of the current system 
and developing the use of photo fit identification 
and electronic identification parades.
Inspectorate Recommendations
The Inspectorate recommends many changes 
to crime investigation practices, including the 
adoption of minimum standards of investigation 
and the introduction of dedicated investigation 
units. The Inspectorate also believes that most 
crime investigations should be completed within a 
twenty-eight day period. The Inspectorate believes 
that this needs to be supported by enhanced 
technology, to allow for crime investigations to be 
accurately recorded and cases tracked through an 
electronic case management system.  
6. Crime Management
The Guerin Report highlighted issues in relation 
to the late submission of case files and undated 
statements, including: 
•	 Submission	 of	 files	 (Part	 8).	 One	 case	 was	
statute barred before the investigation began 
and in another the investigation file was 
never completed (Part 9); 
•	 Undated	statements	(Part	9);	
•	 Files	 not	 being	 reassigned	 when	 the	
investigating officer was on long term leave 
(Parts 6 and 9) or stored in personal lockers; 
inaccessible to other members; 
•	 Investigative	actions	not	progressed	(Part	9).
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The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with crime 
management:
Case Files
The Guerin Report identified a number of issues 
relating to the completion and availability of cases 
files. In particular, concerns about inaccessibity of 
case files due to members being on leave; whether 
due to sickness or otherwise. The Inspectorate 
found similar examples where investigating gardaí 
had retired or were on extended leave and cases 
were not always reallocated. 
Undated Statements 
Part 9 of the Crime Investigation Report specifically 
refers to undated statements. The Inspectorate 
examined a number of case files and found a 
consistent trend of undated statements and other 
memoranda. This was also found by the Garda 
Professional Standards Unit during divisional 
examinations. 
Completing Actions 
The Inspectorate found many examples where 
investigators did not complete investigative actions. 
This included obtaining medical records and 
statements with regard to assault victims. In some 
cases, this followed instructions from a supervisor. 
Examples of these are documented in Part 9.
Recommendations
The Inspectorate has recommended that the 
Garda Síochána move to a more modern crime 
investigation and case management system that 
captures all information relating to a crime. This 
will allow 24/7 access to cases and remove the need 
to rely on paper based case files. The Inspectorate 
has also recommended the introduction of Crime 
Management Units at a divisional level, that will act 
as a single point of contact for investigations and 
will perform a role of allocating and monitoring 
investigations. This unit will have responsibility for 
reallocating crimes in the event that an investigator 
is unable to complete a case.
7. Supervision
The Guerin Report identified issues in respect of 
senior garda visibility, front-line supervision and 
performance monitoring, including: 
•	 Abstractions,	i.e.	the	re-tasking	of	personnel	
from planned work to unplanned work and 
lack of supervision of probationary gardaí 
(Parts 4, 6 and 7);
•	 Crime	 investigation	 and	 management	
affected by the impact of the turnover of 
superintendents (Part 2);
•	 The	 absence	 of	 an	 assigned	 inspector	with	
consequences for the supervision of the large 
number of probationary gardaí assigned to 
the area (Part 6); 
•	 Indication	 that	 failure	 to	 comply	 with	
directions from superior officers went 
without action (Parts 6 and 9);
•	 The	 use	 of	 PULSE	 to	 monitor	 officer	
performance did not occur (Parts 2 and 6).
The Inspectorate identified the following 
issues within the Guerin Report that dealt with 
supervision:
Availability of Front-Line Supervisors
The issue of supervision features in most parts of 
the Crime Investigation Report. In particular, Part 
2 highlights findings which were also an issue 
identified in the Guerin Report on the impact of the 
lack of front-line supervisors to provide guidance 
to in-experienced gardaí. The absence of a patrol 
sergeant 24/7 on all divisions is seen as a key factor 
in many of the concerns identified in incident 
recording and actions at a crime scene. 
Role of Inspectors
With reductions in the allocation of inspectors 
across divisions, the responsibilities of those who 
have retired or re-assigned are shared amongst the 
remaining inspectors. During field visits, it was 
clear that as the breadth of responsibilities expands, 
an inspector’s crime responsibilities do not always 
receive the attention required. In one division 
visited, an inspector had twenty-nine specific 
responsibilities, including domestic violence. 
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Other policing jurisdictions always have an 
inspector on duty 24/7 in an area equivalent to 
a division. This is vital in ensuring that serious 
incidents are well managed from the outset, that 
garda policies are implemented and that leadership 
and visibility is provided to operational members 
and police staff.
District Officers 
‘Travelling superintendents’ was a term frequently 
mentioned during field visits. This refers to a 
superintendent, usually posted on promotion to a 
district that is a long way from home. The constant 
churn of superintendents and other supervisors 
affects leadership, management of the district, 
crime management and building relationships 
with the local community and key partners. 
Recommendation 2.4 addresses this issue.
PULSE Supervision
Throughout the sampling of PULSE incidents, the 
Inspectorate found limited evidence of supervision 
of initial crime investigations; both at the crime 
scene and the recording of an incident on PULSE. 
Recommendation 4.13 in Part 4, recommends that 
the Garda Síochána develops and circulates policy, 
clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of 
the Garda Information Services Centre (GISC) and 
front-line supervisors; in respect of classification of 
crimes and supervision of the initial investigation 
of a crime or other incident. 
Inspectorate Recommendations
Many parts of the Crime Investigation Report 
include recommendations to enhance supervision 
of crime investigation. This includes call handling 
(Part 3), incident recording and crime management 
(Parts 4 and 5), crime investigation (Part 6), 
victim feedback (Part 7) and detections (Part 11). 
Part 2 recommends a new divisional structure, 
with enhanced supervision and clear roles of 
responsibility for supervisors. 
Following the Guerin Report, the Garda Síochána 
has introduced a new inspection and review 
process with a new PULSE tab for sergeants 
to monitor crime investigations. They are also 
developing a new case file template that will 
be adopted nationally. The Crime Investigation 
Report makes many recommendations to increase 
the number of front-line supervisors and to ensure 
that they are supportive and intrusive; so that 
crime is effectively investigated.
8. Training
The Guerin Report highlighted issues in respect of 
gathering evidence at a crime scene and inaccurate 
entries on PULSE, including: 
•	 Monitoring	 arrangements	 for	 probationary	
gardaí (Part 6);
•	 Inexperienced	 gardaí	 investigating	 crime	
(Part 6).
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that dealt with training:
Foundation Training
Training is an area that features in the Guerin 
Report and in the Crime Investigation Report. In 
Part 6, the Inspectorate examined the training 
provided to probationer gardaí between 2000 and 
2009, to assess the initial investigation training 
provided to them. It is clear that accelerated 
recruitment in 2005 to 2009, impacted on the 
style and quality of training provided, both at 
the Garda College and during phases where 
student gardaí were assigned operationally to 
districts. Many of these gardaí did not receive 
adequate training in core skills, such as statement 
taking and interviewing of suspects. In total, 
the Inspectorate estimated that only 25% of the 
available time was spent on operational policing 
and criminal investigation. This was less than 
the time spent on Irish language skills, physical 
exercise and studying. 
Inspectorate Recommendations
The Inspectorate has recommended that the Garda 
Síochána	 conducts	 a	 Training	 Needs	 Analysis	
of front-line gardaí to identify gaps in skills and 
to provide training to address priority areas 
(Recommendation 6.7 in Part 6).
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9. Victims
The Guerin Report highlighted issues in relation 
to the initial contact with victims at the time of 
reporting a crime, and also the follow-up contact 
with victims and witnesses, including:
•	 The	 unsatisfactory	 treatment	 of	 victims	
(Parts 3, 7 and 9);
•	 Discouragement	of	victims	proceeding	with	
an investigation (Parts 3 and 10); 
•	 Victims	 misled	 that	 files	 were	 sent	 to	 the	
DPP (Part 7), were not updated, otherwise 
contacted or no impact statement taken 
(Parts 6, 7 and 8); 
•	 Instances	 of	 passive	 treatment	 of	 victims,	
contrasting with occasions when victims 
were brought face to face with a suspected 
offender by gardaí (Part 7). 
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with victims of 
crime:
First Contact 
The Inspectorate was informed by garda members 
and victims that it can often be the approach of 
the first officer that determines how a victim will 
proceed. The Inspectorate spoke to some victims 
who had a very good service from the first officer 
that initially responded to the call, and other 
victims who perceived that the members were 
disinterested and not always empathetic. The 
Inspectorate found higher levels of satisfaction 
with victims of property crimes than with victims 
of assault and domestic violence.
Follow-Up 
The Inspectorate found that good initial action by 
a member is often spoilt by poor follow-up action 
with a victim. Many victims reported difficulties 
in contacting investigating officers for updates on 
their cases (Part 7).  
The Inspectorate’s report is very much victim 
centred, with the position of the victim taken 
into account throughout it’s findings. On many 
different occasions, victims were unhappy 
with the service provided. Part 7 of the Crime 
Investigation Report examines garda follow up 
contact with a victim. By dip sampling PULSE 
records, checking case files and by contacting 
victims of crime, the Inspectorate identified cases 
where no updates were recorded on PULSE or 
in case files. For many crimes, no updates were 
recorded on PULSE since the date that the original 
crime was recorded. In the majority of these cases, 
the crimes were at least twelve months old when 
the Inspectorate viewed the PULSE record and the 
case files. The Inspectorate chose this period of 
time to allow for the proper investigative course of 
action to have occurred. The Inspectorate believes 
that there is an absence of robust supervision of 
victim contact.
The Garda Síochána are currently rolling out 
Victims Offices across all twenty-eight divisions 
and these will provide a single point of contact for 
victims of crime. 
Inspectorate Recommendations
Parts 6 and 7 of the Crime Investigation Report 
include a number of recommendations to improve 
the service provided to victims of crime. This 
specifically includes a process of contacting victims, 
establishing the service provided and obtaining 
customer feedback.
10. Detections and Monitoring of 
Suspects
The Guerin Report identified issues in the 
management of suspects involved in crime and the 
recording of detections. The report also highlights 
issues with the management of bail at garda 
stations, including: 
•	 Garda	 recording	of	detections	prematurely	
and in the absence of recorded evidence 
(Part 11);
•	 Statute	barred	cases	(Parts	6	and	11);
•	 Discrepancies	 in	custody	 (Part	10)	and	bail	
records, and in a serious case, the bail book 
was lost and there was no garda action when 
the accused failed to sign on (Part 9). 
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with detections 
and suspects in crime:
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Premature Detections
The Inspectorate found that many cases are detected 
(solved) on the day that the crime is first reported to 
the Garda Síochána and without complying with 
the Crime Counting Rules. The Inspectorate has 
examined the practice of prematurely detecting 
crime incidents in Part 11 of the Crime Investigation 
Report and found that many crimes are detected 
well in advance of any action, such as the charging 
or summonsing of an identified suspect. Examples 
of premature detections can be found in Part 11 
of the Inspectorate’s report and is addressed in 
Recommendation 11.7.
Dealing with Suspects
Part 9 provides many examples of cases with a 
named suspect or a lead suspect that were not 
progressed; or there are delays in dealing with that 
suspect. This is a high risk area, as that suspect 
may commit a further offence in the interim period 
prior to any garda action. The Inspectorate found 
an absence of supervision of crimes that are shown 
as detected on PULSE (Parts 4, 5 and 11). Many 
crimes are shown as detected, without any charge, 
summons or other action to validate this decision. 
In many cases, a person shown on PULSE as a 
suspected offender, may be unaware that a crime is 
recorded as detected against them. 
Examination of Detection Rates
From the analysis of 318 PULSE incidents, recorded 
as detected, the Inspectorate found that 72% 
were incorrectly claimed (Part 11). Other data 
sets checked also showed a higher detection rate 
on PULSE than the detection rate assessed as 
correct by the Inspectorate. The Guerin Report 
also highlighted some less serious crimes where 
detections were incorrectly recorded. 
Lapsed Cases
Another area identified in the Guerin Report was 
the inappropriate use of cautions. It highlighted a 
number of cases where cautions were used to deal 
with a case that was outside of the prosecution 
time frame. The Garda Síochána has a significant 
number of cases and crimes recorded as detected, 
dating back many years, that are now invalid for 
prosecution proposes. As a result, the Inspectorate 
have recommended (11.8) that the Garda Síochána 
conducts an audit of all lapsed cases that are shown 
as detected; and any cases that are lapsed and 
marked detected, must be changed to undetected 
status.
Suspension of Detention
Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011, provides a 
new system to make more effective use of detention 
periods for persons brought to a garda station. 
This provision allows the period of detention to be 
suspended and the person released. This requires a 
person to return to a garda station on no more than 
two occasions and the period between the first and 
subsequent detention must not exceed four months. 
During field visits, the Inspectorate did not find 
any evidence of this power being used and many 
investigators did not appear to be aware of the 
provision. 
Station Bail
Garda objection to bail was examined in Part 10. 
Whilst the Garda Síochána do not grant bail, they 
make the first decision in respect of whether to 
keep a person in garda custody prior to court or 
to release a person under their own recognisance 
on station bail to attend court. The Inspectorate 
was informed that persons who should be kept 
in custody are sometimes released on station bail, 
when the local court is not sitting on the next day. In 
such cases, according to the law, the person should 
be taken to another court with jurisdiction. The 
Inspectorate was also informed that the majority of 
people are released from garda detention on station 
bail. 
Objections to Bail
The Inspectorate found that there was a general 
perception among gardaí that there is little point 
in objecting to bail. An example was given where 
a person was arrested for shoplifting, charged and 
sent to court. The person was released from court 
and went straight out and committed a further 
shoplifting offence. The same process was followed 
and the person was charged and sent to court, but 
was again released on court bail. Complacency in 
objecting to bail presents a high risk. 
The Inspectorate found an inconsistent 
understanding about objecting to bail and when to 
use Section 2 of the Bail Act and when to use the 
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O’Callaghan Rules. An example of the knowledge 
gap included an understanding of the definition 
of a serious offence under the Bail Act, which is 
different from the usual definition with serious 
crimes. Under the Bail Act, this would include 
offences such as shoplifting, which would not 
usually be defined as a serious offence. In Dublin, a 
knowledge gap was identified in respect of bail and 
its application; and a sergeant, who is a qualified 
barrister, has been assigned to deliver bail training 
across the city.
Signing on at Garda Stations 
The Inspectorate visited district stations to examine 
the management of persons signing on at garda 
stations (Part 10). The process is managed in paper 
‘signing on’ books and the Inspectorate found 
multiple books in operation. Whilst PULSE had the 
facility to record those signing on, it was not used 
at the two stations visited. At the places visited, 
there were a significant number of people signing 
on and there appeared to be no system in place to 
monitor compliance or to take action when a person 
fails to sign on. The Inspectorate was unconvinced 
that a failure to sign on would be quickly identified 
and actioned.
Warrant Management
Part 10 of the Crime Investigation Report refers to 
the management of warrants and highlights cases 
where warrants are not executed for persons dealt 
with by gardaí. The Garda Síochána is introducing 
a new system that requires a sergeant or a member 
in charge of detained persons at garda stations to 
cover five key points before a person is released 
from custody. This includes ensuring that the 
person is not wanted on warrant. 
In Part 10, the Inspectorate recommends a new 
policy and approach to warrant management. 
The Inspectorate views warrants as a high risk 
area for any police service and at present, there 
are vulnerabilities in the way that the Garda 
Síochána manages warrants. Consequently, 
Recommendation 10.16 advocates that the 
Garda Síochána develops a standard operating 
procedure for the management of warrants.
Inspectorate Recommendations
Overall, the Inspectorate found that the current 
management of named suspects in a crime is an 
area that requires immediate improvement. Bail 
and warrant management are two other areas that 
the Inspectorate has identified as high risk and 
require urgent attention. 
The Inspectorate believes that the Garda Síochána 
must review the approach to bail; from dealing 
with a person in garda custody, to presenting 
objections at court and to monitoring those persons 
who present most risk. Bail needs to be managed 
electronically, as the current paper based system in 
garda stations is neither efficient nor effective for 
offender management. 
Recommendations 11.7 and 11.8 address the 
issues in the PULSE system relating to recording 
detections.
11. Communication and Use of 
Intelligence 
The Guerin Report highlighted issues with the 
sharing of information and contact between senior 
gardaí and members, including: 
•	 Poor	 communication	 between	 ranks	 and	
divisions, within stations and with external 
organisations (Part 2);
•	 Important	 information	 was	 not	 shared	
across divisions (Parts 6 and 8);
•	 The	 inclusion	 of	 children	 within	 PULSE	
records (Part 8). 
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with internal 
communications and intelligence:
Senior Garda Visibility
Throughout this inspection, the Inspectorate was 
informed that there is limited contact between 
front-line staff and some senior gardaí. In Part 
2, the Inspectorate makes recommendations to 
improve senior gardaí visibility with meaningful 
engagement with their staff. 
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Policy Compliance 
In many crime investigation areas, the Inspectorate 
found a garda policy or directive instructing 
certain actions to be taken. The Inspection has 
identified a disconnect between the creation of a 
garda policy and the implementation at service 
delivery level. The issuing of an instruction needs 
to be accompanied by training, guidance and/
or an explanation to those expected to implement 
the policy. Policies also require monitoring by 
supervisors to ensure compliance. 
Tasking of Garda Resources 
The Garda Síochána does not convene a national, 
regional or divisional tasking and co-ordinating 
meeting to inform and direct the activity of 
resources. The Inspectorate believes that the Garda 
Síochána must develop a tasking and co-ordinating 
process at all levels that reviews intelligence and 
crime trends, identifies priorities and allocates 
appropriate resources. In particular, tasking 
meetings should focus on high risk offenders and 
those that operate across divisional and regional 
boundaries. 
Use of Intelligence 
The Inspectorate is aware that the Garda Síochána 
has a large number of children recorded on PULSE 
intelligence records and Recommendation 8.17 in 
Part 8 addresses this issue. 
Inspectorate Recommendations
Operation Fiacla is a national Garda Síochána 
initiative against individuals and gangs committing 
burglary offences. This is a good example of how 
the Garda Síochána can effectively task resources at 
a national and local level towards a particular crime 
issue and co-ordinate activity across all regions 
and divisions. The Inspectorate believes that this 
approach needs to be adopted in respect of other 
priority crimes. 
Effective communication, both internally and 
externally with partner agencies, is vital to modern 
policing. Conscious of this, the Inspectorate makes 
recommendations at various points in its report, 
oriented towards improving how the Garda 
Síochána facilitates good information sharing 
internally across the organisation and externally 
with partners to tackle crime and disorder. 
12. Discipline
The Guerin Report highlighted issues with the 
disciplinary process for dealing with neglect of 
duty including:
•	 No	cases	led	to	the	institution	of	disciplinary	
proceedings for supervisors or management 
(Part 9).
The Inspectorate identified the following issues 
within the Guerin Report that deal with disciplinary 
matters:
Neglect of Duty
During this inspection, the Inspectorate identified 
a number of cases where investigations were not 
conducted in a prompt and efficient manner. In 
particular in the Volume Crime Case Reviews, 
the Inspectorate found a number of cases where 
crimes were not recorded and investigations were 
not conducted. The response to the failure to record 
a crime was dealt with across the seven divisions 
in many different ways. However, as indicated in 
Part 9 of the Crime Investigation Report, no action 
was taken to address any lack of supervision in 
these cases and the focus appears to be solely on 
the individual garda that dealt with the original 
response to the call. 
Underperformance 
In Parts 2 and 6 of the Crime Investigation Report, 
the Inspectorate highlights that the Garda Síochána 
does not have a robust system for dealing with 
underperformance. This is an area that will be 
further examined as part of the Inspectorate’s 
Haddington Road Review. 
Recommendation
The one theme in the Guerin Report which was 
not examined in the Crime Investigation Report, is 
the process for dealing with internal disciplinary 
investigations and the roles of the Garda Síochána 
and the Garda Ombudsman Commission. These 
are not matters within the remit of the Crime 
Investigation Report and the Inspectorate proposes 
that the efficiency of the internal disciplinary 
process be further considered by the Department of 
Justice and Equality in conjunction with the Garda 
Síochána and the Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission. 
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13. Bailieboro Examination 2010
The Guerin Report made reference to an 
examination undertaken by the Garda Professional 
Standards Unit (GPSU) of the Bailieboro district 
and highlighted that the report included a strength 
for the district in that “there are clear guidelines in 
place in relation to policing processes”. 
The Inspectorate sought and examined the 
papers relating to this examination. In addition to 
requesting the examination report, the Inspectorate 
also sought copies of the GPSU interview notes and 
a follow- up review that was conducted in 2011.
Prior to receiving the Bailieboro examination 
report, the Inspectorate was informed that the 
GPSU staff who conducted the examination in 2010, 
may not have been fully briefed about the previous 
events at Bailieboro; and in particular about the 
incidents that were highlighted in the 2014 Guerin 
Report. However, there is a mention in the report 
that personnel in Bailieboro “have been through a 
difficult period arising from a number of internal 
investigations”. The examination report does 
not include any details about incident recording 
practices, crime investigations or other themes 
raised in the Guerin Report. The examination in 
Bailieboro appeared to follow a similar format to 
other GPSU examinations conducted around that 
time and the areas of focus for the examination 
appeared to be the same as those examined in other 
districts. The examination report concludes that 
Bailieboro “is performing well and is displaying 
significant commitment to ensuring that An Garda 
Síochána’s strategic goals are being achieved.” 
Interview Questions
During the examination visit to Bailieboro in June 
2010, the GPSU held interviews with support staff, 
gardaí, sergeants and senior managers; using 
templates with pre-formatted questions on the 
various subjects to be examined. The question 
templates and the notes made during the visit 
include a process area entitled ‘Incident/Crime files 
in the district’. This process area is not mentioned in 
the published examination report. In the notes made 
by GPSU staff at the time, the interviewees were 
asked a series of questions in relation to incident 
recording and case file management. Of particular 
interest to the Inspectorate, was the question 
marked ADTF 5; “Are there some incidents which 
are not being captured and not being fully dealt 
with?” Of the 20 responses from gardaí, six raised 
concerns about recording practices. These included 
the non-recording of minor crimes/incidents such 
as assaults and cases involving victims who were 
intoxicated.
The Inspectorate was not provided with any 
evidence to show that the GPSU checked calls 
received from victims in respect of minor crimes to 
see if they were accurately recorded on PULSE. The 
questions on incident recording were not asked by 
the GPSU in an interview with the district officer.
The style of questions asked throughout the 
examination was very much focused on awareness 
of policies and if the person knew where to find 
them. There was limited probing of understanding 
of policies and practices and no dip sampling to 
substantiate the material gathered at interviews. 
The persons interviewed, generally had poor 
knowledge of policies and procedures in areas 
such as monitoring of sexual offenders, dealing 
with diversity and child trafficking. Many of those 
interviewed highlighted that no training was 
received in the key areas inspected. 
Staffing Levels and Supervision
One of the issues highlighted in the Guerin 
Report was inexperienced gardaí investigating 
crime and a lack of supervision around 
investigations. The GPSU examination report 
provides details of staffing levels across the whole 
district and in 2008, there was one inspector, 
twelve sergeants, fifty-four gardaí and six civilian 
staff members. Of the total number of sergeants, 
seven were actually assigned to Bailieboro. These 
numbers did not change significantly over a three 
year period up to 2010 when the examination took 
place. A ratio of one to four (sergeants to gardaí) 
is very good, and there appeared to be sufficient 
supervisors on that district. Crime levels were 
relatively low and serious crime accounted for a 
very small percentage of overall recorded crime. 
In 2008, this included eight sexual offences, five 
robberies, 151 assaults, and 109 burglaries. Of 
particular note was the fact that there were no 
detective officers assigned to Bailieboro at the 
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time of the GPSU examination in 2010; and that 
situation remained when the GPSU returned a 
year later to conduct a review of the examination. 
The examination conducted in Bailieboro in 2010 
was superficial. It did not include checking incident 
and crime recording on PULSE, it did not examine 
case files looking at how crime was investigated and 
there is no evidence of checking the supervision 
of crime investigations. The Inspectorate did not 
find any reference to any of the cases highlighted 
in the Guerin Report and in particular, there was 
no examination of how the district investigated 
sexual assaults, rape, or other serious crime. The 
examination conducted was not evidence-based 
and lacked probing to see what was happening 
with crime investigation on the street. 
The examination report does not comment on the 
levels of confidence expressed by some gardaí 
in the confidential reporting process. The report 
mentions that people did not fully understand it, 
but it does not deal with the issue of confidence 
raised by some members; which included concerns 
about confidentiality.
It is difficult to understand why the GPSU report 
highlighted that the district was performing 
well, when there was evidence provided at that 
time about the way that crime was recorded, 
investigated and managed. Of most concern was 
the fact that the process entitled ‘Incident/Crime 
files in Bailieboro district’ did not become part 
of the examination report, particularly when the 
Garda Síochána was aware of the concerns raised 
that crimes were not properly investigated.
The Inspectorate enquired (i) the reason why the 
results of interviews relating to incident recording 
and crime files were not included in the main GPSU 
report; and (ii) if a separate report on this matter 
was written for internal purposes. 
In response to this enquiry, the Garda Síochána 
informed the Inspectorate that the questions 
on incidents and crime files were included in 
the examination of four other divisions and the 
results of the questions do not appear to have been 
included in any of the GPSU examination reports. 
The reply further states that the questions were 
discontinued post June 2010. 
In response to the second enquiry, the Garda 
Síochána reported that the GPSU have conducted 
presentations on crime recording issues and case 
files, and that these issues have been included 
in training and development course for senior 
managers. The Inspectorate remains unclear as to 
whether an internal report was ever completed. 
In 2011, a follow-up review was conducted in 
Bailieboro by the GPSU. This is standard practice 
following a GPSU examination. This review focused 
solely on checking implementation of the areas for 
improvement identified in the 2010 examination. 
There is a significant difference between the quality 
of the GPSU examination conducted in Bailieboro 
in 2010 and the new GPSU examination process that 
started in 2013. The Inspectorate commends the 
new approach which is far more evidence based, 
and examinations now include checking calls for 
service, PULSE classifications and case files.
14. Conclusion
The Guerin Report identified a number of issues 
relating to crime and incident investigation, dating 
back to incidents from 2007, with a number of 
highlighted cases investigated by relatively 
inexperienced gardaí. The Inspectorate has for 
the most part, concentrated on crime reported and 
investigated in 2012 and 2013; some five years after 
the first incidents examined in the Guerin Report. 
Notwithstanding	the	passage	of	time,	the	majority	
of issues raised in the Guerin Report in connection 
with crime investigation are consistent with the 
findings of the Inspectorate.
While the Guerin Report identified issues in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes in one 
district, extending to a division, the Inspectorate’s 
report found these same issues across seven 
divisions in all regions.
The findings of the Crime Investigation 
inspection has resulted in a significant number of 
recommendations, designed to improve the initial 
actions taken during the investigation of a crime, 
to ensure accurate recording of incidents and to 
ensure that crimes are investigated promptly and 
to a good standard. The Inspectorate has also 
made a number of recommendations to improve 
the quality of service provided to victims of crime 
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and witnesses. As the matters raised in the Guerin 
Report are comprehensively covered in the Crime 
Investigation Report, the Garda Inspectorate has 
determined that no supplemental recommendations 
in respect of crime investigation are required here. 
However, the issue of dealing with breaches of 
internal garda discipline is an issue that needs 
further examination.
The Inspectorate acknowledges that the Garda 
Síochána has already created action plans and 
delivered initiatives to address several of the issues 
raised in the Guerin Report. 
The two reports recognise that good investigations 
are key to maintaining public confidence in the 
ability of the Garda Síochána to investigate crime 
and to bring offenders to justice.
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Appendix 1
Stakeholders List
External agencies
•	 Central	Statistics	Office
•	 Cosc
•	 Courts	Service
•	 Crime	Victims	Helpline
•	 Data	Protection	Commissioner
•	 Department	of	Justice	and	Equality
•	 Director	of	Public	Prosecutions
•	 Forensic	Science	Laboratory
•	 Garda	Síochána	Ombudsman	Commission
•	 HSE
•	 Irish	Prisons	Service
•	 Joint	Policing	Committees
•	 Local	Authorities
•	 NGOs	concerned	with	crime	victims	issues
•	 Probation	Service
•	 State	Solicitors
•	 Victims	of	Crime	Office
International	Police	Services	and	Inspectorates
•	 Association	of	Chief	Police	Officers	-	Sir	Hugh	Orde
•	 Criminal	Justice	Inspection	Northern	Ireland
•	 Denmark	-	National	Centre	of	Investigations	&	National	Crime	Prevention	Office
•	 Greater	Manchester	Police	Service
•	 Hertfordshire	Constabulary
•	 Her	Majesty’s	Inspectorate	Constabulary,	England	and	Wales
•	 Her	Majesty’s	Inspectorate	Constabulary	Scotland
•	 Metropolitan	Police	Service,	London
•	 New	Zealand	Police	Service
•	 Police	Scotland
•	 Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland
•	 South	Wales	Police
•	 Surrey	Police
•	 West	Yorkshire	Police
•	 Western	Australia	Police	Service
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An	Garda	Síochána
•	 Commissioner	–	M.	Callinan	&	N.	O’Sullivan	(interim)
•	 Deputy	Commissioner	Strategy	and	Change	Management	–	N.	Rice
•	 Deputy	Commissioner	Operations	–	N.	O’Sullivan
•	 Assistant	Commissioners	–	J.	O’Mahony,	J.	Twomey,	D.	Byrne,	J.	Nolan,	T.	Quilter,	D.	Ó	Cualáin,	K.	Kenny,	
G.	Phillips,	F.	Fanning
•	 Garda	Representative	Association
•	 Association	of	Garda	Sergeants	and	Inspectors
•	 Superintendents	Association
•	 Chief	Superintendents	Association
•	 Garda	Response	to	a	Changing	Environment	(GRACE)	Advisory	Board
•	 Divisions	&	Districts
o	 DMR	North	-	Ballymun,	Balbriggan	&	Santry
o	 Donegal	–	Ballyshannon,	Donegal	Town,	Letterkenny	&	Milford
o	 Mayo	–	Castlebar	&	Claremorris
o	 Kildare	–	Naas	&	Leixlip
o	 DMR	South	–	Tallaght	&	Crumlin
o	 Limerick	–	Henry	Street	&	Roxboro
o	 Waterford	–	Waterford	City	&	Dungarvan
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Appendix 2
Divisional Crime Levels of Volume Crimes
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Robbery
Vehicle
Source:	CSO	crime	data	and	CSO	polulation	data
DM
R 
N
DM
RN
 S
Lim
er
ick
Ki
ld
ar
e
W
at
er
fo
rd
Do
ne
ga
l
M
ay
o
Na
tio
na
l
Vehicle
C
ri
m
es
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
o
p
.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Robbery
C
ri
m
es
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
o
p
.
DM
R 
N
DM
RN
 S
W
at
er
fo
rd
Lim
er
ick
Ki
ld
ar
e
Do
ne
ga
l
M
ay
o
Na
tio
na
l
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Crime Investigation Report       Appendices
Appendices  |  V
Appendix 3
All Recorded Burglary Incidents in Ireland 2006 to 2013
Source:	CSO	crime	data,	aggregated	by	the	Garda	Inspectorate
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Appendix 4
PULSE Letters to Victims of Crime
An Garda Síochána, 
District Office, 
Garda Station, 
Dublin . 
01 666XXXX 
10/02/2010
Firstname Surname 
12 Main Street 
Dublin
Re: Incident, which occurred on 01/02/2010 at Main Street Dublin
Dear Mr Surname, 
I am sorry to learn that you were victim of crime recently.  This crime is currently 
under investigation by Garda ______________, at ____________ Garda Station – 
Tel: 01 666____. An Garda Síochána will endeavour to assist you with any queries in 
relation to this matter.  The Garda PULSE incident number is XXXXXX.  Please 
quote this number in any queries or correspondence to An Garda Síochána relating to 
the matter at hand.  
The case will be fully investigated, but you should be aware that delays might be 
experienced during the course of this investigation.  The investigating Garda will keep 
you informed of relevant developments. 
Should you wish to avail of confidential services for the support of victims of 
crime, volunteers at the Crime Victims Helpline 116 006 will provide information 
and support by telephone and / or refer you to relevant confidential support 
services for victims of crime. 
Please find enclosed contact details of all organisations recognised by the Department
of Justice and Equality to support victims of crime.  If you require any further 
assistance, please do not hesitate to contact Garda ____________, or any garda at 
____________ Garda Station. 
Yours Sincerely, 
_______________________
SUPERINTENDENT, 
at ______________ Garda Station. 
GARDA CONFIDENTIAL LINE – 1800 666 111
PULSE Letters to Victims of Crime Appendix 4
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An Garda Síochána, 
District Office, 
Garda Station, 
Dublin.
01 666XXXX 
10/02/2010
Firstname Surname 
12 Main Street 
Dublin
Re: Incident, which occurred on 01/02/2010 at Main Street Dublin 
Dear Mr Surname,
I wish to advise you that progress has been made in this investigation and a person has 
been made amenable.  You are invited to contact the investigating Garda, Garda ____
_______, ___________ Garda Station at  Tel: 01 666_____ if you wish to discuss this 
development.   
Please be advised that delays might be experienced during the investigation / 
prosecution.  As part of this process you may be required to attend court, if this 
happens you will be contacted and given appropriate information and support. 
The Garda PULSE incident number is XXXXXXX. Please quote this number in 
any queries or correspondence to An Garda Síochána relating to the matter at hand.  
Please find enclosed contact details of all organisations recognised by the Department 
of Justice and Equality to support victims of crime.   
Should you wish to avail of confidential services for the support of victims of crime, 
volunteers at the Crime Victims Helpline 116 006 will provide information and 
support by telephone and / or refer you to relevant confidential support services for 
victims of crime.   
Yours Sincerely, 
_____________________
SUPERINTENDENT, 
at ______________ Garda Station. 
GARDA CONFIDENTIAL LINE – 1800 666 111 
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Appendix 5
Recorded Burglary Detection Rates in Ireland 2006 to 2012
Source:	CSO	crime	data,	aggregated	by	the	Garda	Inspectorate
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